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PSYCHOLOGY.

Reviews of the First Edition.

PSYCHOLOGY.

" We regard Father Maher's book on Psychology as one of the
most important contributions to philosophical literature published
in this country for a long time. . . . What renders his work especially
valuable is the breadth of his modern reading, and the skill with
which he presses things new, no less than old, into the service of
his argument. His dialectical skill is as remarkable as his wealth
of learning, and not less notable is his spirit of fairness. . . . W' hether
the reader agrees or disagrees with the author's views, it is impos-
sible to deny the ability, fulness, and cogency of the argument." —
St. James's Gazette, July 8, 1892.

"... The author has proved himself a thoroughly competent guide
and teacher on the subject of his work. Almost every page of his
book bears the mark of careful thought and wide reading. . . Taken
for what it professes to be, this is an e.Kcellent manual. It deserves
and will repay study," — The Scotsman, August 4, 1890.

" This book, by the Professor of Mental Philosophy at Stony-
hurst College, is a sober, scholarly, and important work. . . . The
author's treatment of Psychology is simple, logical, and .graceful.
His definitions are clear and precise, his style is crisp and nervous,
and his knowledge of the literature of his subject is very consider-
able."— Educational Review, June, 1S91.

"This Manual is an able and well-considered effort to reconcile
mediaeval and modern philosophy. The author bases his argument
mainly on the works of Aquinas and the schoolmen, but he gives
fair recognition to modern philosophers and to modern science. . . .
We can commend the book to students of Natural Theology and
Psychology." — The Church Review, September 26, 1890.

"Father Maher's joining of old with new in his Psychology is
very skilful ; and sometimes the highly systematized character of
the scholastic doctrine gives him a certain advantage in the face
of modern psychological classifications with their more tentative
character. . . . The historical and controversial parts all through
the volume are in general very careful and well managed." — Mind.

" The author is always lucid, cogent, and learned. His know-
ledge of the works of writers on Psychology is thorough and sound,
and results in a most valuable aid to the student : particularly good
examples of this are his historical sketches of the Theories of
External Perception, General Cognition, and the Moral Sense,
whilst the historical references and notes on almost every point
should prove extremely helpful."— T//^ University Correspondent,
November, 1890.

"This work cannot be too highly recommended." — The Tablet^
November i, 1890.

". . . The book is a distinct gain to psychological science, and
places its author in the front rank of the clear, deep thinkers of our
time. It is a thoroughly scientific work, evincing on the part of its
author great powers of analysis and discrimination, with the most
profound and varied knowledge of philosophical literature." — The
Irish Ecclesiastical Record, January, 1891.

STONYHURST PHILOSOPHICAL SERIES.

^PSYCHOLOGY:

EMPIRICAL AND RATIONAL.

}^^ %.^^^

MICHAEL MAKER, S.J.,

I ;

D. LIT., M.A. LOXD.

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY AT STONYHURST COLLEGE,

EXAMINER FOR THE DIPLOMA IN TEACHING OF THE ROYAL UNIVERSl'lY

OF IRELAND.

FIFTH EDITION.
(eleventh to thirteenth thousand.)

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON,
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

igo2

Fir?

ROEHAMPTOX '.
PRINTED BY JOHN GRIFFIN.

C/ 1>^ ^

EDUC.

PSYCH.

LI8RARy

PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION.

The unhoped for success which met the present
Avork in the form in which it was printed in i8go
induced me to abstain from making more than a
few verbal changes in the second or third editions.
But by the time the fourth edition of the book was
called for the large quantity of fresh psychological
literature which had appeared, especially from
America, in the entire interval, had rendered sundry
additions and alterations desirable. The process of
emendation once begun it was not easy to draw the
line, and the result is that the present volume is
practically a new work containing a considerably
larger quantity of matter than the former. The
limitations of the series have forced me to squeeze
many topics into small type, as I was unwilling to
omit them altogether. The unexpectedly extended
circulation has, however, made publication possible
without a corresponding augmentation of the price.
The modifications up to the ninth chapter are,
with the exception of the enlarged treatment of
physiology, psycho-physics, and psychometry com-
paratively slight ; but thenceforward the book
has been virtually re-written. Chapters xiv., xvi.,

1()931()

vi PREFACE.

xvii., xviii., xix., xxii., xxiv., are, minus occasional
sections, new : the Supplement on Hypnotism and
the criticisms of the theories of Professors James
and Hoffding entire!}' so. The historical sketches —
which I believe have proved helpful to various classes-
of students — have also been substantially increased,
and I trust considerably improved. I have alsa
introduced a number of diagrams which illustrate
the brain and nervous system.

My aim here, as in the previous editions, has
been not to construct a new original S3'Stem of my
own, but to resuscitate and make better known to
English readers a Psychology that has already sur-
vived four and twenty centuries, that has had more
influence on human thought and human language
than all other psychologies together, and that still
conmiands a far larger number of adherents than
any rival doctrine. My desire, however, has beert
not merely to expound but to expand this old
system ; not merely to defend its assured truths^
but to test its principles, to develop them, to apply
them to the solution of modern problems ; and to-
re-interpret its generalizations in the light of the
most recent researches. I have striven to make
clear to the student of modern thought that this
ancient psychology is not quite so absurd, nor these
old thinkers quite so foolish, as the current carica-
tures of their teaching would lead one to imagine ;
and I believe I have shown that not a little of what
is supposed to be new has been anticipated, and
that most of what is true can be assimilated without
much difficulty by the old system. On the other

PREFACE. vn

hand, I have sought to bring the scholastic student
into closer contact with modern questions ; and to
acquaint him better with some of the merits of
modern psychological analysis and explanation.

There is at least one phase of current psycho-
logical literature to which my opposition is in
no way diminished — the prevalent view that the
science of psychology and ihe philosophy of the human
mind can be shut up in water-tight compartments
and rendered completely independent of each other.
Indeed, the now customary vehement protestations
of psychologists that their works are innocent of
all philosophical beliefs — if not also devoid of all
metaphysical foundations — and the austere gravity
with which they are wont to apologize whenever
they make mention of the soul, or allude to such
irrelevant matters as the possibility of a future life,
the origin of the human mind, or its connection
with the body, have often appeared to me liable to
give rise to the suspicion that the sense of humour
is incompatible with psychological eminence. For it
is now taken for granted by the most distinguished of
these writers that of all human beings the student
of psychology feels least interest in the question as
to whether he has a soul, or what is to become of
it ; and that of all branches of human knowledge
the science of the mind has least to say on such a
topic. In fact, to trespass in such alien matters is
universally assumed to be the gravest of professional
delinquencies.

Notwithstanding the weight of authority for this
view, I have had the temerity to suggest that it is

viii PREFACE.

the most misleading and extravagant idolon of the
psychological cave at the present day. I have even
ventured to maintain throughout this work that to
construct such a water-tight science of psychology,
from which all metaphysical conceptions and beliefs
have been effectually bailed out, is simply impossible.
Accordingly, I warn my readers at the start that
the analysis of mental activities which commends
itself to me as the truest and most thorough, has
resulted in the conception of the human mind as an
immaterial being endowed with free-will and rational
activity of a spiritual order ; and that my exposition
and interpretation of the phenomena lead back to
this conclusion.

At the same time my procedure throughout is
purely rationalistic, in the sense of being based
solely on experience and reasoning. There seems
to have arisen in some minds the notion that
the works of this series assume or imply dogmatic
beliefs pertaining exclusively to revealed religion.
Of course no one who had read my volume,
or who was at all familiar with the series, could
have fallen into such an error; but it may be
as well to repeat formally here that this work is
purely philosophical, and that it contains nothing
to which, not merely every Christian, but every
Theist may not assent. Indeed, the very first insti-
tution to adopt this work as a text-book, save that in
which I am engaged in teaching, was a Protestant
Theological College in the South of England.

I have profited much by the various criticisms
and reviews of the first edition, which were uniformly

PREFACE. ix

very friendl}^ even when the writers were widely
opposed to my philosophical views. But in spite
of the very large alterations and, I trust, improve-
inents in form of treatment, there is no change of
importance in doctrine in the present work.

I wish here, to make general acknowledgment
also of my indebtedness to many writers of various
schools — foes no less than friends. I have endea-
voured throughout the volume to indicate the
particular sources from which I have derived special
assistance ; and I have been all the more careful in
this matter, as I have observed that some writers
have shown a very practical appreciation of my
own labours, without obtruding the fact upon their
readers. In addition, I desire to express my
obligations to the Rev. H. Irwin, S.J., for sundry
valuable suggestions, and also for having corrected
all the proofs.

A few hints on judicious skipping may be useful.
I have marked with special headings the more
scholastic and metaphysical discussions. The
student, unless he be already familiar with or
specially interested in the philosophy of the schools,
had better omit these on first reading. The
beginner will similarly find a flanking movement
preferable to a frontal attack with respect to the
longer historical sketches. For the general reader
perhaps the most interesting course would be to
start with chapter xix. on Free-will, then to read
from chapter xxi. to the end of the volume, after
which he may begin the book and follow his own
tastes. The portions of Psychology generally

PREFACE.

deemed of most importance from the standpoint
of the theory of Education are dealt with in the
following sections: pp. i — 21, 26 — 51, 59—92, 125
— 152, 163 — 200, 208—241, 292 — 303, 314 — 326,

344—367, 37^—?>9^, 424—448, 454— 45S. The
relevanc3% however, of these topics to the art of
teaching varies much, as the intelligent reader will
perceive for himself.

On the other hand, for the benefit of the more
advanced or more earnest student, I have indicated
a considerable quantity of useful supplementary
reading on very many questions of interest which
the limits of my space have compelled me to treat
more briefly than I desired. All the French works
cited can be obtained, I believe, through Alcan
(Paris), the German through Herder (Freiburg).

Stonyhurst, October, 1900.

PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION.

The fourth edition of the present work, con-
taining 3,000 copies, having been exhausted in two
years, the Fifth Edition, which has been carefully
revised, is now issued. Sundry verbal changes and
corrections have been introduced, and the section
on the muscular sense has been re-written, but the
chief addition is a Supplement containing a reply
to Mr. Mallock's criticism.

Stonyhurst, October, 1902.

TABLE OF CONTENTS,

Illustrations Pp- ^^^ — ^^^^

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.
Definition and Scope of Psychology . . . Pp. i— lo
Definitions of Psychology, Subjective and Objective, i, seq.
—Scope, 2— Empirical and Rational Psychology, 5— Psychology
distinguished from Cosmology, 6— From Logic, 7— From Ethics, 8
— Relations with Physiology, 9.

CHAPTER II.

Method of Psychology Pp- n — 25

Psychology a Science, 11— Introspective Method, 11 — Objec- /

tive or Supplementary Methods, 13— These Methods not new, 18 \^

—Rational Psychology deductive, 18— Attacks on Psychology, 19
— Objections to Introspection answered, 20 — Real difticulties, 24.

CHAPTER III.

Classification of Mental Faculties . . . Pp. 26—41
Consciousness, 26 — Subconscious mental activities, 27 — Mental
Faculties classified, 28— Subdivision, 32— Various classifications : 1/

Aristotle's, 33— St. Thomas', 33— Scotch school, 34— Hamilton's, 34
Herbert Spencer's, 35— Attacks on Mental Faculties, 36— Mutual
relations of the Faculties, 39 — Feeling, 40.

BOOK I.
Empirical or Phenomenal Psychology.

Part I. — Sensuous Life.

CHAPTER IV.
Sensation . • Pp- 42 — ^^

Sensation, Sense and Sense-organ defined, 42— Excitation of
Sensation, 43— The Nervous System, 44— Properties of Sensation,
Quality, Intensity, Duration, 46— Composite stimuli, 47— Cognitive
Character of Sensation, 48— Sensation and Perception, 49— Scho-
lastic doctrine of sfccies, 51— Experimental Psychology ; Psycho-
physics, 54— Interpretations of the Weber-Fechner Law, 58 —
Psychometry : Reaction-time, 59.

xii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.

The Senses Tp. 63—97

How many External Senses, 63 — Taste, 65 — Smell, 66 — Touch,
68 — Organic Sensations, Common-sensibility, Coenaesthesis, or the
Vital Sense, 69 — Sense of Temperature, 70— Contact or Passive
Touch, 71 — Cognitional value of Touch, 72 — Active Touch, Muscu-
lar Sensations, 74 — Hearing, 79 — Sight, 83 — The Senses compared,
58— The " Law of Relativity," 90 — Scholastic doctrine of the
Internal senses, 92 — Internal sense, 95 — Common sense, 96.

CHAPTER VI.

Perception of the Material World : Critical

Sketch of the leading theories of

External Perception .... Pp. 98 — 124

Psychology and Philosophy of Perception, 98— Sceptical

Theories, 99 — Philosophical proof of Realism, 100 — Psychology of

Perception, loi — Ambiguity of Terms, 104 — Ego and Mind, 104 —

Two Questions, 105 — Historical sketch : Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,

108 — Hume, Mill, and Bain, no — Kant, 117 — Herbert Spencer, 122.

CHAPTER VII.

Development of Sense-Perception. Education

OF THE Senses Pp. 125 — 162

Growth of Knowledge, 125 — Complexity of perceptional process,
126 — Development of Tactual Perception, 127— Tactual cognition
of the Organism, 130 — Of other Objects, 132 — Cognition of other
Minds, 133 — Secondary acquisitions, 134 — Visual Perception, 135 —
Immediate Perception of Surface Extension, 137 — Mediate Percep-
tion of Distance and Magnitude, 139 — Binocular Vision, 142 — Erect
Vision, 144 — Auditory Perception, 145 — Gustatory and Olfactory
Perception, 146 — Objections solved, 147 — Co-operation of Faculties,
147 — Intelligent Cognition not mere Instinctive Belief, 149 — Mental
nd Cerebral Development, 150 — Primary and Secondary Qualities
of Matter, 152 — Views of Aristotle. St. Thomas, 153 — Descartes,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 154 — Hamilton, Spencer, 155 — The Rela-
tivity of Knowledge, 157.

CHAPTER VIII.
Imagination ........ Pp. 163 — 178

Imagination compared with Perception, 1G3 — Productive and
Reproductive, 165 — yEsthetic, 166 — Scientific, 167 — Dangers of, 170
— Fancy, Wit, Humour, 170 — Illusions, 171 — Dreaming, 176.

CHAPTER IX.

Memory. Mental Association .... Pp. 179 — 207
Memory defined, 179 — Reproduction and Recollection, 180 —
Laws of Association, 181 —Reduction of those laws, 1S4 — Physio-
logical hypothesis, 18S — Co-operative and Contiicting Associations,

CONTENTS. xiii

i88 — Secondary Laws, igo— Retention, igi — Ultra-spiritualist
theory, 192 — Purely physical theory, 194 — Recognition, 195 — Remi-
niscence, ig6 — Intellectual and sensuous memory, 197 — Scholastic
controversy, 198 — Qualities of good memory, 199 — Training of
Memory, 200 — Historical sketch of the doctrine of mental associa^^
lion: Aristotle, St. Thomas, 201 — Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Hartley,/
203 — James Mill, 204— J. S. Mill, Bain, Sully, 205 — Obliviscence, 206.J

CHAPTER X.

Sensuous Appetite and Movement .... 208 — 220
Sensuous Appetency, 20S — Scholastic doctrine of Appetency,
208 — IMovement, 210 — Voluntary movement analyzed, 210 — Auto-
matic, Reflex, Impulsive, 211 — Origin of voluntary movement:
Theory of random action, 212 — Theory of instinctive action, 213 —
Growth of control of movement : Probable theory, 214 — Movements
classified: Secondary-automatic and Ideo-motor action, 218.

CHAPTER XI.

Feelings of Pleasure and Pain .... Pp. 221 — 228
Feeling and other terms defined, 221 — Aristotle's Theory of
Feeling, 222 — Laws of Pleasure and Pain, 225 — Feeling not a third
Faculty, 226 — Theories of Pleasure and Pain, 226.

BOOK I. {continued.)

Part II. — Rational Life.

CHAPTER XII.

Intellect and Sense Pp. 229 — 251

Erroneous views, 229 — Sensationalism, Materialism, Pheno-
menism, Positivism, Associationism, Evolutionism, 230 — Intellect
essentially difterent from Sense, 230 — Proved by Attention, 232 —
Comparison and Judgment, 233 — Necessary Judgments, 234 —
Universal and Abstract Concepts, 235 — Reflection and Self-con-
sciousness, 238— Intellect a spiritual faculty, 239 — Intellect medi-
ately dependent on the Brain, 241 — Balmez on Sensationism, 242 —
Lotze, 245 — Controversy concerning Universals : Extreme Realism,
247 — Nominalism, Conceptualism, 248 — Moderate Realism, 249.

CHAPTER XIII.

Conception. Origin of Intellectual Ideas.

Erroneous Theories Pp. 252 — 291

Origin of Ideas, 252 — Theory of Innate Ideas, 253 — Empiri-
cism, 254— Historical sketch of Theories of General Knowledge :
Plato, 255— Descartes, 256— Geulincx, Malebranche, 258— Spinoza,
260— Leibnitz, 262 — Rosmini, 264 — Kant, 265 — J. G. Fichte, 270 —
Locke, 270 — Bain, 272 — Sully, 275 — Comte, 279 — Origin of Neces-
sary Truths: Associationism, 281 — Evolutionist Theory, 286—
Intuitionalist Doctrine, 289.

xiv CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIV.

•CoN'CEPTiON. Origin of Intellectual Ideas

{continued) Pp. 292 — 313

Thought an Activity, 292 — Thought Universal, 293 — Concep-
tion : Two questions, 293 — Elaboration of Universal Concepts, 294
— Intellectual Apprehension, 297 — Comparative Abstraction, 297 —
•Comparison and Discrimination, 29S — Generalization, 299 — Thought
and Language, 302 — Second Question : Origin of Ideas, 302 — Aristo-
telico-scholastic Theory of Abstraction, 305 — Doctrine of St. Thomas,
312.

CHAPTER XV.
Judgment and Reasoning ..... Pp. 314 — 344

Judgment defined, 314 — Analysis of judicial process, 315 —
Assent and Consent, 318 — Reasoning defined, 320 — Analysis of
Ratiocination, 320 — Deduction and Induction, 321 — Implicit reason-
ing, 322 — The Logic of real life : Newman's Grammar of Assent, 324
— Thought viewed differently by Psychology and Logic, 325 —
Belief: Historical sketch, 326 — Three questions: (A) Nature of
Belief, 328 — Belief and Knowledge, 329 — (B) Causes of Belief, 331
— (C) Effects, 334 — Conscience, 334 — Scholastic view, 335 — Other
Theories : Moral Sense, 336 — Associationist theory, 337 — Origin
and Authority of moral judgments, 339 — Evolutionist hypothesis,
340 — Intuitionalism, 342 — Kant, 342 — Conscience a Spring of
Action, 342 — Butler's doctrine, 343.

CHAPTER XVI.

Attention and Apperception .... Pp. 345 — 360

Attention and Sensation, 345 — Attention and Volition, 346 —
Attention interrogative, 346 — Voluntary and non-Voluntary Atten-
tion, 347 — Laws of Attention, 348 — Effects, 349^Attention and
Genius, 351 — Physiological conditions, 352 — Pleasure and Pain, 353
— Education, 354 — -Unconscious modifications of the Mind, 355 —
Apperception, 357 — Historical sketch, 358— Nature of Apperception,
359 — Apperception and Education, 360.

CHAPTER XVII.
Development of intellectual cognition : Self

AND other important IDEAS . . . Pp. 36I— 377

Reflexion : Grades of Consciousness, 361 — Growth of the
Knowledge of Self, 362 — ^The developed Mind's consciousness of
itself, 363 — Abstract Concept of Self, 365 — Unity, Continuity, Dis-
continuity of Consciousness, 366 — Genesis of other Ideas, 367 —
Substance, Accident, Cause, 368 — The Infinite, 370— Space, 371 —
Cognition of Time, 372— Development of this Idea, 373— Subjective
.and Objective Time, 374 — Relativity of our appreciation of Time,
375 — Localization in Time, 375— Expectation, 376.

CONTENTS. XV

CHAPTER XVIII.

Rational Appetency Pp. 378—393

Rational Appetency: Desire defined and analyzed, 378 — Is
Pleasure the only object of Desire, 379— Motive, 3S0— Spontaneous
action and Deliberation, 381— Choice or Decision, 382— Volition,
Desire, and various forms of conative activity, 384 — Self-control,
385— Order of development, 388— Habit : Practical rules, 388; Moral
discipline, 390— Character, 392— Temperaments, 393.

CHAPTER XIX.

Free-Will and Determinism .... Pp. 394—424

Free-Will : Philosophy and Psychology, 394— Free-will defined :
Scholastic terminology, 395 — Problem stated, 396— Fatalism and
Determinism, 397 — Argument from Ethical Notions: Obligation,
39S— Merit and Desert, 401— Responsibility, 402— Justice, 404—
Free-will and Ethics, 405— Argument from Consciousness: Atten-
tion, 406— Dehberation, 408 — Decision or Choice, 409— Adhesion to
resolution, 411— Metaphysical argument, 413— Objections : Psycho-
logical, 415— Metaphysical, 419— From Science, 420— Theological,

CHAPTER XX.

The Emotions. Emotional and Rational

Language '• .Pp. 425—458

Feeling and Emotions, 425— Scholastic view, 426— Chief forms
of Emotion, 427— Self-regarding, 427— Altruistic, 430— Attached to
intellectual activity, 432— iEsthetic, 435— The Moral Sentiments,
440— No distinct Faculty of feeling, 442— Genesis of Feelings :
James's theory, 443— Classification of Emotions, 446— Expression of
Emotions, 449— Evolutionist Theory, 450— Origin of Language, 454.

BOOK II.
Rational Psychology.

CHAPTER XXI.

Substantiality, Identity, Simplicity, and Spiritu-
ality OF the Human Soul . . . Pp. 459—473
Scope of Rational Psychology, 459— Its importance : Method,
460— SubstantiaUty of the Soul, 461— Validity of Notion of Sub-
stance, 462— The Mind is a Substantial Principle, 463— Abiding
Identity of the Mind, 464— Simplicity, 466— Spirituality, 469.

CHAPTER XXII.

False Theories of the Ego .... Pp. 474 — 492

Kant's Theory, 474— Empiricist theory: Hume, 475— Mill, 476
— W. James's theory, 477— James's Attack on the Soul. 4S1— Double
Consciousness and "Alterations of Personality," 487— Criticism,
489.

XVI CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIII.
Monistic Theories . . . . . . . Pp. 493 — 524

Dualism and Monism, 493 — Spiritualist Monism or Idealism.
494 — Materialism, 495 — Thought is not a secretion of the Brain,
^gg—Nor a function, 497 — Nor a resultant of material forces, 497 —
Dependence of Mind on Body, 499 — Shadworth Hodgson's "Con-
scious Automaton," theory 503 — New-Spinozism, Double-Aspect
theory, or Identity-hypothesis, 505 — Mind-stuff: Clifford, 506 —
Bain, 507 — Spencer, 508 — Mental States not composite, 510 —
Incredible consequences, 513 — Monism: Conservation of Energy:
Hoffding's doctrine, 517— Criticism, 520— Law of Inertia, 523 —
Agnosticism, 524. """^ "

CHAPTER XXIV.

Immortality of the Soul ..... Pp. 525—544
Immortality and Psychology : Theism, 525 — Teleological Argu-
ment, 526— P:thical Argument, 529— Formal Theistic proof, 533—
Argument from Universal belief, 533 — Scholastic Ontological Argu-
ment, 5^^ — Objections against the doctrine of a Future Life, 537.

CHAPTER XXV.

Soul and Body Pp. 545—561

Individuality of the Human Soul, 544 — Unicity of the Soul in
man, 545 — Vitalism and Animism, 546— Organicism : Physico-
chemical theories of Life inadequate, 547 — Definitions of Life, 551
— Union of Soul and Body : Ultra-dualistic theories, 553 — Aristo-
telico-scholastic doctrine, 555— Soul and Body one Nature and
Person, 558 — Aristotle's definition of the Soul, 560.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Soul and Body {continued). Other Problems . Pp. 562 — 578
Locus of the Soul, 562 — The Soul present throughout the Body,
^5^ — Phrenology, 564 — Localization of Cerebral P^unctions, 565 —
Methods of research, 566— D. Ferrier, Plechsig, 567 — Origin of the
Soul, 572 — Traducianism and Creation, 574 — Time of its Origin :
Scholastic doctrine, 575 — Lotze and Ladd, 576 — Origin of the first
Human Soul : Evolution Theory, 578.

SUPPLEMENTS.

A. — Animal Psychology Pp. 579—594

Comparative Psychology, 579 — Difficulties of Animal Psycho-
logy, 580 — Cartesian Theory : Animals sentient, 582 — Animals
irrational, 583— Instinct, 5S7 — Origin of Instinct : Evolutionist
Theories, 588— Animal " Souls," 593.

B. — Hypnotism Pp. 594 — 601

Hypnotism : Historical sketch, 594 — Induction and Character-
istics of hypnotic state, 595 — Theories concerning Hypnotism, 598
C.— Repj^y to Mr. Mallock's Criticism . Pp. C03— Cio

DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING THE

STRUCTURE OF

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM DESCRIBED'

IN THE TEXT.

For the subject-matter of Figures I. — III. see pp. 44 — 46-

Fig. I. — Side view of Brain and Spinal Cord.

(Barnet.)

CEREBRUM

MEDULLA
OBLONGATA J

3EREBELLUM

'INAL CORD

Fig. II.— Spinal Cord
and Nerves, with
Sympathetic Chain
on one side.

SPINAL COLUMK

CUT ENDS OF
SPINAL NERVEa

Fig. III.— Roots of a Spinal Nerve issuing from
the Cord : viewed (A) from before ; (B) from
the side; (C) from above; (D) the ^ roots
separated.

s^^

^.^'*

<>v

alO

■>>■%

\', pons varolii, below
which is the medulla
oblongata; C i to 8, the
cervical nerves ; a to x,

, anterior fissure ; 2, posterior fissure ; 3 and 4, lateral the sympathetic chain
grooves of cord ; 5, anterior, efferent, or motor root ; connected with spinal
6, posterior, afferent, or sensory root. (Furneau.x. ) nerves. (Furneau.x.)

FRONT

REAR

Fig. IV. — The Human
Brain.

A, cerebrum ; b, cerebellum
c, pons varolii ; D, medulk
oblongata ; e, fissure o
Silvius.

Fig.V. — Under surface ct
Brain, showing origi
of the twelve pairs (
cranial nerves.

I, great longitudinal fissur«

2, 2' 2", convolutions of ba
of cerebrum, frontal lobe;

3, base of fissure of Silviui

4, 4', 4", bases of cerebrur
temporal lobes ; 5, 5', oc<
pital lobes ; 7, 8, 9, 10, cat
bellum ; 6, medulla oblo
gata; I. — IX. .cranial nerv«
VI. VII. on pons varc
indicate roots of ocular a:
facial nerves. (Bastian.)

(See Text, pp. 44—4'^)-

ig. VI. — Upper surface of Brain, arachnoid membrane being- removed. (Gray.)

LOWER
FROMTAL

FISSURE
ROL.ANDO

PARIETO-OCCIPITAL FISSURE

REAR

This illustration shows the chief convolutions and fissures of the cerebrum from above.
The two hemispheres are divided by the great longitudinal or median fissure.

(See Text, pp. 45, 567—570).

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PSYCHOLOGY.

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Introduction.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Definition. — Psychology (r?}? -^vxv^ X0709) is that
branch of philosophy which studies the human mind
or soul. By the mind or soul (yfruxv) is meant the
thinking principle, that by which I feel, know, and
will, and by which my body is animated. The
terms Ego, Self, Spirit, are used as synonymous
with mind and soul, and, though slight differences
attach to some of them, it will be convenient for us
(except where we specially call attention to diver-
gencies of meaning) to follow common usage and
employ them as practically equivalent.

Subjective and Objective. — In modern philo-
sophy the mind is also called the Subject, especially
when set in contrast with the external world, which
is characterized as the Object. The adjective sub-
jective is similarly opposed to objective, as denoting
mental in opposition to extra-mental facts, what
pertains to the knowing mind as contrasted with
B

PSYCHOLOGY.

what belongs to the object known. Thus a train of
thought, an emotion, and a dream are said to be
subjective ; whilst a horse, an election, and a war
are objective realities. Such are the primary signi-
fications of these terms, but the meanings vary with
different writers.^

An objection. — We may here be met with the
objection that wc are unwarrantably postulating at
the very commencement of our work the most
disputed doctrine in the whole science of Ps3^cho-
logy — the existence of some '* inscrutable entity,"
called the soul. To this we reply that for the
present we only use the term provisionally to indi-
cate the source or root of our conscious states. We
make no assumption as regards the nature of this
principle. Whether it be the brain, the nervous
system, the whole organism, or a pure spirit, we do
not yet attempt to decide. But we claim to be
justified, in employing the familiar terms soul and
mind to designate this apparent bond, by the obvious
fact that our various mental states manifest them-
selves as bound together in a single unity.

Scope of Psychology. — The subject-matter of
our science is, then, the Soul or Mind. The psycho-
logist investigates those phenomena which we call
sensations, perceptions, thoughts, volitions, and
emotions; he analyzes them, classifies them, and

^ In strict language the vv'ord miud designates the animating
principle as the subject of consciousness, while soul refers to it as the
root of all forms of vital activity. Spirit is of still narrower extension
than mind, indicating properly a being capable of the higher, rational,
or intellectual order of conscious life. E<^o and self strictly signify
the whole person constituted of soul and body.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE.

seeks to reduce them to the smallest number of
fundamental activities. He studies the nature of
their exercise and the laws which govern their
operations, and he endeavours to enunciate a body
of general truths which will accurately describe
their chief and most characteristic features. But
Psychology cannot rest here. Whether it wishes it
or not, Psychology is inevitably a branch of Philo-
sophy.^ It cannot remain satisfied with the mere
generalization of facts; it must pass on to inquire
into the inner nature and constitution of the root
and subject of these phenomena; it must seek to
explain the effect by its cause. Consequently, a
work which does nothing more than describe and
classify the operations of the mind, omitting all
discussion regarding the mind itself, is but an
abortive attempt at a science of Psychology,^ La

" Etymologically, Philosophy {<piXo(To<pla) is equivalent to the
love of ivisdom, but at a very early date it had come to signify the
possession of the highest knowledge, or ivisdom itself Wisdom or
Philosophy, thus understood, was defined as the science of things in
their last causes. The term, Metaphysics, was also employed as syno-
nymous with Philosophy, to denote the science which investigates
^he ultimate principles of things. Metaphysics has been divided
into Ontology, General Metaphysics or Metaphysics proper, also called
General Metaphysics, which studies the nature and attributes of
Being in general, and Special Metaphysics, including Cosmology, Rational
Theology, Sind Psychology, which investigate special forms of Being.
By many modern writers, the terms Philosophy and Metaphysics
are used in a very vague and indefinite sense, to signify the investi-
gation of all fundamental problems bearing on the ultimate origin,
constitution, or end of things, and the nature of knowledge.

^ Yet such a truncated exposition of the subject is almost
unanimously adopted by English psychologists. Confer. A. Bain,
Mental Science, pp. i — 3; J Sully, Outlines of Psychology, pp. i, 2;
J. C Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. i, 2; T. Ribot, Con-
temporary English Psychology, pp. 15 — 20. Similarly William James,
Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. y.^-vi and H. Hoffding, Outlines
of Psychology, p. 29.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychologic sans dme, is Hamlet without the Prince
of Denmark. What is the meaning and value of
life ? What are we ? Whence come we ? W^hither
go we ? These have ever been questions of profound
interest to the human race, and it is the belief that
Psychology can throw some light on them which
has always vested with such importance this branch
of Philosophy.

Besides the fact that the chief interest for
mankind in Psychology is due to the expectation
that some information as regards the nature of the
soul itself can be thence derived, there is another
reason for the explicit treatment of these meta-
physical problems here. The two sets of questions
are incapable of isolation. They can never be really
separated. Our final conclusions as regards many
vital philosophical problems are necessarily deter-
mined by the view taken of the nature of mental
activity in the empirical part of the science. The
sensationalist doctrines, for instance, on perception,
intellectual cognition, or volition, cannot be recon-
ciled with the Hegelian or with the Intuitionalist
conception of the mind. It is, consequently, only
fair to the reader that the philosophical conclusions
to which the treatment of mental phenomena pre-
sented to him logically lead, should be clearly
pointed out.*

^ " The philosophic implications embedded in the very heart of
psychology are not got rid of when they are kept out of sight.
Some opinion regarding the nature of the mind and its relations to
reality will show itself on almost every page, and the fact that this
opinion is introduced without the conscious intention of the writer
may serve to confuse both the author and his reader." (J. Dewey,
Psychology, p. iv.) Hoffding's work is 9 striking illustration of this,

DEFINITION AND SCOPE.

Empirical and Rational Psychology. — The

discussion of the former questions — the inquiry into
. the character of our various mental states and
operations — is called by different writers Phenomenal,
Empirical^ or Experimental Psychology ; whilst the
investigation into the nature of the mind itself is
styled Rational Psychology. Sir W. Hamilton des-
cribes this second part as Inferential Psychology,
or the Ontology of the mind.^ The term Phenomenal
is applied to the first part of Psychology, because
it investigates the various phenomena of the mind,

I the facts of consciousness. It is called Empirical
or Experimental, because we have an immediate
experience of these facts : we can study them by
immediate observation. The second part of our
subject is marked by the epithet Rational, becaus.!;
the truths which are there enunciated are reached,
not by direct experience, but by reasoning from the
conclusions established in the earlier part. In the
present work we have devoted Book I. mainly to
I Empirical Psychology, whilst Book II. is confined

Before the end of chapter ii., in which he has professed to treat
Psychology from the " purely empirical or phenomenal, not meta-
physics! or ontological standpoint" (p. 29), he makes it clear that
the "identity hypothesis" which makes mind and matter merely
" two manifestations of one and the same being," is the only
"scientific" theory as to their relations, cf. pp. 54 — 70. The
outcome of Professor Sully's psychological teaching is practically
the same. Cf. The Human Mind, Vol. II. p. 369. Professor Ladd
justly insists that " the problems oi philosophy all emerge and force
themselves upon the mind in the attempt to thoroughly comprehend
and satisfactorily to solve the problems of a scientific psychology."
{Philosophy of Mind, p. 73. Chapters i. ii. of that work contain some
sound criticism of "clandestine" metaphysics smuggled into what
claim to be purely "scientific" non-philosophical expositions oi
psychology.)

^ Metaphysics, Vol. I. p. 125.

PSYCHOLOGY.

to the problems of Rational Psychology. We have
not, however, sought to make the division rigid :
in fact, our chief contention is that a complete
and accurate separation of the two branches of
Psychology is impossible. Thus we have included
in our First Book certain questions regarding
external perception, memory, the origin of ideas,
the nature of intellectual activity, and the freedom
of the wall which would now-a-days be usually
allotted to the sphere of Rational Psychology. The
two branches of the science of course employ both
observation and inference ; but while frequent appeal
to the facts of consciousness is a prominent feature
in the first stage, deductive reasoning prevails in
the last. Starting from the knowledge acquired in
Empirical Psychology regarding the character of
the operations and activities of the mind, we draw
further conclusions as to the nature and constitution
of the root or subject of those activities. The
knowledge of the effect leads us up to that of the
cause ; the mode of action indicates the nature of
the agent. We may thus hope by a judiciously
combined use of reasoning and observation to attain
to a well grounded assurance regarding the existence
of an immaterial soul, its relations with the body,
ii"s origin, and its future destiny.

Psychology and Cosmology. — The scope oi Psycho-
logy will be made still clearer by pointing out how it is
connected with other kindred sciences, and how it is
separated from them. In the scheme of strictly meta-
physical branches of speculation it stands opposed to
Cosmology, as the Philosophy of spirit to that of nature.
The latter science seeks to investigate the inner consti-

DEFINITION AND SCOPE.

tution of matter, the nature of space and time, and the
ultimate principles or laws which underlie and govern
the course of the universe ; while Psychology confines
itself to the study of the subjective world, the mind
of man.

Psychology and Logic— There are, however, other
departments of Philosophical knowledge of a subjective
character ; both Logic and Ethics deal with mental
activities. As regards Rational Psychology, which inquires
into the nature of the mind itself, there is no difficulty
in seeing how it is differentiated from these sciences, so
we need only keep Empirical Psychology in view when
comparing them. Both Psychology and Logic study
mental states, but whereas the former embraces within
its ken sensations, emotions, volitions, and all other
classes of conscious acts, the latter is limited to the
consideration of cognitive operations, and mainly to
that of reasoning. Again, the points of view from which
they approach their subject-matter is different. Psycho-
logy looks on our mental processes as natural events
interesting in themselves. It seeks to describe and classify
them, to explain their genesis, and to discover their
laws or constant modes of action. It may, indeed,
incidentally, afford useful information regarding the
acquisition of habits, the cultivation of the memory,
and the training of other faculties ; but its primary aim
is speculative. Logic, on the other hand, is interested in
mental operations as representative of objective fact. It is
the science, not of thinking in general, but of correct
thinking. It is less purely a speculative science, and
in the eyes of some even its primary aim is practical.
Its object is the discovery of the general canons of
truth. It is, in the words of St. Thomas, " the science
which teaches man how to order aright the acts of the
intellect in the pursuit and attainment of truth." In a
word, while Psychology studies thought merely as a
subject, Logic investigates it for an object. The researches
of the psychologist are directed towards the causal con-
nections between mental states, and lead up to the
apprehension of a body of natural laws — general truths
describing uniformities of succession and co-existen^"

8 PSYCHOLOGY

among siicii states. Those of the logician centre upon
the vatioiial coyrclations of intellectual acts, and result in the
formulation of a code of nonual laws — a body of precepts
— which can be disobej'ed but under the penalty of
error. In addition to these points of similarit}' and
contrast, the two sciences are related by a certain
mutual interdependence. Psychology, like every other
science, must conform to the rules of right reasoning ;
it must observe the canons of inductive and deductive
inference, and it must carry out the general precepts of
Logical Method. On the other hand, the validity of
thought may be seriously affected by its genesis. The
materials with which the logician works are products
which have been analyzed by the psychologist, and,
consequentl}^ although Logic is not properly based on
Psychology, a false theory of the nature of our cognitive
faculties may sap the very foundations of knowledge,
and lead to a disbelief in the existence of all real truth.
Logic may therefore at times have to appeal to a sound
system of Ps3'chology in justification of its fundamental
assumptions.

Psychology and Ethics. — Ethics as the science of
morality is easily distinguished from PsycJiology. It
investigates the right end of human action, the nature
and foundations of moral distinctions, the grounds of
moral obligation, and the sanctions of morality. It
classifies virtues, vices, and duties, and promulgates
the rules of right conduct. Whereas Psychology con-
siders our mental activities in iheir causes. Ethics studies
them in their results : and while Logic seeks to harmonize
cognition with the order of the physical v/orld — the Real ;
Ethics would conform volition to the order of the moral
world — the IdealJ^ In establishing, however, the exist-
ence of 'vioral intuitions, and in exhibiting their
character, appeal must be made to the philosophy of
the mind. The nature of the mental activity called

• We have noticed only the most striking points of contrast.
Strictly speaking, Logic is concerned for all truth — physical, meta-
physical, and moral. For a complete account of the province of
Logic, cf. Logi:, by R. F. Clarke, S.J. c. i. On the question how
far Logic is to have allotted to it a piaciical aim, cf id. pp. 19—25.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE.

conscience, tlie genesis of moral sentiments, the forma-
tion of moral habits, and the freedom of the will, a
truth on the proof of which moral responsibility in its
universally accepted sense is absolutely dependent ; all
these questions — matters of the highest importance to
the moral philosopher — belong to the sphere of Psycho-
logy.

Psychology and Physiology. — The term Biology
is sometimes used in a wide sense to embrace all
the branches of knowledge which treat of the pheno-
mena of life. More properly, it comprehends two
co-ordinate physical sciences,'' MoypJioIog}', which investi-
gates the structure of living organisms, and Physiology,
which investigates their functions. The latter science
stands in close relations to Psychology, both Pheno-
menal and Rational. The physiologist studies the
various operations of our vegetative life, he examines
into the action of digestion, respiration, growth, nutri-
tion, and the other vital processes which take place
within us. He observes the working of our several
organs, and seeks to enunciate laws that will express
the general uniformities exhibited in the aggregate of
operations which go to constitute our physical life.
These events are perceived by the external senses, and
are ultimatel}' reducible to movements in matter. y

Physiology is thus distinguished from Empirical
Psychology, both by the phenomena of which it treats,
and by the faculty through which these phenomena are
apprehended. It is marked off on the other hand from
Rational Psychology, as the positive science of the physical

^ The term positive science is frequently used to designate those
branches of knowledge v.'hich deal with the laws of phenomena, facts
observable by immediate experience. Some writers would confine the
term science exclusively to this signification. Such usage is, however,
illegitimate. The object of science is to discover causation ; con-
sequently, the inquiry into primary causes, which are properly the
real causes, has a fortiori a right to this title. For the sake of
precision, however, the term philosophical science may be con-
veniently employed to denote those branches of knowledge whic'.i
deal not merely with secondary, but with the higher or primary
causes. Rational Psychology is in this sense a philosophical
science, as compared with the phenomenalistic or so-called positive
sciences of Physiology and Empirical Psychology

lo PSYCHOLOGY.

manifestations of life from the philosophical science which
seeks to investigate into the inney natuve of the subject of
vital phenomena, both physical and psychical. Again,
the vegetative and psychical activities proceeding from
the same root reciprocally influence each other. Our
sensations, intellectual operations, emotions, and voli-
tions, are profoundly affected by the physical condition
of the organism at the time, and in turn they modiiy
the character of the functions of physical life. Conse-
quently, as we shall see in the next chapter, Physiology
forms an important supplementary source of knowledge
in building up our science of Empirical Psychology.
But Rational Psychology is still more concerned
witli the teaching of Physiolog}* Its scope is to
investigate the inner nature of the subject or root of
both psychical and vegetative functions, and the rela-
tions subsisting between that subject and the body. It
is alike interested, therefore, in the sciences of conscious
and of unconscious life, and its final conclusions must
alike harmonize with the established truths of Physio-
logy and of Empirical Psychology.

Readings. — On the dignity, utility, and scope of Psychology, cf
St. Thomas, Coniin. de Anima, Lib. I. 11. i, 2 ; Dr. Stockl, Lehrbuch
der Philosophie, §^ i — 3; Tilmann Pesch, S.] ., Instituiioiws Psychclogicj
(Friburg, 1897), §§ 19—22. 28—30.

CHAPTER II.

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychology a Science. — In describing Psycho-
loery as the science of the human mind or soul, three
conditions are implied — first, that Psychology has a
definite subject-matter, the nature and activities of
the thinking subject ; secondly^ that it possesses an
efft'^ient method ; thirdly, that it comprehends a
systematized body of general truths, or, in other
wcrds, that it embraces a number of facts in their
relations to their universal causes. In our first
chapter we sought to mark out clearly the field of
our science ; in the present we propose to describe
its method, pointing out the chief instruments of
investigation which lie open to us ; the rest of the
work will be devoted to the satisfaction of the third
essential requirement.

The Subjective or Introspective Method. —
The subject-matter of Empirical Psychology is ccm-
sctousness. Now states of consciousness can only be
observed by introspection— Xhdit is, by the turning of
the mind in on itself. Consequently this faculty
of internal observation must be our chief instrument
in the study of the mind. To its adjudication must
bathe first as well as the ultimate appeal in every

12 PSYCHOLOGY.

psychological problem. Mental states can only be
apprehended by each man's own consciousness.
Tlieir reality consists in this apprehension — their
esse is percipi. Therefore the endeavour to decide
as to their nature or origin by information gathered
from any other source is obviously absurd. The
greatest care must, however, be taken to notice
accurately all the aspects of the phenomena pre-
sented to us, and to detect those numerous un-
obtrusive differences in the character of mental
phenomena which ma}' indicate profound divergency
in the nature of their source. The injudicious
observer, impressed by the greater intensity of
sentient states, may thus easily ignore the more
subtle activities of our higher rational life, and so
be led to form a conception of mind from which the
most important features are absent.^

Still, although our mental states are of an
evanescent character, and enjoy but a transitory
existence, it must nevertheless be insisted on that
they are facts as real as any in the universe. A
sensation, an intellectual judgment, or a volition,
possesses as much reality as a nervous current, a
chemical solution, or a transit of Venus ; and whilst
the most thorough-going sceptic cannot question the

^ The truth of this remark is strikingly illustrated in the history
of Mental Philosophy in this country by the manner in which the
relational activity of the mind — its power of apprehending universal
relations — has been ignored or misconceived by the entire sen-
sationalist school from Hartley to Dr Bain. The writings of
Stirling, Green, Bradley, and other thinkers of Hegelian tendencies
have had in recent years the good effect of bringing about the
re-discovery of this intellectual faculty, which occupied such a
prominent position in the psychological system of the leading
scholastic philosophers.

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 13

existence of states of consciousness, ingenious and
acute thinkers have been found over and over again
to deny us all certainty regarding material objects.
This mode of investigating psychical phenomena by
means of internal observation is called the Subjective
or Introspective Method.

Objective Method. -- Introspection must be
supplemented, however, by other lines of research,
if we wish to make our conclusions as trustworthy
and as widely applicable as possible. Appeal to
these additional means of information constitutes
what is called the Objective Method of inquiry, since
they form part of the outside world, and are
apprehended only through the external senses.
But evidence gained in this way is of an essentially
secondary or supplementary value, its chief use
being that of suggestion or corroboration. The
principal forms of objective investigation are the
following :

1. Other minds. — The results of other men's
observations of their own minds as far as these
results can be gathered from oral description, and
compared with the results of our own individual
experience.

2. Language.—Tho, products of the human mind
as embodied in language may afford valuable inform-
ation. Comparative philology and the study of
various literatures are here our chief resources.
Language has been happily styled crystallized or
fossilized thought, and under skilful handling it may
be made to unfold many interesting secrets of past
mental history. Thus the rich and varied vocabulary

14 • PSYCHOLOGY

of the Tagan dialect, which contains over 30,000
words, a vast inherited wealth far beyond the needs
of the present generation, is maintained by Professor
Max Miiller to point to a degradation of that race
from a previous condition of considerable mental
development, rather than to a gradual evolution
from a lower and less intellectual state.- Similarly
the presence in various languages of words con-
noting certain moral ideas may constitute important
testimony in disputed interpretations of conscious-
ness.

3. Hislorical or Genetic Method. — A diligent
study of the human mind as manifested at different
periods of life, and in different grades of civilization,
may throw much light on the laws which govern
the development of the mental faculties, and on the
conditions which have given rise to various customs,
sentiments, and modes of thought. Plistorical
researches into the manners, religions, and social
institutions of different nations may here prove very
fruitful.

4. Animal Psychology, — The study of the
instincts, habits, and other psychical activities of
the lower animals, if undertaken in a sober and
judicious spirit, can be made to yield considerable
assistance in some questions. This sphere of investi-
gation, when grouped with that just mentioned, is

- Cf. "The Savage," Nineteenth Century, January, 1S85, p. 120.
Professor Max Miiller there argues very forcibly, that " the magni-
ficent ruins in the dialects, whether of Fuegians, Mohawks, or
Hottentots, tell us of mental builders whom no one could match at
present." The Tagan language is that spoken by the natives of
Terra del Fuego, the race which Darwin considered to be the lowest
and least developed family of human beings yet found.

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 15

sometimes rather questionably dignified with the
title of Comparative Psychology. However, the
anthropomorphic tendency in man to project his
own thoughts and sentiments into other beings
renders this scientific instrument peculiarly liable to
abuse. Still subject to proper precautions it may
assist us materially. By means of it we may
advantageously apply the great inductive methods of
difference and residues. The lower animals possess
certain faculties in common with man, but they
are deficient in others, and hence by a diligent
study of their actions we are enabled to distinguish
how much of man's conduct is necessarily due to
different faculties.

5. Physiology. — The science of Physiology is also
a source of valuable mformation. The intimate
nature of the relations between the mind and the
organism, so strongly emphasized in the Aristotelian
and Scholastic Philosophy which conceives the soul
as the form of the body, receives more elucidation
every day with the advance of biological science.
In examining into the operations of sense, the
development of imagination and memory, the forma-
tion of habits, and the transmission of hereditary
tendencies, the advantage of a knowledge of the
physical basis of these phenomena is obvious ; but
as all mental processes, even the most purely
spiritual acts of intellect and volition, are probably
accompanied or conditioned by cerebral changes,
too much labour cannot be devoted to the study of
the constitution, structure, and working of the
organism. At the same time care must b^- taken

i6 PSYCHOLOGY.

to distinf^uish clearly between the two orders of
facts. The mental state and its physiological
accompaniment or condition are separated, as
Professor Tyndall says, by an "impassable chasm."
It is then not sufficient to explicitly admit once or
twice, as most writers of the Sensist school do
admit, that the neural and psychical events arc
divided by a difference which transcends all other
differences, and then to forget, or lead the reader to
forget, the vital character of this difference. The
mental states must be treated and described
throughout in such a way that no confusion
between the two kinds of phenomena is caused to
arise in the student's mind, and he must not be
misled into supposing that a conscious process has
been finally explained when its physical correlate
has been indicated, or when the whole operation has
been described in cloudy physiological language.

6. Pathology : Psychiatry, — Hand in hand with
Physiology goes Pathology, the complementary
science of organic disease ; and the opportunities
presented in the investigations connected with this
branch of knowledge for the observation of mental
activities in an isolated or abnormal condition
will occasionally throw light on obscure questions.
Somnambulism, illusions, hallucinations, and various
forms of insanity exhibit particular mental functions
under exceptional conditions, and not infrequently
suggest or confirm explanations of special mental
operations. Similarly, the study of those deprived
of different senses may advance the scientific analysis
of normal perception and the discovery of how

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 17

much is due to the various faculties. But here
again judgment is required, and we must be on our
guard against assigning too much weight to irregular
and exceptional cases. The emotional interest
excited by abnormal occurrences may easily lead us
to exaggerate their philosophical importance, and to
forget that after all the proper subject-matter of our
science is the uicns saiia in corpore sano. The reality
of this danger becomes apparent when we find
writers on Psychology founding their theories as to
the nature of the soul, or of its cognitive operations,
not on the observation of the activities of the normal
healthy mind, but on dubious conjectures regarding
some obscure ill-understood forms of mental aberra-
tion that appear perhaps once among a hundred
thousand human beings.

7. Experimental Psychology : Psycho -physics : Psycho-
mctry. — Closely connected with physiological psy-
chology are certain methods of investigation some-
times styled Experimental Psychology, Strictly
speaking, whenever we deliberately exert or cause
another to exert any form of mental activity in order
to observe it we perform *' a psychological experi-
ment." But the term Experimental Psychology is
commonly confined to the more elaborate methods
of modifying mental operations in order to study
them. Various ingenious means have been recently
invented for estimating the power and accuracy of
imagination, memory, and the several senses ; and
numerous "psychological laboratories" have been
erected for carrying on these investigations in
Germany, America, and elsewhere. The terms

i8 PSYCHOLOGY.

psychonietry and psycho -physics are more especially
employed to denote sundry methods employed for
measuring the duration of simple mental processes
and also the relation between the intensity of sensa-
tions and their stimuli. We shall return to this
subject again.

These Methods not new. — We have here
explicitly enumerated the various sources from
which our science draws its materials, but, although
it has only in recent times become customary thus
to classify them in detail, all of them except the
last have been made use of by writers on the philo-
sophy of the mind since the days of Plato and
Aristotle. Some recent authors appear at times to
believe that these methods of inductive inquiry are
a result of modern discovery, and that surprising
advances of an undefined character have been, or in
the immediate future will be, effected by their
means in our knowledge of the nature of the mind.
A comparatively brief study, however, of Aristotle's
great work on the soul, and of his supplementary
treatises on special psychological questions, will
show how fully he appreciated the value of these
extended fields of information.^

Rational Psycholog-y : Method. — The method
pursued in Rational Psychology will be mainly
inferential. From the truths established in the
earlier part of our work as regards the life of the
soul, we shall draw inferences as to its inner consti-

^ M. St. Hilaire has shown clearly how accurate were the vie;vs
of the founder of the Peripatetic school on the use of the inductive
methods in Psychology. (CI. Psychologic d'Aristote, pp. lii. — Ixv.)

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 19

tution ; from the character of the activity we shall
argue to the nature of the agent, from the degree of
perfection in the effect we shall reason up to that of
the cause.

Attacks on Psychology. — The scope just assigned
to Psychology is objected to by writers of widely diffe-
rent schools in this country, so it may be well to add
a few supplementary remarks in defence of our position.
Opponents we may divide into three classes. Some
deny the possibility of a science either of Rational
or Phenomenal Psychology. Others, admitting the
existence of a genuine science of the phenomena of
the mind, deny the possibility of any real knowledge
regarding the nature or existence of the soul. Others,
again, whilst allowing with this second class the value
of Empirical Psychology, exclude from its treatment
various questions, such as the freedom of the will, and
the origin of intellectual ideas, on the ground that these
are metaphysical or philosophical problems to be treated
of elsewhere. As regards this last view, the divergence
from us may b6 mainly one of method and classification.
Provided these questions are satisfactorily discussed in
some branch of Philosophy, it does not appear vital
what department be selected. We may, however, point
out that Psychology, the philosophy of the mind, seems
to be under more distinct obligations to face these
problems than any other science ; and, in the second
place, as we have already stated, an}^ attempt at
adequate treatment of mental phenomena will inevit-
ably involve some particular philosophical view as to
the nature of our faculties.

The only sufificient answer to writers of the second
class — those who deny the possibility of a rational
science of the soul — is to work out a systematized
body of certain truths regarding its nature, and the
relations subsisting between it and the body. This
we will endeavour to accomplish in the Second Book
of the present volume. That a work claiming to be
a treatise on Psychology ought to make some such

20 PSYCHOLCGY.

attempt seems so manifest that it is difficult to under-
stand why the duty should be so uniformly ignored in
English manuals. ' Locke's influence and the national
distaste for metaphysical argument has had much to do
with it, but probably the authority of the Scotch school
has had still more. For it was to Reid and Stewart
those most interested in a satisfactory exposition of the
evidence bearing on the existence and character of
the human soul naturally looked for a proper vindi-
cation of the subject. Unfortunately, idolatry ^ of
empirical fact and contempt for deductive reasoning
reached a climax in the common-sense school. As a
consequence, the worship of the Baconian method in
its most exaggeratedly vicious form wTOught that evil
in the science of the mind which it would assuredly
have effected, had it been as faithfully followed, in the
study of external nature."^ Thus we find that whilst in
Germany and other Continental countries mental philo-
sophy was approached with a view to the solution of
the most interesting and important problems that can
occupy the human spirit, British psychologists have
been seeking to convert their science into a mere natural
history of psychical phenomena. Any attempt at a
comprehensive treatment of our mental activities is
stigmatized as an illegitimate introduction of philoso-
phical problems, and we have finally reached a stage in
which even such a clearly psychological question as the
freedom of the will is to be rigidly boycotted on the
grounds of its connexion with the discredited science of
metaphysics.

Objections to Introspection. — As regards the
third class of opponents — those who deny the pos-
sibility of a genuine science even of phenomenal
psychology — since they attack the foundations on
which our whole work rests, we will here state and
answer briefly their chief arguments. The leading

"* On the reaction against the pure Baconian doctrine of method
in recent times, see Jevons' Principles of Science, Vol. II. c. xxiii. He
remarks that "its value may be estimated historically by the fact
that it has not been followed by any of the great masters of science."
(p. IM)

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 21

representatives of this view have been Comte in France,
and Dr. Maudsley at home. Botli teach that Ps^xho-
logy is merely a subsidiary department of Biology, and
that it must be studied exclusively or mainly by objec-
tive methods. Dr. Maudsley states the case against
Psychology at length in the earlier part of his work,
The Physiology of Mind. But in this, as indeed in other
philosophical questions, that vigorous writer does not
appear to hold very clear or consistent opinions even
throughout the course of the same volume.

I. He urges that Psychology, as a distinct inde-
pendent science built up by introspection, is impossible,
for introspection is itself impossible. ** In order to
observe its own action it is necessary that the mind
pause from activity, yet it is the train of activity that is
to be observed." {The Physiology of Mind, p. 17.)

This assertion we must meet by a direct denial,
supported by an appeal to each man's inner experience.
First, as regards the various modes of our sentient life,
sensations, perceptions, appetites, pleasures, and pains,
our only difficulty is to understand how such a state-
ment as that attention to them causes their immediate
annihilation could ever have been penned. Life could be
made happy without much difficulty if our disagreeable
states and experiences would vanish when we turned
to observe them; but unfortunately cold, hunger, thirst,
and disease, the pains of muscular strain, and of tooth-
ache are not such obliging visitors. The activities of
sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, can certainly be
studied both in actual operation on their objects, and
as reproduced in imagination. Secondly, that we can
attend to and examine our higher forms of mental
activity is equally certain. Emotions, desires, per-
ceptions of relations, reasonings can be both con-
comitantly studied in their direct course^ and afterwards

" Mr. Sully, who defends the introspective method, yet seems to
hold that immediate concomitant consideration of present mental
states is impossible, that it is on\y past states we can properly be
said to observe, and that in fact " all introspection is retrospection."
{Illusions, p. igo, and Outlines of Psychology, p. 5.) This tenet is a
necessary deduction from the sensationist theory of mental life, but
the logical position for the disciple of that school is that assumed

22 PSYCHOLOGY.

recalled by memory. This is due equally in either case
to the self-conscious power of the mind, and implies in
us a higher order of mental activity than that involved
in mere sentient affections. Our only proof of this, as
well as of every other psychological fact, must be an
appeal to each man's own consciousness.

2. Again, it is a maxim of *' inductive philosophy
that observation should begin with simple instances,
ascent being made from them step by step through
appropriate generalizations." (Maudsley, p. 19.) More-
over, science being universal, the psychologist should
be able to contemplate a variety of specimens which
exhibit the object of his investigations in its various
stages of development. But introspection presents only
a single subject for examination, and that a most rare
and exceptional one, *' the complex self-consciousness
of an educated white man." Consequently, even were
introspection possible, its deliverances would be
deprived of that feature of universality essential to
every genuine science. To this we may reply in the
first place that, were a number of anatomists limited
each to the study of a single human organism, they
would still be able to frame a collection of results con-
taining a substantial amount of agreement. Secondly,
comparison of observations among psychologists, appeal
to general experience, and the several objective methods
we have described, and which have been in use from

by Dr. Maudsley, and not the halting inconsistent doctrine of
Mr. Sully. To the mind endowed with no activity essentially
higher than that of the sensuous order, both introspection and retro-
spection are equally impossible. But that the human mind is capable
of concomitantly observing its own normal states becomes clear to
any one making the attempt. It is actually the converse of Mr.
Sully's dictum which expresses the truth, " All retrospection involves
present introspection," for, it is the present representation of the
past state which is examined, and only n'liile actually present to the
mind can it be the subject of observation. But if we can attend to
a present state which happens to be an image of a past state, surely
there can be nothing to prevent attention to a state which is not
such a representation. Consequently we can concomitantly study
those mental processes of which we are conscious. In a word, as
Mill urges against Comte, " Whatever we are directly aware of we
can directly observe." (Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 64.)

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 23

the very birth of Psychology, completely destroy the
force of the supposed difficulty.

3. A kindred objection is urged against the necessary
limitation of introspective observation to a single ob-
server, " a witness whose evidence can be taken by no
one but himself, and whose veracity, therefore, cannot
be tested. . . . The observed and the observer are one,
and the observer is not likely in such a case to be un-
biassed by the feelings of the observed, and to conform
rigidly to the rules of exact observation." (id.) The
answer to the last objection will apply again in great
part here. Further, (a) the psychologist, like the physio-
logist and every other scientific inquirer, must seek to
lay aside prejudice and to approach his subject in an
impartial spirit, (b) He must, like them, exercise care
and diligence. And (c) he must check his results by
comparison with those of other observers, and by the
study of other minds through the various supplementary
methods.

4. Dr. Maudsley also argues that tlie range of
introspection is very limited. {a) " Consciousness
which does not even tell us that we have a brain is
certainly incompetent to give any account of the
essential material conditions of our mental life." (p. 21.)
(b) Mental life itself, too, is largely beyond the range
of introspection. •' It is a truth which cannot too
distinctly be borne in mind, that consciousness is not
co-extensive with mind." (p. 25.) As regards the first
part of the difficulty it might, perhaps, be not unfairly
retorted against the physiologist that the method of
external observation on which his science is based can
tell us nothing of the mental conditions which pro-
foundly influence many physical processes. Letting
this pass, however, it is sufficient to recall to mind
that conscious states and mental activities are real
facts differing in kind from all physical events, in order
to give them as good claim to form adequate matter
for an independent science as physiology has to be
separated from chemistry or mechanics. Finally, that
the study of the physical conditions of conscious pro-
cesses is a legitimate source of useful supplementary

24 PSYCHOLOGY.

information has been, as we before urged, fully admitted
from the time of Aristotle ; but unfortunately^ owing
to the hitherto extremely backward condition of the
science of Physiology in general, and especially in that
department which deals with physical basis of mental
life, it can afford very little reliable information of any
importance.

5. Dr. Maudsley also argues that the illusions and
hallucinations of the insane seem to them as clear and
evident affirmations of consciousness, as do the intro-
spective observations of the psychologist. Therefore
the latter are untrustworthy. This objection is trivial.
Insanity is, unhappily, a possible contingency among
the investigators both of soul and body, but science
will not be ultimately injured by such casualties.

6. Finall3^ it is urged, as a general proof of the
worthlessness of Subjective Psychology, that " there is
no agreement between those who have acquired the
power of introspection." (id.) This objection is based
on a confusion of two very distinct questions — the
character of the mental states of which psychologists
affirm that they are conscious, and the hypotheses or
explanations which they advance to account for these
states. As regards the former, that there is a very
large amount of general agreement, any one who con-
sults the psychological literature even of schools the
most opposed will discover. On the other hand, wide
and manifold divergence in the theories advanced to
explain the origin and nature of mental life, the history
of Philosophy since the great scholastic stream of
thought was abandoned unequivocally demonstrates.
But that is not the fault of introspection any more
than conflicting views as to the source of the sun's
heat are a reflection on the trustworthiness of the
telescope.

Real Difficulties. — We have treated Dr. Maudsley's
objections at such great length, not on account of any
considerable importance we assign to his work, but
because the discussion of his arguments helps to make
clear to the student the actual difficulties and limitations
of the Introspective Method. For it must be admitted

METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.

that internal observation is often not easy. Mental
states, unlike the objects of pliysical science, are
unstable and ever changing. They are not indepen-
dent of concomitant states. Even though it be untrue
that a// ■ introspection must be retrospective, yet the
more vehement forms of mental excitement can be
adequately studied only by means of recollection. The
limitation, too, of direct observation to a single specimen
with its inevitable peculiarities may be attended by
serious risks. Bias and intellectual prejudices may
unconsciously interfere with the correct appreciation of
facts, and our ver}^ familiarity with our mental states
increases the labour of accurate observation. Still
these hindrances to introspection can be overcome by
(a) diligence and attention, (b) the skill acquired by
practice of reflection, (c) industr}^ in repeating our
observations under varied conditions and the employ-
ment of recollection in studying afterwards states which
cannot be well examined whilst actually occurring,
(d) honest effort to be unprejudiced and impartial in
the observation of facts and to be on our guard against
the more impressive features of imagination and sensuous
states ; finally, by (e) making the fullest use of the
various supplementary objective methods to test and
confirm the results of direct introspection.

Readings. — On the opposition in nature between Psychology and
the objective sciences, cf. Dr. Martineau's Essays Philosophical and
Theological, "Cerebral Psychology," pp. 245—253. On the various
methods, cf. Pesch, Institutioncs Psych. §§ 25—30 ; Dr. Gutberlet, Die
Psychologie (Munster) pp. i — 15 ; and F. Mark Baldwin, Sense and
Intellect, pp. 20 — 32. On objections to the possibility of Psychology,
cf. Pesch, lb. §§ 31 — 34. On the necessity of a consistent theory cf
Rational Psychology, even for a complete view of the physiological
conditions of mental activity, cf. Professor Ladd's Physiological
Psychology, pp. 585, 586.

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.

Consciousness. — The subject-matter which Em-
pirical Psychology investigates is Consciousness,
but, as we have already remarked, the chief instru-
ment by which our investigations are to be carried
on is also Consciousness. The question then at once
arises : What meaning or meanings are we to attach
to this term ? The word has been employed in a
variet}^ of significations, but for our purpose it will
be necessary to distinguish and recognize only three.^
In its widest sense Consciousness as opposed to
unconsciousness denotes all modes of mental life.
It comprises all cognitive, emotional, and appetitive
states which are capable of being apprehended ; it
is, in fact, S3monymous with the sum-total of our
psychical existence. In its second sense it signifies
the mind's direct, intuitive, or immediate knowledge
either of its own operations, or of something other
than itself acting upon it. This usage, which is
supported by Sir W. Hamilton and some of those
writers who maintain that we have in certain acts

^ For a detailed account of the various meanings assigned to
the term consciousness by philosophers, see the volume of the present
series on First Principles of Knowledge, by John Rickaby, S.J.
pp. 340—347.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES 27

an immediate perception of a reality other than
ourselves, makes Consciousness equivalent to imme-
diate or direct knowledge. Understood in this way
Consciousness signifies the energy of the cognitive
act, and not the emotional or volitional acts as
cognized. On the other hand, it is opposed to
mediate and to reflex knowledge. In its third
meaning the term is limited to that deliberately
reflex operation by which the mind attends to its
states and recognizes them as its own. Conscious-
ness in this sense is no longer that common
constituent of all subjective phenomena, whether
intellectual, emotional, or appetitive, which makes
them mental realities ; nor yet is it the simultaneous
notice which the mind concomitantly possesses of
such acts. It is a supplementary introspective
activity by which all our mental states are studied,
and through its means what is implicitly appre-
hended in our direct consciousness is explicitly
brought under review. In this signification the
word is equivalent to Self -consciousness, and when-
ever there is danger of ambiguity, or whenever it is
of importance to bring out the distinction, we will
employ this latter term with its adjective self-
conscious.

Subconscious Mental Activities.— It should not be for-
gotten, however, that besides the mental operations which
reveal themselves in consciousness, there is much evidence
to establish the existence of vital activities of which we are
not at the time aware. Not only are there normally
unconscious functions of organic life, such as digestion,
respiration, circulation, but the sensitive faculties of the
mind, even in a natural healthy state, seem at times to
undergo modifications without our apprehending these latter.
Thus, very faint impressions on the sense-organs are ordinarily

28 PSYCHOLOGY.

not perceived, and when the attention is engrossed by some
object of interest, other sensations of sound, sight, and touch,
although perhaps of considerable intensity, may escape
unnoticed. The noise in the playground outside my open
window, the sound of the flames rising up from the grate, the
resistance of the table on which I have been leaning, and of
the pen which I have been holding between my fingers were
completely unobserved until I now deliberately adverted to
them. In the estimation of distance, in the recognition of
objects and in the normal acts of perception of mature life
rapid reasonings are frequently made with so little cognizance
of the operation as to be styled " unconscious inferences."
Memories, acquired tendencies, habits constantly affect the
character of our conscious life, whilst not themselves present
to consciousness. The sleeper and the man in deep reverie
respond to sensory stimuli by appropriate movement .without
having any knowledge of either the exciting cause or the
resulting movement. Cheerfulness and sadness, love, hate,
and fear are often the outcome of feelings which elude our
best efforts to discover them. Such undercurrents, lying as
it were below the surface of mental life, have been called by
recent psychologists subconscious states. There is considerable
dispute as to their exact nature and how their relation to the
mind should be conceived. For the present it is sufficient to
call attention to their reality and to remind ourselves that
although unsusceptible of introspective observation, some ot
these activities are intimately connected with our conscious
life.

Mental Faculties : Classification. — Our primary
duty in entering upon a scientific treatment of tlie
facts of Consciousness is to effect a proper distribu-
tion of these phenomena. From very ancient times
it has been customary to divide our mental states
into a small number of general groups conceived to
be the outcome of separate faculties ov powers ^^ of the

~ The exact meanings of the terms, Faculty, Power, Capacity,
Function, and the like, are not very accurately fixed in Psychology. -
Power { potent ia ) may be conceived as either active or passive, tliat
is either as a special causality of the mind or as its susceptibility
for a particular species of affections or changes. Hamilton,
following Leibnitz, would confine the term Faculty {Facultas,
Facilitas) to the former meaning and Capacity to the latter. The

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 29

mind. By a faculty is meant the mind's capability
of undergoing a particular kind of activity; thus,
our sensations of colour are due to the faculty of
vision, our recollections to the faculty of memory,
and our volitions to the faculty of will. Such a
method of classification is justified by the con-
spicuous differences found both in the quality of
the several kinds of mental life, and in the manner
in which the latter put the mind in relation with the
object.^

Cognitive and Appetitive. — These activities assume
either of two generically different forms. Every
mental act or energy constitutes a relation between
the mind or subject and the object or terminus of
that act. Now this relation we find always to

terms Act, Operation, Energy, on the contrary, denote the present
exertion of a power. The last of the three, however, is also used
in a kindred sense to the previous terms, as the perfection or
special ground in the agent from whence the activity proceeds.
The word Function may signify either the actual exercise or the
specific character of a power. Faculty, Power, and Capacity, all properly
signify natural abilities. Accordingly, G. H. Lewes inverts the
original and universally accepted meaning when he would make
the term Faculty connote an acquired or artificially created
aptitude. Faculty is efficient cause of Function, not vice versa,
though the latter is both/;/a/ and formal cause of the former. (Cf.
Hamilton, Metaph. Lect. x. ; Lewes, A Study of Psychology, p. 27.) _

'■^ "The ground for the division of the mental faculties lies in
the special nature of the psychical activities." (Cf. Jungmann, Das
Geniilth unddasGefiihlsverniogender neueren Psychologic, p. 12.) Scholastic
philosophers taught that the faculties of the soul should be dis-
tinguished per actus et objecta, that is, according to the nature of each
activity and the object towards which it is directed. The former
principle, however, is the real causal ground for the distinction, the
latter being valuable mainly as an indication or symptom which
helps to exhibit more clearly diversities in the quality of the
energy. " Potentia, secundum illud,quod est potentia, ordinatur
ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad
quem ordinatur; et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae
diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus." {Sum. i. q. 77. a. 3. c.)

30 PSYCHOLOGY.

consist either in (a) the assumption by the soul of
the object into itself after a psychical manner
{imagine intentionali) , or {h) the tendency of the soul
towards or from the object as the latter is in itself.
In the previous case the object of the state is
presented or represented in the mind by a cognitive
act, in the latter the mind is inclined* towards or
from the object by an appetitive act ; and the aptitude
for the one class of operations is described as cogni-
tive, percipient, apprehensive, and the like, while
the root of the other has been styled the " striving,"
" orectic," '* conative," or " affective " power. Under
the faculty of cognition or knowledge are aggregated
such operations as those of sense-perception, memory,
imagination, judgment, and reasoning; under the
affective or appetitive faculty are included desires,
aversions, emotions, volitions, and the like.

2. Rational and Sensuous. — Besides this distribu-
tion of mental energies into those of a Cognitional
and those of an Appetitive character, and running '
right through both classes, there is another division
of still more vital importance from a philosophical
standpoint ; we mean that based on the distinction
between the powers of a higher ^ rational^ or spiritual
grade, and those of the lower, sensuous, or organic
order. Throughout the entire history of Philosophy
it has been recognized that this difference is of
profound significance. Thinkers upholding so multi-

•* There is indeed a certain sense in which the apprehensive
faculties exhibit a tendency towards their appropriate objects. This
is impUed in the scholastic term intentionalis. Still the distinction
between such general responsive afiinity and the special " striving"
element of appetite remains evident.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 31

farious and divergent philosophical creeds as Plato,
Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant,
and Hegel, all agree in looking on this difference of
nature in our sensuous and intellectual activity as
the central fact in the whole of Philosophy. Accord-
ingly, in addition to the division which separates
appetency from cognition, and intersecting both
these departments of mental life, we must draw a
line marking off sensuous from rational or spiritual
phenomena. These, however, must not be conceived
as two co-ordinate classes of activities standing inde-
pendently side by side ; they are akin rather to
superimposed strata. The superior faculty pre-
supposes and supplements the action of the lower,
though both are properties of the same soul.

To the sensuous order belong such operations as
seeing, hearing, forming concrete pictures by the
imagination, and conserving sensible experiences in
the organic memory. Intellectual consciousness
comprises the processes of forming universal
concepts, judgments, and inferences, the recollection
of rational truths, and the operation of reflecting on
our own mental states. In the sphere of orectic
activity or conation we find in the lower grade
organic appetite and sensuous desires, in the higher
spiritual desires and rational volition. Affections,
emotions, and passions pertain partly to one, partly
to the other order. It is true of course that in
actual concrete experience we cannot separate the
superior from the inferior activity. The sensation
in mature life is rarely given without some faint
accompanying exercise of Intellect. But such

32 PSYCIIOLOGY.

dependence, or concomitance, does not identify the
two energies.

Subdivision. — A further examination of our
cognitive power of the sensuous order reveals to us
certain lesser differences which afford us reason for
a subdivision of this generic capability. We find .!
that some faculties make us directly cognizant of
material phenomena existing without the mind.
These are the External Senses. Others have for
their objects not such extra-mental realities, but
conscious representations of the former. These
faculties were called by the scholastic philosophers
the Internal Senses, the chief of which are Imagina-
tion and Memory. The first forms images of absent
objects, the second super-adds to such representa-
tions a conviction of their having been previously
experienced. The principal subdivisions, therefore,
of the lower grade of cognitive life are Imagination,
Memory, and the External Senses. In the sphere
of spiritual knowledge the various operations of
conception, judgment, inference, and reflection, do
not present sufficient divergency in nature to warrant
a subdivision of Intellect into different faculties.
These several processes are merely successive func-
tions of the same power.

Besides the general partition of appetency, or
affective consciousness, into rational and sensuous,
no further subdivision seems obvious. The most
imi~ortant class of states which might appear to
claim as their root another special property of the
soul are the Feelings and Emotions. In so far,
however, as they are not identical with the merely

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 33

pleasurable or painful aspect of our cognitive
energies, these phenomena may be traced to the
affective or appetitive disposition of the mind taken
in a wide sense In our present chapter we can of
course merely enunciate the principles upon which
our system of classification is based ; the justification
of that scheme will be found in the detailed treat-
ment of these various mental activities throughout
the present book.

Various classifications of Mental Faculties*

Aristotle's Scheme. — Although the vast majority of
psychologists have followed the method of referring our
psychical phenomena to a small number of general
faculties, yet there has been a good deal of disagree-
ment regarding the scheme of powers to be assumed as
ultimate. Aristotle, rejecting Plato's allotment of three
really distinct souls to man, teaches that the human
being is possessed of one vital principle which informs
and animates the body. This soul {ij/vxr}) is endowed
with five distinct genera of faculties: "Vegetative
Power {to OpeTTTLKov), on which the maintenance of the
corporeal organism depends ; the Appetitive Faculty
(to opeKTLKov), which is exerted in striving after what is
good and agreeable, and in repelling what is disagree-
able (Siw^L^ Kal 4>vy^) ; the faculty of Sensuous Percep-
tion {to aia9r)TLK6v), by which the objects perceptible by
sense are represented in our cognition, the Locomotive
Faculty {to KLvrjTtKov), by which we are enabled to move
the body and its members, and make use of them for
external action; and lastly, the Reason (to Stavor^TiKoV).
The four faculties first-named belong to brutes, as v\^ell
as to man. Reason, on the other hand, is the charac-
teristic which distinguishes man from the brutes."^

Scholastic System.— St. Thomas follows Aristotle,'^ but

5 Stockl's Handbook of the History of Philosophy (Translated by
Thomas Finlay, S.J.), p. 119. This work contains an excellent
epitome of Aristotle's Philosophy.

^ Cf. Sum. i. q. 7S. a. 10.

34 PSYCHOLOGY.

lays greater stress than the Greek philosopher on the
distinction between mere sensitive appetite (opcit?
aXoyos), for which we are not responsible, and rational
appetite or will." Leaving out of account, then, the
physiological or extra mental powers of the soul, we
have cognitive capabilities of the sensuous order ;
intellect, or the faculty of rational knowledge; and the
two kinds of appetite. This is the scheme which we
have ourselves adopted. With St. Thomas, as with us,
emotional states are either complex products made up
of cognitive and appetitive activities, or mere aspects
of such energies.

Scotch School. — Among modern writers, Reid and
Stewart put forward the distribution into Intellectual and
Active Powers, based on the antithesis maintained by
the peripatetics between the cognitive and appetitive
faculties. In doing so, however, they overlooked the
equally important principle of division into Sensuous
and Rational aptitudes, all forms of cognition bemg
alike styled intellectual. In addition to this deficiency,
their classification errs b}' opposing intellectual to active,
whereas the higher order of cognitive activity is as
essentiallv active as many modes of appetency.

Tripartite Division. — Hamilton adopts the three-fold
distribution of the facts of consciousness into pheno-
mena of Knowledge, of Feeling, and of Conation. This
classification, first propounded last century by Tetens,
a German philosopher, was popularized by Kant, and
probably enjoys most general favour among psycho-
logists of the present day. It bases its claims on the
assumption of three ultimate radically distinct modes
of conscious activity to one or other of which all forms
of mental life are reducible, while none of these, it is
asserted, can be identified with, or resolved into, either
of the other two. Consciousness assures me, it is urged,
that I am capable of Knowledge, of seeing, hearing,
imagining, reasoning, and the rest. It also testifies to
the fact that I may be drawn towards or repelled from
objects, in other words, that I am endowed with the
faculty of Desire. Finally, it reveals to me that I

' Sum i. q. 80. a. 2.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 35

experience pleasure and pain, and that I am subject to
various emotions, such as curiosity, pride, anger, and
admiration, which are not acts of cognition, nor yet of
desire. Accordingly there must be postulated as the
basis of this last class of states a third capability in the
mind, the Faculty of Feeling. Our objection to this
scheme is that it sins both by excess and defect. On
the one hand it ignores the fundamental distinction
between the lower and higher grades of mental life, and
on the other hand it asserts without sufficient grounds
the existence of a separate third faculty. Hamilton,
like most Kantians, was at times fully aware of the
divergence in kind which marks off rational from
sensuous cognition. Yet this all-important difference
receives no real recognition in his classification, whilst
the phenomena of feeling, for which he demands a third
compartment, are reducible either to aspects of cogni-
tive energies or modes of appetency.

Spencer's Bipartite Division. — Mr. Herbert Spencer
rejects the triple division of mental phenomena for
a two-fold one: (i) Feelings, and (2) Relations between
Feelings or Cognitions. In his view volition is merely a
complex form of feeling, and even the " relations "
between feelings he speaks of as being merely special
feelings. As a psychological classification this division
has been very justly, but not consistently, rejected by
Dr. Bain, on the ground that what is required is not a
scheme of mental products, but of the different kinds
of powers or forces of the mind by which such
products are attained.^ Looked at, however, as an
ultimate analysis of our mental operations, it must be
condemned as proceeding from a false conception of
mental life.'\

^ The Senses and Intellect, p. 640. (2nd Edit.)

9 H. Spencer, Bain, Mr. Sully, and all empiricists, since they
teach that the mind is nothing more than the sum of our conscious
states, mean by a faculty merely a group of like mental acts, while
Hamilton, who believes that the mind is a real indivisible energy,
conceives the different faculties, not, indeed, as independent
agents, but as special forms of causahty or susceptibility in the
soul.

36 PSYCHOLOGY.

Attacks on Mental Faculties. — But difference of view on
the subject of the mental powers has not been confined to the
problem of classification. A vigorous crusade has been
preached by several psychologists during the present century
against the "faculty hypothesis" in any form. The move-
ment was initiated in Germany by Herbart in opposition to
Kant, and has been sustained there by Drobisch, Beneke,
Schleiermacher, Vorliinder, and others. In France, MM.
Taine, Kibot, and positivists generally, have followed in the
same direction, and a vast amount of wit and rhetoric has
been expended in the demolition of these " metaphysical
phantoms." We believe, nevertheless, that, once the reality
of the mind as a permanent indivisible energy is admitted,
the assumption of faculties when properly explained is
unassailable.

Faculty defined. — A mental faculty or power is not of the
nature of a particular part of the soul, or of a member
different from it as a limb is distinct from the rest of
the body. It is not an independent reality, a separate
agent, which originates conscious states out of itself apart
from the mind. But neither is it merely a group of con-
scious states of a particular kind. It is simply a special
mode through which the mind itself acts. " It is admitted by
all that a faculty is not a force distinct from and independent
of the essence of the soul, but it is the soul itself, which
operates in and through the faculty." ^"^ A faculty is, in fact,
the proximate ground of some special form of activity of which the
mind is capable. That we are justified in attributing to the
soul faculties in this sense is abundantly clear. Careful use
of our power of introspection reveals to us a number of modes
of psychical energy radically distinct from each other, and
incapable of further analysis. To see, to hear, to remember,
to desire, are essentially different kinds of consciousness,
though all proceed from the same source. Sometimes one is
in action, sometimes another, but no one of them ever
exhausts the total energy of the mind. They are partial
utterances of the same indivisible subject. But this is
equivalent to the establishment of certain distinct aptitudes
in the mind.^^

^" Cf Die PsycJioIogie, von Dr. Constantin Gutberlet, p. 4.

^' " The proposition, ' our soul possesses different faculties,'
means nothing else than ' our soul is a substance which as active
principle is capable of exerting different species of energies.' " " If
the soul produces within itself acts of perception, then must it also
be endowed with a property corresponding to this effect, and this
property must be something actual, objectively real in it; other-
wise a stone may at times be just as capable of percipient acts. To

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 37

Objections examined. — In England the chief psycholojijist
darini^ the early part of this century who attacked the doctrine
of mental faculties, was Brown. As the right view was
sufficiently vindicated then by Hamilton,^- we need not return
to refute the former writer or Bailey, who added little of any
value on the same side. Mr. Sully, however, may be taken
as a representative of recent attacks, so a word in answer to
this author may be useful. After premising that the discussion
•of the ultimate nature of the " so-called faculties " belongs to
Rational Psychology, and so lies outside of his sphere, he
continues: "The hypothesis of faculties can, however, be
■criticized from the point of view of Empirical Psychology in
so far as it succeeds or does not succeed in giving a clear
account of the phenomena. Looked at in this way, it must
l)e regarded as productive of much error in Psychology, It
has led to the false supposition that mental activity, instead of
■being one and the same throughout its manifold phases is a juxta-
position of totally distinct activities ansivering to a bundle of
detached powers, somehow standing side by side, and exerting no
influence on one anotJier. Sometimes this absolute separation
■of the parts of mind has gone so far as to personify the
several faculties as though they were distinct entities. This
has been especially the case with the faculty or power of
AvilUng."!^

One or two observations m.ay be urged in reply, (i) Mr.
Sully, in asserting that all mental activity is one and the
same, cannot seriously intend to maintain that the conscious
activity known as seeing is identical with that of hearing, or
•that cognition is not different in nature from desire. But if he
allows these energies to be radically distinct modes of con-
deny that property whilst we admit its manifestations, is to assert
that the faculty of perception is nothing else than the sum of its
acts, and is equivalent to postulating accidents without a substance,
•effects without a cause, and to discoursing of phenomena and opera-
tions when the subject, the agent, is abolished." {Das Geviiith unci
das Gefi'ihlsvermogen dcr neueren Psychologie, von Jungmann, p. 11.)

12 Mctaph. Ixx.

13 Outlines, p. 26. Similarly, Mr. G. F. Stout, Analytical Psycho-
logy, Vol. 1. pp. 17 — 21. Mr, Sully is undoubtedly right when he says
that discussion of the nature of the faculties pertains to Rational
Psychology. But this only proves the evil of " clandestine " Meta-
physics. The distinction between the "criticism from the Empirical
point of view," which rejects faculties as properties of the mind,
putting in their place aggregates of mental states, and the discredited
Metaphysics is not very obvious. In fact, such criticism of meta-
physical conceptions invariably involves a counter metaphysical
^system of its own. (Cf. Ladd, Philosophy of the Mind, pp. 32, 33.)

38 PSYCHOLOGY.

scioiisness under the vague saving clause of " manifold
phases," then all that is needed for the establishment of a
variety of mental aptitudes in the sense for which we contend
is admitted. (2) The description of the theory as involving
the absurd view that the faculties form "a juxta-position of
totally distinct activities answering to a bundle of detached
powers, somehow standing side by side and exerting no-
influence on each other," is a mere travesty of the doctrine.
Indeed, so far have the supporters of the doctrine been from
setting " the faculties side by side exerting no influence on
one another," that a great part of the modern attack is based
on quite an opposite representation of their view. They are
charged in Germany with making the mind the theatre of a
perpetual civil war among the faculties ; and Vorlander com-
pared the world of consciousness in their system to the
condition of the Roman Germanic Empire, when the vassals
(the faculties) usurped the functions of the regent (the soul),
and were perpetually intriguing and strugghng with each
other; whilst Schleiermacher styled the theory a "romance
replete with public outrages and secret intrigues." If the
faculties are to be annihilated on the charge of being ever-
lastingl}' involved in mutual conflict, it is rather hard that
they should be condemned at the same time for exerting no
influence on each other. The truth is, no such ridiculous
view regarding the nature of our mental powers has ever been
held by any psychologist of repute, but in talking of the
obvious and indisputable fact that our intellectual operations,,
emotions, and volitions, interfere with and condition each
other, philosophers, like other folk, have been compelled by
the exigencies of language to speak as if the faculties were
endowed with a certain independent autonomy of their own..
They have, however, of course, from the days of St. Augustine,.
and long before, been aware that it is the one indivisible
soul which remembers, understands, and wills. ^•^ (3) Even
regarding the activities of sense and intellect, which we hold,,
and shall prove to be essentially different, the assertion of
an imagined and real independence is untrue. The second
faculty pre-supposes as a necessary condition of its action the
exercise of the first, and is dependent on it for its operation,,
whilst both are merely diverse energies of the same simple
soul. (4) Finally, the Will is not an independent member,
an entity separate from the mind ; it is merely that per-

^* Cf. St. Aug. De TrinUate, Lib. X. c. xi. "Potentia est nihil aliud

quam quidam ordo ad actum." (Aquinas, De Anima, Lib. IL

lect. 11.) To assign a mental state to a power or faculty is not to

explain it, — except in so far as classification may be deemed expla-

atioD. See p. 587, below.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 39

fection of the Ego which constitutes it capable of that
special form of energizing called willing ; it is the soul itself
which wills.

The Mind a Real Unity. — There is, however, a tenet implied
in our system irreconcilably opposed to the phenomenalist
view of Mr. Sully and all other sensationist writers. We hold
as a fundamental all-important truth that there exists one real
indivisible agent called the Mind, which is something more
than the series of events known as conscious states. Those,
on the contrary, who maintain that the mind is nothing but
an aggregate or series of separate states connected by no real
bond, naturally find no place in their theory ior faculties.

Mutual Relations of the Faculties. — There
remains another question related to our present subject :
Which is to be conceived as the most fundamental of
our activities? To answer this we must recall our
double division of faculties, on the one hand, into
sensuous and rational, and on the other hand into
cognitive and appetitive.

Now of the two former kinds of mental life that of
sense is primary. The faculty of sense manifests itself
at the earliest age, it extends throughout the entire
animal kingdom, and its exercise is always pre-supposed
in order to furnish materials to be elaborated by the
rational powers in man. Intellect, on the other hand,
is something superadded to sense. In all its forms it
requires as the condition of its operation the previous
excitation of the lower powers, it manifests itself later
in life than sense, and it is confined to the human
species. Turning now to the other division : Whether
is cognition or appetite the more primordial ? But
little reflection is required, we think, to make it clear
that knowledge is naturally prior to volition. We
desire because we perceive or imagine the object of our
desire to be good. W^e are drawn or repelled by the
pleasurable or painful character of the cognitive act.
A sensation of colour, sound, or contact, viewed in its
proper character, is a rudimentary act of apprehension,
and it may awaken a striving either for its continuance
or for its cessation ; an intellectual judgment may
similarly give rise to a volition. It is true that some
desires manifest themselves in an obscure way without

40 PSYCHOLOGY.

any antecedent cognitive representation that we can
clearly realize. Tliis is especially the case with the
cravings of physical appetite, such as hunger and thirst.
Purely organic states which give rise to 3earnings of
this kind, however, are rather of the nature of physio-
logical needs than properly psychical desires ; and in
proportion as they emerge into the strata of mental
acts the cognitive element comes into clearer conscious-
ness. We may, therefore, lay it down as a general
truth that appetite is subsequent to knowledge and
dependent on it. These faculties are thus to be viewed,
not so mucli in the light of two co-ordinate powers
standing side by side, as in that of two properties of
the scul, the exertion of one of which bears to that of
the other the relation of antecedent to consequent.

Feeling. — What position as regards the two powers
just mentioned does the so-called third Faculty of Feeling
hold in our system ? Feelings understood as a group
of emotional states are not, we have already remarked,
the offspring of a third ultimate distinct energy, but
complex products resulting from the action of both
cognitive and appetitive faculties, Feeling viewed
simply as pleasure and pain, and such is the only sense
in which this form of consciousness has even an
apparent claim to the position of a separate facult}',
is merely an aspect of our cognitive and appetitive
energies. It exhibits itself as a positive or negative
colouring, which marks the operations of these powers.
As a (]uality of knowledge it must be conceived to be
dependent on cognitive activity rather than vice versa.
But, inasmuch as it is through this quality that cogni-
tion determines the character of the consequent appetite,
feeling, or rather the cognition as pleasurably or pain-
fully coloured, stands in the relation of cause and effect
to the subsequent appetite. Since, liowever, the activity
of desire may also be more or less agreeable, and since
it may result in satisfaction or discontent, feeling here
again stands in the relation of sequela to volitional
energy. Feeling thus considered as a qualit}' of
conscious acts is of the nature of a variable phase
or tone of both cognitive and appetitive activity ; but

CLASSIFICATION Of THE MENTAL FACULTIES. 4I

when in the position of a dependent accident of the
former it may be a causal condition of the latter. ^^

Readings —Classification of the Faculties, of. Sum. i. q. 78. For
a very able treatment of the whole subject, see Jungmann'sDas Gemi'ith
itnd das Gefi'ihlsvermogen der neueren PsycJiologie. (Freiburg, 1885.) See
especially §§ 1—5 and 83—100. The attacks on the Faculties are
also exhaustively dealt with by Pesch, Instit Psych §§ 383—390.
On the nature of Faculties, cf. Suarez, De Anima, Lib. II. c. i. and
Metaph. Disp. 18, sect. 3; Gutberlet,. D/^ PsycJiologie, pp. 3—8;
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theories, Vol. II. pp. 10—13; Mercier,
Psychologic, pp. 490 — 494.

1-5 This account of the relations subsisting between cognition,
feeling, and appetency, which we believe to represent the view
of St. Thomas, embraces the elements of truth possessed by
both Hamilton and Dr. Bain in the controversy on the subject.
Hamilton is right in holding that the cognitive or apprehensive
form of consciousness is the most fundamental, and that feeling,
i e., pleasure or pain, is dependent on the former, whilst desire is
a still later result. There is thus some foundation for his assertion
that consciousness is conceivable as cognitive energy void of
pleasure and pain, whilst the latter cannot be conceived unless
as a quality of the former. On the other hand, through not
recognizing the difference between sensuous and intellectual cogni-
tion, he falls into the error of supposing that the latter, and some-
times even that peculiarly reflex form of it which is known as
self-consciousness, is necessarily prior to sensuous pleasure and
pain. Dr Bain maintains feeling to be the primordial element, but
under this term includes both the pleasurable and painful aspects^ of
conscious states, and certain sensations. He is right in holding
sensuous life in general to be prior to rational life, but wrong in
making feeling under the form of pleasure or pain antecedent to or
co-ordinate with cognitive sensibility.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Book I.

Empirical or Phenomenal Psyciiolo';y,

Part I. — Sensuous Life.

CHAPTER IV.

SENSATION.

Sensation : Sense and Sense-organ. — The most
fundamental and primitive form of conscious life is
sensation. Such being the case, sensation cannot,
properly speaking, be defined. It may, however, be
described as an elementary psychical state aroused
in the animated organism by some exciting cause.
A sensation is thus a modification, not of the mind
alone, nor of the body alone, but of the living
being composed of mind and body. The power oi
experiencing sensations in general is termed saisibi-
lity, while the capacity of the living being for a
particular species of sensations is called a sense.
The special portions of the organism endowed witli
the property of reacting to appropriate stimuli so as

SENSATION. 43

to evoke these particular groups of sensations are
called sense-organs. A being capable of sensations is
described as sentient, or sensitive; and the term
sensuous may be applied to all those mental^ states
which are acts, not of the soul alone, but of the
animated organism.

Excitation of Sensation. — The excitation of a
sensation usually comprises three stages. First,
there is an action of the physical world external to
the organism. This action, transmitted in some
form of motion to the sense-organ, gives rise there
to the second stage. This consists of a molecular
disturbance in the substance of the nerves which
is propagated to the brain. Thereupon, a com-
pletely new phenomenon, the conscious sensation,
is awakened. The nature of the external agencies
which arouse sensation is the subject-matter of the
science of Physics ; the character of the process
within the organism which precedes or accompanies
the psychical state is studied by the science of
Physiology ; while the investigation of the conscious
operation itself is the function of Psychology. In
describing the action of the senses later on, we will
say a brief word on the physical and physiological
conditions of each in particular, but a few very
general remarks on the nature of the physical basis
of conscious life as a whole may be suitable here.

1 We employ the word mental, as equivalent to conscious. In this
sense, it is applicable to all states of consciousness, whether cogni-
tive or appetitive, sensuous or supra-sensuous. The usage of those
scholastic writers who would make this adjective synonymous witli
intellectual, seems to us inconveniently narrow, and too much opposed
to common language.

44 SENSUOUS LIFE.

The Nervous System. — The nervous apparatus of the
animal organism is two-fold — the sympathetic system, and the
cerebrospinal system. Whilst the former controls organic or
vegetative life, the latter constitutes the bodily machinery of
our mental states. The cerebrospinal system itself is also
composed of two parts or subdivisions, the central mass,
and the branches which ramify throughout the body. The
central mass, called the cerebro-spinal axis, is made up of
the brain and the spinal cord passing from it down through
the backbone. The spinal cord consists of a column of white,
fibrous matter, enclosing a core of grey, cellular s ibstance.

From the spinal cord, between every two vertebrae, there
issue forth two pairs of nerves. The nerves proceeding from
the front of the spinal column are called the anterior, efferent,
or motor nerves, inasmuch as they are the channels employed
in the transmission of impulses outwards, and are thus the
instruments of muscular movement. The nerves coming from
the back of the spine are called the afferent, or sensory
nerves, because by their means the molecular movements
which give rise to sensations, are conveyed inwards from
the various organs of the body. The strands of nerves
dividing and sul)dividing as they proceed farther from the
trunk branch out into the finest threads through all parts
of the skin, so that it is practically impossible to prick any
place even with the finest needle without injury to some
nerve. The entire surface of the body is thus connected
with the brain through the spinal cord by an elaborate
telegraph system. {See illustrations at the beginning of the book.)

The Brain. — The brain itself is divided into several portions
or organs, the functions of which are, however, in many cases
but obscurely apprehended. Amongst the chief are the following:

1. The medulla oblongata, which is situated at the root of
the brain where the spinal cord widens out on entering the
skull. It is, in fact, the prolongation of the spinal cord. From
it proceed the nerves of the face and those governing the
actions of the heart and lungs. Hence the fatal nature of
injuries in this quarter.

2. Higher up and projecting backwards over this into the
lower part of the back of the sknll is a large, laminated mass,
forming the cerebellum. Its precise functions are still much
disputed, but it seems to play an important part in co-
ordinating locomotive action.

3. Above and in front of the medulla oblongata is a quantity
of fil^rous matter which from its shape and position has been
called the " bridge " ov pons varolii.

4. Above all there rises the cerebrum or large brain,
exceo:ling in size all the other contents of the skull. It

SENSATION. 45

includes several well-differentiated parts lying at its basement,
the chief of which are the corpus striaiuni, the optic thalamus,
the corpus callosum, and the corpora qiiadrigemina. The cere-
brum consists mainly of a soft, pulpy substance of mixed grey
and white matter, the former being composed of vesicles or
cells, the latter of fibres^ The surface has a very convoluted
or crumpled appearance, caused by a large number of fissures.
One great furrow, called the median fissure, running from the
front to the back of the head, divides the cerebrum into two
nearly equal corresponding parts, the right and left hemispheres.
Lesser clefts, the chief amongst which are the Sylvian fissure,
and ihe fissure of Rolando, subdivide the two hemispheres into
lobes or districts, each containing several convolutions. The
nerve-cells in the upper cortical surface of the cerebrum
seem to be specially instrumental in the memory, or retention
and reproduction of sensory and motor impressions.

The human brain, when it has reached maturity, exceeds
that of all the lower animals in the richness of its convolutions.
These latter seem to increase the efficiency of the brain as
an instrument of the mind, perhaps, by largely augmenting
its superficial area. It is thickly interlined throughout with
small blood-vessels, and though ordinarily less than one-
fortieth of the weight of the body, it receives nearly one-fifth
of the whole circulating blood. Mental operations, as is well
known, exhaust a great deal of nervous energy, and vigorous
intellectual activity requires a plentiful supply of healthy
blood to this organ.

Nerves branching mto different parts of the head are
given off from the centre of the base of the brain in pairs.
The first pair, starting from beneath the corpus callosuui and
proceeding forward form the olfactory nerves. The next pair,
having their root a little farther back in the optic thalamus,
supply the optic nerves. The remaining nerves have their
source in the medulla oblongata. The fifth pair supplies the
nerves which control the skin of the face and the muscles of
the tongue and jaws. The eighth pair, starting still farther
back in the medulla oblongata, constitute the auditory nerve.
The ninth pair go to the tongue ; and the various nerves
issuing from the spinal cord lower down form the tactual
and motor nerves of the rest of the body.

Nerve-terminals. — The external nerve-ends in the several
sense-organs are modified and arranged in various ways so as
to react in answer to their appropriate excitants. 13 ut it is
not yet agreed among physiologists how far specialization in
the structure of the different parts of the nerve-apparatus is
required in order to respond to the different forms of sensori-
stimuli.

46 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Sensori-motor action. — The ordinary process of movement
in response to sensations then is of this kind. An impression,
c.f^., tactual, gustatory, or visual, wrought upon the end-organ
of an afferent nerve, is transmitted in some form of motion to
a centre in the brain. When it arrives there a sensation is
awakened. This state of consciousness now produces an
impulse which flows back along a motor nerve and causes
some movement. Thus, if a man treads on my foot, I pull it
awa}^ even involuntarily.

Reflex-action. — A simpler form of motor-reaction, however,
is exhibited in reflex -movement. Here the impression is reflected
back along a motor nerve from the spinal cord or some
inferior centre before reaching the great terminus in the
brain, and there is an appropriate movement in response to
the stimuli without the intervening conscious sensation.
Thus, tickling the sole of the foot causes convulsive movement
even after the spine has been broken and conscious sensibility
has been extinguished in the lower part of the body.

Properties of Sensation : Quality, Intensity,
Duration. — The most prominent feature by which
sensations of the same or different senses are dis-
tinguished from each other, is that of quality. The
sensations of sound are thus of a generically different
quahty from those of smell, while the feeling of blue
is of a specifically distinct quality from that of red.
These states ma}^ also vary in tone, or pleasurable-
ness and painfulness.

Besides differing in quality, sensations may also
vary in intensity, and duration. By the intensity of
a sensation is understood its vividness, its greater
or less strength in consciousness. The degree of
intensity depends partly on the force of the objective
stimulus, and partly on the vigour of attention.
The duration of a sensation means obviously the
length of time during which it persists in existence.
This is determined mainly by the continuance of
the stimulus. The duration of the sensation is not.

SENSATION.

however, always either equal to or simultaneous
with that of the stimulus. A certain brief interval
is always required between the irritation of the
organ and the birth of the mental state, and the
latter continues for a shorter or longer period after
the cessation of the former. A certain lapse of
time is consequently necessary between two succes-
sive excitations in order that there be two distinct
sensations. Thus, in the case of sight, if the action
of the stimulus be repeated oftener than five times
in the second, it ceases to be apprehended as a
series of separate events, and instead, one con-
tinuous sensation is aroused. The ear can distin-
guish as many as fifteen successive vibrations in the
second, while the recuperative power of taste and
smell, after each excitation, is far lower than that
of sight.

Composite stimuli. — It is erroneous, however,
to speak of the continuous sensation produced by
these repeated excitations as a CGinpound sensation
arising from the combination of a number of simple
sensations. It is only by an inaccurate metaphor
that unextended mental states can be described as
blending, or mixing, after the manner of liquids or
gases ; and there is, moreover, nothing to show that
the supposed constituent elementary states ever
came into existence. The simplest and briefest
sensation has for its physical condition a neural
process, divisible into parts ; it would, however, be
absurd to speak of it as composite, on this account.
In the case of a continuous sensation of sound, or
colour, arising from an intermittent stimulus, the

SENSUOUS LIFE.

physical and physiological conditions may be more
complicated, but the mental state felt to be simple
must be described by the psychologist as such.^

Somewhat similarly, in the case of touch, a
certain interval of space, variable in different
portions of the body, must exist between the parts
of the organism affected by two stimuli, m order
that these may be felt as distinct. The capacity of
sensation for variation in intensity and duration has
suggested in recent times the attempt to secure
exact quantitative measurement of mental pheno-
mena, and the title of Psycho physics has been
allotted to this line of investigation.

Cognitive character of Sensation — The features
hitherto described, including even pleasantness or
painfulness, are merely aspects or accidental pro-
perties of sensation. Its essential nature lies in its
cognitive quality. The intensity, duration, and
emotional tone of a sensation, exist only as they are
known. They are of a variable and adjectival
nature. They determine and modify, but they do

2 The "objective " analysis of mental states by Mr Spencer and
M.Taine is thus illusory. If states which consciousness— the only
possible witness concerning such facts — declares to be simple, are
to be reduced to units of the character of nervous shocks, because
the action of the physical agent is of a composite character, then we
certainly cannot stop at the feeling of a " shock," as the unit. The
briefest and simplest sensation of the colour of violet, which involves
between six and seven hundred billions of vibrations in the second,
must be resolved into an incredible number of unconscious units of
consciousness, for the existence of none of which, of course, is there
any evidence A knowledge of the physical conditions of mental
states is valuable, but conscious elements affirmed to be simple by
introspection, must be accepted as such by the psychologist.
"Mental facts," as Mr. Mark Baldwin urges, "are simple states,
and they are nothing independently of the mind whose states they are."
(Cf. Senses and Intellect, pp. gS— io6; also Dr. Mivart, Nature and
Thought, 2nd Edit., pp. 89—92.) See also pp. 510—512, below.

SENSATI0>^. 4q

not constitute the essence of a sensation. A sensa-
tion is in itself an elementary mode of consciousness
of a cognitional character. Knowledge, however,
may have reference either to extra-organic, or to
intra- organic objects and events. We may be
cognizant of something other than ourselves, or of
the states of our own sentient organism, and different
censes stand higher and lower in regard to these
different fields. In sight, in the muscular sense,^
and in the tactual sensations of pressure, knowledge
of external reality is the prominent feature ; in
hearing, taste, smell, and the organic feelings, the
sensation is a cognition, which originally bore a
subjective character. In the case of these latter
faculties, the pleasurable or painful aspects of sensa-
tions frequently rise to great importance ; and on
some occasions the sensation becomes mainly a
cognition of pain, or, more rarel}^ of pleasure.

Sensation and Perception. — Tiiis distinction between the
objective and subjective import of the sentient act has caused
the two terms, sensation and perception, to be contrasted witli
each other. Sensation, as thus opposed to perception, is
variously defined to be, tlie modification of the sense viewed
merely as a subjective state, the consciousness of an affection
of the organism, or the feeling of pleasure or pain awakened
by the stimulus. Perception^ is described as the objective

" This term is used to denote the power of experiencing sensa-
tions of resistance or impeded energy and movement. Its nature
will be discussed in the next chapter.

^ The word perception, or rather, the Latin verb percipere, was
originally used in a wide sense to denote any form of apprehension
or comprehension, whether sensuous or intellectual. Later on. it
became limited to sensuous apprehension, and was employed by
Reid, in contrast to the term sensation, to designate the sensuous
cognition of something as external to us. Sensation originally meant
the process of sensuous apprehension considered as revealing to us
both itself as a subjective state, and the objective quality to which
it corresponded. By Reid it was confined to the former significa-

50 SENSUOUS LIFE.

knowledge, the apprehension of external reality given in the
sentient act ; or, as the act by which we locahze or project a
sensation or cluster of sensations, actual and possible, into
the external world. .

This separation of the two terms is convenient for bring-
ing out the difference between the developed form of cognition
exhibited by sense in mature life, and the vague kind of
apprehension afforded in the earlier acts of the sentient
powers : but the distinction is one of degree, not of kind. In
the most rudimentary sensations of pressure and of colour,
there is a cognition of something other than self, and though
rude and indefinite in character, this is still an act of objective
kTiowledge. Consequently, there is already here perception,
in the modern signification of the term. This vague act
receives exacter definition as we advance, and in later years
the quality perceived by the sense is cognized as situated in
a determinate place, and accompanied by other qualities.
Such further determinations, are, however, the result of other
sensations, and if no one of them revealed external reality to
us, the aggregate could not do so. This subject will be better
understood when we come to treat of the nature of Perception.
Some writers define Sensation as the feeling of pleasure or
pain attached to an act of sensuous apprehension, but very
few, if any, adhere consistently to this interpretation. When,
for instance, the sensations of the different senses are spoken
of, and their various properties, quality, intensity, tone, dura-
tion, and the rest, are described by psychologists, sensation
does not mean the pleasurable or painful aspect of certain
mental states, but these states themselves. It is only when
used in this narrow signification, as a feeling of pleasure or
pain, that sensation and perception can be held within certain
limits to stand in an inverse relation to each other.^

tion.and thus explained : "The agreeable odour (of a rose) which,
I feel, considered by itself without relation to any external object,
is merely a sensation. Perception has always an external object,
and the object in this case is that quality in the rose which I discern
by the sense of smell." The later sensationalists {e.s;;. Mr. Sully,
Outlines, c. vi.), inverting the doctrine of Reid and Hamilton, that
perception is the apprehension of a real external quality, describe
this act as an ejection or projection out of the mind of a sensation
carrying with it a cluster of faint representations of other past
sensations, the whole being "solidified" or "integrated" in the
form of an object. On the terms sensation and perception,
cf. Hamilton, On Reid, Note D, also Metapli. Vol. H. 93—97.

5 Hamilton explains Reid to mean by perception. " the objective
knowledge we have of an external reality through the senses ; by
sensation, the subjective feeling of pleasure or pain with which the

SENSATION!. 51

The modification of a sensuous faculty is thus,
in its simplest form, of a percipient character, and
in the case of vision and touch, the sensation from
the beginning possesses a certain objective refer-
ence. A sensation viewed in this way as a modifi-
cation by which the mind is made cognizant of a
material quality of an object, was called by the
schoolmen a species sensibilis.

The Scholastic Doctrine of Species.— The doctrine of
species has been attacked and ridiculed by man}- modern
writers, and this in a manner which sfiows how widespread
and profound, even amongst students of philosophy, is the
ignorance regarding the most familiar terms of scholastic
writers. Democritus and Epicurus formerly taught that we
know objects by means of minute representative images which
stream off from their surface, and pass into our soul through
the channels of the senses. The Latin word species, meaning
an image, was used by their Roman disciples to signify these
volatile images. Aristotle and his followers, however, rejected
the theory of a physical efflux of species, and taught instead,
that objects effected modifications in the mind by acting on
the sense-organs through motions in the intervening media.
The term species was later on employed to denote these modi-
fications by which the mind is made to apprehend the exterior
object. In this sense, which is that accepted by the greatest
philosophers of the middle ages, such as St. Thomas, Albertus

organic operation of sense is accompanied," and adopting this view
he enunciated the law that above a certain point the stronger the sensa-
tion the iveakcr the perception, and vice versa. He seeks to establish
this general opposition by a comparison (a) of the several senses,
and {b) of different impressions within the same sense. Confined to
sensuous apprehension, the formula seems to be approximately true,
although it is pain rather than pleasure which interferes with
cognition. As a generalization applicable to higher intellectual
forms of cognitive activity, it does not hold. Consciousness is not,
as Hamilton seems to imply, a fi.xed quantity where increase in
cognition involves decrease in feeling. This is in direct opposition
to the doctrine adopted by Hamilton himself from Aristotle, that
pleasure is a reflex of mental energy. In the view of the Greek
philosopher, keen and intense pleasure accompanies vigorous
intellectual activity, and the greatest and best pleasure is the
necessary sequela of the exercise of the highest form of cognitive
energy. (Cf. Hamilton, Metaph. pp. 93 — 105.)

52 ■ SENSUOUS LIFE.

Magnus, and Scotus, the species is not an entity which ha&
immigrated into the mind from the object, but a modification
or disposition awakened in the mind by the action of the
object. They teach, moreover, that this mental modification
is not what is primarily perceived in the act of simple appre-
hension. The mind, they hold, directly tends towards the
objective reality; and only by a reflex or concomitant act does
it cognize the mental state as such. With them. Species non
est id quod primo percipihir, sed id quo res percipitur. It is the
medium vel principium quo, non ex quo, res cognoscitnr. In other
words, the species is not an intermediate representation from
which the mind infers the object, but a psychical modification
by which the mind is lii^ened, or conformed, to the object, and
thus determined to cognize it.°

Intentionalis. — The adjective intentionalis was added to the
term species to signify that the cognition, though truly reflecting
the external object, does not resemble it in nature. The
mental modification was held to be merely a psychical or
spiritual expression of the material thing. Resemblance is of
many kinds. A photograph, or a statue, is, in a certain sense,
utteily unlike a man formed of flesh and blood; the blind

^ If the primary object of cognition were the mind's own unex-
tended modification, idealism and relativism would be inevitable.
" Qnidam posuerunt, quod vires, quae sunt in nobis cognoscitivae
nih 1 cognoscunt, msx proprias passiones, puta, quod sensus non sentit
nisi passionem sui organi, et secundum hoc intellectus nihil intel-
ligit, nisi suam passionem, scilicet speciem intelligibilem in se
receptam ; et secundum hoc species hujusmodi est ipsum quod intelli-
gitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. Primo
quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt
scientiae ; si igitur ea, quoe intelligimus essent solum species quae
sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus,
quae sunt, extra animam, sed solum de speciebus inttlligibilibus quae
sunt in anima. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquoruni dicentium,
omne quod videtur, esse verum ; et similiter quod contradictoriae
essent simul verae ; si enim potentia non cognoscit ni^i propriam
passionem, de ea solum judicat . . . puta si gustus non sentit nisi
propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens sanum gustum judicat mel
esse dulce, vere judicabit; et similiter si ille, qui habet gustum
infectum, judicet mel esse amarum vere judicabit ; uterque enim
judicabit secundum quod gustus ejus aflicitur. . . . Et ideo dicen-
dum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo
intelli£;it intellectus. . . .

" Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum
eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem qua
intelligit. Et sic species intellecta sccundario est id quod intelligitur.
Sed / J ^7/oi intelligitur /n/«c) est res cujus species intelligibilis est
simiUtudo." {Sum. la. q. 85. a. 2.)

SENSATION. 53

man's representation of a circle by the sense of touch, is very
different from the visual image of the same figure ; the intel-
lectual ideas aroused by the words, "equality," "colour,'^
"square," must be widely divergent from both the image and
the reality to which they correspond. Yet, in spite of these
unlikenesses, there exist genuine relations of similarity
between such pairs of things as those just mentioned. The
scholastic writers adopting this view, taught that our know-
ledge, although in itself, as a mental activity, opposed in
nature to material reality, docs, nevertheless, truly inirror the
surrounding world. They held that though neither the tactual
nor the visual image resembles in nature the brass circular
substance presented to the sense, yet both accurately reflect
and are truly like the external reality ; and they called these
mental expressions of the object species intcntioiuilcs.

Species sensibiles et intelligibiles. — Furthermore, as the
schoolmen held the human mind to be capable of two
essentially distinct kinds of cognition, sensuous and intellec-
tual, they termed the apprehensive acts of the former species
sensibiles, of the latter species intelligibiles vel intellcctuales. In \
the genesis of the species they distinguished two moments ci 1
stages. The modification of the sensuous faculty, viewed as 1
an impression wrought in the mind by the action of the
object, was named the species impvessa. The reaction of the
mind as an act of cognitive consciousness was styled
the species expressa. The latter term designated the sensation
considered as a completed and perfect act of consciousness
elicited by the soul ; the former indicated the earlier stage of .
the process, the alteration in the condition of the mind looked \
at as an effect of the action of the object." The species proper, ^
however, whether impvessa or expressa, was an affection of the
mind. The term species corporal is was sometimes used to
signify the physical impression or movement produced by the
object in the organism, but the strict meaning of the word
species, and the only meaning of the term species intentionalis,
was the mental state. Thus, neither the image of the object
depicted on the retina of the eye, nor the nervous disturb-
ance propagated thence to the brain, but the conscious act
finally awakened, was held to be the true species or species
intentionalis.

True doctrine. — Rejecting the interpretation of the species
as roving images, and every theory conceiving them as repre-
sentations mediating between the object and the cognitive

"^ The existence of the species impvessa ]" proved by the fact of
memory. That the alteration or modification wrought in the soul by
the act of perception must persist in some form, is established by
the facility of representation and recognition

SENSUOUS LIFE.

faculty, the thought embodied in the doctrine is thoroughly
sound. Unless we are prepared to maintain that our soul
is born with all its future knowledge ready made, and wrapped
up in innate ideas, we must allow that the physical world
does somehow or ether act on our faculties, and that our
perceptions are due to the influence of material objects upon
us. The mind does not determine all its own modifications,
and the strongest volition is unable to make the deaf man
hear a word, or the blind man see a colour. But this is to
admit that the faculty is stirred into conscious life and
informed by dispositions wrought in it by the perceived object.
Further, unless we are ready to adopt the position of absolute
scepticism, we must hold that knowledge does somehow
correspond to reality. There is not a merely arbitrary con-
nexion between the object and its apprehension. The latter
is a true, though psychical expression of the former. This
subject will be more fully dealt with hereafter, but we have
said enough to justify the doctrine of species iutentionales, as
understood by St. Thomas, and the leading philosophers of
the school.^ The modern writer may prefer to describe the
perception of a triangle as a modification of the mind
mirroring or reflecting in terms of consciousness the external
object, but this is only the old doctrine in other phraseology.

Experimental Psychology. Psycho-physics.—

The ineasuremcnt of mental states. — If one ounce be added
to a weight of three ounces placed on our hand resting
upon the table, \ve can just distinguish the new sensa-
tion from the old. A single voice also makes a per-
ceptible increase in the sound when added to a musical
trio. If, however, we add a single unit to a weight of
thirty ounces or to a chorus of twenty voices, no
difference can be felt. By observing and comparing
sensations produced by stimuli varying in intensit}', a
German physiologist, Weber (1834), showed that the
incvemcnt necessary to he added to a given stimulus in order to
awaken a sensation consciously distinguishable from the former

^ Kven Hamilton confounds the maintenance of species with the
doctrine of mediate perception, and so looks on St. Thomas and the
great body of the schoolmen as representationalists or hypothetical
realists. (Cf On Reid, Note M, pp. 852 — 857.) The passage cited
from St. Thomas, p. 52, refutes the charge. For a full treatment of
the subject, see Sanseverino,D)';/</;»i7o^'^w, pp. 390 — 400; Pesch, Instit.
Psych. % 472; Boedder, Psych. Rationalis, H 255 — 260; Schiffini,
Psychologia, § 302.

SENSATION.

sensation varies with the force of the former stiniuhis. Thus,
if d represent the minimum increment that must be
added to a stimulus of the force Z in order to be felt,
there will be needed an increment of 2 ^ to a stimulus
of 2 Z to be perceived, and in general nd must be
added to n Z to cause the minimum appreciable
difference in the resulting sensation. In other words,
the minimum appreciable increment in a physical stimulus bears
a constant ratio to that stimulus, though this ratio dilfeis

for several senses. This ratio, |, is found by some
observers (though others give different results) to be in
sensations of light yj^-, in muscular sensations j\-, in
sensations of pressure, of warmth, and sound J. The
generalization has been called Weber's Law.

Continuing Weber's investigations, Fechner (1S61)
formulated the law in a more complete shape. His
main object was to find some fixed unit by which to
measure sensations. He believed l.e had discovered
■such a unit in the least observable difference between two
sensations. This he supposes to be a constant quantity
for the same sense, whatever be the intensity of the
sensations, excluding extreme limits. Any sensation of
intensity N may be conceived, he held, as equivalent to
N of these units, and may according be mathematically
■calculated in terms of the stimulus.

To take an example: "If stimulus A just falls short ot
producing a sensation, and if r be the percentage of itself
which must be added to it to get a sensation which is barely
perceptible — call this sensation i — then we should have the
series of sensation-numbers corresponding to their several
stimuli, as follows :

Sensation o — stimulus A
Sensation i = stimulus A (i+r)
Sensation 2 = stimulus A {i + r)^
Sensation 3 — stimulus A (i +rf

Sensation n = stimulus A (i + r) n

The sensations here form an arithmetical series, and the

.stimuli a geometrical series. ... So that we may truly say

(assuming our facts to be so far correct) that the sensations

vary in the same proportion as the logarithms of their respective

.stimuli. And we can thereupon proceed to compute the

56 SENSUOUS LIFE.

number of units in any given sensation (considering the unit
of sensation to be equal to the just perceptible increment
above zero, and the unit of stimulus to be equal to the
increment of stimulus r, which brings this about) by multi-
plying the logarithm of the stimulus by a constant factor
which must vary with the particular kind of sensation in
question. If we call the stimulus R and the constant factor

C, we get the formula :

S = C Log. R.

which is what Fechner calls the Psychophysisclie Maas-
foriuci:''-^ The outcome, accordingly, of these investigations
is sunnned up in the so-called psycho-physical law: To increase
the intensity of a sensation in arithmetical progression, e.g., as
I, 2, 3, 4, the stiniiilus must be increased in geometrical progression,
e.g., as I, 2, 4, 8, or, the sensation increases as the logarithm of
the stimulus.

The absolute sensibility of an organ, or part of an
organ, is measured by the minimum perceptible
stimulus, or that which just rises above the threshold of
consciousness. ^^^ The absolute sensibility of the skin to
tactual pressure varies in different parts from -002 to
•015 of a gramme; the absolute sensibility of the skin
to changes of temperature varies from -2° to -9° Centi-
grade, the skin being about 30° Cent. ; that of hearing is
the sound of a ball of cork, i milligramme weight,
falling on a vibrating plate from a height of i milli-
metre, at a distance of 91 mm. from the ear; that of

9 James, Vol. I. pp. 538, 539.

''"This "absolute sensibility" is ascertained by gradually
increasing an imperceptible stimulus, or by diminishing a clearly
perceptible one till it just reaches the margin. Similarly, the
minimum observable difference can be obtained either by starting with
two equal stimuli and progressively unequalizing them, or by
begnining with easily distinguishable stimuli and reducing the
difference until they are barely discernible. To eliminate the errors
incidental to such delicate appreciations, the experiments are multi-
plied and combined in various ways, and also corrected by the
ordinary scientific methods of measurement such as that of average
errors or that of correct and mistaken cases. Thus, if two stimuli differ
by less than the minimum observable difference, true and false guesses
as to which is the stronger tend to be about equal ; but as soon as
the difference begins to exceed the minimum limit, the correct
judgments rapidly exceed those which are erroneous. (See E.
Scripture, The Neiu Psychology, c. iii.; Ladd. op. cit. p. 3O4; James.
ibid. Vol. I. pp. 540, 541.)

SENSATION. 57

sight, the ^ Jy of the Hght reflected by white paper under
the full moon. 11

When the stimulus has reached a certain intensity,
further increase produces no appreciable difference in
the sensation. This maximum stimulus measures the
Jieight of sensibility of the sense; and the interval between
the threshold and this point has been termed the range of
the sensibility of the sense.

Criticism. — The professed object of this line of
investigation is to introduce quantitative measurement
into Phenomenal Psychology, and so to reduce this
branch of mental philosophy to the condition of an
exactscience. Now, whilst we readily admit that great
care and ingenuity has been exhibited in carrying out
these experiments, and that many of the facts established
are curious and interesting, we believe that the advocates
of Psycho-physics mistake and seriously exaggerate the
value of that branch of study.

1. In the first place, it may be objected that the
fundamental assumption on which Fechner's scheme of
measurement rests is untenable. The so-called least
observable differences of sensation, or more correctly the
Judicial acts by which we discriminate barely distinguish-
able impressions, are not constant equal quantities of
consciousness. Still less can it be proved that every
sensation is a definite multiplication of such units. i'

2. Next, it is only a small part, and that the lowest
and most unimportant part of mental life, that can be
at al approached by the instruments of this science.
Emotions, volitions, and all intellectual processes are
obviously beyond the reach of any form of quantitative
me surement. Even, then, if psycho-physics had
attained the utmost hopes of its supporters, and if
— what appears equall}^ unlikely — these supporters
became agreed as to their results, our knowledge of
mental life would not really be thereby much advanced.

3. Again, there may be raised an objection against

11 Unfortunately the figures given by different observers vary.

'- Cf Ladd, ihld. pp. 361, 362; Lotze, MdapJiysic, §§ 25S, 259;
James, ibid. p. 54G. On the other side, cf Wundt, Hiiiuan and
Animal Psycholvvy (Eng. Trans.), pp. 20— Co.

58 SENSUOUS LIFE.

the conclusions of psychophysicists even within the re-
stricted sphere of sensational consciousness, an objection
which strikes at the possibility of any kind of quanti-
tative estimate of mental phenomena. An assumption,
involved in all Fechner's experiments, and lying at the
root of his chief psychological law, implies that while
sensation increases in quantity or intensity, the quality
remains unaffected. A locomotive of twenty-horse
power can drag a load twice as heavy as an engine
of ten-horse power. The force exerted in such a case
may be rightly described as double in quantity yet
similar in quality. But we can hardly say this as
regards the energies of mental life. Sensations of light,
sound, temperature, and the rest, increased in intensity,
do not appear to preserve the same (pality of con-
sciousness. The transition from black to white, from
hot to cold, from the trickling of the fountain to the
roar of the waterfall, is not merely a variation in
quantity. In small increments, the alteration in
quality may escape notice, but when the effects of
large changes in the degree of the stimulus are
compared, introspection seems to affirm changes of
quality as well as of quantity.

4. Finally, these difficulties are reinforced by serious
attacks from careful observers, who question the truth
of the alleged results on the evidence of direct experi-
ence. Thus, Hering, for example, rejects the Weber-
Fechner generalization on the grounds, (a) that admit-
tedly its application has to be limited to a very narrow-
range above and below normal stimulation, and {b) that
it is completely " inapplicable either to taste or smell,
to heat, to weight, or to sound, and that therefore it
has not the character of a general law of sensibility."^-^

Interpretation of the Weber-Fechner Law. — Why, it may

be asked, does the sensation increase more slowly than its

'^ Ribot, La PsycJwlope AUcmandc, p. ig6. Chapter v. of that
work contains a good reaumc of the subject. See also, Ladd's
Physiological r.\YcJio!of;y, I't. II. c. v. The reader of that chapter will
notice how much disagreement prevails regarding the figures. Of
scholastic writers on this subject, see Gutberlet, Die Psychologic,
pp 34—41 ; Mercier, Psychologic, pp. 148 — 154; Farges, L^ Cerveaii
et I'Aine, pp. 209—226.

SENSATION. 59

objective excitant ? Fechner answers that his f,'enerah;cation
is an ultimate law describing the relation between physical
stimuli and ps3xhical reaction, or between body and soul.
The intensity of the nervous change transmitted to the brain
increases, he supposes, in direct proportion to the physical
stimulus, but the sensation only in proportion to the logarithm
of the latter. It must, therefore, be conceived as an ultimate
psycho-physical law for which no further explanation can be
demanded.

Others give 2i physiological interpretation to the generaliza-
tion of the facts in so far as this holds good. It is, they
assert, not an ultimate expression of the relation betweeia
mental and material action, but a law describing the relations
between the external physical stimulus and the nervous
action which reaches the brain. The conscious reaction in
this view increases in direct proportion to the intensity of the
final physiological stimulus, but the latter increases more
slowly than the physical stimulus, owing to the augmentation
of resistance and friction as the sphere of nervous disturbance
becomes larger.

Finally, others seek to explain the law psychologically,
maintaining that it expresses neither the relation between the
physical and the psychical change, nor between the former
and physiological action, but between the sensations and our
powers of discriminating them. All appreciation, according
to these writers, is relative to existing states. The differences
between mental states have their value determined by their
relation to these states, diminishing in proportion to the
intensity of the latter. ^^

Whilst the reality of the law is subject to such serious
dispute, speculation as to its interpretation appears to us
neither very hopeful nor profitable, but the physiological
explanation seems to give a sufficient account of the facts.

Psychometry : Reaction-time. — If a harpoon be
stuck in the tail of a whale an appreciable interval
elapses before the tail is moved. The impression, in
fact, requires time to be transmitted along an affcvent
nerve to the whale's brain before the whale becomes
conscious of the pain, and another period is needed for
the transmission of an impulse back from the brain
along a motov nerve to set the tail in motion. The
whole interval is called reaction-time.

A similar phenomenon is observed in the case of

" Cf. Wundt, i}}id. pp. 59—64.

6o SENSUOUS LIFE.

human beings in regard to impressions on the several
senses. In recent years ingenious psycho-metrical
instruments have been invented, and a great number
of elaborate experiments have been made to determine
accurately the reaciioii-time with respect to different kinds
of sensation. The general plan pervading the various
methods of expermient is the stimulation of some sense-
organ to v.-hich the subject responds by a sign the
instant he apprehends the sensation. ^'^ The experiment
can be varied so as to involve simpler or more complex
operations. Thus the subject, who is blindfolded, is
asked to press an electric button as soon as he feels a
tap on either knee, whilst a finely graduated time-
keeper measures, to the one-hundredth part of a second,
the interval between the tap and the signal. Next he
is asked to press the button only when the right knee is
tapped, remaining quiet if the left is touched ; or he is
requested to signal with the other hand if he feels the
sensation in his left leg. The act of choice here intro-
duced considerably lengthens the process. Similar
experiments are made in regard to the time occupied in
apprehending and discriminating various sensations of
colour, sor.nd, taste, and smell.

Tlie entire process between the impression and the
motor sign has been analyzed into several stages,
amongst vh'ch the following may be easily distin-
guished:^^ (i) The excitation of the end-organ of the
sense sufficiently to start the neural change. (2) The
conduction of this neural change along the centripetal
or afferent nerves to the brain. (3) The transformation
of the sensory impression into the motor impulse.
(4) The transmission of this motor change back along
efferent nerves to the appropriate muscle. (5) The
excitation and contraction of this muscle in the signalling
action.

Of tliesc stages only the third is a psycho-ph3sical
event. All the others are physiological, and as their
duration can be approximately determined by various

^^ A full description and numerous illustrations of these various
psycho-niclv'-'i] machines are given by E. Scripture, op. cit.
^ '^ Cf. I dJ '>p. cit. p. 470; James, op. cit. p. 88.

SEMSA TtON. 6t

experiments and then climinatccl, the lengtli of the
strictly psycho-physical portion of the whole reaction,
it is alleged, may be estimated.

Wundt gives as average total reaction-time of a
series of experiments, for impressions of sound, 0-128 of
a second; for light, 0*175; for touch sensations, o-i88.
But Exner, Hirsch, and others give different figures.
Study of these investigations goes to prove that the
reaction-time varies much with different individuals.
On this fact is based the "personal equation" of
different observers which have to be taken into account
in certain delicate astronomical observations. Further,
it seems clear that practice shortens the reaction-time
very considerably, and that expectant attention also
diminishes it. On the other hand, fatigue increases it ;
intensity of stimulus, too, causes a difference ; the
v/eather, the general health of the individual, and the
nature of the stimulus also modify the rapidity of
the reaction.

Many writers exhibit a laudable enthusiasm for this
new department of investigation. We confess, however,
we cannot share in their hopeful expectations of psycho-
logically valuable future results; nor does the character
of those yet reached justif}^ the very roseate anticipations
entertained. For these experiments after all furnish
physiological rather than psychological information. They
measure the speed or intensity of nervous processes
with which certain mental operations may, or may not,
be concomitant ; but they throw no real light on the
quality of these latter. They are in no true sense a record
of the rapidity of thought, and if employed as a means of
measuring intelligence or mental development, they are
utterly misleading. They may indeed help to indicate
the delicacy or discriminative sensibility of the sense-
organs and nervous system, but the extent to which the
reaction-time can be shortened by a little practice and
other slight alterations of tlie conditions proves what
a ver}^ insecure standard it would be even in this
respect.^''

^■^ Mr. Sully writes: "Those researches show that mental
capacity in general grows between the age of six and seventeen — at

62 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Readings. — On the physiology of the nervous system, see any of
the elementary text-books of Physiology. Carpenter's Mental Physio-
logy, c. ii., and R. S. Wyld's Physics and Physiology of the Senses,
Pt. IV. treat the subject well, with special reference to Psychology.
However, by far the best and most exhaustive work on the physio-
logical conditions of mental life, which has yet appeared in English,
is Professor Ladd's Elements of Physiological Psychology. The German
reader will find an able and interesting treatment of the whole
subject of sensation by Gutberlet, Die Psychologic, pp. 12—48. On the
history of the terms sensation and perception, cf. Hamilton, Meta-
physics, Vol. II. pp. 93 — 97, and Notes and Dissertations on Reid, Note
D. The subject of species is treated in all the Latin manuals ;
perhaps, Sanseverino's Dynamilogia, pp. 373 — 403, is amongst the
best. Suarez, De Anima, Lib. III. cc. 2, 3, discusses the matter at
length. See also J. Rickaby, First Principles, pp. 8, seq. An admir-
able exposition of the Scholastic doctrine of intellectual knowledge
by means of specks is contained in Kleutgen's Philosophic der Vorzeit,
U 18-52.

first quickly, then more slowly, &c." [Teachers' Handbook of Psychology,
p. 94, 4th Edit. ; cf. Scripture, loc. cit. pp. 134, 169.) The value of
such experixnents as a standard of " mental capacity " is evinced by
the fact that the reaction-time of a pauper, aged 77, experimented
on by Exner, was reduced by a little practice from 0-9952 to o 1866
of a second ! The explanation is simple enough. The " mental
capacity " of the old man was pretty much the same at the end as
at the beginning of the experiments, but his nervous apparatus had
acquired the " knack " or facility of reacting in less than one fifth
of the original time. Similarly, children may exhibit varying
aptitudes, inherited or acquired, in regard to such operations, as
they may vary in their power of acquiring any ordinary reflex-
action, with little or no relation to their intellectual ability. On
the whole subject, cf. James, Vol. I. c. iii. and Ladd, Part II.
c. viii.

CHAPTER V.

THE SENSES.

How many External Senses ? — A group ci
sensations containing a number of features in
common are assigned, we have said, to a special
sense. The question may now be raised, how many
senses have we ? There has been a good deal of
disagreement on the point among modern writers,
but the decision arrived at does not seem to us to
be of very much importance, provided that the
various forms of sensibility be recognized. The
specialization of the organ, the nature of the
stimulus, and the quality of the consciousness, have
each been advocated as the true principle of classi-
fication, and different plans have consequently been
drawn up.^ In favour of the old-fashioned scheme

^ Following Kant, Hamilton styles the five special senses the
sensus fixus, and adds to them a sixth general sense, the sensiis vagus,
common feeling, the vital sense, or aen^Fstiesis, embracing the feelings
of temperature, shuddering, health, muscular tension, hunger, and
thirst, &c. Dr. Bain's scheme stands thus: a. Muscular sense.
B. Six classes of organic sensations: (i) of muscle, (2) of nerve,
(3) of circulation and nutrition, (4) of respiration, (5) of temperature,
(6) of electricity, c. The five special senses. G. H. Lewes empha-
sized the importance of the systemic sensations, e.g., feelings of
digestion, respiration, temperature, circulation, &c. Mr. Murray,
who adheres consistently to distinction of organ as his principle
of division, gives this classification : I. The Five Special Senses.
II. General Senses, a. Connected with a single organ: (i) muscular

64 SENSUOUS LIFE.

of the five senses, taste, smell, hearing, sight, and
touch, it may be urged that it recognizes the obvious
structural differences of organ, to a great extent the
most marked differences in the quahty of the con-
sciousness, and also generic differences in the
phenomena apprehended. The eye reveals to us
colours, the ear sound, the nose smell, the tongue
taste, and touch pressure. In the language of the
schools, the formal objects of the several senses are
generically different. However, if this classification
be adopted, it must be remembered that under the
sense of touch are comprised many groups of mental
states importantly different in quality, and frequently
attached to parts of the organism of very specialized
character.

Method of Exposition. — The most convenient
order of procedure will be to start from the simpler
and more easily described faculties, and to go on
gradually to those of a higher, more varied and
complex nature. In our exposition we will adopt
the usual plan of saying a few words on the formal
obj-ect of each sense, on the physiological machinery
employed, and on the character of the consciousness
awakened. In dealing v/ith this last phenomenon,
which is the proper subject-matter of Psycholog}',

sensations, (2) pulmonary sensations, (3) alimentary sensations.
B. General sensations not confined to a single organ: (i) of tem-
perature, (2) of organic injuries, &c., (3) of electricity. The true
principle, however, if it could be satisfactorily applied, would be
the quality of consciousness. Differentiation of organ is an extrinsic
physiological consideration. Still the difficulty of determining how
much qual'.tative difference justifies the assumption of a special
s'.ose renders the former princiyli of little value once we depart
from th.e old scheme oi five senses.

THE SENSES. 65

the two chief features to be attended to are what
have been styled the emotional and the intellectual
aspects of the sense. By the former is meant, the
susceptibiHty of the faculty to pleasure or pain ; by
the latter, its efficiency as an instrument of know-
ledge of the external world. The use of the epithet
*' intellectual," however, is very inaccurate here,
and still more so when applied to individual sensa-
tions. The Intellect is a faculty essentially distinct
from sensuous powers, and its activity, just as that
of any of the senses, may possess a pleasurable or
painful character. It will accordingly be more
appropriate to term this property of a sense or
sensation its cognitional aspect.

Taste. — Physiological conditions. — The formal
object of the sense of taste is that quality in certain
soluble substances in virtue of which they are called
sapid. The organ of taste is the surface of the
tongue and palate. Over these surfaces are dis-
tributed the gustative papillce, from which nerves
proceed to the brain. In order to excite the sensa-
tion, the body to be tasted must be in a state of
solution in the mouth. The precise nature of the
action of the sapid substance on the papillae is
unknown, but it is probably chemical.

Sensations. — The sensations of this faculty do not
possess such definite qualitative differences as to
fall into well-determined groups, and consequently
there is no general agreement in the classification
of different tastes. The proper pleasure of the
sense is sweetness; its proper pain bitterness. Most

66 SENSUOUS LIFE.

gustatory sensations involve elements of tactual,
nasal, and organic feelings. Thus, acid, alkaline,
fiery, and astringent tastes, are in part the effects
of tactual stimulation ; feelings of relish and disgust
are traceable to the sympathy of the alimentary
canal ; and sensations of smell also influence our
estimation of the sapid qualities of many substances.
The cognitional value of this sense is very low. Con-
tinuous stimulation rapidly deadens its sensibility ;
its recuperative power is tardy, its sensations are
wanting in precision, and they can be but very
imperfectly revived in imagination. The main
grounds of its cognitive inferiority, however, lie in
its essentially subjective character. Abstracting
from the information afforded by concomitant
tactual sensations, taste originally gives us no
knowledge of external reality, and, consequently,
with the exception of the vague systemic feelings
of the organism, it must be ranked lowest as a
medium of communication with the physical world.
On the other hand, viewed from the standpoint
of feeling, this sense is capable of intense but short-
lived pleasure and pain. Though the lowest of our
faculties in point of refinement, and the most subject
to abuse, its great utility as a guide in the selection
of food throughout the animal kingdom is evident.

Smell. — Physiological conditions. — Odorous par-
ticles emitted from gaseous or volatile substances
constitute the appropriate stimulus of this sense.
The organ of smell is the cutaneous membrane
lining the inner surface of the nose. The action of

THE SENSES. 67

the odorous substance is probably of a chemical
character, and the simultaneous inhaling of the air
is requisite for the production of the sensation. In
the act of inhalation the stimulating particles are
drawn through the nostrils over the sensitive
surface. Even the strongest smelling substances
are not perceived as long as we hold our breath.

Sensations. — This sense resembles that of taste
in many respects. Vagueness is a marked feature
of each; continuous excitation renders both obtuse;
their recuperative power on the cessation of the
stimulus is weak; and both are originally of a like
subjective character. The close affinity of the two
faculties is exhibited in the difficulty of determining
how far the recognition of a particular substance is
due to taste, and how far to smell ; and in the
readiness with which most of the adjectives, such
as sweet, bitter, pungent, primarily qualifying
sensations of taste, are transferred to those of
smell. The attempt to distinguish port wine from
sherry, apart from sight and smell, is a familiar
method of illustrating the former. The delicate
susceptibility of smell to some kinds of stimulation
is, however, very surprising. The merest trace of
a drop of oil of roses awakes a pleasurable feeling,
and as infinitesimal a particle as the one thirty-
millionth part of a grain of musk is perceptible.
The delicacy of this faculty in the dog and other
brute animals,- as is well known, far exceeds what

- Cf. Bernstein, The Five Senses, p. 290. He says that some
animals can, when the wind is favourable, scent the huntsman
several miles away. The number and the minuteness of the volatile
particles which proceed from objects perceivable at such distances
pass comprehension.

68 SENSUOUS LIFE.

it attains in man. Just as in the case of taste, the
sensations of smell may be of an extremely agree-
able or disagreeable character. They stand higher,
however, in order of refinement. They are, too,
more easily revived in imagination ; and, being
awakened by objects at a distance, these sensations,
like those of sight, assume the character of pre-
monitory signs of other future experiences. In this
way the sense of smell comes to surpass both organic
and gustatory sensations, as an instrument of ex-
ternal perception.

Touch. — Under the generic sense of touch are
comprised a variety of classes of feeHngs widely
different from each other. Consequently, very early
in the history of Psychology, we meet wdth discus-
sions as to whether this term does not include several
specifically distinct senses. Aristotle^ called attention
both to the close relationship of taste with touch,
and to the divergent nature of sensations of tem-
perature, of softness and hardness, and of contact
proper. It would certainly seem that sensations
of temperature, differing so much in quality from
those of touch proper, awakened, moreover, by
distant objects, and seated either in different nerves
or different properties of nerve, from those of our
tactual feelings, have as strong claims to be con-
sidered the utterances of a separate sense as our

^ Aristotle, in the De Anima, II. 11. 22 — 24, holds a plurality of
senses to be contained under the generic faculty of touch. Else-
where, in the De Gen. Animalium, he seems to adopt the monistic
view. St. Thomas, however, prefers to look on these sensations
as merely differenv classes of feelings comprised under one tactua.
sense, the formal object of which has not received a definite namel
(Cf. Sum. i. q. 78. a. 3 ; also SchifTini, Disp. Mctaph. Vol. I. p. 322.)

THE SENSES. 69

gustatory states. Since, however, every proposed
subdivision of touch into separate senses appears
open to grave objections, and since the question is
really of no very great importance, the most con-
venient plan will be to distinguish and describe
separately the leading modes of sensibility included
under touch in its widest sense, without deciding
whether they should be assigned to different faculties.
These forms of consciousness are : (i) the organic
sensations, (2) the sensations of temperature, (3) touch
proper, and (4) the muscular sensations.

The Organic Sensations, Common Sensibility,
Ccenaesthesis, or the Vital Sense.— Under these
various designations are included the numerous modes
of sensuous consciousness attached to the organism as
a whole, or to particular portions of it. Their essential
function is to inform us, not of the properties of the
extra-organic world, but of the good or ill condition of
our own body. Prominent among them are the systemic
sensations, comprising those of the alimentary canal,
such as the feelings of hunger, of thirst, and repletion,
the sensations of respiration, of circulation, and such
other states as are normal to the system. In addition
to these, the chief remaining organic sensations are
those arising from disease, and from laceration or
fracture of any part of the organism. Estimated from
a cognitional point of view, the organic sensations are
of little importance. With the exception of particular
hurts, they are of an indefinite and obscure character.
They can be but very feebly reproduced in imagination.
Being in great part beyond the range of touch and
sight, they are vaguely and imperfectly localized, and
they give us practically no information regarding the
external world.* On the other hand, as sources of

^ Common sensibility has, however, great importance from an
intellectual standpoint in this respect, that it is the source of much
error. It may seriously distort men's judgments. Peace and war
have at times depended on the Prime Minister's digestion.

SENSUOUS LIFE.

pleasure and pain, they possess immense influence over
the tenour of our existence, and they are of the greatest
utihty as guardians of our physical health.

Sense of Temipersiture.— Physiological conditions.—
Diffused throughout the organism as a whole, yet
specially seated in the skin, the sense of temperature
has claims to be grouped botli with the organic sensa-
tions and with the sense of contact proper. Some
writers have maintained that our consciousness ot
temperature is dependent on a set of nerves distinct
from those employed in tactual sensation. This is not
yet absolutely proved, but that the properties of the
nerve-fibres involved are completely different^ is shown
by the fact that either class of feelings may be almost
entirely suspended, whilst the other remains compara-
tivel}^ unaffected.

Sensations. — As our consciousness of temperature is
relative to that of our own person, this sense can afford
little assurance about the absolute heat or coldness of
an external object. When the environment is of the
same temperature with that of the part of our body
exposed, we are unconscious of it. If we pass into the
chill night air from a hot room, we are keenly aware of
the change, but even before the skin of our face and
hands is reduced to the same degree of warmth as the
surrounding atmosphere, we become habituated to the
stimulus, and consciousness of temperature almost
disappears. It has been found, however, that wdthin
a moderate range, fine variations can be noticed in
comparing the temperatures of two bodies ; and the
hand is able to detect a difference of J a degree Cent,
in two vessels of water. The effect of heat or cold
increases with the extent of the surface exposed. Thus,
water which feels only comfortably warm to the hand

'' Recent ingenious experiments by Goldscheider and other
physiologists, seem to show not merely that the nervous end-
apparatus of temperature sensations differs from that of pressure
and of pain, but even that there are in the skin distinct " heat-spots "
and "cold-spots"— minute localities sensitive to heat but not to
cold, and conversely. This appears surprising when we recollect
that to the physicist heat and cold are purely relative. (Cf. Ladd,
op. cit. pp. 34^—350)

THE SENSES. ' 71

or arm, may cause severe pain if the whole person is
immersed. In extreme heat and cold, the sensation of
temperature proper disappears, and, instead, in both
cases, a like feeling of keen organic pain ensues. In
polar voyages, the sailors speak of cold objects burning
their hands. Viewed generally, this sense is of little
cognitive, but of much emotional significance. Its
appropriate pleasure lies in moderate warmth, its
specific pain in extreme heat and cold.

Sense of Contact or Passive Touch. — Physio-
logical conditions. — The organ of this sense consists of a
system of papillcd distributed over the surface of the
dermis, or under-skin, which covers the surface of the
bod3\ Above this dermis lies the cuticle or external skin,
which acts as a protection for the papillae, nerves, and
veins lying beneath. From the papillae proceed nerve-
fibrils to the spinal column and thence to the brain.
The proper stimulus of the sense of touch is simple
pressure on the external skin. In order that a sensation
be awakened, the effect of the physical excitation at
the surface must be transmitted along a sensory nerve
to the brain. If the nerve is severed above the point
of irritation, no mental state is elicited, and if an
intersected nerve is irritated above the point of sever-
ance, the cause of the sensation aroused is judged to be
at the old peripheral extremity. From this it has been
inferred that the sensation occurs not at the surface,
but in the brain or central sensorium, and that it is by
experience we come to learn the seat of the exterior
impression.*^ If this doctrine is to be interpreted as

^ The doctrine that the true seat of sensation is a Hmited
internal centre is as old as Aristotle. (Cf. St. Thomas, Comm. De
Anima, II. 11. 22, 23.) He holds there that the heart is the proper
locus of tactual sensation, the intervening flesh being only a medium
differing from the air or other external media by the fact that it is
not an accidental but a connatural instrument. That our apparent
consciousness to the contrary does not suffice to decide the question,
he shows by pointing to the fact that if a covering or rigid substance
is placed between the skin and the excitant, we then localize the
sensation at the outer surface of the new tegument, and not in the
skin. In the De Gen. Animalium, however, he seems to pass into
the other view. (Cf. also P. S. Seewis, Delia Conoscenza Sensitiva,
pp. 368 — 372.) Dr. Stockl is among the most distinguished of

72 SENSUOUS LIFE.

implying that peripheral stimuli were originally localized
by us in the brain, or that the soul is confined within
the limits of the brain chamber, and that the action of
the excitant impinges upon it there, then it must be
rejected as warranted neither by ph3'siological nor
psychological evidence. The fact, however, may be
held to show that our ability to localize impressions
is very largely due to experience, and that our original
capacity in this respect was very imperfect.

The physiological process which is the proximate
cause of sensation contains three stages. The first is
the peculiar action set up in the exterior terminals of
the nerves of the various senses. The specialization
in structure and constitution of these apparatus, which
modern Physiology has brought into prominence,
demonstrates the significance of this moment in the
operation. The second step is the transference of
the excitation by means of a molecular change along
the nerve to the brain. Here the last item in the
physical process takes place, but of its character we
know virtually nothing. On its completion, however,
the soul which animates equally every part of the
nervous system, and, in fact, every part of the organism,
reacts in the form of a conscious sensation. The
quality of this mental state is affected by the portion
of the body in which the physiological process has
taken place ; the feeling, for instance, of an impression
on the leg or the back is different from that of a similar
impression on the arm. Nevertheless, the sensation
is not definitely localized from the beginning at the
precise spot of peripheral stimulation ; the exact site
of the starting-point of the neural change is learned by
experience. This subject will, however, be discussed
more fully in a future chapter.

Cognitional Value of Touch. — The sense of touch
stands very high as a medium of external perception,
•/et its sensations possess in many respects the vague-

modern scholastic writers who support the view that sensation is
elicited, not in the external parts of the sense-organ, but in the
brain. (Cf. Empirische PsycJwlogie, § 6, n. 12.)

THE SENSES. 73

ness and want of precision wliich cliaracterize the
faculties hitherto dealt with. Thus there is compara-
tively little variety in kind among our tactual feelings
which are mainly discriminated as rough, smooth,
gentle, and pungent. They possess, however, a delicate
sensibility to differences in the intensity and duration
of the stimulus, and still more important in this con-
nexion, they are endowed with fine local characters on
account of which they come to be referred with great
accuracy to the place of excitation. By means of this
property the mind is able simultaneously to apprehend
co-existing points, cognizing them as separate ; and in
this apprehension there is the presentation of extended
space. The simplest form of tactual sensation, such as
that of the contact of a feather, does not seem to
involve the feeling of pressure, and this is sometimes
styled the sense of contact proper, but it scarcely
passes beyond the range of the organic sensations.
The vast majority of our sensations of contact are
sensations of pressure, and this element must be
included under the sense of touch.

Discriminative Sensibility. — The sensibility of the skin
to purely tactual pressure varies in different parts of
the body. If a particular point on the hand is tested,
we can, according to some writers, notice the difference
between two successive pressures when it equals the
■^^th of the original weight. Pressures on two different
hands can only be observed when one exceeds the other
by "I. The capacity of touch for local discrimination
also varies in different parts of the skin. The method
of experiment adopted by Weber, was to place the
two points of a pair of compasses on the part to be
examined, and then to widen or narrow them until the
two points could be just felt as separate. It was found
that along portions of the back and forearm the points
of the compass required to be from two to three inches
apart in order to be distinguished, whilst on the tips of
the fingers and the tongue an interval of one twelfth
and one twenty-fifth of an inch sufficed. The spaces
within which the doubleness of the stimulus is not
observed are called "sensory circles," though the figure

74 SENSUOUS LIFE.

is not generally an exact circle. The smallness of the
circle measures the perfection of the sensibility.

The consciousness of mere contact, of tactual
pressure, and, with some writers, that of temperature,
comprise the feelings which should be grouped under
touch proper. There are, also, a few other special modes
of tactual sensation, such as tickling, and itch, which
have a very well marked character of their own.
Sensations of touch cannot be very vividly reproduced
in imagination ; yet the reality of these representations
is shown by our power of comparing a present sensation
of touch, such as that of a brush or piece of silk, wdth a
recollected experience, and also by the manner in which
ideal sensations of touch are awakened by the visual
appearance of objects. We seem io see the roughness,
smoothness, or softness of objects, although, of course,
these properties can only be apprehended by touch.
This fact, too, marks the high degree of associability
possessed by these sensations. These various qualities
of the sense of touch give it great importance in the
department of objective cognition. We have not,
however, hitherto laid stress on the fact that pressure,
revealed through tactual sensations, is an influential
agent in the generation of our conviction of the
externality of the material world, just as the apprehen-
sion of co-existing points determines our assurance of
its extension. In such sensations of pressure muscular
feelings are often implied, and though passively received
impressions of contact do really involve the apprehen-
sion of something other than ourselves, yet it is when
combined with the muscular sensations, and as con-
sequent on the effort put forth by our own energy, that
their full significance in the apprehension of the reality
of the external world is realized. As a source of
pleasure the sense of touch, apart from feelings of
temperature and other organic states, ranks low. It
has, however, been selected from the beginning as the
sense most convenient for the intiiction of chastisement,
and its capacity in this respect is indisputable.

Active Touch. — The muscular or kinesthetic sensa-
iions. — Sensations of pressure are commonly blended

THE SENSES. 75

with muscular feelings of resistance on our part, and
occasionally with those of movement. These feelings of
impeded energy and of movement constitute the mani-
festations of the so-called active or muscidav sense of
modern pS3xhologists, and it is in connexion with these
that the intellectual or cognitional importance of touch
becomes most conspicuous. The difference between
the tactual and muscular consciousness of pressure will
be realized by holding up a half-pound weight on our
hand, and then placing the same weight on our hand
whilst the latter is supported by the table. In the
former case there is in addition to the tactual impression
a feeling described as a sense of effort or strain. Again,
if we allow our arm to be unresistingly moved by
another person, we shall have the passive consciousness
of pressure or contact, with also faint tactual and
organic feelings due to the changing position of the
skin, joints, and muscles. But if we ourselves move it,
instead of the passive feeling of pressure we have the
consciousness of muscular energy put forth, accom-
panied as before b}^ the faint organic and tactual
sensations due to the varying position of the limb.

Physiolog^ical Conditions. — The analysis of this state of
consciousness and the determination of the physiological
conditions of its various elements have given rise to the
Muscular Sense Controversy, an unsettled dispute in which
psychological, physiological, and pathological evidence is
invoked on both sides.

(i) One theory holds that our muscular consciousness
consists merely of a special class of tactual sensations seated
in ordinary afferent nerves in the skin and surface teguments,
the crumpling, pressure, and strain of which excite these
feelings, 'i'o this it is objected that in cases where the skin is
rendered insensible by disease or anassihetics like cocain, the
power of movement and the feeling of effort often remain.

(2) The second theory includes among the elements of our
muscular consciousness besides those of the skin, sensations
located in sensory nerves pertaining to the muscles, tendons,
ligaments, and cartilage connexions of the joints. All these
feelings, it holds, are the concomitants of in-coming nervous
processes along aff'erent nerves. They report and measure
movement, strain, or resistance already accomplished, not

76 SENSUOUS LIFE.

something to be done. Among the advocates of this view are
W.James, Ferrier, Bastian, and Munsterberg.

(3) The third theory maintains that in addition to, and
quite distinct from these incoming or peripherally excited
feelings, our muscular consciousness includes a feeling of
innervation, oi effort put fortli, the mental correlate of centrally
initiated outgoing currents of motor energy which traverse the
efferent nerves in the execution of movement or resistance.
Its chief supporters are Bain, Wundt, Ladd, Stout, and
Baldwin.

In behalf of (3) it is argued : {a) In children and young
animals there is exhibited from the very beginning a fund ot
activity and spontaneous movements originated by a surplus
of energy rather than by external stimulation. The feeUngs
attached to such primitive activity must have for their
physical basis efferent or motor discharges. (Bain.) {b) A patient
who strives to move a paralyzed limb is conscious of effort
without any sensation of movement — which does not take
place, (c) If the muscles which move the eye to right or left
are partly paralyzed, the degree of rotation needed to fixate
an object is over-estimated and its position misjudged. This
illusion proves that our estimate of the movement is measured
by the intensity of the effort or innervation which has to be
exerted, not by incoming sensations of muscular contraction
actually accomplished in the movement. (Wundt.)

In favour of (2) it is urged by W. James : (a) The
assumption of this unique active sense or feeling of innervation,
opposed in nature to all other forms of sensation, — whicli are
concomitants of afferent nervous processes — is ^'unnecessary.''''
This feeling, were it ever present, would have vanished as a
useless link. Movements due to emotions and reflex action
occur without it. {b) There is really no introspective evidence
for its existence. An anticipatory image of the complex
feeling of muscular contractions, involved in the movement
plus the volition or fiat of the will — which is not a sensation —
is the total mental state revealed by careful introspection.
{c) To the arguments based on the seeming existence and our
apparent estimate of the feeling of effort in cases of paralysis
of certain muscles where incoming sensations from them
would be impossible, it is answered that the feeling is still
really of a purely afferent character coming from the strain
of other groups of muscles, especially those of the chest and
respiratory organs, as will be noticed if we "make believe"
of shutting our fist tight, or puUing the trigger of a gun
without really moving our fingers.

We confess the question seems to us as yet not definitely
decided. The reader will find it fully discussed in VV. James's

THE SENSES. 77

Principles of Psychology, vol. ii. pp. 189 ff. 493 ff . ; and Ladd,
Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 115 ff. 218 ff.

Cognitional value. — The discriminative sensibility
of our muscular consciousness to varying degrees
of resisting force is very delicate. The duration of
muscular sensations is also finely felt. This latter
property, when we have acquired the power of esti-
mating velocity, is the chief instrument in our measure-
ment of space. A sweep of the arm lasting for a longer
or shorter time, velocity being equal, passes through
a greater or less space. Estimation of velocity is not
an original quality of muscular feeling, but is learned
by experience. Velocity has no meaning unless in
reference to space, and it is determined by th'j
quantity of space traversed in a given time. We
observe that, in a given time, a certain amount of
energy is required to move the arm over a definite
length of space, known by sight or touch. By
association the degree of impetus becomes the symbol
of the rate of velocity. The calculation of the quantity
of movement executed by our limbs through means
of the muscular feelings alone, unless in the case of
a familiar act, is generally very imperfect. If we
attempt to ascertain the size and shape of a strange
room in the dark, we shall find how vague are our
notions of our movement. Similarly, if the eyes are
closed and the arm is bared so that the tactual sensa-
tions of the sleeve are eliminated, the inadequacy
of motor estimation of space will become apparent ;
when the velocity is increased we invariably tmder-
value the distance moved through.^

The muscular sensations, like the other organic
feelings, cannot be vividly revived in imagination,
but our power of determining the exact degree of

^ The fact that our muscular appreciation of velocity is not
innate but acquired, and is at best vague and indefinite, constitutes
a very serious difficulty to writers like Dr. Bain, who resolve our
perception of space into the consciousness of unextended muscular
sensations varying in duration and velocity. The latter idea
involves the notions both of space and time, and should not be
assumed as an innate endowment, least of all by the empirical
school. (Cf. Mahaffy, The Critical Philosophy, pp. 138 — 144)

^S SENSUOUS LIFE.

energy to be put forth in the practice of habitual ^
actions, such as standing, walking, writing, speaking,
and the hke, is very dehcate. The sense of sight,
just as well as that of contact, is a heavy debtor to
these sensations. Not only the movements of the
licad and the eyes, but the still more minute changes
by which the convexity of the crystallme lens is
niodified to suit the varying distance of the object,
are all effected under the guidance and estimation
of muscular sensations, and it is only by means of
their acute sensibility that many of the nicest dis-
criminations of the visual faculty are possible.

Movement, moreover, enables us to multiply the
experiences of each sense, to vary the relations between
the object and the faculty, and to bring the most
sensitive part of the latter to bear on the former.
Consequently, the sensations which measure move-
ment play an important part in perfecting our know-
ledge of the properties of matter. Still it is the
consciousness of foreign resistance revealed in tactual
and muscular feelings combined, which forces upon
us most irresistibly the reality of the external material
world. In this respect the cognitional importance of
the united muscular and tactual sense exceeds that
of sight and all the other organic faculties together.^

Capacity for pleasure and pain.— l^he muscular feehngs
may give rise to a good deal of pleasure or pain.
When the body is in a healthy condition muscular
exercise affords keen enjoyment, as is established by
the general popularity of field sports. The proper
pain of muscular sensations is fatigue, _ and this can
l)e very severe when forced activity is maintained
under exhausting conditions. Besides these mental
states which we have described, the muscles, like
other parts of the body, can be the subject of the
pains of laceration or disease, but such feelings belong
rather to the general group of organic sensations,

" Amongst the qualities of matter made known by combined
muscular and tactual sensations are solidity, shape, size., hardness,
softness, elasticity, liquidity, &c. Consciousness of movement and
of variation in pressure are the main factors in such perceptions.

THE SENSES. 79

Hearing. — Physical and Physiological conditions. —
This sense is aroused by vibratory movements
transmitted from the sonorous substance through
the air or other medium to the ear. The organ
of hearing consists of three chief parts, the external
ear including the pinna and external ineatns, the
tympanic cavity, drum, or middle ear, and the
labyrinth or internal ear. The two extremities of
the tympanic cavity are connected by a chain of
small bones, and the labyrinth consists chiefly
of a number of small cavities, and contains a
liquid in which the auditory nerve is distributed.
The vibrations transmitted from the sounding object
are concentrated by the external ear, and passed on
through the middle ear by means of the chain of
small bones to the liquid contained in the labyrinth.
The disturbance of this substance excites the auditory
nerve, and this excitation is the immediate ante-
cedent of the sensation of sound.

Musical Sounds. — Sensations of hearing naturally'
divide into two great classes, those of musical, and
those of non-musical sounds. Another important
division is that into articulate sounds, or the words
of language, and inarticulate sounds. When these
last are non-musical they are called noises. The
musical character of the first class of sounds seems
to be dependent on the periodical nature of the
vibrations which excite these sensations. The chief
properties of musical notes besides intensity, are
pitch, quality, and timbre or clang. The pitch of a
sound means its altitude on the musical scale, and
is determined by the rapidity of the vibration.

8o SENSUOUS LIFE.

The terms timbre, clang, and sometimes musical
quality, designate the pecuhar feature by which the
sound of a note on one instrument differs from that
iof the same note on another. Thus the timbre of
the viohn differs from that of the cornet and of
the human voice. ^^ Particular combinations of notes
according to certain relations of pitch produce the
agreeable effect known as harmony. Notes which
sounded together produce instead an unpleasant
sensation, are said to be discordant and inharmonious.
Under certain circumstances, however, discords
may be pleasant. Groupings of musical sound in
particular time periods produce the consciousness
of melody, and skilful combinations of various in-
struments so as to secure harmony, melody, and
agreeable blending of timbre conspire to awaken the
delightful feelings of a rich symphony.

Non-musical Sounds. — Of the non-muiical sounds
the number which are classed as mere noises are
practically unlimited. The collisions of different
bodies, the cries of the various animals, the roaring
of the wind and of the ocean, are instances of such.
All forms of sound, both musical and non-musical,
are susceptible of discrimination in regard to
intensity and duration, as well as in regard to quality.
It is owing to the very great delicacy of the ear in
these several respects that articulate speech is an
instrument of such enormous value. More than
five successive excitations per second produce a

^'^ Helmholtz explains the different timbre of different instruments
as due to variations in the upper tones which accompany the
proper fundamental note. However, this theory cannot, as yet, be
held to be established

THE SENSES. 8l

continuous sensation in the eye, while the recupera-
tive power of the auditory nerve is so perfect that
we can distinguish sixteen impressions in the same
length of time. The rapid succession of sensa-
tions, frequently discriminated by but slight differ-
ences in character and intensity, which present to
us without fatigue the long series of syllables
constituting a speech, exhibit the wonderful per-
fection of this sense under these various aspects.^^

Sounds and Signs. — Sounds of all kinds are highly
susceptible of being conserved in the memory and
reproduced in imagination, and they are also readily
associated with other mental states. To this latter
property is due their aptness to constitute a system of
symbols. The repeated conjunction of the sound of a
name with the perception of its object causes the former
to suggest in the mind of the child the idea of the latter.
Later on, with the dawn of intellect and reflexion, words
come to be used and recognized as signs of things. In
acquiring a foreign language, the primary associations
are formed, not, as in learning our mother-tongue,
between the foreign words and the objects which they
signify, but between the former and the corresponding
terms in our own language, by the assistance of which
we ordinarily think and reason about the objects of

" A good musical ear is one that possesses a fine sensibility to
pitch, to melodious groupings of successive tones, and to symphonic
combinations of timbre. A good linguistic ear is one finely dis-
criminative of the quality of sounds, and of the varying degrees of
intensity which mark intonation or accent. As a consequence the
two aptitudes are not always united. The ear well formed to
catch the peculiar characteristics of the French, German, or Italian
languages, may be insensible to considerable differences in pitch, and
therefore unconscious of the discord effected by inharmonious com-
binations. Perfection in either line implies good individual capacity
of retention. Keen susceptibility to differences of pitch, and con-
sequently to musical harmony, may be found where the general
power of hearing is comparatively feeble, and vice versa. For a
good linguistic ear, however, general acuteness of the sense seems
requisite.

82 SENSUOUS LIFE.

experience. In commencing to read the connexion is
first formed between the visual sign and the oral
syllable or word, though gradually the intermediate
representation of the word tends to drop out of existence,
and in the end tlie written symbol immediately suggests
to us the object signified.^-

Cognitional importance of Hearing. — Notwithstanding
its very delicate sensibility as to differences in quality,
intensity, and duration, in addition to the very revivable
and associable character of its sensations, which all
conspire to give the ear such high intellectual value as
a representative faculty, it ranks very low as a direct
medium of objective knowledge. Of itself it affords no
information of the extension or impenetrability of
bodies — the two fundamental properties of matter.
Indeed, the attribute which it immediately reveals is
of purely secondary and accidental character. Never-
theless, of such a high order are the intrinsic excellences
of its sensations, and so admirably are they adapted
to compose a perfect system of signs, that, when once
a few elementar}^ experiences have been gathered by
the other senses, this faculty is enabled, by appro-
priating them, to put us into a position to take
possession of the rich treasures of knowledge acquired
by the whole human race.

Capacity for pleasure and pain. — The capacity of the ear
for pleasure is large, while its potentialities for pain are
comparatively limited. The agreeable feelings awakened
by the qualities of musical sound are of the noblest
and most refined character. They are rich in variety,
they do not pall by long continuance, and they may
be frequently renewed. In all these respects the}^
differ from the gratifications of the less refined senses.
A far greater part, however, of these higher pleasures
are traceable to intellectual and emotional enjoyment

^2 The muscular sensations excited in uttering words either
aloud or in a whisper, make a parallel line of association with the
aural and visual signs, and in persons in whom the faculty of
articulation is more retentive, or more frequently exercised in
acquisitions of this sort, thinking and reading in silence tend to be
accompanied by movements of the lips. Energetic eftort to realize
the full import of the visual sign occasions the same phenomenon.

THE SENSES. 83

afforded by the general character of a musical com-
position than to the mere sensuous satisfaction produced
by pleasant sound. Cultivation increases the refine-
ment and extends the range of this capacity for
happiness, but at the same time rendering the faculty
more keenly alive to defects and blemishes it anni-
hilates many minor pleasures possible to the less
delicate taste. Discord is painful to the musical
ear, and harsh sounds of any kind, as well as intense
noises, have an unpleasant effect on all normally
endowed persons.

Sight. — Physical and Physiological conditions. —
The formal object of the eye is coloured surface.
According to the now generally accepted undulatory
theory, the physical conditions of sight consist of
vibrations transmitted to the eye through the inter-
vening ether from the reflecting or self-luminous
body. Difference of colour depends on variation
in the rate of rapidity of the vibratory movements.
The organ of vision is an optical instrument of a
very complicated and ingenious construction. The
eye-ball is a nearly spherical body containing within
it three masses of transparent liquid or gelatinous
substances called humours, and so arranged as to
form a compound lens. The shape of the eye-ball
is secured by an outer coating called the sclerotic,
which embraces the whole eye with the exception
of the circular spot in front, where the transparent
cornea takes its place. Under the sclerotic is a
second covering, the dark choroid coat, and over the
interior surface of this towards the back of the eye
is distributed the retina. This is a transparent
network composed of several layers of fibres and
nerve cells, and connected with the choroid by a

84 SENSUOUS LIFE.

layer of rods and cones. These latter seem to be
the properly sensitive apparatus. In the centre of
the retina is the yellow spot, which is the most
sensitive part of the organ, and here the rods and
cones are packed in greatest abundance. From the
retina slightly to the side of the yellow spot the
optic nerve proceeds to the brain. Rays falling on
it are unperceived, whence it is styled the blind spot.
Of the humours filling up the main body of the eye,
the middle one, called the crystaUine lens, which is
of double convex form, is the most important. The
shape of this lens is capable of alteration, being
rendered more or less convex by the automatic
contraction or extension of the ciliary muscle to
suit the distance of the object viewed. When
something is presented to the eye, the rays passing
from it enter the pupil of the eye and are con-
centrated by the lens arrangements so as to form
an inverted image on the retina. From the layer
of rods and cones forming the inner stratum of the
retina, this impression is conveyed as a neural
tremor to the brain, whereupon the sensation is
awakened.

Sensations of Sight. — There are attached to the
eye both muscular and visual sensations proper.
The former, which measure the movement and the
greater or less convexity of the eye-ball, contribute
very much to the accurate determination of the
special relations of visible objects. The visual
sensations proper are those of light and of colour.
These are susceptible of very delicate shades of
difference, and the various hues of colour and

THE SENSES. 85

degrees in the intensity of light which can be
distinguished in a landscape are virtually innumer-
able. It has been estimated by means of some
ingenious experiments that an increase in the force
of a stimulus equivalent to about one in one hundred
can, within certain limits, be just discerned by the
eye. The principal species of colour generally
recognized are the seven hues of the spectrum, red,
orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet.
There are a large number of distinguishable inter-
mediate tints between these leading colours, and
the terms have therefore not a very exactly defined
meaning. These various hues are found to result
from the analysis of white light. The ether vibra-
tions which excite visual sensations are of enormous
rapidity, and the rate increases from about 460
billions per second, for red rays, to about 670
billions in the case of violet.

Helmholtz and others have traced analogies between the
colour spectrum and the musical scale. In point of agree-
ment we find {a) a series of seven principal colours, in corre-
spondence with the notes of the gamut, {b) both series
produced by variations in the rate of the vibratory stimulus,
and {c) both capable of certain agreeable and disagreeable
combinations described as harmonious and inharmonious.
The points of difference are however greater, {a) The
character of each of the tones of the musical octave is so
distinct and well marked as to have been recognized from the
earliest times ; the colours of the spectrum on the contrary
are vaguely defined and pass gradually into each other, many
intermediate hues having equally good claims to a recognition
in the scheme ; {b) the change in the musical octave advances
regularly in one direction, each succeeding note being farther
from the first, while in the spectrum the movement is along a
curve, and the last colour, violet, returns nearer than either
indigo or blue, to the earlier colours red and orange ; (c) the
auditory sensation rises regularly with equal increments in
the rate of vibration, whilst large changes produce no

86 SENSUOUS LIFE.

conscious effect in parts of the spectrum ; (d) the range of
vision is exhausted by a single octave, while the ear can span
from six to eight.

Composite Sensations.— PAthough. the sensation of white
is evoked by a combination of physical stimuli separately
productive of other feelings, it is inaccurate, as we have
before indicated, to speak of the consciousness of white as
being a compound or complex mental state. The sensation,
in itself unanalyzable, must be accepted as such.^ The
true type of the compound or complex sensation is that
aroused by a union of different voices or instruments,
where attention enables us to discriminate the separate
elements of consciousness. The analysis of white light,
the existence of various forms of colour blindness, of
colour harmony, and of what are called iiegative^^
images, have suggested the hypothesis that the nerves
of vision distributed in the retina are of certain different
classes adapted to respond to particular elementary
forms of colour. The theory has assumed different
forms in the hands of different scientists, but as the
question is physiological rather than psychological, w^e
need not enter into it here.^*

Tone and Depth. — The term tone is sometimes used to
express the position of a colour in the spectrum, while
depth is dependent on the quantity of pure white light

'^'•' After-mages, incidental images, or spectra, are of two kinds,
positive and negative. The former term is used to denote the images
of sensuous perceptions of objects, which frequently continue to
persist for some brief time after the cessation of the stimulus. If
after gazing steadily for a few minutes at a coloured object we direct
our eyes to a white surface, instead of the positive after-image we
become conscious of an image of the object, but in the complementary
hue. This is termed a negative image, and is explained on the
above hypothesis as due to the temporary fatigue and consequent
obtuseness of the nerves previously excited, which are now unable
to absorb their share of the new stimulus.

^* The survival of these after-images was observed by Aristotle
and the Scholastics: "Si aliquis videt aliquid lucidum ut solem,
et subito claudat oculos, non advertendo visum, sed observando
illud directe, primo apparebit ei color rei splendidae deinde muta-
bitur in medics colores successive donee veniat ad nigrum, et
omnino evanescat et hoc non continget nisi propter simulacra
splendid! derelicti in visu." (St. Thomas, Comm. Dc Somuiis, lect. 2.)

THE SENSES. 87

blended with the colour in question. The word intensity
is occasionally employed as synonymous with depth;
properly, however, it should signify the stronger or
feebler force of the sensation. In addition to the
fineness of the discriminative power of sight in these
several respects, visual sensations are in a high degree
capable of being retained in memory and recalled in
imagination. In fact, so superior in vivacity are the
representations of this faculty to those of the other
senses, that some writers have been found to deny,
but without adequate grounds, the existence of any
other kind of images. The eye, though surpassing the
other senses, is less delicately sensible to the duration
of the stimulus than the ear. The persistence of
positive after-images exhibited in the continuous im-
pressions produced by the rapid circular movement of
a bright object, prevents us from discerning more than
five or six successive excitations in the second.

Cognitional importance. — These numerous capabilities
would be sufficient of themselves to secure to sight
high cognitional rank, but it is to the fact that the eye
aftbrds an immediate presentation of surface extension^
that its fundamental importance as a source of objective
knowledge is due. The apprehension of colour neces-
sarily involves that of space in two dimensions. It is
undoubtedly true that originally the single eye, if it
remained in a fixed position, could have apprehended
but a very limited quantity of surface, that its precep-
tion of shape would have been extremely vague, and
that it could have afforded no information at all as
regards distance; but nevertheless the sensation of
colour necessarily implies some perception of extension.
The point will be made clearer when we come to treat
of the development of sense-perception ; here, however,
we would note that the means by which our visual
perceptions of shape and distance are elaborated, and
our apprehension of surface enlarged, are changes in
the position and form of the eye made known to us by
muscular sensations. The movement of the axis of
the eye round the object viewed, the convergence of the
two eyes varying with its distance, the self-adjusting

88 SENSUOUS LIFE.

process by which the optical lens is flattened or
rendered more convex so as to focus the object upon
the retina, are accompanied by faint feelings of tension
which play an important part in giving precision to
our spatial cognitions. In mature life the "local"
sensibility of the retina is very fine. Close to the
centre of the yellow spot irritations as near together as
•004 mm. are felt as distinct ; but the discriminative
power diminishes as we pass towards the circum-
ference. The size of the retinal image, of course,
decreases with the distance of the object, still this
extreme delicacy of the retina to the local character
of the irritation enables the eye to become a very
perfect instrument for the accurate appreciation of
extension.

Capacity for pleasure and pain. — As a direct source of
pleasure or pain visual sensations rank probably lower
than those of any other faculty, though indirectly they
may contribute much to our happiness. Bright lights
and hues are pleasing, and harmonious combinations
have an agreeable effect. A strong glare of light is
painful, but the feeling is organic rather than visual.
Prolonged confinement in the dark produces an intense
desire for light and great joy on first restoration to
liberty, but the pleasure soon fades. The contempla-
tion of the beauties of nature and art affords rich and
refined delight, but here the effect is of an intellectual
and emotional character, and not merely an immediate
function of the sense.

The Senses compared. — In our last chapter we
remarked on the inverse ratio subsisting between the
perceptional and the pleasurable or painful capacity of
the senses. Glancing back at them now, when they
have been separately passed under review, and their
chief features described in detail, the truth of that
observation will be realized. If we divide our tactual
consciousness into the two great groups, the organic
sensations, including the feelings of temperature on the
one side, and the muscular feelings and sensations of
touch proper on the other, and proceed to arrange
them first according to emotional, and then in regard

THE SENSES. 89

to cognitional rank, we shall find that the two schemes
will assume virtually an inverse order. Viewed as
direct sources of pleasure and pain, starting from the
highest they seem to stand thus : organic sensation,
taste, smell, hearing, muscular and tactual states, and
sight. But marshalled as instruments of objective
knowledge the order is reversed : sight, tactual and
muscular sensations, hearing, smell, taste, and lowest,
the organic feelings. This classification regards only
the immediate or direct emotional and cognitional
properties of the consciousness of each sense, and the
intrinsic difficulties of all such comparison would pro-
bably cause diversity of view about the former scheme ;
still, estimated from this limited standpoint, it seems to
us approximately correct.

Indirectly, indeed, sight is a much more important
source of pleasure and pain than the sense of smell,
and the knowledge of the universe acquired by hearing
far exceeds that gathered from the actual experience
of all our other senses combined ; but in both cases we
have merely appropriation of the results attained by
the other faculties, and extension of these results by
means of association and inference. Viewed purely
as a state of feeling, a sensation of colour or sound
can afford much less pleasure or pain than an agreeable
odour, or a nauseous stench. Similarly, the sensations
of hearing are more precise, more finely discriminable,
and more vividly revived in imagination, not only than
those of taste and smell, but even than our tactual and
muscular consciousness. Yet, inasmuch as they give
us immediately no assurance of the reality, or of the
extension of the material world, they must be ranked
cognitionally higher than taste or smell, but lower than
the combined muscular and tactual sense. Touch,
indeed, since it reveals the mechanical properties of
the world, has claims to stand even before sight as an
instrument of objective cognition, and it is certainly
more necessary ; still, the immense range of the latter
faculty, its perfect presentation of the geometrical
relations of the universe, and the delicacy of its other
cognitive capabilities have led us to place it at the head

go SENSUOUS LIFE.

of the list. We need not attempt any further justifica-
tion of the arrangement adopted, as the reader, by
returning on our treatment of the senses separately,
may ascertain the various considerations which have
led to our conclusion. ^^

The ♦' Law of Relativity."— The quality and intensity of a
sensation are affected not only by the character of its own
stimulus, but also by the quality and intensity of other simul-
taneous or immediately preceding sensations. Thus the same
water is apprehended as hot or cold if the hand has been
previously dipped in a liquid of lower or higher temperature.
The same article may feel smooth or rough, heavy or light,
according to the opposite character of the previous experience.
After tasting a bitter substance water appears sweet. The
sudden cessation of a prolonged noise has a startling effect,
as when the miller is awakened by the stopping of his mill.
A black object produces a stronger impression when seen
after or in the midst of a white field, and the several colours
are felt more deeply " saturated," that is, come out richer and
fuller when observed at the same time or immediately
subsequent to those of complementary hue. In general
contrast, whether simultaneous or successive, intensifies the
force of sensation.

On the other hand, the effect of protracted stimulation of
a sense diminishes and may finally cease to be noticed. We
are ordinarily unconscious of the contact of our clothes, of
the pressure of our own weight upon our limbs, of the
continuous hum of the city, of the smell of flowers, or of the
oppressiveness of the atmosphere in a room where we have
been for some time, and, speaking generally, of any constant
uniform excitant.

This influence of variation upon consciousness has been
called by recent psychologists the " Relativity of Sensation."
It is a well-known experience in our mental life, and a consi-
derable factor in our pleasures and pains. It was familiar to
Aristotle and the Schoolmen, who, on account of its effects,
laid down the rule that to secure correct apprehension the

'•''' Balmez, Fundamental Philosophy, Bk. II. cc. x. xi. maintains
the inferiority of touch to sight and hearing from a cognitional
point of view. He does not, however, distinguish sufficiently in
this question between the direct or immediate efficacy of a sense
and that which is merely mediate. In range and representative
power the more refined senses vastly surpass touch, but to a very
large extent their wealth is built upon the capital supplied by the
more fundamental faculty.

THE SENSES. qi

several sensuous faculties must be in a neutral or normal
condition.^*"'

But the sweeping generalization erected upon these facts
under the title of the Law of Relativity is untenable. Accord-
ing to this doctrine, at least as expounded by some of its best-
known advocates, all consciousness is merely /^^//;i^ of difference
or change. Thus Hobbes asserted that " to be always sensible
of one and the same thing is the same as not to feel at all."
Dr. Bain writes : " The Principle of Relativity, or the neces-
sity of change in order to our being conscious, is the ground-
work of Thought, Intellect, and Knowledge as well as Feeling.
. . . We know heat only in the transition from cold and vice
versa. . . . We do not know any one thing in itself, hut only the
difference between it and another thing. . . . The present sensa-
tion of heat is in fact a difference from the preceding cold."^''

Criticism. — To us it seems clear that whilst change — ■
motiis de potentia ad actum, as the scholastics termed it — is an
essential element in the aivakening of sensation, and also an
important factor in its vividness, it is, nevertheless, the very
reverse of the truth to assert that all consciousness is a
"feeling of difference." In sensation we are primarily
conscious of a positive quality, for instance, of a sound or of
a colour, not merely of the relation between two feelings.
All comparison presupposes the perception of the terms to
be compared, and the primitive act of the sense is not com-
parative, but simply apprehensive. What man's conscious-
ness would be like if he always had but one imvarying form
of sensation we do not pretend to know ; but experience
shows that we may continue aware of a uniform stimulus, for
example, of a musical note for an indefinite time if it be not
submerged or crowded out by other feelings,^^

^♦^ " Sicut tepidum in comparatione ad calidum est frigidum; in
comparatione ad frigidum est calidum. . . . Et oportet quod sicut
organum quod debet sentire album et nigrum neiitrum ipsorum
hahet actii sed utrumque in potentia; et eodem modo in aliis sensibus."
(St. Thomas, De Anima, Lib. ii. lect. 23. Cf. also Dc Somniis, lect. 2.)

^^ Cf. Senses and Intellect, p. 321 ; Emotions and IVill, p. 550 ; Body
and Mind, p. 8i ; also Hoffding, Outlines, pp. 114 — 117, and Wundt,
op. cit. pp. Ill — iig.

^^ Mr. J.Ward has forcibly argued against the supposed law:
(i) That the axiom, Idem semper sentire et non sentire ad idem recidiint,
though a truism in reference to the totality of mental life, or to con-
sciousness as a whole, is false as regards many individual impressions.
(2) That the suggested illustrations, e.g., insensibility to continuous
motion, temperature, pressure of the air, &c., are cases of physio-
logical, not psychical habituation, and so are not constant mental
impressions at all. (3) That " constant impressions" in the form

92 SENSUOUS LIFE.

The actual facts on which the " Law of Relativity " and
*' Law of Contrast " are based seem to receive a simple
physiological explanation in the enfeebling effect of fatigue
upon the sense-organ and nerves engaged. These latter
become habituated to the stimulus, and react with less energy
if the same excitation be prolonged, whilst contrasted feelings
employ fresh neural elements or other cerebral tracts.
Moreover, from the mental side uniform sensation diminishes
in interest, and attention being drawn away by rival novel
stimuli, the m.onotonous experience attracts less and less
notice.

The Relativity of Knowledge. — There is another form of the
doctrine of the relativity of consciousness, which maintains
that all our knowledge is relative to us, and that we have
accordingly no real knowledge of things outside of the mind.
This latter question will be discussed more appropriately
after we have dealt with sense-perception, and we shall treat
it under the title of the Relativity of Knowledge at the end of
chapter vii. Both doctrines are erroneous, but many writers
maintain the second without adhering to the first, although
those who adopt the first naturally adhere also to the second.

The Scholastic Doctrine of the Internal Senses. — In

addition to those sensuous faculties by which we are enabled
to perceive external objects, the mind is endowed with the
capability of apprehending in a sensuous manner, facts of a
subjective order. This power or group of powers constitutes
those modes of mental life styled by the schoolmen the Internal
Senses. The Aristotelian doctrine elaborated by the mediaeval
thinkers distinguishes four such faculties, the sensiis communis,
the vis cestimativa or vis cogitativa, the imagination, and the
sensuous memory. They were termed senses, or organic powers,

of "fixed ideas" are the very reverse of a "blank." (4) That if
every feeling were " two-fold " or a " transition," a man surrounded
by a blue sky and ocean, or passing from a neutral to a positive
state of consciousness, must be unaware of any impression at all,
which is not the fact. (5) There is, too, the old difficulty of
Buridan's ass. (6) Moreover differences, which are themselves real
presentations or objects of apprehension, are cognized, e.g., degrees
of variation in shade, pitch, pressure, &c., and therefore presuppose
the perception of the absolute terms. Mr. Ward also rightly traces
Dr. Bain's confusion on this subject to his ignoring the difference
between the mere successive or simultaneous occurrence of two related
feelings, and the intellectual perception of their relation. {" Psychology,"
Encycl. Brit. Qlh Edit. See also Mark Baldwin, Senses and Intellect,
pp. 58—61 ; W. James, Vol. II. pp. G — 20; and Farges, VObjectivitc
de la Perception, pp. 104 — 115, 202 — 208.)

THE SENSES. 93

because they operate by means of a material organ, and have
for their formal objects individual, concrete, sensuous facts.
The word internal marks their subjective character, and
the internal situation of the physical machinery of their
operations.

Sensus Communis. — The sensus communis, or common
sense, has also been styled the internal sense and the central
sense. It has been described by St. Thomas, after Aristotle,
as at once the source and the terminus of the special senses.
By this faculty we are conscious of the operations of the
external sensuous faculties, and we are made aware of
differences between them, though we cannot by its means
cognize them as different. Apart then from intellect, by which
we formally compare and discriminate between objects, some
central sense or internal form of sensibility is required, both
in the case of man and of the lower animals, to account for
the complete working of sensuous life. In the growth and
development of sense-perception, the action of this internal
form of sensuous consciousness is involved. Antecedent to
and independent of intellectual activity, the revelations of
the several senses must be combined by some central faculty
of the sensuous order, and it is this interior aptitude which
has been called sensus communis-}^

Vis Aistimativa. — The vis cestimativa, or sensuous judicial
faculty, was a name attributed to those complex forms of
sensuous activity by which an object is apprehended as fit
or unfit to satisfy the needs of animal nature. It thus denotes
that capability in the lower animals which is commonly
described as Instinct. The term vis cogitativa was sometimes

19 It has been held by St. Augustine, St. Thomas (of. Sum. i.
q. 78, a. 4. ad 2. and 87. 3. 3), and other philosophers, that no
sense can know its own states, and that, not merely for the co-
ordination of the different senses, but for the cognition of any single
sensation, an internal faculty in addition to the special sense is
requisite. Aristotle {De Anima, III. 1. 2) decides against this view
on the intelligible ground that such a doctrine would involve an
infinite series of sensuous faculties. Elsewhere, however [De Somno
et Vigilia, 1. 2), he appears to adopt the contrary theory. Suarez
argues cogently against this multiplication of faculties as unneces-
sary, and his teaching appears to us sound. No sense can have a
reflex knowledge of its own states, but this does not prevent a sense
from having concomitantly with the apprehension of something
affecting it an implicit consciousness of its own modifications. A
being endowed with the sense of touch or hearing ought to be con-
scious, it would seem, of tactual or auditory sensations without the
instrumentality of any additional faculty. (Cf. Suarez, De Anifna,
Lib. III. c. ii. and Lahousse, op. cit. pp. 160 — 163.)

94 SENSUOUS LIFE.

employed to designate the aptitude for analogous operations
in man, at other times to signify a certain mode of internal
sensibility operating concurrently with the intellect in the
perception of individual objects.-"

Sentimento Fondamentale. — The term sentimcnto fonda-
mentale, or fundamental feeling, was employed by Rosmini to
denote an assumed faculty, or form of sensuous consciousness,
by which the soul is continually cognizant of the body in which
it is present.'^^ The soul, he teaches, and not the living being
composed of both soul and body, is the true principle of this
feeling. It is by their modification of the sentimento fonda-
vientale ihdii the impressions of the special senses reveal them-
selves to the soul. The fundamental feeling, unlike the sensiis
communis of the scholastics, is held to have been ever in a
condition of activity, even antecedent to the exercise of the
special senses. " It begins with our life, and goes on con-
tinuously to the end of it." Nevertheless, it is rarely adverted
to, and considerable power of psychological reflection may be
required to discover its existence. By this feeling we have a
subjective perception of our organism ; through sight and
touch, on the other hand, we apprehend it in an extra-subjective
manner. Finally, the union of soul and body consists in an
immanent perception of the activity of this faculty.

Sensus Fundamentalis. — Tongiorgi uses the terni senstis
fundamentalis in a kindred meaning to denote an inferior form
of the sensus intimus. By the sensus intimus, he understands a
perpetual consciousness both of its own substantial existence
and of its acts, with which he maintains the soul to be
endowed. This actual cognizance of itself is essential to the

20 It was urged that intellect, the formal object of which is the
miiversal, cannot directly apprehend individual substances as such.
Nevertheless, we have intellectual knowledge of them, for we form
singular judgments, e.g. : " This plant is a rose," " Peter is a negro."
Consequently, it was inferred, there is a special form of internal
sensibility through which the concrete object is so apprehended
that by reflection upon this sensuous presentation the intellect can
cognize the singular nature of the object. St. Thomas thus describes
the operation : " Anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit
singulare, non quidem directe, sed per quandam reflexionem, in
quantum soil, ex hoc, quod apprehendit suum intelligibile, revertitur
ad considerandum suum actum et speciem intelligibilem, quas est
principium ejus operationis, et ejus specie! originem, et sic venit in
considerationem phantasmatum et singularium quorum sunt
phantasmata. Sed hac rejiexio compleri non potest, nisi per adjunctionem
virtutis cogitative et imaginative." {Q. Un. de Anima, a. 20. ad i.)

21 ''By the fundamental feeling of life we feel all the sensitive
parts of our body." (77*^; Origin of Ideas, Eng. Trans. § 705.)

THE SENSES. 95

soul and independent of all special mental modifications. It
is, moreover, natura if not tempore antecedent to them; yet, as
the soul exists always in some particular state, it can never
apprehend itself unless as determined by an individual
affection. The sensus intimus exerts itself in a higher and a
lower form, as rational, and as sensuous consciousness. By
the inferior order of activity the soul continuously feels its
presence in the body which it informs, and thus apprehends
the various impressions which occur in different parts of the
organism. This sensuous cognizance of the body he styles
the sensus fundamentalis, inasmuch as it is the common root or
principle of the external senses,-

Suarez' doctrine. — Accepting the doctrine of Suarez, that
there is neither a real, nor formal distinction between the
internal senses, it does not appear to us to be of any very
profound importance what classification of faculties we select,
as best fitted to mark off the various phases of mental life
which have been allotted to internal sensibility. Moreover,
the brain seems to be the common physical basis for all these
different modes of consciousness, so that there is no differentia-
tion of organ corresponding to special operations which might
tell decisively in favour of any particular scheme of division.

Internal Sense. — The term internal sense has had a variety
of significations in the history of Philosophy. In the Peri-
patetic system, sensus internus designated generically the four
faculties, sensus communis, vis cestimativa vel cogitativa,phantasia,
a.nd memoria sensitativa ; but also at times it indicated more
specifically the sensus communis. In the Cartesian school, the
sensus intimus or conscientia, signified all consciousness of our
own states, whether sensuous or intellectual ; and the latter

-^ St. Thomas applies the term sensus fundamentalis to the faculty
of touch. The sensus fundamentalis, as described by Rosmini and
Tongiorgi, has been objected to by modern scholastic writers on
various grounds, (i) Internal sensibility, since it is an organic
faculty apprehending concrete sensuous facts, must, like external
sense, pertain not to the soul alone, but to the whole being — the
composituni humannm. (2) The primary function of internal sense is
the apprehension of the modifications of the external senses, its
exercise must thus follow, and not anticipate, that of the latter.

(3) There is absolutely no evidence for the existence of a perpetual
cognition of our own body independent of all special activities.

(4) The constitution of the union of body and soul in the perception
of the former by the latter would reduce their connection to that of
an accidental alliance. (Cf. Liberatore, On Universals, Trans, by
E. Dering, pp. 130, seq., also PsycJwlogia, §§ 27 — 29; Lahousse,
Psych. %% 348 — 355. Contra: Tongiorgi, Psych. 271, 280; Rosmini,
The Origin of Ideas, Vol. II. Ft. V. c. iii., and Psychology, Eng.
Trans. Bk. I. c. vii.)

SENSUOUS LIFE.

term has retained the same connotation with modern scholastic
writers.--^ With Locke, internal sense is equivalent to the intel-
lectual faculty of reflection, by which our mental states are
observed. With Kant, it comprises the sensuous intuition of
our mental states, not, however, as they are in themselves,
but as modified by the a priori form of time. The term
internal sense, legitimate in its original signification in the
Peripatetic system, is very inappropriate in its modern usage
as expressing the intellectual activity of self-consciousness.
That activity is neither in point of object, of nature, nor of
intrinsic dependence on physical organ akin to the senses.

Basis of Division. — The scholastic classification of four
internal senses was grounded on the existence of generic
differences in the formal objects o£ the several faculties. The
formal object of the sensiis communis consists of the actual
operations of the external senses ; that of the imagination is
the representation of what is absent ; the function of the vis
(Bstimativa is the apprehension of an object as remotely
suitable or noxious to the well-being of the animal ; that of
the sensitive memory is the cognition of past sensuous experi-
ences. Some writers reduced these faculties to two, others
augmented them to six. The nature of the distinction between
these senses was also disputed. Suarez,^* after a careful
examination of the various opinions on the point, decides
against the existence of either a real or a /or;;m/ distinction,
and contends that Aristotle is with him in looking on the
internal senses as merely diverse aspects or phases of a single
sensuous facult3\^-^

Common Sense. — Common sense is also a very ambiguous
term, (i) In the Aristotelian Psychology, it meant only the
internal sense above described. (2) It has been since used
to express certain universal and fundamental convictions of
mankind. It is in this signification that it has been appealed
to as a philosophical criterion of truth by the Scotch school.
(3) In ordinary language it implies good sense, sound practical
judgment. (4) Common sensibility, and also common sense, have
been sometimes used by psychologists to indicate {a) the
faculty of touch, and {b) the ccenassthesis or the vital sense,
and the various forms of organic sensibility.

Readings. — On classification of the senses, cf. St. Thomas, Sj<w. i.
q. 78. a. 3 ; De Anima, II. 11. 22 — 24, et III. 1. i ; De Sensii et Sensato,

^^ Cf. Tongiorgi, PsycJioIogia, Lib. III. c. ii.
^* De Anima, III. c. 2.

"^ Cf also Lahousse, PsycJioIogia, §§ 221—223; and on the other
side Sanseverino, Dynamilogia, cc. 3 — G.

THE SENSES. 97

1. I. On the various senses, cf. De Anima, II. 11. 13 — 24, De Sensu et
Sensato, Lib. I. Pesch gives an exhaustive account of the Scholastic
teaching on the external senses {Instit. Psych. §§ 521 — 561.) Cf. also
Salis Sewis' Delia Coioscenza Sensitjva. Of modern works on the
special senses, cf. Wyld, Physics and Philosophy 0/ the Senses, Pt. III.;
Ladd, op. cit. Pt. I. c. v. and Pt. II. cc. iii. iv. The Five Senses of
Man, by Bernstein, is a good popular treatise in many respects, but
the author frequently confuses in a very crude manner the physical
and the psychological processes. On internal senses, cf. St. Thomas,
Sum. i. q. 78. a. 4 ; De Anima, III. 11. 2, 3; Suarez, De Anima, III.
cc. II, 30, 31; Lahousse, Psychologia, c. v. art. i; Sanseverino,
Dynamilogia, cc. iii. v. ; Pesch, Instit. Psych. §§ 561 — 623.

CHAPTER VL

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD : CRITICAL

SKETCH OF THE LEADING THEORIES OF

EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

Psychology and Philosophy of Perception.—

How do we perceive the External Material World ?
and : What are our grounds for believing in its real
existence ? These are the problems which have most
harassed Philosophy since the days of Descartes.
The two questions, the Nature of external percep-
tion and the Validity of our belief in a material
universe, are most intimately bound up with each
other. The worth of every theory of cognition
must be estimated by the sufficiency of the account
which it gives of the reality that is known.
Accordingly, though only the question of the
character of the process of apprehension is strictly
psychological, while the validity of the act belongs
to Epistemology^ or Applied Logic, we shall find
it very advantageous in the interests of our own
science to trespass here a little on the domain of

1 Epistemologv is that branch of Philosophy which, whether it be
allotted to Applied Logic, Rational Psychology, or Metaphysics,
investigates the truth or validity of knowledge in general. It is
separated by modern psychologists from their science, which,
according to them, has to deal only with the genesis and growth of
knowledge.

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

another volume of the present series. This impossi-
bility of separating the problems of the genesis and
the truth of knowledge shows again the futility ol
all attempts at isolating Phenomenal Psychology
from Rational Psychology and Philosophy proper.

Sceptical Theories.— Let us begin with the
more fundamental question : What are our grounds
for believing in the existence of a Material World
outside and independent of our thought ? The
answer given by certain philosophers is that there
are no real grounds for this belief, and that it is an
illusion, or, at any rate, an irrational prejudice.
This is Scepticism. Now scepticism may be of either
of two species : the one, ahsoliite or universal, which
denies or disputes the possibility of attaining certi-
tude by any of our faculties, or in any department
of knowledge; the other mitigated, limited, ov partial
scepticism, which, admitting certain truths as evident,
and certain faculties as infallible sources of cognition,
yet discredits some convictions of mankind generally
deemed to be of vital importance. Against absolute
scepticism argument is alike useless and impossible.
Its advocate is in an impregnable position, because
he puts himself outside the pale of discussion.
Nothing can be dcre for such a man except to leave
him alone. Of partial or mitigated sceptics there
are many varieties, but our concern here is only
with that class, commonly called Idealists, who deny
the existence of an independent material world.
Several of these philosophers will be refuted in
detail in our historical sketch in the latter part of
this chapter, and an exhaustiv^e treatment of scepti-

loo SENSUOUS LIFE.

cism in general is to be found in the volume of this
series on First Principles of Knowledge.'^ Accordingly,
we will here limit ourselves to a brief enumeration
of the arguments establishing the existence of an
external material world.

Philosophical proof of Realism. — (i) The reality
of other minds is admitted, we believe, by every sect
of idealists falling short of absolute scepticism. But
our assurance of the existence of other minds is only
an inference from changes in the bodies which they
animate. Consequently we cannot deny the exist-
ence of the latter outside of our own consciousness
and maintain the independent reality of the former.
But if we admit the existence of other human
bodies, clearly we cannot reject any part of the
material universe. (2) The idealist cannot explain
the course and development of his own mental life
without implying the permanent extra-mental exist-
ence of his sense-organs and bodily frame. (3) The
established relations between mental states and
their neural conditions, and in fact all the chief
truths of Physiology become unintelligible absur-
dities if the permanent existence of a material
organism outside of our thought is denied. (4)
Physical science in general assumes the existence
of an independent material world, and the harmony
of its teaching with later results verifies the assump-
tion. (5) The mutual confirmation of our several
senses, exhibited in experiences of sight, touch, and
movement, similarly demonstrates the existence of
a material universe outside of the mind. These

2 Cf. Ft. I. c. viii. and Ft. II. c. ii.

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD. loi

faculties, which present to us the extensiontil
character of physical objects in widely different
terms of consciousness, nevertheless agree unani-
mously as regards the spatial relations of parts to
parts. The diagonal, for instance, bears the same
proportion to the sides of the square,' \vhethor the'
lengths of the lines be apprehended by, yisuaJ, ,
tactual, or motor sensations. No'iV ^thi^i. ujianiraJty '
is perfectly accounted for if by our several faculties
we perceive a material world which really embodies
these spatial relations. But if there does not exist
an extended reality outside of our consciousness
this agreement in the testimony of different witnesses
is inexplicable.

Psychology of External Perception. — Theory of
Mediate Perception. — The arguments just given will
be more fully developed in the historical sketch at
the end of this chapter, but their mere summary
statement is sufficient to establish the existence of
an extended material world of which our body forms
part. The psychological question now emerges :
How do we perceive or know this outer universe ?
Answers to this question, in spite of many important
minor differences, may for the present be reduced to
two. On the one side the majority of non-Catholic
philosophers since the time of Descartes assume
that the unextended mind cannot have an immediate
apprehension of extended reality in any form. It
can directly know only its own states. Consequently
the chief effort of modern speculation has been,
either, assuming the existence of a Material World,
to explain how from a knowledge of purely subjective

102 SENSUOUS LIFE.

feelings the mind can attain to the cognition of such
an extra-mental reality, or, rejecting the existence
of this latter, to account for the universal illusion.

Philosophers believing in some sort of an inde-
pendent Material World, who maintain that the
mind can onlv attain to a knowledge of such a
world' mediately as an inference from the ideas, or
subjective representations, of which alone we are
immediately cognizant, have been styled Representa-
iionalists or advocates of Mediate Perception. They
have also been called Hypothetical Realists, Hypothe-
tical Dualists, or Cosmothetic Idealists, since they look
on the external universe as a necessary hypothesis to
account for the ideas of w^hich we have an imme-
diate perception. All these authors err in the one
common but groundless assumption that the human
mind can immediately know nothing but its own
unextended states. Starting from this false hypo-
thesis, their theories give no adequate account of
our knowledge of extension, and logically lead to
subjective Idealism. We will expose some of their
chief defects presently in our Historical Sketch.

Immediate Perception. — In complete opposition
to Representationalism are to be found Aristotle, all
the leading scholastics,^ mediaeval and modern, and
in this country during the past hundred years,
Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton. At the present day
Drs. Martineau, Mivart, M'Cosh, and Porter, are
amongst the best known English-speaking repre-
sentatives of the same line of thought. All these
philosophers, notwithstanding sundry lesser points

3 See pp. 52, 54.

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD. 103

of disagreement, hold that man, at all events in
some cognitive acts, immediately apprehends extended
material reality. They teach that knowledge is not
limited to the perception of mental states, or to the
discernment of the relations between ideas. There
are outside and independent of the world of thought
real things; and we can, these writers agree in
common with the universal conviction of mankind,
cognize at least some of them. This theory has
been named by Hamilton the doctrine of Immediate
or Presentative Perception, because it asserts that
some objects of knowledge can be immediately
present to the knowing subject. Its supporters
have also been styled Natural Realists, and Natural
Dualists, because they maintain the existence of
extended material reality standing in opposition to
the immaterial mind to be a primitive deliverance of
our percipient faculties.

We hold the true doctrine to be that of Imme-
diate or Presentative Perception. My present know-
ledge of an extended material universe independent
of my mind is inexplicable unless at least in some of
my percipient acts there is contained an immediate
apprehension of extension ; and this apprehension
necessarily reveals a duahty or opposition between
the simple subject of consciousness and the objective
material reality. The growth and development of
our several percipient faculties will be described in
detail in our next chapter, so that it will be our
duty here merely to expound accurately what we
consider to be the general philosophical theory of
Presentative Perception.

104

SENSUOUS LIFE.

Ambiguity of Terms. — We must begin by clearing
up certain confused notions wliich have often obscured
and disfigured the treatment of the problem, not only
on the part of our opponents, but even in the hands
of some able and vigorous defenders of Immediate
Perception, especially among the Scotch school. The
exact meaning to be assigned to the terms. Ego and
Non-EgOf Self and Not-Self, Mind and External World,
in this controversy is of the very first importance ; or
rather the vital point is that whatever definite significa-
tions are attached to them be adhered to throughout.

Ego and Mind. — Now in the first place by the
term Ego is to be understood during the present dis-
cussion the entire person, the whole man made up of body
and soul. The Non-Ego is, therefore, whatever is not
part of my person. In strictness it includes God and
the universe of pure spirits ; but as the reality of
immaterial beings does not enter into our present
controversy, we may define the Non-Ego as, the Material
Universe distinct from my own animated organism. Self and
Not- Self are to be considered as synonymous with £^(7
and Non-Ego. The terms. Mind and External, or better,
Extra-Mental World, must be carefully distinguished
from the former pairs of words. Abstracting from all
questions as to the substance of the soul, by Mind we
here understand the unextended conscious subject, the unity
of m}'' psychical existence, viewed apart from my body.
By the External or Extra-Mental World, is meant all
material reality, including both my own body and the
extra-organic universe. Mind is thus narrower than
Self or Ego, and External World is wider than Not-Self
or Non-Ego.

Man not a Pure Spirit. — In the second place we
must make clear our starting-point. Some representa-
tionalists often argue as if the mind were de facto
completely separated from the body, or at any rate
standing out of all relations to the corporeal frame.
What would be the nature of perception in such a
situation we do not pretend to determine : it is not the
problem of Human Psychology. We take man as he
is ; one being made up of mind and body, endowed

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD. 105

with sensuous as well as intellectual faculties, and
possessed of a variety of extended sense-organs, the
natural instruments by which he acquires knowledge,
not only of the surrounding world, but of his own body.*
Two Questions. — Now in the problem of the
Perception of the Material Universe, two points connected
with the ambiguous terms just defined, and consequently
almost invariably confounded, have to be kept apart.
They are, in fact, two distinct questions — the one, my
apprehension of extension and extra-mental reality in
any form, the other, my cognition of the Non-Ego or
Extra-Organic portion of the material world. To begin
with the first : we hold it to be certain that at all
events in the case of its own organism the Ego has an
immediate perception of extension. In sensations of
sight and pressure there is directly revealed space of
two dimensions. Whether the cause of the sensation
is externalized, projected beyond the surface of the
extended organism, or not, the conscious state aroused
immediately presents extension. The proof of this lies
in the fact that if extension were not so given the
perceptions and conceptions of space of which in
mature life we are indubitably possessed could never
have been generated. If the mind knew only its own
simple subjective modifications, our present cognition
of material objects would be impossible. No aggrega-
tion, composition, or fusion of mental states which
individually do not present any element of extension,
could produce the notion of extension. If some of our
senses have directly revealed space to us, the repre-
sentations of material objects which we form can be
accounted for; if none of them had done so, these
representations could never have arisen. This argument
will be more fully developed when we come to criticize
in detail the theories advanced to explain the genesis
of an external world of three dimensions out of simple
conscious states.

4 It may be well to remind the student here that this assump-
tion of an extended human body does not involve us in any pet itio
principU. We are not now proving the existence of a material
world— that we have done some pages back— but we are explaining
Jww man perceives this world.

io6

SENSUOUS LIFE.

Immediate perception of Extension. — Next comes the
question : Do any of our percipient acts immediately
make known to us the existence of a reahty other than
ourselves? It is here precision and consistency in the
use of the terms Ego, External World, and the rest,
become vitally important for clearness of thought in the
present discussion. We have said that in certain
percipient acts, more particularly in those of sight and
touch, there is given an immediate presentation of
extension : Of what is this extension apprehended to
be an attribute ? To what is it cognized to belong ?
In mature life, undoubtedl}', we perceive in an
apparently instantaneous flash of cognition that the
object against which we press is a soft velvet cushion,
that what we see is a red-brick house at the far side
of a river. But this does not settle the question, for
in these acts there demonstrably are involved complex
processes of inference or association of ideas. Taking,
however, the sensations of vision and pressure in their
simplest form, do they immediately give, in addition to
the perception of extension, a knowledge of material
reality as distinct from the percipient agent ? The
solution of this question will be found in reverting to
our distinctions. In the simplest percipient act w-hich
directly reveals extension there is given an immediate
apprehension of "otherness," at least in the sense of
the extra-mental. Extension, whether it pertains to our
own sense-organs, or to objects outside of our body, is
at all events not an attribute of simple mental modifica-
tions. It is opposed to the subjective conscious act.
Consequently, aUhough in the earlier stages of life such
distinctions may not be explicitly realized, there is
given in the immediate presentation of extension —
whether this extension be referred to the Ego, to the
Non-Ego, or not determinately to either — an immediate
apprehension of what is not the Mind. There is thus
an ultimate duality in our consciousness at least in this
signification that some of our faculties are capable of
immediate]}'' apprehending extension, and extension
thus apprehended necessarily stands opposed to the
unextcnded mind.

PERCEPTION OF THE MATERIAL WORLD. 107

Perception of extra-organic Objects. — But is Duality
immediately given in the wider sense ? Does the per-
cipient act not only directly manifest to me an extended
phenomenon irreducibly opposed to the simplicity of
the purely subjective state, but does it also immediately
reveal this extended phenomenon as other than my Ego,
other than my Self in the sense of my whole being, body
and soul ? or is my knowledge of the existence of a
Non-Ego in the strict sense — of a material world outside
of my own body — is this cognition of a more complex,
mediate, and possible inferential character? This is
certainly a more disputable point. The majority of
Natural Realists seem at times to imply that the
Non-Ego in the sense of Extra-organic material reality
is originally presented as extended, distinct from, and
opposed to my whole bodily self; but the distinction
between the two uses of the term Ego — as including
and as excluding the organism — is on such occasions
rarely kept clearly in view. The second, or qualified
form of Natural Dualism, would maintain that, whereas
extension, and therefore objective reality, standing in
opposition to the mind, is originally immediately given
in sensations of my own organism, yet cognition of
material reality as external to my organism is a result
of analysis, comparison, and inference. This view, in
fact, holds that our perception of the extra-organic
universe, although in tlie developed intelligence so easy
and rapid, is nevertheless a complex process.

It does not appear to us that this second form of
the doctrine of Presentative Perception is always
realized with sufficient distinctness. The Non-Ego
ma}^ indeed, be originally and immediately presented
in some of the infant's first percipient acts as extrinsic
to its organism. But this is not necessary tD account
for our later knowledge. Fortunately, however, this
second stage of the problem of Perception is of little or
no philosophical importance ; and at any rate the
line of demarcation between inference and immediate
judgment is not very well defined. It is essential
that extension, and consequently, a reality opposed to
the unextended subject of consciousness, be directly

io8 SENSUOUS LIFE.

presented, but granted such an immediate perception,
even limited to the spatial character of my own material
organism, our knowledge of the rest of the universe
would be easily developed.^ In the next chapter we
shall describe this process of development. Before
doing so, however, we shall insert a historical retrospect.

Historical Sketch of Modern Theories of External

Perception.

The question of External Perception has played such a
large part in modern philosophical speculation that we deem
it expedient to attempt a brief sketch of the subject. And
we do this all the more willingly because experience has
assured us that here, as often elsewhere, the most convincing
proof of the true doctrine is to be found in a careful examina-
tion of the history of counter-hypotheses.

Descartes (1596 — 1650), whose philosophical speculations
start from the dictum that I have an immediate and infallible
knowledge of my own thought and of nothing more, may be
justly considered the author of the problem of the bridge
from the mind to the material world. It is to Locke (1632 —
1704), however, that the various forms of British scepticism,
together with the idealism of Kant, are to be traced. Know-
ledge, Locke repeatedly maintains, consists in the perception
of agreement or difference between our ideas. We thus
immediately apprehend, not an external reality, but our own
mental states. Nevertheless, Locke holds that a material
world does exist outside of the mind. He is thus a Hypo-
thetical Dualist. We only know psychical representations,
but we posit as their cause a physical universe.

Bishop Berkeley (1685 — 1753) soon made manifest the
inconsistencies of Locke's teaching. Berkeley is celebrated
chiefly for two contributions to the history of Philosophy,
his system of Phenomenalistic Idealism and the Theory of
Vision known by his name. The essence of the latter is
contained in the two tenets that the eye of itself can perceive
neither (a) distance, nor (b) surface extension. Visual sensa-
tions had originally as little reference to space as sounds or

^ Thus Hamilton justly observes: "It is sufficient to establish
the simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us,
immediately to apprehend the Non-Ego in certain limited relations;
and it is of no consequence whatever, either to our certainty of the
reality of the material world, or to our ultimate knowledge of its
properties, whether by this primary apprehension we lay hold, in
the first instance, on a larger or a lesser portion of its contents."
{On Rcid, p. 814.)

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 109

tastes. By experience and association, the sensations of the
eye grow to be symbols of tactual and motor sensations
which constitute our knowledge of solid bodies and of space
of three dimensions. From this account of the psychology
of perception the transition to his metaphysical theory of the
nature of the External World is easy. Locke's groundless
assumption that we can immediately perceive nothing but
our own mental states, is accepted without question. All
objects of knowledge are held to be reducible to ideas of
the senses (sensations), internal feelings such as emotions,
and acts of the imagination. Accordingly, we may not
assert the existence of an independent extra-mental world.
We can know or perceive only what is in the mind. The
esse of every knowable object is percipi. If material sub-
stances existed beyond consciousness, they could in no
way be like our ideas, and cognition of such things by
ideas would be impossible. Moreover, matter could not
act upon an unextended spirit. Therefore the hypothesis
of an inert corporeal world which has existed for a time
unperceived must be abandoned. Still, Berkeley vigorously
asserted that his theory is in complete harmony with
the belief of mankind. The table, chair, or fire, which
I perceive, he does not deny to exist ; but, adhering to
Locke's assumption, he calls whatever is apprehended an
idea, and going still further he repudiates the hypothetical
material cause supposed by his master to have awakened
these ideas. But whence then do these ideas come, and what
happens when I cease to perceive them ? Berkeley replies
that God, and He alone, is the cause of my ideas. By the
Divine agency, and not by any hidden inconceivable material
substance, the permanence, regularity, and orderliness of the
ideas are sustained. When I no longer think of ideas
(material objects) they still endure in the Divine mind, and
may be apprehended by other men. In Berkeley's system,
then, there are held to exist minds or spiritual substances,
ideas, and the Divine spirit.*^

^ Berkeley's theory may be objected to on various grounds, such
as his equivocal use of the terms idea and conceive, and his un-
questioning acceptance of Locke's assumption, but we have never
seen any experiential argument which, strictly speaking, disproves
the hypothesis of hyperphysical Idealism. God, without the inter-
vention of a material world, could potcntid absolutd immediately
produce in men's minds states like to those which they experience
in the present order. The only demonstrative argument against
the Theistic Immaterialist is, that such a hypothesis is in conflict
with the attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity.
God could not be the author of such a fraud.

110 SENSUOUS LIFE.

David Hume (171 1 — 1776), similarly starting from Locke's
principles, pushed Berkeley's Idealism to the most absolute
scepticism. All cognitions, or all objects of cognition — for
with these writers the terms are interchangeable — are
reducible to impressions (sensations) and ideas, fainter copies
of the former. To explain our belief in a permanent external
reality, as well as to account for our other fundamental
convictions, Hume appeals to the laws ot the Association of
Ideas. Through '• custom " by the reiterated occurrence of
various impressions we grow to believe in the enduring
existence of material things when unperceived. Such belief
is, however, an illusion ; we only know the transient mental
impressions. There is no such thing anywhere as an abiding
substance, the substratum of changing qualities or accidents.
We have no "impression" of it, therefore it does not exist.
Berkeley got thus far as regards the notion of materird
substance; but Hume logically shows that by the same
reasoning the idea of a spiritual substance, of a permanent
mind amid changing states of consciousness is equally
fictitious and unreal. The mind, just as well as the material
world, is nothing more than a cluster of transitory impres-
sions. The persuasion that nothing can begin to exist
without a cause is also due to association. No single
experience could give us the idea of causation ; but the
frequent repetition of two successive impressions so welds
them together in our minds that we are deluded into the
belief of some mysterious causal knot binding them, while
there is really no connexion but that of succession. This
illusory belief in particular instances of causality is afterwards
gradually widened into the universal law, that every being
which begins to exist presupposes a cause.

We have here all the essentials of later associatiovdsm. The
substantial souls, retained by Berkeley, follow the material
world of Locke, and the Divine Spirit also becomes a useless
and inconceivable hypothesis. Hume, too, possessed the
merit of realizing clearly and frankly admitting, what sub-
sequent disciples of sensism either fail to see, or attempt to
ignore, that the groundwork of physical science, and the
certainty and exactness of mathematics are fatally destroyed
by consistently following out the assumptions of the school.
The conclusions of the Scotch sceptic thus constitute a
complete reductio ad absurdum of Locke's principles.

J. Stuart Mill and Dr. Bain. — The chief modifications
introduced into the general theory by more recent sensaticn-
alists, are the final dismissal of Berkeley's hypothesis of
the Divine action, the greater importance assigned to the
muscular sense, and a more elaborate attempt to harmonize

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION, m

the new conception of the external world with ordinary
beliefs. However, the arguments are in the main similar
in kind to those urged by the earlier advocates. Thus, it
is asserted, that a world existing independently of the mind
is inconceivable. " To perceive is an act of the mind. . . .
To perceive a tree is a mental act; the tree is known as
perceived and not in any other way. There is no such thing
known as a tree wholly detached from perception, and we
can only speak of what we know." Consequently, the hypo-
thesis of an external world existing when unperceived is
absurd. " The prevailing doctrine is that a tree is something
in itself apart from all perception ; that by its luminous
emanations it impresses our minds, and is then perceived,
the perception being the effect of an unperceived tree the cause.
But the tree is known only through perception ; what it may
be anterior to or independent of perception we cannot tell ;
we can think of it as perceived but not as unperceived. There
is a manifest contradiction in the supposition, that we are
required at the same moment to perceive the thing and not to
perceive it."''

The ^^ Psychological'^ or Empiricist doctrine of our belief in
matter. — The chief strength, however, of the theory lies in the
asserted sufficiency of the account which it professes to give
of the material world apprehended by us. Assuming as
self-evident the axiom that we can know only our own ideas,
the external universe, it is alleged, really means to us nothing
more than certain sensations plus possibilities^ of other sensa-
tions. The most objective and real attributes of material
things are in common belief their extension and impenetrability.

"^ Dr. Bain, Mental Science, pp. 197, ig8. In Emotions and Will
(3rd Edit.), p. 578, he still denies that " the situation intimates
anything as an existence beyond consciousness." This argument in the
hands of Dr. Bain, as in those of Berkeley, is based on a deceptive
ambiguity in the terms "conceive" and "perceive." We cannot
of course /^/w/f^ an unperceived world, nor can we conceive a world
the conception of which is not in the mind ; but there is no contra-
diction or absurdity in the proposition: "A material world of
three dimensions has existed for a time unperceived and unthought
of by any created being, and then revealed itself to human minds."
Dr. Bain's description of the "prevailing doctrine" is only
applicable to the theory of mediate perception. It does not r^fer
to Natural Realism, which makes the external material reality the
perceived and not the 2/Hperceived cause of our cognitions.

* It should be carefully borne in mind that in the associationist
theory a "possibility of sensation" is not a real actual agent
existing out of consciousness. It is as such, non-existent. Its only
existence is in the idea or conception by which future experiences ars
represented. Mill seems frequently to forget this.

112 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Nevertheless, these properties, it is asserted, are ultimately
reducible to groups of muscular feelings possible and actual.
" The perception of matter, or the object consciousness, is
connected with the putting forth of muscular energy as
opposed to passive feelings. . . . Our object consciousness
further consists of the uniform connection of Definite feelings
with Definite energies. The effect that we call the interior
of a room is in the final analysis a regular series of feelings
of sense related to definite muscular energies. A movement
one pace forward makes a distinct and definite change in the
ocular impressions ; a step backwards exactly restores the
previous impression. . . . All our so-called sensations are in
this way related to movenients. . . . On the other hand,
what in opposition to sensations we call the flow of ideas —
the truly mental or subjective life — has no connection with
our movements. We may remain still and think of the
different views of a room, of a street, of a prospect in any
order." ^

The apparently independent world of every-day experience
has not suddenly manifested itself to us after the manner of
a transitory hallucination. It is a gradual growth, and it is
in tracing the supposed genesis of this illusory belief that
Mill best exhibited his psychological and metaphysical
ingenuity. Starting with the postulates of expectation, the
occurrence of impressions, and the laws of mental associa-
tion, he professes satisfactorily to explain all our present
convictions. We experience, he says, various sensations, such
as those of colour, sound, and touch. After they have passed
away we conceive them as possible. These feelings usually
occur in groups, thus the consciousness of yellow is found in
combination with certain sensations of contact, of smell, and
of taste, which go to make up our perception of an orange.
Similarly, visual feelings precede the tactual sensations which
we have come in course of time to call the table. By associa-
tion the groups of states become so knotted together that one
of them by itself is able to awaken in idea the rest, and to
suggest them to us as possible experiences. A material object
is, in fact, to us at any time one or two actual feelings with
the belief in a suite of others as possible. The actual im-
pressions are transient ; the possibilities axe permanent.

In addition to the feature of permanence and fixity among
these groups of possible impressions there is the constant and
regular order which we observe among them. By association
this gives rise to the notions of causation, power, and activity ;
and we gradually come, on account of their permanent
character, to look upon the groups of possible sensations as
^ Bain, Mental Science, pp. 199, 200.

MODERN THEORIES OE EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 113

the cause of the actual feehngs. Moreover, finding changes
to take place among the possibilities of our impressions
independently of our consciousness, we are led by abstraction
to erect these possibilities into an entirely independent
material world. This operation is completed by the dis-
covery, that otJicy human beings have an experience similar
to our own, and ground their conduct on the same permanent
possibilities as ourselves. Besides the apparent permanence
and independence of the material world, its most striking
contrast with our sensations lies in its extension and impene-
trability. The latter property, however, is merely the feeling
of muscular action impeded. Space is similarly an abstrac-
tion from motor feelings. Muscular sensations differing in
duration "give us the consciousness of hnear extension
inasmuch as this is measured by a sweep of a limb moved
by muscles. . . . The discrimination of length in any one
direction includes extension in any direction." Not only is
the idea of space derived from non-spatial feelings successive
in time, but this mode, "in which we become aware of
extension is affirmed by the psychologists in question to be
extension." " We have no reason for believing that space
or extension in itself is anything different from that by which
we recognize it.''^" The synchronous character of space
receives its completion from sight, which presents to us
simultaneously a vast number of visual impressions associated
with possibilities of motor and tactual feelings. Such is the
empiricist theory of our belief in a material world.

Criticism.— Phenomenal Idealism as thus advocated has
been attacked from many different points of view, but we can
here afford space for only a few of the leading diflficuhies
which seem to us absolutely fatal to the hypothesis, (i) In
the first place, as we have already indicated. Idealism is
incompatible not only with vulgar prejudices, but with the
best estabhshed truths of science. Astronomy, Geology,
physical Optics, and the rest of the physical sciences, are
inseparably bound up with the assumption that matter which
is neither a sensation nor an imaginary possibility of a sensation
exists apart from observation. They teach that real, actual,
material bodies, of three dimensions, not only exist, but act
upon each other according to known laws whilst no human mind
is contemplating them. Possibilities enjoying no existence
beyond consciousness could not attract each other with a
force varying inversely as the square of the distance ; they
could not pass from green forests into coal beds, nor could
they refract or interfere with other phenomena so as to
determine the character of visual sensations independently of
^^ Mill's Exam, of Hamilton (2nd Edit.), pp 223, 229, 230.
I

(( UNIVERSITY

114

SENSUOUS LIFE.

our wills. How, for instance, is the double discovery of the
planet Neptune from the simultaneous but independent calcu-
lations by Adams, and Leverrier, to be explained, if there are
not in the universe besides human minds extended agents
which retain and exert their influence when unthought of by
any created intelligence.

(2) This irreconcilability between phj^sical science and
phenomenal IdeaHsm results in a very noteworthy case of
felo de sc in the hands of Dr. Bain.' He commences his
works on Empirical Psychology with an elaborate account of
the brain, the nervous system, and the various sense-organs.
Later on in the same volumes he resolves the material world,
including, we presume, the aforesaid objects, into a collection
of mental states. Finally, in his book on Mind and Body, he
rec-olves the mind, that is, the total series of conscious states,
into subjective aspects or phases of neural currents. Now
obviously there is at least one absurdity here. What is the
exact meaning of the statement that a mental state is but the
subjective aspect of a nervous process, which is itself but a
group of sensations ? At one time the mind is alleged to be
a function of the brain, and elsewhere the brain, with the
rest of the physical universe, is analyzed into a plexus of
muscular feelings incapable of existing beyond consciousness.
These two mutually destructive tenets. Phenomenal Idealism
and Physical Materialism, are the logical outcome of the
sensist theory of cognition ; but unfortunately disciples of
that school do not usually reason out on both sides the
consequences of their assumptions with the clearness and
courage of Dr. Bain. The only subject for regret is that the
latter writer neither attempts to reconcile the two repugnant
theses, nor frankly avows that they form a reductio ad ahsurdnm
of his theory .1^

^^ The defence suggested by some writers, that the scientific
psychologist is no more bound to give a metaphysical account of
the materials with which he deals than the astronomer, or the
geologist, is a mere shallow evasion of the difficulty. Psychology
stands here in quite a different position from that of all the
physical sciences. Its first duty is to furnish such an exposition
of the nature of cognition as will secure an intelligible meaning to
the terms employed in all sciences including itself, and assuredly
it may not with impunity reduce its own statements to nonsensical
absurdities. If it resolves neural currents into modifications of
consciousness, it may not then turn round and resolve this con-
sciousness into aspects of the aforesaid currents. If it does so, it is
bound at all events to explain the precise significance of the out-
come of this interesting dialectical feat. Mill's very just contention
against Hamilton is very much to the point here. " When a thinker

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 115.

(3) Again, the primary assumption on which all pheno-
menalistic theories since the days of Locke have been based
is false. That we can only know our own mental states, that
we cannot apprehend material reality as affecting us is'
neither an a priori nor a self-evident truth, and still less can
it be established from experience. The fact that we are
unable to imagine how matter can act upon mind, or how
mind can become immediately cognizant of something other
than itself, is no objection against the clear testimony of
consciousness, as manifested after the most careful intro-.
spection, that the mind does immediately perceive something
other than itself acting upon it. Moreover, from this first
illegitimate assumption flows the second error, that extension
is identical with that by which it is measured. The velocity of
a moving locomotive or of a flying swallow is not the same
thing as its force. Now, our knowledge of extension may
receive accurate definition and determination, mainly by
means of the muscular sensations, and yet what we call the
extension of objects may be not only something different
from these sensations, but it may also be immediately
apprehended in a less defined manner through some other
senses.

(4) Further, we must deny in toto that sensations, muscular
or any other, viewed in themselves as purely subjective, non-
spatial feelings, could ever by any process of addition or
transformation be worked up into an apparently extra-mental
world. It is only by the surreptitious introduction of
extended elements that an extended product can be effected ;
and the great use made of the muscular sensations in the
empiricist theory is due to the fact that the illicit transition
from the asserted originally subjective signification of motor
sensations to the objective meaning implied in ordinary
beliefs is liable to escape notice. If these feelings are
steadily remembered to be simple states of consciousness
varying only in duration and intensity, it will be seen that
they cannot, any more than sensations of sound or smell,
" consolidate " into extended objects. Duration — serial
length in time — belongs to all sensations, yet many of these
afford no knowledge of space, much less constitute it. Sensa-
tions may also vary in intensity without evoking the notion

is compelled by one part of his philosophy to contradict another
part, he cannot leave the conflicting assertions standing and throw
the responsibility of his scrape on the arduousness of his subject ;.
a palpable self-contradiction is not one of the difficulties which can
be adjourned as belonging to a higher department of science.*'
(Exam. pp. 122, 123.)

Ii6 SENSUOUS LIFE

of velocity ; this latter cognition, in fact, presnpposes the idea

of space.

In all associationalist accounts of the genesis of our
knowledge of an external world there is a continual equi-
vocation between strictly mental existence and that which is
intra-organic but not purely mental ; between the significa-
tion of the terms describing the organism legitimate on their
principles and the alleged erroneous meanings which these
words convey to the vulgar mind. Notwithstanding all lofty
disclaimers to the contrary, sensationalists when tracing the
gradual manufacture of the material universe out of simple
states of consciousness, really do assume the existence of
an extended organism, as known from the first. When
Mr. Bain, or Mr. Spencer, describes how muscular feelings,
varying in duration and velocity, give rise to the belief in
extended space, the explanation seems plausible because the
reader almost inevitably passes from the subjective inter-
pretation, which is all that is lawful to the writer, to the
objective realistic meaning embodied in common language.
The phrases, "range of an arm," "sweep of a limb," and the
like, employed by associationists in expounding the supposed
origin of the notion of extension, necessarily suggest to the
mind real extended objects known as such, and so con-
veniently hide the true difficulty. Commencing with a
knowledge of our own body as extended, the development
of our conviction of an independent material world might,
perhaps, even on sensationist lines, proceed tolerably enough;
but if our body and the rest of space are nothing more than
sensations, and if the mind can only apprehend its own
subjective feelings, then the first step is impossible. Suc-
cessive muscular or tactual feelings in the interpretation of
these sensations permissible to Mr. Spencer or Mill can no
more account for the present appearance of extended objects
than experiences of sound, of smell, or of toothache.

(5) The argument from the existence of other minds to which
we have before alluded may also be here urged with peculiar
force against Mill and Dr. Bain. Both of these writers lay
stress upon the value of the testimony of other minds in
establishing our belief in an independent world. Our know-
ledge, however, of other minds than our own is only gained
by an inference from changes in certain portions of the
physical world, assumed to have a real existence beyond our
consciousness. Now if the chief premiss is invalidated, if it
is demonstrated that we have, and can have no knowledge
of anything external to our consciousness, that the seemingly
independent human organisms around us are only modifica-
tions of our own mind, clusters of our muscular feelings

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 117

actual and ideal, then assuredly it is an unworthy superstition
to continue to put faith in the external existence of other
minds, and still more ridiculous and absurd to invoke their
testimony as a leading agency in the generation of our belief
in the material world, including of course the bodies from
which their existence is inferred,

(6) There remains another fundamental difficulty which
goes to the very root of the sensationist philosophy. This
genesis of space out of time necessarily implies, at all events,
the existence of a. pennanent mind. Under the pressure of Dr.
W.Ward's severe criticism, Mill was obliged in addition to his
other assumptions to "postulate " memory. A mere succession
of disconnected feelings could never give rise to the notion
of tiine, and still less could the possibilities of such successive
sensations be condensed by themselves into the simultaneity
of space. But memory is precisely what the doctrine which
reduces the mind to a sei'ies of feelings has no right to postulate.
An abiding subject permanent among our changing states
is an essential requisite for the existence of memory. If,
however, the notion of time is impossible to the sensationalist,
a fortiori is that of space.

Emanuel Kant (1724 — 1804). — A theory of perception
equally erroneous with that of Hume's school, but starting
from an almost diametrically opposite conception of the
nature of the mind and of cognition, is that of Kant. Instead
of explaining all mental products as complex results arising
out of the aggregation, association, and coalescence of sensa-
tions passively received, Kant holds the mind to be endowed
from the beginning with certain a priori or innate subjective
" forms," by which all its experience is actively moulded or
shaped. Among the most important of these are the two
" intuitions " of Space and Time. The first is imposed on the
acts of external, the second on those of internal sensibility.
The sensations of our external senses are non-spatial in them-
selves, and they are awakened by a non-spatial cause. It is
the subjective co-efficient that shapes the mental act so as to
give rise to the perception by which we seem to apprehend
extended objects outside of the mind. Similarly our mental
states are presented to us by the internal sense — inner con-
sciousness— as occurring in time. This, too, is an illusion
due to a purely subjective factor in cognition. We have no
reason for supposing that these states are not timeless iti
themselves. We can only know phenomena, or the appearances
of things as shaped and coloured, by these subjective con-
ditions; to noumena, or things-in-themselves, we can never
penetrate. Still the existence of a noiimcnon beyond con-
sciousness Kant maintains as requisite to account for our

Ii8 SENSUOUS LIFE.

cognitive acts. He is thus a Hypothetical Duahst, denying
an immediate apprehension of an external reality, but asserting
its existence as a necessary supposition.

Criticism. — Deferring to a later chapter the examination of
•Kant's system as a whole, we may here indicate a few of the
objections suggested against his treatment of the subject-
matter at present under discussion. In the first place, it has
been urged that Kant's attempted proof of the existence of
a priori ingredients in all our knowledge is invalid, (a) " Space,"
he argues, " is not a conception which has been derived from
outward experiences. For in order that certain sensations
may 'relate to something without me . . . and that I may
represent them not merely without and near to each other,
but also in separate places, the representation of space must
exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of
space cannot be borrowed from external phenomena through
experience, but, on the contrary, this external experience is
only possible through the said antecedent representation." ^'^
Space is, therefore, a purely subjective a priori form, inherent
in the constitution of the mind, and imposed on the raaterial
element given in sensation.

This method of reasoning was employed by Plato to show
that all knowledge is really innate. It sins by proving too
much. If it were true that we could not apprehend an object
as extended unless we had a previous representation of ex-
tension, then it would seem to follow that we could never
cognize a taste, sound, or smell, unless we had antecedently
a similar cognition of the nature of the taste, sound, or smell.
If there are in existence extended material bodies, and if we
are endowed with the faculties of touch and sight, there is no
reason why we should not immediately perceive the spatial
qualities of these bodies when they act upon our senses.
The perception may of course be at first vague, but frequent
experience can perfect it.^^

(b) " We never can imagine or make a representation to

^^ Critique, translated by Meiklejohn, p. 24.

^•^ In maintaining that our developed knowledge of space is a
result of experience, a distinction not always realized by Kant
should be made between the abstract concept or notion of space in
general and the concrete perception of an individual object as extended.
The former is an elaborate intellectual product reached by abstrac-
tion, reflexion, and generalization, and presupposes many individual
perceptions of concrete extension. The perception, on the other
hand, is given, vaguely indeed at first yet truly, in the immediate
experience of an extended surface affecting the sense of contact or
of sight.

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION, iig

ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may
easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must,
therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility
of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent
on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily
supplies the basis for external phenomena." (p. 25.) This
difficulty is solved by distinguishing between actual or real
space, and possible or ideal space. The former is identical
with the voluminal distance or interval enclosed by the
surface-limits of the entire collection of created material
objects, the latter is simply the possibility of extended
objects. Now, although all material things were annihilated,
the possibility of their existence, and therefore possible space,
would remain. Consequently, having once apprehended
the extension of existing bodies, we can never think them to
be impossible, although we may abstract from their existence.
The conception of ideal space, or the possibility of material
bodies, is thus indestructible, not because it is merely a con-
dition of thought, but because it is a condition of corporeal
being.

(c) " Space is no discursive or, as we say, general con-
ception of the relations of things, but a pure ifituition. For,
in the first place, we can only represent to ourselves one
space, and when we talk of divers spaces we mean only parts
of one and the same space. Moreover, these parts cannot
antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component
parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be
cogitated only as existing in it." Again, (d) " Space is repre-
sented as an infinite given quantity." To these arguments
we may again reply that a general conception of the relations
of material things, or an abstract notion of the possibility of
extended objects, may be formed from many perceptions
of diff'erent parts of space. The fact that such an idea of
possible space represents the latter as infinite, or rather
indefinite, one, and all embracing, in no way proves that this
representation is given a priori.

Kant further holds that the necessity and universality which
characterize geometrical judgments establish the subjective
origin of our cognition of space. This must be denied.
Objects without the mind may have certain modes or rela-
tions of a contingent and others of a necessary nature. But
if such were the case there can be no reason why the mind
should be incapable of apprehending both with equal truth.
The explanation put forward by Natural Realism is that there
are certain essential and certain other accidental conditions
of material being, and that these are reflected by necessary
and contingent features in our thought. This is a simple

l2o SENSUOUS LIFE.

and adequate account of the problem without the gratuitous
assumption of innate forms. ^*

Still even were it true that our knowledge of external
objects in no way represented them, the doctrine of Kant,
that our apparent cognition of otcr own mental states as they
are in-themselves is deceptive, would be erroneous. In this
region, at least, the distinction between phenomenal knowledge
and noumenal existence is utterly invalid. A conscious state
cannot have any existence-in-itself apart from what it is appre-
hended to be. lis esse is percipi. Since, then, mental states
are as they are apprehended, and since they are apprehended
as successive, they must form a real succession in-themselves.
They cannot be timeless as they are non-spatial. But if so
Kant's " form of the internal sense " — the intuition of time — is
extinguished. According to him time, like space, is merely a
subjective condition of our internal consciousness imposed on
realities timeless in themselves. As, however, there is a real
succession in our ideas, there is a true correlate to the notion
of time. A sequence of changes being once admitted in our
conscious states, an analogous succession of alterations cannot
be denied to the external reality which acts upon us, and so
we are justified in maintaining the objective validity of the
notion. The whole growth and evolution of each man's
mental life, and its connexion with the development of his
organic existence, affords the most cogent conceivable evidence
of the real truth of the conception of time.

Further, the arguments already put forward against Phe-
nomenal Idealism show that neither space nor time can be a
purely subjective /orm. Physics and astronomy, for instance,
are irreconcilable with such a view. Thus, the latter science
by a series of elaborate deductions from {a) ahstrsict geometrical
theorems dealing with the properties of pure space, and (6)
dynamical \a.ws describing the action of unperceived/oy<:^s in

^^ " Kant's fallacy may be put shortly — What is apodictic
(necessary) is a priori ; what is a priori is merely subjective (without
relation to ' things-in-themselves ') ; therefore what is apodictic is
merely subjective. The first premiss, however, is wrong if a priori is
understood in the Kantian sense to mean being independent of all ex-
perience. Kant wrongly believes that certitude to be possessed a priori
(independently of all experience) which we really attain by a com-
bination of many experiences with one another according to logical
laws; and these laws are conditioned by the reference of the subject
to the objective reality, and are not a priori forms. He erroneously
maintains that all orderly arrangement (both in time and space,
and that which is causal) is merely subjective." (Ueberweg's Logic,
§ 28.) Kant has nowhere shown the impossibility of necessary
relations being disclosed to the mind in real objective experience.

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 121

an orderly manner in time, foretells a transit of Venus a
century hence, and the result verifies the assumptions. Now
the introduction of the second element is peculiarly in-
compatible with the alleged subjective nature of space.
A consistent system of pure geometry might perhaps be
worked out in such an a priori space, but there would be
no reason why its theorems should exactly apply to the
operations of extra-mental non-spatial agents. Accordingly,
the orderhness of the universal force of gravitation, which
varies inversely as the square of the distance, and produces
regular movements in certain intervals of time, establishes
agreement between the supposed mental forms and the
reality beyond consciousness. ^^ The physicist also teaches
us that the external causes of our sensations of colour and
sound are vibratory movements of ether (in extra-mental
space) occurring in succession (in extra-mental time). He
further informs us that the quality of the sensation is deter-
mined by the size and rapidity of these waves. Now this
teaching is irreconcilable with the view that the supposed
space and time are merely subjective forms of outer and inner
sensibility. It implies that the so called noumena, the extra-
mental causes of our sensations of colour, occupy a real space
of three dimensions, antecedent to and independent of the
observation of the percipient mind.^^

15 "Physical phenomena find throughout their most complete
explanation in the supposition that things-in-themselves exist in a
space of three dimensions as we know it. It is at least very
doubtful that any other supposition could be so brought into
agreement with the facts. We have, therefore, every ground for
believing that our conception of substances extended in space of
three dimensions does not in some way symbolize things which exist
in themselves in quite another way, but truly represents things as
they actually exist in three dimensions." (Ueberweg's Logic, § 44,
note.) The above line of argument is also urged with great force
in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, YoX. II. pp. 160 — 166.

^^ Some defenders of Kant assert that he never really intended
to make space and time purely subjective, and Mr. Mahaffy replies
rather brusquely to Trendelenburg that Kant "never denied their
objectivity unless in an absurd sense." {Critical Philosophy, p. 68.)
Undoubtedly it is often very difficult to make out Kant's meaning,
but if there is a single point on which he seems to be unmistakable
it is that space and time are formal, or purely subjective. Whereas
sensations of sound and colour are given from ivithout, space and time
he holds to be subscribed from within. "Space does not represent
any property of objects as things-in-thcmselves, nor does it represent
them in their relations to each other; in other words, space does_ not
represent any determination of objects as attached to the objects

122 SENSUOUS LIFE.

In addition to these objections a number of other defects
in Kant's system have been exposed. He assumes without
investigation the false representatiouaUst theory in vogue
since the times of Descartes and Locke, teaching that we
have no immediate knowledge of things affecting us, but only
of our own mental states. He illogically postulates an ex-
ternal noumenal world as the cause of our conscious states,
whereas he has no ground for asserting its existence, espe-
cially since he teaches that causality is another deceptive
intellectual form wdth no objective value. Finally, he is
confused and inconsistent in expounding the nature of the
supposed a priori forms, frequently appearing to conceive
them as complete representations, ready made from the start
and fitted with perfect accuracy on to the first act of percep-
tion, whilst at other times he seems to look on them as slowly
and gradually realized with extended experience.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, starting from the same assumptions
as Hume and Mill, nevertheless rejects Idealism, substituting
in its place a species of Hypothetical Dualism which he calls
Transfigured Realism. With him, as with them, we can know
nothing but our own feelings ; yet he affirms that there is
outside of the mind an Unknoivable Reality, the objective
cause of our sensations. But beyond the fact that such a
noumenon exists, we can assert nothing of it. " What we are
conscious of as properties of matter, even down to weight and
resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective
agencies, which are unknown and unknowable." i'' His defence
of this theory is based on an analysis of our mental operations
akin to that of the older Associationists, supplemented by an
argument against the Idealism of these writers extending over
some nineteen chapters. The chief proofs which he urges

themselves, and which would remain even though all subjective
conditions of the intuition were abstracted. . . . Space is nothing
else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense, that is,
the subjective condition of the sensibility under which alone
external intuition is possible." (Cf. Critique. Transcend. .^EstJi. § 4.)
Such passages could be multiplied indefinitely. It is a summary,
but not very convincing disposal of opponents to simply assert that
any other view of space than this is absurd. If it is still maintained
that Kant allowed the existence of a noumenal space which suffices
for the demands of physical science, then under the shadow of this
obscure and elastic term we have admitted an extra-mental extension
of three dimensions conditioning the unobserved causes of our
sensations, and the chief contention of the Transcendental ^^sthetic is
abandoned.

"^"^ Principles of Psychology, % ^']2,

MODERN THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 123

against Idealism are these: (i) Priority. — In the history of
the race, as well as in the history of every mind, " Realism is
the primary conception," and Idealism is merely derived from
and subsequent to the former. (2) Simplicity. — The chain of
reasoning establishing Realism is simpler and shorter than
that proving Idealism. The latter, too, depends on the
former. (3) Distinctness. — The doctrine of Realism is pre-
sented in distinct and vivid terms, whilst Idealism can
be apprehended only in a vague and obscure manner.
(4) Realism is established by the criterion of the Universal
Postulate. We must accept as true what we are obliged to
think, and we cannot think away the existence of the objects
which we perceive.

We can only touch on one or two points of this theory
here. In the first place, though Mr. Spencer's arguments
are undoubtedly valid against the idealist, they are not less
efficacious against his own system. All the proofs from
simplicity, priority, the application of the Universal Postulate,
and the rest, tell equally in favour of Natural Realism against
Transfigured Realism as expounded by himself. In the second
place, Mr. Spencer's Transfigured Realism is little, if at all,
fitter to meet the demands of science than Kant's non-spatial
noumena or Mill's possibilities of sensation. Accordingly, for
disproof of the new hypotheses, we refer the reader back to
the arguments we have been just expounding. Physical
science asserts much about the internal relations of the
extra-mental causes of our sensations, which implies the
existence of a real time, and of a space of three dimensions
apart from our consciousness, yet truly mirrored by the
features of that consciousness. Mr. Spencer's own state-
ment, too, that there are variations in the modes of the
asserted Unknowable corresponding to our consciousness of
changes in space and time, abandons his most important
tenet that we can know nothing about the Unknowable except
its existence. The same difficulty which proved fatal to the
theories of Mill and Kant tell equally against Mr. Spencer.
Neither the assumptions nor conclusions of Physical Science
can be confined within the territory of phenomena. The
notions of " energy " and " force " lying at the root of
mechanics and physics, and the laws of their action which
science professes to expound, imply that the mind has a real
valid knowledge of the supposed noiunenal or unknowable
causes of our sensations. Finally, Mr. Spencer's reduction
of the material world, which we appear to perceive, into
groups of feelings is based, like that of Hume and Dr. Bain,
on the false assertion that we cannot have an immediate
knowledge of external reality.

124 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Probably the best exposition in English of the above line
of argument, based on the conflict between Empiricism and
Physical Science, is that to be found in Mr. Arthur Balfour's
Defence of rhilosophic Doubt, chapters ix. and xii. Viewed as
an argiimentiim ad hominem against the school of Mill and
Spencer, the reasoning there is perfectly valid, and seemingly
unanswerable, though in other respects some of the sceptical
CDncludons appear to us to be overdrawn.

Headings.— The First Prineiples of Knoivledge, by John Rickaby,
Pt. II. c. ii. ; Dr. Mivart, Nature and Thought, c. iii. ; On Truth,
cc. vii. — xi. ; Dr. Martineau, A Study of Religion, Vol. I. pp. 192 —
214; Hamilton, Metaphysies, Lect. xxv.— xxviii. ; Professor Veitch's
Hamilton, cc. v. — vii.; Dr. M'Cosh, Exam, of Mill, cc. 6, 7;
Ueberweg, Logic, §§ 37—44 ; R. Jardine, The Elements of the Psycho-
logy of Cognition, pp. 47—58, 125 — 148. The whole subject is very
ably handled by A. Farges in L'Objectivite de la Perception des Sens
ex'.ernes et ies Theories Modernes (Paris, 1891). See also J. Mark
Baldwin, The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 134 — 138. The ablest
treatise however in English on this subject is Professor T. Case's
Ph)sical Realism (Longmans).

v-''^

CHAPTER VII.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION!
EDUCATION OF THE SENSES.

Growth of Knowledge. — The true account of
our cognition of the external world is that which
maintains the doctrine of immediate perception — that
in some of its acts the mind directly apprehends a
material reality other than itself; but there is no
incompatibility between this theory and the admis-
sion that in the percipient acts of mature life there
are involved many results gathered by association,
and numerous mediate inferences of a more or less
complicated nature. The advocate of immediate
perception is not committed to the doctrine that the
eye of itself immediately apprehends something pre-
sented to its view as a solid brick house situated at
a hundred yards distance, nor that touch from the
beginning makes known a particular sensation of
pressure as due to a squeeze of the foot. The
apparently simple cognitions which succeed each
other from moment to moment in mature life,
contain certain primary data which have been
immediately presented to the senses ; but a large
fraction of the whole is, in most cases, built up
out of contributions furnished by imagination and

126 SENSUOUS LIFE.

memory. The variety of the elements involved,
and the plurality of the stages comprised in these
brief acts of knowledge, have been dwelt on at
copious length by many modern psychologists, and
elaborate descriptions of the gradual development
of apprehension by the "aggregation," ''segrega-
tion," and "integration" of sensuous "ingredients"
into the final product, the perceived thing, are very
familiar to the reader of English philosophical
literature.

Intellect usually ignored. — In spite, however, of the seeming
exhaustiveness of these analyses one all-important factor
is almost invariably omitted. Intellect, in its old and proper
signification, as a higher rational activity superior to sense,
awakened, indeed, to exercise by the latter, but transcending
its range — Intellect, thus understood, is ignored. Yet it is
precisely this faculty which makes intelligible the stream of
change disclosed in sensation. The formal object of sense is
the concrete quality of the individual thing, and it is percipient
of successive changes and co-existing accidents ; but it cannot
apprehend the being or essence of things ; it is blind to the
causality of agents, and to the substantiality of objects ; and of
those numerous relations of identity, similarity, unlikeness,
dependence, and the rest, which form the universal frame-
work, the rational tissue, of our knowledge, it can give no
account. A creature endowed merely with sensibility could
never come to know itself as a person, to apprehend itself as
an abiding ego, and to set itself in contrast and opposition to
an objective world. Nor could it come to truly cognize any
portion of the external universe, any more than itself as a
being. Now in normal perception these sensuous and intel-
lectual elements are closely interwoven, and it may require
careful attention and reflexion to separate them. ; but none
the less are they radically different in kind. As, however, the
plan of our work requires us to treat of intellectual activity
by itself, we will in the present chapter devote ourselves
mainly to the exposition of the development of the sentient
factor in the process, although, of course, in man's actual
experience sense and intellect are not thus isolated.

Complexity of perceptional process. — Before
beginning, an example may be useful to show the

Development of sense-perception. 127

reader unfamiliar with psychological analysis, that
seemingly simple perceptions are really complex.
Walking in a field, I become suddenly conscious of
a familiar sound, and exclaim, " I hear my big,
white dog barking in the road on my right about
eighty yards away." But a little reflexion will
convince me that the sense of hearing contributes
only a small share to such a percipient act. Of the
distance, direction, size, and colour of the agent
which has caused the noise, my ear of itself can tell
me nothing. It merely presents to me an auditory
sensation of a particular quality, and of greater or
less intensity ; the remaining elements of the cogni-
tion are reproductions of past experiences. Similarly
in other cases, unnoticed inferences, and faint associa-
tions furnished by the rest of the senses, attaching
to the direct testimony of each particular faculty,
simulate after a time the character of immediate
revelations of the latter. These indirect or infer-
ential cognitions may be styled the acquired perceptions
of the sense in question. It is the office of the
psychologist carefully to analyze these into their
primitive elements, to ascertain what are the ulti-
mate data afforded by each sense, and to trace the
chief steps in the process by which the elaborate
result is reached.

Development of Tactual Perception.— Although

in describing the general features of the different senses
viewed as mental powers, the order of treatment
adopted was unimportant, here in tracing the develop-
ment of perception it is a matter of great moment to
follow as closely as possible the natural order in which

J2S SENSUOUS LIFE.

de facto the several faculties come to offer their contribu-
tions.^ Accordingly we will commence with the sense of
touch, including under it tactual sensations proper,
feelings of pressure, and muscular sensations, whether
of resistance or of movement. It seems to us a mistake
in this connexion to endeavour to separate the conscious-
ness of pressure from that of mere contact. The isola-
tion is purely ideal. The difference between them is
one of degree, and in the actual experience of the child
sensations of touch, so far as they are of any psj^cho-
logical significance, involve feelings of pressure. The
consciousness of resistance to active effort put forth,
indeed, implies a new element, and facilitates the appre-
hension of something other than self given in the
recipient sensation of passive pressure, but even this
latter state makes us directly cognizant of extra-mental
reality. Starting then with the sense of touch, naturally
the first question which meets us is : How do we come
to know the spatial relations of the several parts of our
own person P

Localization of Sensations. — In mature life we instan-
taneously localize an impression in the point of the

1 To start with perception by taste, smell, or hearing, or at all
events to take any of these as the true type of external perception,
is a complete inversion of what is actually given in nature, and may
lead into serious philosophical error. These are precisely the
faculties by which originally we do not obtain any direct percep-
tion of matter. They are wanting in the most important feature of
that species of cognition which they are supposed to exemplify.
They are originally of an almost purely subjective character, and
are therefore but little better suited than imagination or memory
to illustrate the manner in which we .come to know the material
universe. Hearing, employed not for the illustration of indirect or
acquired perceptions, but as a typical representation of the per-
ceptual process in general , as is often done by psychologists,
misleads the reader into the belief that since by far the greater
part of the information yielded by this faculty is of a mediate
and inferential character, testifying only to possibilities of other
forms of sensation, therefore all modes of perception are of a
similarly subjective character, and no percipient faculty gives us
a direct immediate presentation of extended matter. Hearing
and smell exhibit abundantly the force of associated or acquired
perceptions, but direct perception they do Jiot illustrate.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 129

body2 irritated; and some writers maintain that the
affirmation of consciousness is of such a character
that this reference of a feehng to the part excited must
be a natural endowment possessed from the beginning.
But what precisely is meant by saying, " I feel a pain
in my foot" ? The statement at once calls up a visual
image of the member affected ; and it further presents
this image at about five feet in a nearly vertical line
from my eyes. However, as distance cannot be directly
apprehended by the eye, but is known primarily through
muscular sensations of movement, and as the visual
image of my foot is certainly not given in the painful
feeling of pressure, the first consciousness of such a
sensation could not have been similar to this. We are
not born with an innate idea or representation of our
person. Aristotle, long ago, taught that all knowledge
starts from experience, and the topography of our own
body is no exception to the rule. By observation and
experiment, and not through any a priori endowment,
we have come to learn the shape and appearance of our
organism, and to know the definite locality on the visual
map to which a particular tactual stimulation is to be
referred.^

2 This seems true in the case of sensations of surface pressure,
not so, however, as regards the organic sensations, or those of the
other special senses. We project or externalize the cause of
the auditory or visual sensation, but unless the impression is
markedly painful we do not in mature life advert to the point of
the organism affected by the stimuli of these senses. It is in fact
the organic or tactual element involved in these sensations which
enables us to localize them in our own body.

3 Dr. Gutberlet, who maintains the doctrine that an original
local reference of a very vague character is attached to sensa-
tions of contact, summarizes the arguments against the extreme
" nativistic " or a priori view : (i) We appear to localize impressions
in parts of the body demonstrably incapable of sensations, e.g., in
our bones, teeth, hair, &c. (2) We also misinterpret the locus of
known impressions, assigning them to wrong places, e.g., pressure
of the elbow is felt in the fingers, irritation of the brain is referred
to the extremities. (3) Irritation of the stump of an amputated leg
causes us to assign the sensation to the locality originally occupied
by the lost limb. (4) We sometimes project sensations outside of
the body, e.g., the feeling of pressure to the end of a walking-stick
or a pen. (5) The definiteness of localization varies considerably

J •

130 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Tactual Cognition of the Organism.— Although
the extreme " nativistic " theory is thus erroneous,
exaggerated empiricism rushes into an equally false
opinion when it refuses to admit the presence of any
element of a local character, or any presentation of
extension in our primitive sensations of contact. The
true doctrine, as usual, lies between the extreme views.
Impressions of extended objects are given from the
beginning as extended, and bearing a local reference,
but of an extremely vague and indefinite character.
From the apprehension of purel}^ unextended sensations
the notion of extended matter cannot be formed, and in
this respect the cognition of the spatial character of our
own body stands in the same situation as the rest of the
material world. The extended nature of the organ is
given simultaneously with that of the extended surface
pressing upon it, but as we have said, this primitive
presentation is very ill-defined.*

Local SigJis. — Of the shape or quantity of the
surface covered our knowledge is at first almost infini-
tesimal, whilst of the local relations between the point
affected and the rest of our person we necessarily as yet
know nothing. Nevertheless the character of an impres-
sion is largely dependent on its situation ; the pressure,
for instance, of the same object across the fingers, the
palm, the fore-arm, on the head, and on the calf of the

in different parts of the body, and decreases in proportion as the
part affected is beyond the range of the eye and of the hand, e.g.,
irritation in the back and within the organism. {Die Psychologic,
pp. Co, Ci.)

"* " There is an element of voluminousncss . . . discernible in each
and every sensation, though more developed in some than in others,
and this is the original sensation of space, out of which all the exact
knowledge we afterwards come to have is woven by processes of
discrimination, association, and selection." (James, Vol. II., p. 135)
Similarly, J. Mark Baldwin: "No purely empirical explanation is
sulhcient to account for the extensive form of sensation. . . . The
power to perceive space is as native as the power to percei\e
anything else ; but this does not mean that space is native to the
mind any more than trees are or music. Objects are given to us in
space, and space is given to us with objects." {Senses and Intellect,
p. 122.) The empiricism of the associationists on this question is
tailing more and more into disrepute.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 131

leg, possesses in each case a certain distinctive feature.
Further, this variation in the aspect of the mental state
is in proportion, though not in a constant proportion,
to variation in locality. Thus, if the same stimulus be
applied to two points on the arm, separated by a short
interval, the sensations aroused will contain a certain
difference of character, which will increase if the inter-
mediate distance be increased ; similarly with impres-
sions on the fingers, though here change in the sensation
is more rapid in proportion to variation of locality.
Assuming the faculty of apprehending extended impres-
sions over the surface of the body, and this " local
colouring," which marks the sensibility of the different
parts affected, if an object is moved along the skin from
one locality to another, the capacity of the intermediate
region for tactual sensations is discovered.

The terms, local sign, and local colour, have been used by
Lotze to designate a purely subjective quality varying with
the part of the organism affected, and attached to the purely
subjective non-spatial presentations of sense. These local
signs become symbols of the muscular sensations of movement
required to pass from one sensitive point to another, and by
their means out of mental states, individually revealing no
element of extension, the notion of space is alleged to be
built up. Lotze thus advanced beyond the empiricism
advocated by Dr. Bain, Mill, and other English sensationalists,
in admitting the necessity of more than mere tactual and
muscular sensations. But the local signs cannot generate,
though they ma}' be of great value in defining our notion
of space. A direct presentation of extension must be some-
how afforded as material to work upon.

Sensations of Double-Contact. — It is probably, how-
ever, the experience of double-contact, which contri-
butes most to the definition of the relative situation of
the several parts of the organism. If a child lays his
right hand upon his left there is awakened a double
tactual feeling of extension. If he then moves the right
palm along the left arm up to the elbow or shoulder he
becomes conscious of a series of muscular sensations in the
right arm, and also of a series of extended tactual
impressions both in the right hand and along the left

132 SENSUOUS LIFE.

arm, which vary in character as they depart farther
from the original sensation in the left hand. This
movement may be then reversed and the tactual sensa-
tions gone through in the opposite direction ; and
finally by laying the left arm along a flat surface, or
vice versa, the series of tactual impressions, formerly
given in succession, will now be presented as co-existing
outside of each other in space. When these or kindred
experiments have been executed a few times, the
difference in character of the tactual impressions on
two points of the arm awaken by association a repre-
sentation of the number of tactual sensations and of the
duration of the series of muscular sensations required to
span the interval, and their relative situations are so
far defined. In this way a blind child would rapidly
gather by experience a tolerably accurate knowledge
of the configuration of its body, and of the relative
positions of its varying forms of tactual sensibility.
The localization of impressions would become more
definite in the parts capable of being easily explored
by means of sensations of double contact, while the
outlying districts would be known in a less perfect way.
Combination of Touch and Sight. — Still, it is sight
which, normally speaking, presents to us the rich
realities of space. Apprehending in a simultaneous act
a large space of the surface of the body, the eye far
surpasses in efficiency the consciousness of double
contact, while it supplements the latter experience as a
third witness in a multitude of observations. As our
education advances the visual image of the point of the
organism stimulated becomes more intimately associated
with the local colouring of the tactual sensibility of that
point, and the map of the sense of touch is translated
into that of sight.

Tactual Cognition of other Extended Objects. —
Together with progress in our knowledge of our own
body proceeds our education as regards the material
world outside ; every increment of information in the
one department is a corresponding gain in the other.
Abstracting again from vision, when the child lays his
liand flat on some object before him, suppose a book,

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTIOM. 133

he becomes conscious of an extended impression. By
moving his hand he experiences two concomitant series
of tactual and motoy sensations. When he reaches the
edge of the surface the tactual sensations cease, and
then reversing the operation he may reproduce them in
the opposite order. After a few such experiments, he
would come to know in a rough way the number of
units of tactual or motor sensations necessary to pass
from the first to the last impression of contact, and he
would thus have a measure of the length or hreadth of
the book. Suppose he then takes the volume between
his two hands or fingers, he will discover that it presents
several resisting surfaces, and some further experiments
in the way of tactual and muscular feelings define his
knowledge of its solidity and zveight.

Here, again, as before, to the normally endowed being,
the visual images presented by sight of the objects
touched and handled enormously faciUtate progress, and
gradually enable him to infer the temperature, magnitude,
solidit}^, and weight of things at a distance. This mode
of education is going on in one shape or another every
moment of his waking existence, and consequently his
perception of the objects in his immediate vicinity very
soon becomes tolerably accurate.

Permanent existence of Material Objects. — The several
members and parts of his own body permanently present
as the centre of his pleasures and pains, and the subject
of his sensations of double contact, are known to be
very different from all other objects. These latter by
their repeated recurrence to his notice in like circum-
stances, by the frequently confirmed experience that he
can renew his acquaintance with them at will, and by
their regularity in producing their effects, whether
observed or unobserved, first evoke a dim belief, and
then a rational conviction as to their abiding existence
when beyond his view. Consequently, at a very early
stage in his existence he becomes alive to the fact that
his nurse, his bed, his food, and other objects of interest
are not annihilated every time he closes his eyes.

Inferential knowledge of othey Minds. — Among external
objects a class particularly interesting for the child are

134 SENSUOUS LIFE.

organisms like in shape to his own, These bodies,
moreover, react by movement in response to stimuli
just as he himself does. But in his own case his
consciousness assures him that mental states are the
effects of similar stimulation and the causes of similar
movements. Consequently, by analogy he infers that
mental existences like his own are present in other human
bodies. Language is indeed the strongest evidence for
the reality of other human minds, but even when it is
absent, as in the case of the lower animals, the
argument is felt to be irresistible.

These other human minds can now in turn afford
valuable corroboratory evidence concerning the objec-
tive existence and permanence of material objects when
doubts as to the possibility of illusion are awakened.

Secondary acquisitions. — We have spoken so far of the
essential capabilities of touch : a word may be of interest
now on the special or accidental acquirements of this per-
cipient faculty. The degree to which the sense of touch can
be cultivated, and the fineness of the capacity of both
muscular and tactual sensations for being discriminated
appear truly amazing when thoughtfully considered. The
miller can by the sense of feeling distinguish variations in the
quality of flour utterly invisible to the eye. The clothier can
recognize subtile differences in the texture of silk, linen, or
velvet, of an equally minute character. In such universal
attainments as those of speaking, reading, writing, playing
the piano, shaving, and indeed in all mechanical arts, the
most delicate sensibility is exhibited. These actions involve
a complicated series of movements under the guidance of
muscular and tactual sensations which are distinguishable
by differences so faint that we are fairly lost in astonishment
at the infinitesimal forces governing thus infallibly the
seemingly easy process.

It is in the blind, however, that this sense reaches its
proper perfection. By them space is known and remembered
solely in terms of tactual and motor experience. Their
attention is concentrated on this field of cognition, and their
powers of memory devoted to its service. The increased
exercise and cultivation of the remaining senses when sight
is in abeyance, has the eftect of developing these faculties in
an extraordinary manner, and none of them more so than
that of touch. The blind, for instance, who have been taught
to read, can decipher the contents by passing their fingers

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 135

rapidly over type not much larger than the print of the
present work, with a facihty that seems ineredible to their
more fortunate brethren who make the attempt. Dr. Carpenter
relates of Laura Bridgman, the well-known deaf and dumb
mute, that she unhesitatingly recognized his brother " after
the lapse of a year from his previous interview by the ' feel '
of his hand."^ She estimates the age and frame of mind of
her visitors by feeling the wrinkles of their face, and it is said
that she can even perceive variation in intensity and pitch of
voice by feeling the throat.*^ John Metcalf, the celebrated
blind road-maker, was deemed an excellent jud^^^e of horses.
When a lad he was a favourite guide through the lanes and
marshes of his native county. As a young man he followed
the hounds on horseback across country, and on one occasion
won a three mile race round a circular course. These latter
feats, however, were performed rather by the sense of hearing
than of touch. To guide him in the race, he placed a man
with a bell at each post ; and in the hunting-field the cry of
the hounds, the intelligence of his horse, and his knowledge
of the country enabled him to keep a leading place. *"

Visual Perception. — As the formal object of
sight is merely coloured surface, the eye cannot
originally inform us of distance. This faculty, even
more than that of touch, has constituted a battle-
ground for the "nativistic" and "emipirical" theories.
The more thoroughgoing nativists have held that the
eye, or rather the visual organ consisting of both eyes,
has from the beginning the power of immediately
or intuitively apprehending the distance and relative
situation of objects, just as well as the ability of
perceiving differences of colour. Empiricists, on

^ Mental Physiology, § 127.

*> " Pressing thus on the throat of several persons successively,
she sometimes sportively attempts to imitate their voice with her
own in a way which shows that she does distinguish differences
of both loudness and pitch (paradoxical as the language may be)
without any conception or sensation whatever of sound." (Cf. Mind,
1879, pp. 166, 167.)

'' Smiles, Lives of Engineers, Yo\. p 210.

136 SENSUOUS LIFE.

the other hand, deny to the eye all native capacity
of cognizing extension in any form. According to
their view, it is only by experience and association
that ocular sensations, which in themselves bear no
more reference to space than feelings of sound or
smell, are gradually construed into extended solid
objects. Here again, as before, it will be found
that truth lies in the mean. The primary percep-
tion of the eye is simply coloured surface; neither
distance, solidity, nor absolute magnitude is origi-
nally presented to us by this sense. These are
secondary or acquired perceptions, gained by
associating in experience various shades of colour,
and degrees of tension in the ocular muscles, with
different motor and tactual experiences. But surface
space is originally perceived directly.

The original presentation of superficial extension is very
vague. The central point of the retina is most sensitive, and
the shape of an external surface, e.g., of a triangle, is defined
by moving the line of direct vision round its outline. The
relative situation of the parts subtending different points on
the retina, and the intervals of space between them, vaguely
presented by the quantity of intermediate distinct sentient
points, similarly receive accurate determination by means of
the muscular sensations involved in bringing the central axis
of the eye to bear on them. In sight, as in touch, Lotze
amends the empirical doctrine by the hypothesis of " local
signs." Though the sensations of diff'erent points of the
retina are qualitatively diff'erent, he holds that there is
originally no presentation of extension. By association the
qualitative mark of any spot awakens a representation of the
quantity of muscular sensation requisite to direct the central
point towards the object subtended by that spot, and this,
he teaches, is all that spatial distance means. Greater or less
space is, in fact, merely the possibility of more or fewer
muscular feelings. (Cf. Metaphysic, Book III. c. iv.)

Here again, as in the development of tactual perception
the hypothesis of " local signs " may be accepted as a means

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 137

of explaining the determination of the relative positions and
comparative magnitudes of objects within the extended field
of vision, but it cannot account for the original presentation
of extension itself.

Immediate Perception of Surface Extension.

■ — The argument used to establish the direct per-
ception of extension by D'Alembert, Hamilton, and
others, has never been really answered. We will
adopt Dr. Porter's enunciation of the proof: " If
two or more bands of colour were present to the
infant which had never exercised touch or move-
ment, it must see them both at once ; and if it sees
them both, it must see them as expanded or ex-
tended ; otherwise it could not see them at all, nor
the line of transition or separation between them.
Or if a disc of red were presented in the midst of
and surrounded by a field of yellow or blue, or if a
bright band of red were painted so as to return as
a circle upon itself, on a field of black, the band
could not be traced by the eye without requiring
that the eye should contemplate as an extended
percept the included surface or disc of red."^

8 The Hicman Intellect, p. 155. Cf. also Balmez, Fundamental
Philosophy, Book II. c. xii.,and Hamilton, Metaph.\o\. II. pp. 165, 172.
This argument is restated in an effective manner by Mr. Mahaffy,
The Critical Philosophy, pp. 115 — 121. It is no reply to say that the
extent of colour perceived by a motionless eye is very small and its
outline vague. This is true, though not to the extent that Mill
and Dr. Bain would make out. It is conceded by them that the
retina is extended, and that a small circle of colour can be originally
apprehended by sight alone. This admits at once the leading con-
tention of the intuitive school. A circle of the one-tenth of an inch
in diameter is as truly extended as the orbit of a planet, while no
microscope can reveal space in a sound or an odour, and no
summation of these latter sensations can result in a surface
or a solid.

I3S SENSUOUS LIFE.

Experimental evidence. — This demonstration is reinfoixed
by the direct evidence of a number of experiments tried on
persons who had late in Hfe been couched for cataract.
The testimony from this line of investigation is unhappily
not yet in as satisfactory a condition as could be desired. It
is a significant comment on the lofty claims of some physio-
logical psychologists to find that the experiments on
Cheseldeu's patient still receive a leading place among the
most recent text-books. In spite of the supposed enormous
and fruitful advances of physiological psychology, that
venerable and oft-recounted incident, now nearly one hundred
and seventy years old, and claimed by both sides, is still
amongst the least unsatisfactory cases we possess. The best
experiment, however, on the whole, seems to be that ot
Dr. Franz, of Leipzig (1840). In the operations of both Franz
and Cheselden the subjects were intelligent boys of seventeen
and eighteen years of age. When, after the cataract had
been removed, the eyes of the patients were sufficiently
healed to be exposed to the light, a series of observations and
experiments were instituted in order to ascertain exactly how
much they could directly perceive by their newly-received
faculty. The points of importance best established were :
(1) that the newly-acquired sense presented to the mind a
field of colour extended in two dimensions of space ; (2) that
it did not afford a perception of the relative distances of
objects, all being apprehended in a confused manner as in
close proximity to the eye; (3) and that, consequently, no
information was given as to the absolute magnitude of things.
(4) In Franz's case, where the investigation was more skilfully
conducted than on the earlier occasion, the patient recognized
the identity between horizontal and perpendicular lines now
seen by the eye and those formerly known by touch. He
could similarly recognize square and round figures, though he
could not distinguish these from solid cubes and spheres.'*

" These two cases, and others of less value during the interval,
are reported in the I'liil. Trans, of the Royal Society. Dr. Carpenter,
Mental Philosophy, %l 161 and 167, alludes to some other instances,
and others again are cited by Helmholtz, but the two given above
are among the best. A large portion of the account of Franz's
case is transcribed from the Phil. Trans. 1841, into Mr. Mahafly's
Critical Philosophy, pp. 122 — 133, and in briefer form into Dr. M 'Cosh's
E:xam. of Mill, pp. 163—165. Hamilton's Metaph. Vol. II. pp. 177—
179, contains the Cheselden case at length. The best summary,
however, of all these cases is given in Preyer's Development of the
Intellect (1896), pp. 286— 317. The fact that the most recent case
recorded there is that of Franz, already fifty-six years old, is
instructive.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 139

Analogical argument. — The force of the evidence in favour
of the immediate apprehension of space of at least two
dimensions by the human infant is still further increased by
the fact that several of the lower animals are now proved to
possess a perfect appreciation of even three dimensions of
space at birth. Mr. Spalding established intuitive perceptions
in the case of chickens by covering their eyes with hoods as
soon as they left the shell, and so preventing all visual
experiences until they were strong enough for various experi-
ments. When the hoods were removed they immediately
showed their appreciation of spatial relations. " Often at the
end of two minutes," says Mr. Spalding, " they followed with
their eyes the movements of crawling insects, turning their
head with all the precision of an old fowl. In from two to
fifteen minutes they pecked at some speck or insect, showing
not merely an instinctive perception of distance, but an
original ability to judge, to measure distance, with some-
thing like infallible accuracy. . . . They never missed by
more than a hair's breadth, and that too, when the specks
aimed at were no bigger, and less visible, than the small dot
of an /."i"^ He shows a similar power of intuitive perception
to be possessed by young pigs and some other animals
physically well developed at birth. This positive proof of
the existence of intuitive apprehension of space of three
^limensions demonstrates in a striking manner the absurdity
of the imphcit assumption in associationist accounts of the
subject that immediate vision even of surface extension is
impossible.

Mediate perception of Distance and Magnitude.

— That the human eye has not originally the capacity of
estimating distance is shown by such experiments as
those just cited; and by the fact that in mature life in
unusual circumstances, as for instance, at sea, we feel
at a great loss when we attempt to judge the length of
considerable intervals of space. The simple experi-
ment of closing one eye, especially when entering an
unfamiliar room, also shows how imperfect is our purely
visual appreciation of distance. And the various
illusions of painting, of the diorama, and of the stereo-
scope, all go to prove the truth that the apparently
immediate apprehension of the third dimension of space

'" Cf. Macmillan's Magazine, February, 1873; James, Vol. II.
pp. 394—400 ; and Preyer, The Senses and the Will, pp. 66, 235—241.

140 SENSUOUS LIFE.

by sight is really an acquired perception, which
involves a rapid process of inference from numerous
visual signs.

In developed perception there are engaged many
factors whose presence and action are commonly
ignored. Starting from an originally indefinite appre-
hension of extended coloured surface, we find that
different perspective appearances, shades of colour,
and degrees of tension in the ocular muscles are asso-
ciated with longer or shorter distances to be moved
through in order to touch the coloured object. After a
sufficient number of experiences the visual appearance
suggests the appropriate amount of movement, and the
former becomes the symbol of the latter. The chief
elements in the process seem to be the following :

1. Focal adjustments — The single eye is subject to
different muscular sensations according to the varying
distance of the object up to an interval of twenty feet.
This is due to the self-regulating action of the ciliary
muscle, which increases or decreases the convexity of
the crystalline lens so as to adjust the focus to a shorter
or longer range.

2. Axial adjustment. — The muscular sensations
awakened by converging the axes of both ej'es to meet
in a point, vary according as the object is nearer or
farther within a space of two hundred yards.

3. Mathematical perspective. — The size of the retinal
image and the apparent size of an object change with
the distance of the latter ; consequently, if its real
magnitude is already known, we have the means of
determining how remote it is. It is for this purpose
the painter is accustomed to introduce the figure of a
man or of some well-known animal into the foreground
of his pictures.

4. Aerial perspective. — Finally, changes of colour, and
the greater or less haziness in the outlines of objects
becomes by experience the signs of a longer or shorter
interval between them and us.

Our visual perception of the magnitude of an object

11 Cf. Le Conte, Sight, Part II. c. v.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 141

is an inference from its apparent size and presumed
distance, and most of the steps just given may enter into
the estimate. Thus, in judging the dimensions of an
unfamiHar object, such as a rock, or a mound of earth
afar off", we are led to form an idea of the length of
space intervening by the number and apparent magni-
tude of known objects between us and the point in
question, by the apparent size of other known figures,
such as those of men or animals situated in its vicinity,
and by the clearness or mistiness of the outlines of the
object and of its neighbours. Having thus estimated
the distance we infer the real from the apparent magni-
tude of the object.

Mutual aid of Sight and Touch. — The education of tlie
sense of sight proceeds concomitantly with that of the
faculty of tactual and motor sensations. Mutually
aiding each other their progress is very rapid. The
advantages gained by touch through the consciousness
of double-contact are now largely increased by the
addition of a power which can apprehend in an instant
the entire contour of the body, and the situation of the
various agents acting upon it. The length of the sweep
of the arm or leg are known not merely in the dim
terms of subjective motor feelings, but through the
fine visual perceptions of space. The wide range of
the eye, and those other numerous excellences which
have been detailed in describing this sense, confer upon
its acts the power of arousing with marvellous facility
and speed the representation of associated tactual and
muscular sensations. By this singularl}' perfect appro-
priation of the acquisitions of touch, vision is enabled
to inform us in an easy, rapid, and admirable manner
of a multitude of the tangible properties of things which
we could never, or but by an incredible amount of labour,
ascertain through actual contact. At the same time,
the control of the organ of sight is secured by the ciliary
muscles ; and while we watch the movement of the
arm, the muscular sensations of the eye reveal the
quantity of change in its own direction, the degree of
convergence of the optic axes, and the increase or
decrease in the copyexity of the cr3'stalline lens. In

142 SENSUOUS LIFE.

this way by the mutual co-operation of the two faculties
our knowledge of the most important attributes of
matter is elaborated.

Vision, unlike touch, taste, and smell, does not seem to be
capable of much advance in range or refinement beyond what
it normally reaches. The skill with which the Indian can
follow a trail and the sailor recognize an object at sea seem
among the most remarkable effects of special education of
this sense. Unlike the other faculties, sight is normally
developed almost up to its full maximum efficiency.

Binocular Vision. — A large district of the spatial scene
apprehended by sight is common to both eyes, but the out-
skirts on either side extend beyond the binocular field of
vision, and can be reached only by a single organ. In the
perception of distant objects within the common field there is
ordinarily formed on each of the retinas a similar picture,
but things seen in our immediate neighbourhood offer a
different appearance to the right and to the left eye. This
fact has given rise to the problem of single vision. Why with
two eyes do we not see two objects instead of one ? Various
explanations have been suggested. One view supposes that
we originally saw double, but by experience have learned to
assign the two images to a single cause. Another maintains
that the two eyes form really but one organ. There are, it is
held, "identical or corresponding points " on the two retinas,
and pairs of nerves running from these to the brain coalesce,
so that the two stimuli are fused into a single final excitation
awakening but one sensation. Other writers have asserted
that although the two eyes see different pictures yet, at any
given time, we attend only to one.

As regards the last hypothesis it is undoubtedly true that
one eye is commonly more active than the other, and most
people will find that the right is more efficient than the left ;
still it is going beyond the evidence to assume that our
attention is normally so concentrated upon the activity of
one eye that the other may be thrown out of account. In
favour of the second view may be urged the authority of
several distinguished German physiologists starting with
Miiller fifty years ago, who consider the anatomical evidence
to be on the whole in support of the physical explanation.
It is also maintained that if the two retinas were really
subjects of two distinct sensations, careful reflexion and
examination of our consciousness ought to enable us to
distinguish them. Finally, it is held that the analogy in the
case of young animals constitutes a forcible argument. If

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 143

the two eyes are co-ordinated so as to originate a sin£;lc
perception from the beginning in these latter, as is un-
doubtedly the case, it is reasonable to suppose, where there
is no positive evidence to the contrary, that the same holds
for the young infant.

On the other side it is argued : (a) That more accurate
knowledge of anatomy does not bear out the nativistic
position. {b) That points physiologically not " corres-
ponding " sometimes give rise to a single perception, whilst
on other occasions points that ought to correspond excite
double vision. In abnormal conditions, such as squinting,
where the derangement is permanent, vision is single, in spite
of the non-correspondence of identical points, and when the
irregularity has been removed by surgical means, so that the
two axes get into a normal position, double vision arises for a
time, but by continued experience passes again into single
vision. {c) Some writers contend that the " conflict or
rivalry of the retinas," which takes place when the two eyes
are made to contemplate different colours, is in favour of the
empirical theory. If there was a real physical fusion of the
nerve currents from the retinas to the brain, then we ought
to have a sensation of an intermediate character and not, as
is the case at present, an alternative struggling sensation of
each. A modification of this experiment, however, is held
by others to support the nativistic theory.'^ {d) It is also
urged that the illusion produced by the stereoscope, where
two dissimilar pictures presented to the different eyes give
rise to the perception of a single object, confirms the empirical
theory.^^

On the whole that view seems to us to be nearest to the
truth which, while admitting a certain degree of natural
harmony in the structure of the two instruments, yet assigns
to experience the development and perfection of binocular
vision.^**

^- Cf. Wyld, Physics and Philosophy of the Senses, pp. 226, 227.

'^ The stereoscope is an instrument, invented by Wheatstone,
and improved by Brewster, in which slightly dissimilar pictures,
such as would be presented to the right and left retinas by a neigh-
bouring solid object, are simultaneously set separately each before
the appropriate eye. The result is an irresistible conviction of a
single solid object. The empirical school hold this fact to establish
that single vision is really an interpretation of two mental images
attained by experience. Their opponents, however, would argue
that though illusory in the present case, the single apprehension is
due to native disposition and not merely to association.

^^ The reader interested in the question will find the empirical
doctrine supported by Carpenter, op. cit. §§ 168— 171, and Bern-

144 SENSUOUS LIFE.

The importance of binocular vision in the perception of
soHdity and distance is very great. The muscular tension
involved in the convergence of the axes of the two eyes, and
the dissimilarity in the two retinal impressions, confer an
immense advantage on the double organ. Somewhat analo-
gously to the case of the two hands in the sense of touch,
and to the two ears in hearing, the twin members of the
visual faculty, by means of their different standpoints, are
enabled to bring forward valuable contributions of a new
character. Moreover, though double-contact aids us by two
distinct and separable experiences, while ordinarily in sight
but one sensation is consciously realized, yet the effect of the
second visual organ, whether due to experience or connate
aptitude, is such that we obtain an instantaneous perception
of the third dimension of space.

Erect Vision. — In addition to binocular vision, a second
"anomaly" of sight is found in the perception of objects as
erect while the image on the retina is inverted. Some writers
refuse to admit the existence of any special difficulty. We do
not, they point out, see the retinal image but the object, and
it is simply a law of our nature that an inverted image
awakens the perception of an erect object. Others accen-
tuate the fact that during the transmission of the retinal
impression to the brain in the form of a neural tremor, the
original spatial relations of the parts must be lost, and so
there is no reason why the resulting mental state should
redistribute them in their old position. The erection of the
object will then be due either to innate disposition or acquired
habit. Dr. Carpenter holds that " one of the most elementary
of our visual cognitions is the sense of direction, whereby we
recognize the relations of the points from which the rays
issue and thus see the objects erect, though their pictures on
the retina are inverted." ^^ By this "extradition," rays of
light falling from above or below will be referred back to their
source. He appeals to the operations for cataract as con-
firming his view. The question is, however, of no great
philosophical significance.

stein, The Five Senses, pp. 128, seq. On the other side, of. R. S.
Wyld, op. cit. pp. 221 — 227. P. Salis Sewis, Delia Conoscenza Sensi-
tiva, pp. 483 — 486, opposes the physiological explanation which
he traces back to Galen. La Psychologic Allemande Contemporaine,
pp. 118 — 145, by M. Ribot, gives an account of the dispute between
Nativists and Empiricists in Germany. However, this book, which
is written entirely from an empiricist standpoint, is very unreliable.
^^ Mental Physiology, § 165.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 145

Auditory Perception. — The ear gives us origi-
nally no knowledge of the spatial relations of the
external world, nor even of the nature of the objec-
tive cause of the sensations of sound. Of the
acquired perceptions of this faculty the most re-
markable are the sense of the direction of a sounding
body, and the sense of its distance. Both are due to
association, and neither of them reach in man a
very high degree of perfection. If while our eyes
are closed a noise is produced near us by the con-
cussion of two objects, such as keys, we shall find
it almost impossible to localize the sound, especially
when the experiment is performed above our head
or near our feet. In mature life we estimate the
distance of a familiar sound by means of its in-
tensity. If it is of a rare character, such as that
of thunder or of the explosion of gunpowder, we
feel completely at a loss. The discrimination of
direction is dependent on the difference in the
effects produced in the two ears, and also on the
variation in the character or intensity of the sound
brought about by moving the head. An object on
the right side makes a stronger impression on the
right than on the left ear, and the sound is intensified
by bringing the head or body to that side, or by
setting the ear in a more direct line with the
sonorous object. Hares and other animals endowed
with large movable ears far surpass man in this
respect. Careful cultivation may extend consider-,
ably the power of distinguishing faint sounds, and,
we find certain uncivilized tribes, as well as some
species of the lower animals, in which this sense has '

146 SENSUOUS LIFE.

been developed to a surprising degree as a means
of ascertaining the advent of their foes or their prey.
Its imperfection as an imformant regarding space
is partially redeemed by the fineness of its appre-
ciation of time lengths, and to this quality its value
not merely as the musical faculty, but as the instru-
ment of social communication is largely due.

Gustatory and Olfactory Perception. — Neither
the sense of taste nor that of smell afforded us origi-
nally an immediate perception of external reality.
If we make the experiment of tasting a liquid of
moderately sweet or sour flavour, which is at the
same temperature as the organ, we shall find that
even in mature life the resulting sensation is of a
vague ill-defined character, and contains little more
direct reference to the external world than a head-
ache, or a general feeling of depression. In
experience, however, special tastes have been found
to be invariably excited by objects possessing par-
ticular tactual and visual qualities, and therefore the
three classes of sensation come to be associated so
that either may recall the others. By cultivation
this faculty can be developed in a very surprising
degree, and the expert can detect variations in the
flavour of tea, wine, and other articles so faint as to
be utterly imperceptible to the ordinary mortal. The
first odours which assailed our nostrils probably
awoke us up to an indefinite pleasurable or painful
feeling, and to nothing more. But after a time
we grew to associate certain smells with particular
objects known by touch and sight, and as the
higher activities of the mind unfolded themselves

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 147

we began to apprehend the former as the cause of
the latter. To the circumstance that this sense is
stimulated by effluvia of distant bodies, much of its
superiority to taste, both in point of refinement and
of cognitional importance, is due. As revealing
future gustatory experiences, and giving timely
warning of poisonous or unwholesome food, olfac-
tory perception becomes an instrument of con-
siderable value. This faculty, like that of taste, is
susceptible of a high degree of cultivation, and in
the absence of some of the other senses it has
reached a remarkable degree of acuteness.

Objections solved.— The account we have just given of
the gradual growth of perception obviates various difficulties
urged against the doctrine of Natural Reahsm. Mr. Bain, for
instance, objects against Hamilton that the terms " external,"
"independent," and " reahty " " are not simple and ultimate
notions, but complex and derived," and consequently that
"it is inadmissible to regard any proposition involving them
as an ultimate fact of consciousness." ^^ Undoubtedly these
terms in ordinary language imply a variety of elements which
it would be absurd to assert are all given in the " primitive
unanalyzable dictum of consciousness." Accordingly, to main-
tain that the first sensation of pressure or sight revealed to
the infant a material world as external, independent, and real,
in the full significance of these words, would be as unjustifi-
able as to hold that the first glance at a triangle or circle
presents to us all its geometrical properties. Starting from
impressions of sight and touch which vaguely present to us
extended reality other than our perceiving mind, our present
well-defined knowledge of our own sentient organism, and of
objects external to it, became gradually elaborated. The
continuous existence of these realities when unperceived,
which especially establishes their independence of the Ego^
is guaranteed by memory, reflexion, and inference, and not
by direct intuition. Finally, through the same means we
learn to distinguish between the illusions of the imagination
and the genuine deliverances of the external senses, and so
come to comprehend the full meaning of reality.

^^ Mental Science, p. 120.

148 SENSUOUS LIFE.

The objection that we cannot have an immediate know-
ledge of an " external reality," that " it is impossible to
understand how the mind can be cognizant of a thing
detached from itself," ^^ is equally futile. It is at least fully
as impossible to understand how the mind can be cognizant
of itself. How mind and body are united, Jiow either can act
upon the other, or indeed how any one thing can 7nove
another, are to our present faculties insoluble questions ; but
the fact that there is interaction cannot be denied any more
than the growth of plants or the existence of gravitation,
merely because we cannot imagine how such an event is
possible. If the living body is informed and animated
throughout its whole being by a spiritual soul, why should not
the sentient organism so constituted be capable of responding
to a material stimulus by an immediately percipient act ?
A priori dogmas as to what is or is not impossible are here
out of place, especially in the hands of empiricists. To
experience we must appeal, and this testifies that in sensa-
tions of pressure and sight we are immediately percipient of
something other than our own mental states, whilst observa-
tion of many of the lower animals proves that they can
accurately appreciate spatial relations from birth.

Co-operation of External Senses, Internal
Sense, and Intellect. — We have endeavoured, in
the present chapter, to trace the growth of each of
the external senses separately, and we have tried to
confine ourselves to the development of the sensuous
factor in apprehension. But in real life there is no
such isolation. The external senses are all con-
nected with the same brain, and they are all faculties
of the same mind. Their several activities are
accordingly unified in the same interior sensuous
consciousness. In human beings, as well as in the
lower animals, the operations of the senses are
synthesized by internal sentiency, and apart from
all higher rational activity, the sensations of the
different senses are obscurely felt as similar or
dissimilar.

1'^ Mental Science, p. 209.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 149

But in man, during mature life, even the
simplest acts of perception usually involve in-
tellectual activity, and it is virtually as impossible
to assign the exact date of the first awakening of
rational cognition as it is to point to the birth of
the primitive free volition. In both departments
lower grades of consciousness, sentiency and spon-
taneity, precede as necessary conditions the higher
forms of mental life ; and to the child during the
years of early infancy the existence of the external
world is given as an instinctive and indestructible
belief, and its reality is for him little more than that
of sensations and possibilities of sensations.

Dr. Porter very aptly remarks: "It is quite conceivable,
as has been already suggested, that before those percepts
(perceived things) and sensations (qualities apprehended by
sensations) are connected under the relation of substance
and attribute, they should be known as constant attendants,
co-existent or successive, and that, simply as conjoined, the
presence or the thought {i.e. sensuous image) of the one
should, under the laws of association, suggest the thought of
the other. It is under this relation that things and properties
are known to the animal. It is obvious that the animal
cannot and does not distinguish the relation of conjunction
from that ot causation. If he has experienced one sensation
or sense-percept in connection with another, the repetition of
the one brings up the image of the other, and the pain and
pleasure, the hope and fear, which are appropriate to it.
The dog connects with the whip in the hand of his master
the thought (image) of chastisement and pain ; with the sight
of his gun or his walking-stick, the excitement of a ramble or
of sport." i«

Intelligent Cognition not mere Instinctive Belief.—
It is through a confusion between the spontaneous faith
embodied in the primitive percipient act and the rational
conviction evoked in the developed consciousness by intel-
lectual perception, that Reid and others were misled into
describing our assurance of external reality as an instinctive

18 The Human Intellect, § 166.

i:;o SENSUOUS LIFE.

&^//^/ irresistibly suggested by the sensation. Instinctive belief
stands opposed to intelligent cognition as being blind and
irrational. No grounds can be assigned for its existence,
and no cogent reason can be adduced for its validity. The
mere fact that a mental state of this character is inde-
structible does not alone afford it a sufficient philosophical
guarantee, while the appearance of idealist philosophers
would seem to imply that such a faith can at all events suffer
temporary eclipse. But our knowledge of material objects
is not of this kind. However blind and unintelligent may be
the trust of the infant or the brute in an external world,
developed cognition in man is essentially other than im-
pulsive faith ; and his certainty of a material universe, au
assurance in which rational intuition, abstraction, reflexion,
and inference are involved, and which is based on reasons
as solid as those we have already advanced, is most erron-
eously described as an instinctive belief.

Mental and Cerebral development. — Mental development is
marked by growth in power, enlargement in range and
variety, and increase in the complexity of our mental activi-
ties. Much industry has been recently devoted to the
systematic observation of the working of the faculties of the
mind from earliest childhood, and although the psychologist's
interpretations of the infant's mental states may remain of
doubtful value, careful study of facts must ultimately prove
fruitful in the interests of truth. Among the results, partly
physiological, partly psychological, claimed to be established
are the following.

The weight of the human brain at birth is about one-sixth
of that of the whole body. The brain more than doubles its
size during the first year, after which its increase is much less
rapid, and although it continues to grow very slowly to
middle life, it has nearly reached its full size by the end of
the seventh year, At maturity it averages between one-
fortieth and one-fiftieth of the weight of the body, reaching in
normal adult Europeans from about forty-six to fifty-two
ounces. Whilst during infancy it thus grows rapidly in bulk,
it also exhibits increasing distinctness and perfection in its
several parts, and its convolutions become deeper and more
marked. The sense-organs also, though very imperfect at
first, develop still more speedily, and within a few weeks, or
at most a few months, they attain maturity. Experiments go
to show that the newly-born child is deaf, probablj' owing to
the presence of a fluid in the internal cavit}- of the ear, which
is only gradually replaced by air. At first, sound produces
merely a vague shock, The muscular control over the eves

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 151

is imperfect, and according to some observers during the first
days of its life the infant merely distinguishes light from
darkness, whilst the capacity to discriminate colours remains
very feeble for some weeks. ^•* The child seems to be unable
to distinguish different distances, by means of sight. Although,
as we have already observed, this aptitude is enjoyed from
the beginning in a completely developed condition by some of
the lower animals. Sensations of contact are of a similarly
indefinite character. On the whole it is probable that the
consciousness of the infant during the first weeks of its life is
of a vague, indefinite, drowsy character, in which there is
little or no awareness of the various qualities of sensations
which will become so widely differentiated later on.^°

With varied and contrasted experiences, however, the
sensibility to different stimuli rapidly improves, and the
monotony of the earher somnolency is more and more broken
up. Each stimulation leaves a certain residual effect in the
faculty, and repetition of an impression, while strengthening
the power exercised, also tends to awaken a faint curiosity
and interest, and the infant begins to compare in a semi-
conscious way different experiences, and also to recognize
them on their recurrence. As definiteness of impressions is
increased memory improves, and conscious attention is called
more and more into play, and intellect proper begins to exert
itself. The primary tendency of all mental activity is objec-
tive— self-consciousness coming later. The course and the
range of development is determined in part by inherited
temperament, in part by surrounding circumstances, physical,
intellectual, and moral.

Periods. — The periods of development are variously divided
by different writers, but in general the following are recog-
nized as distinct epochs. Infancy, reaching to nearly the end

13 Cf. Preyer, The Mind of the Child, Part I. pp. 180— 1S3. Some
of his conclusions, however, seem very hazardous and scarcely
warranted by the evidence. Their uncertainty illustrates clearly
the grave difficulties inherent in the objective method as employed
in Comparative Psychology.

2" "The baby assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at
once, feels it all as one great, blooming, buzzing confusion." (James,
Vol. I. p. 488.) J.Ward {"Psychology," Encyc. Brit. ,gih Edit.) similarly
insists that the primitive consciousness must be a sensory continuum,
a homogeneous mass, as it were of feeling in which the separate
elements have to be gradually discriminated and differentiated by
subsequent experiences. This is a striking reversal of the old
associationist " atomistic " view which conceived mental develop-
ment as mainly a process of fusion or "chemical combination" of
originally distinct impressions.

152 SENSUOUS LIFE.

of the second year, during which the several faculties of
sense-perception reach maturity, the power of locomotion is
imperfectly acquired, and the first efforts at speech are made.
Childhood comes next, reaching to the seventh year. Memory
and imagination show considerable progress. Curiosity
frequently manifests itself, and the so-called "play-impulse"
or tendency to spontaneous, random movement is active.
A lull self-conscious knowledge of his own personality is
reached early in this period, although the general tendency of
the mind is objective ; and the power of voluntary self-control
and reflective obedience to rule is ordinarily sufficiently
developed before the eighth year to constitute the child
responsible for his acts where temptation does not exceed a
moderate degree of strength. For this reason moral theolo-
gians have fixed on the seventh year as the date about which
the " use of reason " is commonly reached.

The next seven years mark the period of boyhood, during
which the faculty of memory increases in strength and intel-
lectual abstraction comes more into play. Self-control too
grows in power, and individual peculiarities reveal them-
selves. This is especially the plastic period when the founda-
tions of those moral and intellectual habits are to be laid
which will in great part determine the quality of the boy's
future career. If habits in conflict with truthfulness, generosity,
obedience, or purity are in possession at the age of fifteen, it
is extremely difficult to dislodge them afterwards.

The period of youth, covering the next seven years, marks
the final "setting" of the character in various directions.
Whilst the memory and imagination continue active, the
intellectual faculty of abstract conception, judgment, and
reasoning rapidly expands, and the power of introspection
also increases. The emotions and passions come into pro-
minence. This is especially the season for building up ideals.
It is the age of enthusiasm, of poetry, and of fancy, but it is
also the epoch during which our most important intellectual
convictions and moral habits crystallize and determine for
good or ill the course of our whole future life.

Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter. —

Oar knowledge of the smell, sound, taste, or tempera-
ture of objects differs widely in character from our cog-
nition of their extension, figure, or number. The latter
are called primary, the former secondary qualities of matter.
The significance of this difference has played a prominent
part in the history of the Philosophy of Perception in

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 153

modern times, especially in England, but the distinction
was clearly grasped in its most essential bearings by
Aristotle and St. Thomas. Aristotle distinguished
between ''common" and "proper sensibles," and
further between the latter in a state of formal actuality
or energy (eV ivcpyeia, in actu), and in a dormant or
potential condition-^ (eV Suva/^ct, in potentia). The " proper
sensibles " are the qualities in bodies which correspond
to the specific energies of the several senses — colour,
sound, odour, taste, temperature, and other special
tactual qualities. Under the " common sensibles " were
mcluded extension, figure, motion, rest, and number.
They are perceived through, but smiultaneously with,
the sensibilia propria, and by more senses than one.
Moreover, the sensihilia propria do not exist in a state of
actuality except when perceived, but only virtually as
dormant powers of matter. To this latter most profoundly
important distinction, erroneously imagined to be a
discovery of modern philosophy, we will return again.
Aristotle's doctrine on both points was adopted by
St. Thomas,'-- who reduced the various forms of
common sensibles to that of quantity. This was con-
ceived to be the most fundamental attribute of matter,
and the various qualities which give rise to the special
sensations were looked upon as properties inhering

21 There was also another distinction recognized by the
Peripatetic school, that of sensibile per se and sensibile per accidens.
That is sensibile per accidens which is apprehended indirectly
through being accidentally conjoined with something which is
sensibile per se ; and in this signification individual corporeal sub-
stances were said to be sensibile per accidens, " ut si dicimus quod
Diarus vel Socrates est sensibile per accidens, quia accidit ei esse
album." (St. Thomas, De Anima, Lib. II. 1. 13.) Both sensibilia propria
and sensibilia communia were held to be sensibilia per se ; the former,
however, being classed as per se primo vel proprie, the latter as per se
secundo. The several "proper sensibles " (per se primo) were defined
to be the formal object, or appropriate stimulus of the different
special senses. The " common sensibles " (sensibilia per se sed non
proprie), extension, figure, &c., manifest themselves through, but
simultaneously with, the sensibilia propria. They are thus not
mediate acquisitions derived from the former, but forms of reality
directly revealed through them.

-- Cf. Sum. i. q. 78. a. 3. ad 2. and iii. q. 77. a. 2.

154 SENSUOUS LIFE.

in it. From this to the modern division into primary
and secondary quaHties the transition is obvious.

Descartes, between whom and Locke the credit
of the discovery of the ancient distinction has been
supposed to lie, taught that the attributes, Magnitude,
Figure, Motion, Situation, Duration, and the Hke, are
clearly perceived. We have an idea of them as they
may be in the object. On the other hand, Colour, Pain,
Odour, Taste, et cetera, are not thus apprehended. We
have only a confused and obscure knowledge of some-
thing or other in the external body which causes these
sensations in us.

Locke, who borrowed from Galileo the terms
Primary or Real and Secondary Qualities to mark the old
distinction between the common and proper sensibles, gives
solidity, extension or bulk, figure, motion or rest, and
number, as included in the first class. These attributes
we cannot conceive as separable from matter, and,
moreover, they are like the ideas by which we represent
them. The secondary or imputed qualities, colours,
sounds, tastes, smells, and the rest, are not essential to
the idea of matter. Where present in bodies they exist
merely as powers to produce sensations, properties
emerging out of occult modifications of the primary
attributes, and capable of awakening in us feelings in
no way like themselves.

Berkeley and Hume, proceeding from Locke's
most fundamental doctrine that we can only know our
own ideas, quickly demolished the distinction. Hume
even demonstrated that, on Locke's principles, the
primar}'- qualities, extension, and the rest, are less real
and objective than the secondary, for the former are
merely complex subjective products elaborated out of
the latter, and so the purest of mental fictions. In the
Kantian philosophy, although the subject is not explicitly
treated, the objective significance of the two groups is
similarly reversed. As Space is an exclusively sub-
jective form, while the sensatiors of smell, sound, et
cetera, have some sort of an external correlate, however
remote from them in kinship, the latter would seem to
be of a less purely ideal character.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 155

Sir W. Hamilton from a psychological point of
view distinguishes three classes : (i) Primary or objective.
(2) Seciindo- primary or subjectivo-objective, and (3) Secondary
or subjective qualities. ^3 The primary qualities include all
the relations of matter to space whether as container
or contained. These are (i) Extension, (2) Divisibility,
p (3) Size, (4) Density, (5) Figure, (6) Absolute Incom-
pressibility, (7) Mobility, (8) Situation. These attri-
butes are completely objective. They are percepts
proper, implying no reference to sensation in their

23 These groups have been also styled the geometrical, mechanical,
^.nd. physiological properties, and Mr. Herbert Spencer [Principles of
Psychology, Pt. VI. cc. xi. — xiii.) still further enriches our already
exuberantly wealthy terminology by the invention of the terms,
statical, statico-dynamical, and dynamical, to mark substantially the
same distinctions. In the dynamical or secondary attributes the
external body is active, the mind is wholly passive. These qualities
are objectively occult properties in virtue of which matter modifies
the forces brought to bear on it, so as through these forces to
awaken sensations. With the exception of taste, they act across a
distance ; they are accidents cognizable apart from the body, and
manifested only incidentally. In experiences of the statico-dynamical
kind, both subject and object are simultaneously agent and patient.
These attributes are known through some objective re-activity
evoked by subjective activity. "In respect of its space [statical)
attributes, body is altogether passive and the perception of it is
wholly due to certain mental operations." Unlike the other attri-
butes, " extension is cognizable through a wholly internal co-ordina-
tion of impressions ; a process in which the extended object has no
share." Some distinctive features of the different groups previously
recognized are here pointed out, but there are also some errors.
The mind is never purely passive, even in sensations like those
of colour, taste, et cet., the mental reaction is as real as the physical
stimulation. Consequently the distinction between the dynamical
and statico-dynamical fails. Mr. Spencer is right in holding that
the primary are not the direct object of the special senses in the
same manner as the secondary qualities. In the words of St. Thomas
the sensibilia communia do not constitute formal objects of individual
senses. Still they are not, as Mr. Spencer's exposition implies,
purely subjective products, but forms of reality revealed through,
yet concomitantly with, certain of the proper sensibles. Surface
extension as such does not of course stimulate the retina or the
nerves of touch ; it is made known in experiences of pressure and
colour. Still it is not a mediate inference from the latter, nor a
complex integration of unextended feelings of any kind. Cognition
of the third dimension of space results, as we have already described,
from a reapplication of the same faculties in a new direction.

156 SENSUOUS LIFE.

meaning, though involving sensation in their first
apprehension. They are, he holds, absolutely essential
to body ; deprived of them matter is inconceivable.
The secundo -primary qualities comprehend gravity,
cohesion, repulsion, and inertia. Viewed as objective
they are forces resisting our locomotive faculty or muscular
energy. As subjective they are revealed through the
varying affections of pressure in the sentient organism.
Involving in their meaning these subjective sensations,
they do not possess the objective independence of the
primary qualities. They are, moreover, not essential
to matter. The secundary qualities are not in propriety
qualities of bodies at all. As apprehended they are
only sensations which lead us to infer objective pro-
perties in the external thing. They are experienced
as idiopathic affections of our organism, indefinite in
number, and producible by a variety of stimuli.
Besides the sensations of the special senses, Hamilton
includes in this class a number of other feelings, such
as shuddering, titillation, and sneezing. They are of
course in no way essential to matter. ^^

Criticism. — The recognition of the distinction in
kind between the primary and the secondary qualities, or
between the common and proper sensibles, is justified meta-
physically by the more and less fundamental character
of the two classes respectively, and psychologically by
the numerous differences in the mode of their appre-
hension. Among these latter enough attention has
not been directed to the ancient distinction based on
the fact that secondary and secundo-primary qualities
are disclosed only through a single sense, while the
primary attributes are revealed through a plurality of
independent sources. This circumstance, as well as
their more intelligible nature, makes our cognition of

2-1 As regards Hamilton's treatment of the subject : (i) There is
no warrant either metaphysical or psychological for the intermediate
class. On both grounds it belongs to the third. (2) It is absurd to
speak of secondary qualities of matter as not being properties of
matter at all, but merely conscious states. Hamilton, moreover,
is peculiarly inconsistent in this respect, since he elsewhere holds
that all our senses make us immediately cognizant of the non-ego.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 157

them clearer, more convincing, and more compre-
hensive. The perfect identity of ratios subsisting
between parts of space, e.g., the relation of the side
to the diagonal of the square, known through visual
and tactual sensations, the mathematical power of the
blind, and the recognition of circular and square figures
by those just receiving sight for the first time, present
an irresistible testimony to the reality of what is
affirmed by such diverse witnesses. In addition to
this, the manifestation of extension in the two different
experiences of colour and pressure enables us to detach
in a singularly perfect manner the common element,
and so to form an abstract idea of extension, far
■surpassing in clearness those derived from any single
sensuous channel.

The Relativity of Knowledge. — This expression has been
used in a great variety of meanings, (i) The phrase Relativity
of Knowledge, or rather the Law or Principle of Relativity, has
been used to signify a leading tenet of Bain and Wundt —
that knowledge and feeling are possible only in transition,
that we can know anything ( nly by knowing it as distinguished
from something else, that ni fact all consciousness is of
difference. We have discussed the subject at the end of
chapter v. This doctrine, however, is not that ordinarily
intended when we speak of the Relativity of Knowledge.

(2) The Relativity of Knowledge in its most important sense
refers not to the nature of the relations between one known
object and another, but to that between the known object
and the knowing mind. All systems of philosophy which
reject the doctrine of immediate perception of extended
reality must maintain that our knowledge is relative to the
mind in the sense that we can never know anything but our own
subjective states. Among these the most consistent thinkers,
as we have argued, are the idealists proper. They logically
maintain that if we have no knowledge of anything beyond
consciousness, it is unphilosophical to suppose that anything
else exists. This thoroughgoing view is represented by Hume,
and by Mill at times. The great majority of modern philo-
sophers, however, shrinking back from this extreme, have
adopted some intermediate position akin to that of Kant or
Mr. Spencer. They maintain that while all our knowledge is
relative to our own mental states, and in no way represents
or reflects reality, yet there is de facto some sort of reality
outside of our minds. Our imaginary cognitions of space,

158 SENSUOUS LIFE.

time, and causality are universal subjective illusions either
inherited or elaborated by the mind ; consequently, since
these fictitious elements mould or blend with all our experi-
ence, we can have no knowledge of things in themselves, of
noiimena, of the absolute. But notwithstanding this, and in
spite of the fact that the principle of causality has no more
real validity than a continuous hallucination, these philo-
sophers are curiously found to maintain the existence of a
cause, and even of an external, non-mental cause of our
sensations.

(3) True doctrine. — Another, and what we maintain to be
the true expression of the Relativity of Knowledge, and one
which is in harmony with the theory of immediate or pre-
sentative perception, holds — (a) that we can only know as
much as our faculties, limited in number and range, can
reveal to us ; (b) that these faculties can inform us of objects
only so far, and according as the latter manifest themselves ;
(c) that accordingly (a) there may remain always an indefinite
number of qualities which we do not know, and (b) what is
known must be set in relation to the mind, and can only be
known in such relation.^^

So much relativity is necessarily involved in the very
nature of knowledge, but it in no way destroys the worth of
that knowledge. If knowledge is defined to imply a relation
betweep the mind and the known object, and if the noumenon
•or thiiig-in-itself is defined to signify some real element of an
■object which never stands in any relation to our cognitive
powers, then a knowledge of noumena or things-in-themselves is
obviously an absurdity.-^ But if by noumena are understood, as

-^ What is given in one or more relations may necessarily
implicate other relations, and these may subsist not merely between
the mind and other objects, but between the several objects them-
selves. Still, mediate cognitions of this sort are knowledge only in
so far as they are rationally connected with what is immediately
given. Our knowledge of the mutual dynamical influence of two
invisible planets, which faithfully reflects their reciprocal relations,
is but an elaborate evolution of what is apprehended by sense and
intellect in experiences where subject and object stand in immediate
relations

-^ " To speak of ' knowing,' ' things in themselves,' or ' things as
they are,' is to talk of not simply an impossibility, but a con-
tradiction ; for these phrases are invented to denote what is in the
sphere of being and not in the sphere of thought ; and to suppose them
known is ipso facto to take away this character. The relativity of
cognition [i.e., in the sense defined) imposes on us no forfeiture
of privilege, no humiliation of pride ; there is not any conceivable
form of apprehension from which it excludes us." (Cf. Martineau,
A Study of Religion, Vol. I. p. 119.)

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. 159

Kant on the one side, and sensationalists like Mr. Spencer on
the other seem to mean, hypothetical external causes ot" onr
sensations, which yet somehow do not in any way reveal
their character through these sensations, then we must, in
the first place, deny the assumption that we can only know
our own conscious states, and, in the second, we must point
out the fundamental contradiction common to both schools
of disputing the objective or real validity of the principle of
causality, whilst in virtue of a surreptitious use of this rejected
principle they affirm the reality of an unknowable noumenal
cause.

Cognition of Primary and Secondary qualities compared. —
Admitting all knowledge to be relative in the third sense
defined, there yet remain grades in the comparative perfection
of cognitions gained through diverse channels ; and here the
distinctions both between sense and intellect, and between
the primary and secondary qualities of matter, assume great
importance. The doctrine that colours, sounds, and the
other secondary qualities do not exist in objects as they are
in the mind has been often cited as a modern psychological
discovery. This, however, is a complete mistake. The wide
difterence which separates the objective or material conditions
of sound, colour, and the rest from the corresponding subjec-
tive consciousness, was as clearly and as firmly gi'asped by
Aristotle and St. Thomas, as by Locke, Hume, Kant, or
Herbert Spencer. The acute minds of the sensationalists
and sceptics of Ancient Greece had, in fact, raised in one
form or another all the most forcible difficulties now urged
by their modern representatives, and the Stagirite was
necessarily led to answer them. He did this by pointing out
the distinction between the potential condition and the com-
pleted realization of the secondary properties. Sound and
colour in apprehension he describes as having reached their
full perfection, actuality, or energy, whilst when unperceived
they exist in the object merely in a. potential or virtual state.
In this stage he recognized them simply as powers capable of
arousing sensation. He even called attention to the ambiguity
arising from the frequent use of the same word — e.g., " sound"
or " taste," to designate both the physical property and the
mental state; and he employs the two terms, sanation and
audition, to bring out the difference. He thus successfully
opposed the scepticism of the ancient empiricists, who denied
all reality or differences of colours, sounds, and the rest apart
from perception, by admitting their contention as regards the
full realization of the qualities of matter, while refusing to
allow its truth in reference to the potential conditions of
these qualities. Neither light, nor sounds, nor odours would

i6o SENSUOUS LIFE.

exist in their proper signification as actualities if all sentient
beings were withdrawn from the universe ; but they would
still remain as potencies ready to emerge into life when the
recipient faculty appeared. Aristotle's treatment of the subject
was adopted and elucidated by St. Thomas, and we deem the
matter of such importance that we cite a number of passages
from both the Greek philosopher and his scholastic com-
mentator below.2''

Sensuous and Intellectual cognitions compared. — Through its
secondary qualities, then, an object is known by any sense
only as something capable of producing a particular sensation
in me. The primary attributes are, however, of such a kind,

"7 " Sensibilis autem actus et sensus idem est, et unus; esse
autem ipsorum non idem. Dice autem ut sonus secundum actum,
et auditus secundum actum. Contingit enim auditum habentia
non audire, et habens sonum non semper sonat. Cicm autem operetur
potens (id quod potest) audire, et sonet potens sonare, tunc secundum
actum auditus simul fit, et secundum actum sonus. Quorum
dicet aliquis hoc quidem auditionem esse, hoc verum sona-
tionem." (Aristotle, De Anima, Lib. III. Lect. 2.) " Sonativi
(rei sonorae) igitur actus, aut sonus aut sonatio est. Auditivi
autem, aut auditus aut auditio est. Dupliciter enim auditus, et
dupliciter sonus. Eadem autem ratio est et in aliis sensibus et sctisi-
hilibus , . . sed in quibusdam nomina quoque sunt posita, ut
sonatio ac auditio ; in quibusdam caret alterura nomine ; visio
enim dicitur actus visus, at coloris (actus) nomine vacat, et
gustativi gustatio est, at saporis nomen non habet." {id. ib.)
" Necesse est quod auditus dictus secimdum actum, et sonus dictus
secundum actum, simul salventur et corrumpantur ; et similiter est
de sapore et gustu, et aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Sed si dicantur
sectindum potent iam, non necesse est quod simul corrumpantur et
salventur. Ex hac autem ratione (Aristoteles) excludit opinionem
antiquorum naturalium . . . dicens, quod priores naturales non
bene dicebant in hoc, quia opinabuntur nihil esse album, aut
nigrum, nisi quando videtur ; neque saporem esse, nisi quando
gustatur ; et similiter de aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Et quia
non credebant esse alia entia, nisi sensibilia, neque aliam virtutem cognos-
citivam, nisi sensum, credebatit quod totum esse et Veritas rerum esset in
apparere. Et ex hoc deducebantur ad credendum contradictoria
simul esse vera, propter hoc quod diversi contradictoria opinantur,
Dicebant autem quodammodo recte et quodammodo non. Cum enim
dupliciter dicatur sensus et sensibile, scilicet secundum potentiam et secundum
actum, de sensu et sensibili secundum actum accedit quod ipsi dicebant
quod non est sensibile sine sensu. Non autem hoc verum est de
sensu et sensibili secundum potentiam. Sed ipsi loquebantur sim-
pliciter, id est sine distinctione, de his quae dicuntur multipliciter."
(St. Thomas, Comm. de Anima, Lib. IIL 1. 2, ad finem). Cf.
Hamilton, Notes on Reid, pp. 826—830.

DEVELOPMENT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. i6i

and presented to us in such a manner, that our knowledge
of them, even when Umited to the range of the sensuous
faculties, is of far superior importance to that which we
possess of the sensibilia propria. In themselves the primary
attributes consist of extensional determinations universal to
matter, and independent of the nature of the sentient faculty.
In relation to us the fact of their being revealed through the
several channels of ocular, motor, and tactual sensations,
gives our sensuous perception of them a clearness and distinct-
ness far surpassing that oi the proper seusibles.

But it is as affording material for intellectual knowledge
that their true value is to be estimated. Disclosed through
distinct channels the common presentation is instinctively
detached by the higher abstractive activity of the mind ; and
since it is thus given to us unobscured by any subjective
affections of sensibility, it is perceived in a very perfect and
comprehensive manner. Owing to this fact our simplest
intellectual cognitions of spatial relations are enabled to
image with distinctness and lucidity the most fundamental
laws of the physical world.

Finally, by observation, reasoning, and abstraction we
come to discern in these primary attributes universal exten-
sional relations conditioning the mutual connexion and inter-
dependence of material objects apart from their perception
by the knowing spirit. We are assured that, although the
reahzation of the secondary qualities requires the presence of
the sentient faculty, yet the most important part of the
meaning of the primary attributes holds in its absence : we
see that while perception is essential to the one, it is
accidental to the other. Remote and compHcated deductions
from a few primary luminous intuitions of space and number,
together with certain assumptions as to the action of real
force, are found to describe accurately the future conduct of
the universe. Astronomy and Physics, the Law of Gravita-
tion as well as the Undulatory Theory of light, imply the
extra-mental validity of our notions of space, motion, and real
energies, and assume their existence and action apart from
observation. The verification which subsequently observed
results afford to our reasoned deductions must, consequently,
be held to estabhsh that these conceptions are neither " inte-
grations " of purely subjective feeUngs, nor mental "forms,"
which in no way represent the hypothetical, unknowable,
external noumenon, but true cognitions which mirror in a
veracious manner the genuine conditions of real or ontolo-
gical being. Our knowledge, then, of the primary attributes
does not relate exclusively to our own mental states, as is
asserted in the prevalent creed of relativity. Still in the case
L

i62 SENSUOUS LIFE.

of these, as well as of the secondary qualities, we can never
know the object unless in so far as it reveals itself directly or
indirectly to our faculties, and in the simplest creature there
will always remain beyond our ken an indefinite number of
secrets which a higher intelligence might scrutinize, so that
the perfection, range, and penetration of knowledge is, in
truth, ever relative to the knowing mind.

Readings. — On immediate perception, cf. Farges, L'Objectivite de
la Perception, pp. 17 — 36, 83—99, 155 — 181; also J. Mark Baldwin,
Senses and Intellect, c. viii. ; Dr. Porter, The Human Intellect, Pt. I.
cc. iii. — vi. ; Balmez, Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. I. pp. 267 — 324,
339 — 360. Oa the localization of sensations, cf. Gutberlet, op. cit.
pp. 59—84; Mercier, Psychologie, pp. 132 — 147; On the Primary
and Secondary Qualities of Matter, cf. St. Thomas, De Anima, II.
1. 13; Hamilton, Metaph. II. 108— 115; Notes on Reid, pp. 825, seq. ;
On Relativity of Knowledge, St. Thomas, De Anima, III. 1. 2;
Martineau, A Study of Religion, Bk. I. c. iv. ; M'Cosh, Exam, of Mill,
c. X. and Intuitions of Mind, pp. 340, seq. (2nd Edit.) ; Dr. Mivart,
On Truth, c. x. ; Mark Baldwin, op. cit. 58 — 63.

CHAPTER VIII.

IMAGINATION.

Imagination defined. — Imagination may be
defined as the faculty of forming mental images
or representations of material objects, apart iroi^'
the presence of the latter. The representaiioii
so formed is called in nearly all recent psycno-
logical literature an idea. This application of a
term, which in the old philosophies invariably
expressed the universal representations of the intel-
lect, is unfortunate ; but it has become so general
that there is little hope of restoring the word to its
ancient and proper signification. Accordingly, to
avoid confusion, when employing the word idea to
denote the general concept or notion, we will add
the epithet intellectual to mark its supra-sensuous
character. The term phantasm, by which the school-
men expressed very concisely the acts of the imagi-
nation, has been employed in the same sense by
Dr. M'Cosh, and occasionally also by Hamilton and
Dr. Porter, and we will use it along with the word
ima^e to denote this sensuous representation.

Ideas and Impressions. — The idea or phantasm
of the imagination differs in several respects from
the percept, presentation, or impression, that is the
act by which w^e perceive a real or present object,

1 64 SENSUOUS LIFE.

such, for instance, as a house. The idea is almost
invariably very faint in intensity as compared with
the impression. The outlines of the one are obscure
and its constituent parts confusedly presented, while
the other is realized in a clear and distinct manner.
Still more striking is the contrast between the
unsteady transitory character of the representation
and the permanent stability of the perceived object.
The image, too, is normally subject to our control,
and can be annihilated by an act of will ; the sensa-
tion, on the contrary, so long as the sense is exposed
to the action of the object, is independent of us. The
imagination, moreover, may vary the position of its
object, and our own movements do not force us to
leave behind us the idea. With the percept of the
external sense it is otherwise ; every change in our
situation produces an alteration in its appearance.
Depending on these lesser differences is the dis-
tinction most noted of all, the reference to objective
reality, the belief in external independent existence
which accompanies the act of sense-perception but
is absent from that of the imagination. And yet, as
St. Thomas pointed out long ago,^ ideas are con-
founded with real objects, if not corrected by actual
perception or free exercise of intellect.

Scholastic Doctrine. — The Phantasy or Imagination was
classed as an internal sense by the philosophers of the
Peripatetic school. This view was based on the facts that
the imagination operates by means of a physical organ — the
brain ; that it represents particular concrete objects ; and
that these have only an internal or subjective existence. It
was accordingly defined to be an internal power of the
sensuous order. It was distinguished from the sensiis communis,

1 Qq. Disp. De Malo, III. a. 3, ad o

IMAGINATION. 165

by the circumstance that while the function of that faculty-
was held to be the apprehension and distinction of the actual
operations of the several senses, and of the qualities of objects
hie et nunc perceived by them, the imagination forms repre-
sentations or images of objects even in their absence. Modern
writers commonly describe this aptitude of the mind as an
intellectual power, but that this opinion is erroneous wil
become evident later on.

Productive and Reproductive Imagination. — Several forms
of the activity of the imagination have been allotted special
names. The most commonly accepted division of the faculty
is that into Reproductive and Productive Imagination. The
former term is employed to designate the power of forming
mental pictures of objects and events as they have been
originally experienced, while the Productive Imagination
signifies the power of constructing images of objects not
previously perceived. The term Reproductive Imagination
is used by some writers to denote the faculty of memory
in general. This usage is objectionable. The differentia of
memory is not reproduction, but recognition. All imagination,
as we urge above, is essentially reproductive. The chief
features in which remembrance differs from mere revival of
images are : (i) The freedom of the imagination as to the
number and variety of its acts, the Hmited character of our
recollections; (2) the casual and variable order of the former
states, the serial fixity and regularity of the latter ; (3) the
isolated nature of imaginary events, the solidarity or related-
ness of remembered occurrences, which are inextricably inter-
woven with multitudes of other representations ; (4) finally,
the peculiar reference to my own actual experience involved
in the act of identification or recognition, which forms part of
the recollection but is absent from the creations of fancy.

The spontaneous action of the faculty is sometimes called
the passive imagination as contrasted with the active or
voluntary exercise of its powers."^ The epithets constructive
and creative, are frequently applied to Productive Imagination,
especially when the product is of a noble or beautiful kind.
Strictly speaking, however, the imagination does not create
0r produce anything completely new; it merely combines
into novel forms elements given in past sensations. These
fresh combinations are effected under the guidance of will
and judgment, and accordingly Hamilton has styled this
aptitude, the " Comparative Imagination," and the " Faculty
of Relations." It has also been asserted that its range is not
limited to objects of sense. This view is gravely erroneous.
The scope of imagination is rigidly confined to the reproduc-
' Cf. Mark Baldwin, op. cit. p. 224.

i66 SENSUOUS LIFE.

tion of former data of sense, and the congenital absence of
any faculty correspondingly limits the field of the phantasy.
The imagination, moreover, should not any more than external
sense be called a faculty of relations, since both alike are
equally incapable of apprehending such supra-sensuous reali-
ties. It is the intellect which in one case as in the other
perceives abstract relations, and it is as serious an error to
confuse rational activity with the power of forming sensuous
images as with the capability of experiencing sensations.

Functions of the Imagination. — The Imagination plays an
important part in artistic and mechanical construction, and
in the more concrete branches of physical science. In all
forms, however, of constructive imagination the three factors,
purpose, attention, and discrimative selection co-operate. There
must be at least in dim outlines before the mind an aim or
object to be realized. Then, as in order to satisfy this vague
desire the spontaneous activity of the faculty brings forward
its materials, the attention is fixed on those likely to fit in to
the wished-for ideal. Finally, selective discrimination retains
those judged to be appropriate and rejects the remainder.

^Esthetic Imagination. — In the creation of works of art the
fancy of the poet, painter, sculptor, or musician, is employed
in grouping and combining his materials so as to awaken
admiration and satisfaction in the mind. At times his aim
will be to hold the mirror up to nature, in order to delight by
the exquisite skill and fidelity with which he reproduces an
actual experience recalled by the memory. At other times
he assumes a nobler part, and seeks to give expression to
some thought embodying an ideal type of beauty or excel-
lence, which is never met with in the commonplace world of
real life, but is dimly shadowed forth in rare moments by our
own imagination. The Beautiful is indeed the proper aim of
the aesthetic fancy, as that of the scientific imagination is the
True, and so discriminative selection directs the attention
towards those elements which when combined will result in
an Ideal. This function of the Imagination is called Idealiza-
tion. Intellectual and volitional activity, however, are involved
in such operations. The ideals formed may be artistic, scien-
tific, ethical, or religious. Analysis of past experience and
synthetic recombination of the elements constitute the
essential stages of the process in each department. Both
operations involve attention, abstraction, and comparison, so
that the highest powers of the soul are employed in this
exercise.^ This faculty is said to be rich, fertile, or luxuriant
when images of great variety issue forth in spontaneous
abundance. Taste, on the other hand, implies judicious or
=^ Cf. Dr. Porter, op. cit. §§ 353 -37--.

IMAGINATION. 167

refined, rather than luxuriant fancy. Great genius in any of
the branches of art presupposes a fertile imagination, but
true excellence is attained only when this power is controlled
and directed by good judgment. The importance of Imagi-
nation in mechanical contrivance and invention is obvious.
The power of holding firmly before the mind a clear and
distinct representation of the object to be formed is one of
the most necessary qualifications of constructive ability.

Scientific Imagination. — The relations between
imagination and science have been the subject of
much dispute, some writers holding that a rich and
powerful imagination is adverse rather than favour-
able to scientific excellence, while others consider
this aptitude to be "as indispensable in the exact
sciences as in the poetical and plastic arts." And
that "it may accordingly be reasonably doubted
whether Aristotle or Homer were possessed of the
more powerful imagination."*

Concrete Sciences.— To answer the question we must
distinguish different branches of science. In departments of
concrete knowledge, such as geology, botany, animal physi-
ology, and anatomv, the imagination is exercised almost as
much as in history ,'oratory, or poetry ; and even in astronomy
and chemistry it plays an important part. The acquisition
of information, and the extension of our command over any
of the fields of physical nature involve careful use of our
powers of external sense-perception ; and progress is
measured by the number and quality, the clearness and com-
plexity, the readiness and precision of the ideas gathered.
Fresh species, new properties, novel modes of action, must
be more distinctly apprehended, more firmly retained, and
more easily reproduced in imagination with every successive
advance. The native efficiency of this faculty must, conse-
quently, largely determine the rate of improvement and the
limit of excellence attainable by each individual. In the
region of original research, and especially in the construction
of^hypotheses, fertility of imagination is an essential element
of success ; and the leading men in the history of these
sciences have almost invariably been endowed with a bold
and teeming fancy.

'^ Hamilton, il/^l'fl///. ii. p. 265.

168 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Scientific HypotJicscs. — Discoveries in Science, where they
are not directly suggested by some lucky accident, generally
start from hypotheses more or less erroneous which are
gradually revised and corrected till they embrace all the
tacts. Scientific hypotheses differ from the guesses we are
constantly making in all matters merely in the clearness with
which they are conceived, and the rigour with which they
are tested. All guesses involve exercise of the Imagination,
and so in proportion to the fertility of this faculty will be the
mind's readiness in framing hypotheses of every kind. An
efficient imagination contributes much to clearness and
precision in the suppositions put forward by the intellect,
and if well under control, it facilitates their retention in
distinct consciousness and so renders them susceptible
of searching examination. The great scientists, such as
Newton and Kepler, have been even more remarkable for
their rigorous severity in testing, than for their originality
in inventing their hypotheses. But the accurate represen-
tation of possible causes and effects, the firm and distinct
grasp of such conceptions, the anticipation of probable
consequences, the comparison of diverse modes of action
likely to happen under different contingencies, and the
careful following out of trains of reasoning from conditional
assumptions are all much facilitated by superior natural
aptitude and judicious culture of the imagination.

According as man's memory is well stored with infor-
mation in any branch of science, his fancy becomes fertile
in picturing the action of unobserved causes and agencies,
and in proportion as he is familiar with its subject-matter,
his imagination will instinctively reject guesses likely to
clash with known facts. A certain acquired sagacity controls
and directs his conjectures along likely paths and lead him
to detect those unobtrusive analogies which are the fruitful
parent of so many great discoveries. Mr. Mark Baldwin
thus writes : " The imagination is the prophetic forerunner
of all great scientific discoveries. The mental factors seen
to underlie all imaginative construction are here called into
play in a highly exaggerated way. The associative material
presented covers generally the whole area of the data of the
scientific branch in hand ; familiarity with the principles
and laws already discovered is assumed and in general a
condition of mental saturation with the subject. ... In
most cases the beginning of a discovery is nothing more than
a conjecture, a happy supposition. The mind at once begins
to search for means of testing it, which itself involves the
imagination of new material dispositions. These tests are
made more and more rigid, if successful, until the crucial

IMAGINATION. 169

test, as it is called, is reached, which cither confirms or
disproves the hypothesis."*^

Abstract Sciences.— When, however, we pass from the
concrete to the more abstract branches of knowledge, such as
pure mathematics, logic, and metaphysics, we find imagina-
tion sinks into a secondary position. The materials with
which the mathematician or the metaphysician deals are not
representations of phantasy, but of intellect. They are
devoid of those impressive concrete qualities which dis-
tinguish the sensuous image from the abstractions of thought;
and the chief difficulty of the beginner is to turn aside from
the obtrusive features of the phantasm, and keep solely in
view the delicate but vital relations which constitute the
essence of scientific knowledge.

It seems to us, then, to be the very reverse of
truth to say that imagination holds a place in
abstract science similar to that which it occupies
in poetry. As all thought is representative, the
abstract thinker must, of course, be capable of
forming representations of the subjects of his specu-
lation ; and the distinctive characteristic of genius
in this direction lies in the power to grasp vigorously
some fruitful notion and to concentrate upon it for
long periods the whole energy of the mind. Still
it is a grave error to confound the rational activity
of the intellect with the operations of the sensuous
imagination. And it should be borne in mind that
although elastic and fertile powers of fancy often
accompany great intellectual gifts, and although
even in the abstract sciences discovery may be at
times materially aided by the power of holding
steadily before the mind concrete images ; neverthe-
less it is the intellect and not the imagination that

5 Senses and Intellect, pp. 236, 237. There are many valuable obser-
vations in his chapter on this subject.

I70 SENSUOUS LIFE.

apprehends the universal relations which form the
framework of science.

Dangers of Imagination. — It is needless to point
out how easily richness of imagination may prove
detrimental rather than beneficial to scientific pro-
f^ress. In Ethics or Metaphysics, no less than in
History or Biology, exuberant and prolific fancy
when uncontrolled by reason, may divert attention
from the essential to the accidental, may pervert
and mislead the powers of judgment, and may so
confuse the reason that fiction is substituted for
objective reality, and brilliant poetic hypotheses are
preferred to the prose of commonplace truth.

Fancy. — The term Fancy is sometimes used to
mark the activity of the imagination as exercised in
the production of comic, or even of beautiful images,
provided they be of a minute or trivial type. Fancy,
too, is confined to the sphere of the unreal whilst
imagination may represent the actual. The epithets
merry, playful, weird, which are applied to the
former, indicate the various kinds of action in which
it manifests itself, and it is with that aptitude unt
and humour are mainly connected.

Wit and Humour. — Intellect, as well as imagination, is
involved in the exhibition and appreciation of li^it and
humour, but the happy suggestions of the fancy are the
essential materials which go to make up the amusing
picture. Wit and humour agreeing in some respects are
distinguished in others. Both aptitudes imply the power
of noting and manifesting unexpected points of agree-
ment between apparently disparate ideas ; but wit excels
in brilliancy and pungency. It is, too, of a more in-
tellectual character, while humour appeals rather to the
moral side of human nature. The witty man is quick tc
perceive incongruous associations of every kind, the humouris

IMAGINATION. 171

is a close observer of the foibles and weaknesses of his
fellow-men. Humour is mainly innate, wit is to some extent
am.enable to education and culture. Humour, implying the
power of sympathy with the feelings of others, is commonly
associated with good nature, while wit is frequently sharp
and unpleasant. This distinction is admirably expressed in
Thackeray's saying that " Humour is wit tempered by love."
The most degraded form of wit is exhibited in puns, where
commonly there is merel}^ an accidental similarity in oral
sound. The felicitous apprehension of a hidden connexion
between incongruous ideas, which constitutes the essence of
true wit, is almost invariably absent.

Illusions. — As the activity of Imaj^ination is the
chief source of certain abnormal mental phenomena of
an important character described as illusions, halluci-
nations, dreams, and the like, this will be, perhaps, the
most appropriate place to treat of them. In ordinary
language the terms illusion, delusion, and fallacy are
frequently used in the same sense to denote any
erroneous conviction. In a more limited signification
fallacy means a vicious reasoning, an intellectual in-
ference of a fallacious character, whilst illusion signifies
a deceptive or spurious act of apprehension, a.nd delusion
implies a false belief of a somewhat permanent nature,
and of a more or less extensive range. These states
of consciousness have in common the note of untruth-
fulness ; and we may, from a psychological standpoint,
define a mental act to be untrue, which disagrees from
its object as that object is known by the normal human
mind. An illusion is thus a deceptive cognition which
pretends to be immediately evident, and it can refer to
mistaken memories and erroneous expectations, just as
w^ell as to false perceptions of the external senses.^

Sources of Illusion. — The causes of illusion we may in
the first place roughly divide into two great classes,
according as they belong to the subjective or the objective
worlds. Our mistakes may arise either from mental
influences, or from irregular conditions of the material
universe, including among the latter the state of our
own organism.

^ Cf. Mr. Sully's Illusions, cc. i. ii. Many of these phenomena
tre very skilfully analyzed by that writer.

172 SENSUOUS LIFE.

Mental influences. — The wide range of the first group
win become evident if we recall the various elements
which we have shown in a previous chapter to be
involved in apparently simple acts of sense-per-
ception. The material directly presented to us, even
by the power of vision, is extremely small. By far
the greater part of the information given through
each act of apprehension is due to memor}^, inference,
and associated sensations of other faculties faintly re-
vived in imagination. Accordingly, the condition of
the mind immediately antecedent to the impression of
any particular object has a most important influence
in determining how this object will be perceived. If
the imagination is vigorously excited, and if we have
a lively expectation of beholding some special occur-
rence, there is a considerable probability that anything
bearing even a distant resemblance to it will be mis-
taken for the anticipated experience. As the ph3^sical
concomitants of the activity of the imagination are
similar in kind to those of real sensation, and as even
in normal perception a large part of the mental product
is furnished by the phantasy from the resources of
previous experiences, it is not surprising that where
anticipation of an event is very strong, and its repre-
sentation very vivid, the mind may perceive an occur-
rence before it happens, or apprehend an object where
none exists. This species of deception, in which a
mental state is excited without any external cause, is
called a subjective sensation. Such simulated cognitions
may work very serious effects on the organism. The
pain or pleasure, according to the agreeable or dis-
agreeable character of the illusion, may be fully as
intense as if the appearance were a reality."

" " A butcher was brought into the shop of Mr. Macfarlan, the
druggist, from the market-place opposite, labouring under a terrible
accident. The man on trying to hook up a heavy piece of meat
above his head slipped and the sharp hook penetrated his arm so
that he himself was suspended. On being examined he was pale,
almost pulseless, and expressed himself as suffering acute agony.
The arm could not be moved without causing excessive pain, and
in cutting off the sleeve he frequently cried out ; yet when the arm
was exposed it was found to be quite uninjured, the hook having
only traversed the sleeve of his coat." (Carpenter, op. cit. p. 15S.)

IMAGINATION. 173

In addition to expectation, desire, and fear, are
the mental states which have the largest share in the
production of illusion. The strength of the inclination
to believe in that which we like, manifests itself in every
department of human life. Yet, paradoxical as it may
at first sight appear, dislike can also contribute to the
generation of an illusory behef. The most important
constituent in the emotion of fear is aversion, but it is
a matter of frequent experience that a lively fear of
anything tends to create in the mind a counterfeit
perception of it. The timid wayfarer, travelling by
night, sees a highwayman in every gatepost, whilst the
child who has just been listening to ghost stories
converts the furniture of his moonlit bed-room into
fairies and hobgoblins. Inordinate anxiety generates
all sorts of doubts and suspicions, and — •

Trifles light as air
Are to the jealous confirmation strong.

The mental process in the case of fear is, however,
fundamentally akin to that of desire. The immediate
effect of both sentiments is intense excitation of the
imagination, a lively picture of the desired or dreaded
event is conjured up by the fancy, and the vivid image
is taken for the reality.

Othey influences. — The second group of causes of
illusion, which may be roughly described as non-
mental, are subdivided according as the deception is
due, {a) to ill-health either of the particular organ
employed, or of the brain and nervous system as a
whole, or (b) to some irregularity in the composition of
the medium intervening between the organism and the
object apprehended.

(a) Organic. — The forms of illusion which may arise
from an unsound condition of the organ are very
numerous. A sense may be subject to permanent defects
such as partial deafness, short-sightedness, and colour-
blindness, or it may suffer transient disabilities such as
fatigue, disarrangement, and temporary disease of the
nerves employed in a particular perception. After
steadily gazing at a small disc of a brilliant colour, the

174 SENSUOUS LIFE.

eye will see a similar spot of a complementary hue if
directed immediately afterwards towards a plain white
surface. Intense stimulation of any of the senses renders
it for a time insensible to lesser excitations. Santonin in-
duces colour-blindness to violet, and other drugs deaden
other modes of sensibility. The disease of jaundice
sometimes gives things a yellow tinge. In certain
cerebral and nervous diseases illusions often take a
more pronounced and extreme form, and the mind
may not only misapprehend real things, but it may
even become incapable of distinguishing between actual
objects and pure phantoms of the imagination. An
aberration of this extreme and permanent kind is com-
monly termed a halliicination. The passenger who, in
a London fog, mistakes a lamp-post for a policeman,
is said to be under an illusion. The fever-patient who
sees his empty room crowded with people, and the
lunatic who believes he is the Emperor of China, are
possessed by hallucinations. The passage, however,
from the one state to the other is gradual, and there is
no rigid line of demarcation separating them. The
cause of these aberrations seems to lie in the abnormal
working of the interior physical processes which
usually give rise to sensations, or which have accom-
panied particular cognitions in the past, and so cause
these latter to be reproduced from memory with such
vividness as to be confounded with real impressions.
The illusions of delirium tremens, and of manv forms
of mental derangement, are probably caused b}'- mis-
taking internal irritation of the nerves for external
natural sensations. And complete lunacy may arise
either from disorder of the functions of the cerebrum,
caused by the presence of poisonous materials in the
blood, or from some organic disease which has already
seized on the substance of the brain.

{h) External. — The deceptions originated by irregular
conditions of the environment are very familiar. If we
gaze at the sun through a piece of red or green glass,
only rays of these colours will be allowed to pass, and
its disc will appear of a corresponding hue. A dull
wintry landscape observed through a transparent sub-

IMAGINATION. 175

stance of a slightly yellow tint assumes a golden
autumnal appearance. The magic effects of the trans-
formation scene at the pantomime are the result of the
skilful management of coloured lights, and spectral
apparitions are commonly produced by the manipula-
tion of concave mirrors at the sides of the stage. In
operations of this nature, however, the sense is perfectly
truthful as regards its own revelations. It responds in
an appropriate manner to its proximate stimuli, and the
error is due to the abnormal relations between the latter
and the remote object which they ordinarily present to
the mind. ^

Illusion in the strictest sense of the term comes
into existence when we pass from the immediate data
of the senses to their indirect or acquired ^perceptions.
Here, when the customary character of the environ-
ment is changed, the imagination excited through past
association may induce complete deception. Our esti-
mate of distance and magnitude may thus be altogether
invalidated. A figure seen through a fog is enlarged
because the vagueness of its outlines causes us to
exaggerate its distance. The perspective appearance
of landscape paintings and of stereoscopic pictures, as
well as the ingenious contrivances to which the diorama
owes its success, are designed to awaken through the
imagination by means of the laws of suggestion an
illusory belief as regards the spatial relations of the
several parts of the perceived object. Akin to this
class of illusions are some others due to the unusual
presence or absence of materials for comparison. The
empty rooms of a house in the process of building
always look smaller than they really are, because we
have not the customary furniture to call our attention
to the capacity of the space. Similarly, a dispro-
portionately large table diminishes the size of a
chamber. On the other hand, a multiplicity of small
objects magnifies a given amount of space. A field
with hay-cocks scattered over it, a harbour with ships,
or an orchard studded with apple-trees, seems far
larger than the same space when empt3^ The other
senses are subject to analogous mistal es. The illusion

176 SENSUOUS LIFE.

produced by an echo is similar to that of the looking-
glass. In a rarified atmosphere the force of sound is
lowered in a surprising degree. De Saussure judged
the explosion of a pistol at the top of Mont Blanc
to be about equal to that of a common cracker below.
Want of homogeneity, moreover, in the intervening
medium can interrupt, reflect, or change the character
of sound just as of light.

Dreaming and Reverie. — A specially interesting form of
illusion, or rather hallucination, is that exhibited in dreaming.
Dreams are mental processes which take place during sleep,
and are in some respects akin to states of reverie which occur
during waking life. In dreaming the imagination assumes
the part played in waking life by the external senses.
During sleep the activity of these latter falls into almost
complete abeyance ; volitional control over the course of
thought ceases ; the power of reflexion and comparison is
suspended ; and the fancy of the dreamer moves along
automatically under the guidance of association. Considera-
tion of these circumstances will help us to partially account
for the peculiar features of the dream. Its chief charac-
teristics are, (a) its verisimilitude, (b) its incoherence and
extravagance, (r) its possession of a certain coherence
amid this inconsistency, and (d) the exaggeration of actual
impressions.

{a) Verisimilitude. — The apparent reality of the dream is,
in great part, a consequence of the cessation of the action of
the external senses. In sleep the images of the fancy which
may arise within us are not subject to the correction which
the presentations of the senses are ever furnishing during
waking life. Even in the most profound reverie, when our
thoughts move along at random, there is always, so long as
we are awake, a plentiful stream of sensation flowing in upon
the mind through the several faculties ; and although we
scarcely advert to them, these sensations exert a steady
counteracting influence on the flights of fancy. The objects
which we dimly see around us, the tactual and auditory
impressions of which we are vaguely conscious, all conspire
to keep us in constant collision with reality ; and when we
imagine ourselves at the head of an army, or in the jaws of a
tiger, the obscurely apprehended table and chairs of our room
exert a silent check upon the credence we are inclined to
give to all vivid ideas. In sleep it is otherwise ; the corrective
action of the external senses being cut off, we are completely

IMAGINATION. 177

at the mercy of the phantasy, and place imphcit confidence
in each new illusory cognition.''

(b) Incoherence. — The inconsistency of the dream seems to
be due to its course being left entirely to the guidance of
fortuitous associations modified by the interference of acci-
dental sensations at the moment. The absence of voluntary
attention or control over our thoughts disables us from
reflecting upon the ideas which arise spontaneously, and
prevents us from comparing them with past experience, or
with each other. In reverie, on the contrary, this voluntary
power rarely sinks into complete abeyance, and on the
suggestion of some flagrant absurdity, the mind can exert
itself against the illogical train of images, and even if it
permits the incongruous series to take their course, at least
reserves its assent. The casual entrance of the few external
impressions which penetrate to the mind during sleep, and
the action of the systemic sensations are probably fertile
sources of new lines of thought. But since self-command no
longer exists, although we may feel a vague surprise at the
chaotic groupings of ideas thus effected, we are yet unable to
elicit the reflective act by which the inconsistency may be
brought home to us, and accordingly thought follows thought
in an arbitrary manner.

(r) Coherence. — The consistency of the dream, in so far as
it occasionally exists, probably results in part from an orderly
succession of previously associated ideas, in part from a
faint power of selection exerted by a dominant tone of con-
sciousness at the time, which rejects striking eccentricities.

(d) Exaggeration. — The exaggeration of occasional real
impressions is accounted for by the fact that while the^ great
majority of external sensations are excluded, those which do
find entrance are thereby in a peculiarly favourable position.
They are in novel isolation from their surroundings ; their
nature is vaguely apprehended;** and they cannot be con-

^ 8 Lewes, following Hartley, explains the apparent reality of the
phantasms of the dream, mainly by the suspension of the corrective
action of the external senses. Cf. Physiology of Common Life, pp. 367 —
370. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, § 482, in accordance with the
important part he assigns to Will in mental Hfe, like Stewart, lays
chief stress on " the entire suspension of volitional control over the
current of thought " during sleep. St. Thomas had anticipated both
explanations. He accounts for the illusions of sleep by the suspen-
sion of the senses combined with the interruption of the voluntary
control of reason. See note on next page.

9 Mr. Sully {Illusions, pp. 147—149) ascribes the magnifying
agency of the dream chiefly to the obscure manner in which the
nature of the stimulus is apprehended— igtiotum pro magnifico. The

17S SENSUOUS LIFE.

fronted with other experiences. Accordingly they usurp the
whole available resources of consciousness, and so assume an
utterly inordinate importance, A slight sensation of cold or
pressure, if it accidentally fits in with the current of our
dream, may thus give rise to the illusion that we are lost in a
snow-storm, or crushed under a falling house. The- seeming
rapidity of events, which is simply the rapidity of thoughts
confounded with reality, is explained in the same way.^*^

In brief, then, as following Aristotle, St. Thomas himself
repeatedly teaches, the mind accepts the representations of
the imagination as real objects unless it be checlced by some
other faculty ; consequently when, as in sleep, the senses and
the free application of the understanding which constitutes
voluntary attention are suspended, illusion is inevitable. ^^

Readings. — On the Imagination, of. St. Thomas, Comm. De Anima,
Lib. III. Lect. 4 — 6; Mark Baldwin, op. cit. c. xii. ; Carpenter,
Mental Physiology, c. xii.; Hamilton, MetapJi. Lect. xxxiii. ; Porter,
cp. cit. Part. II. cc. v. vi. ; Gutberlet, Die Psychologie, pp. 83, seq.
On Illusions, cf. Farges, L'Ohjectivite de la Perception des Sens Externes,
pp. 184 — 237; Baldwin, op. cit. c. xiii. The subject of Dreams is
treated by Aristotle in a special tract, cf. St. Thomas, Co;;/;;?. D^
Somn'.is. Carpenter, op. cit. c. xv. is good on the same subject.

force of a novel impression even in waking life is usually over-
estimated. In sleep the general lethargy of the higher centres
engaged in cognition prevents proper recognition of even familiar
stimuli, and so converts them into strange or formidable phenomena.

^^ " The only phase of the waking state in which any such
intensely rapid succession of thoughts presents itself, is that which
is now well attested as a frequent occurrence, under circumstances
in which there is imminent danger of death, especially by drown-
ing, the whole previous life of the individual seems to be presented
instantaneously to his view, with its every important incident
vividly impressed on his consciousness, just as if all were combineci
in a picture, the whole of which could be taken in at a glanco^^
(Carpenter, op. cit. § 484, note.)

^^ " Quod rerum species vel similitudines non discernantur a
rebus ipsis, contingit ex hoc quod vis altior, quae judicare et dis-
cernere potest, ligatur. . . . Sic ergo cum offeruntur imaginariae
similitudines, inhasretui eis quasi rebus ipsis, nisi sit aliqiia alia vis
qua contradicat, puta sensus aut ratio. Si autem sit ligata ratio, et
sensus sopitus, inharetur similitndinibus sicut ipsis rebus, ut in visiis
dormientium accidit, et ita in phreneticis." {Qq. Disp. De Malo III.
a. 3. ad 9. Cf. Comment, in Arist., De Somniis, Lect. iv.)

CHAPTER IX.

MEMORY. MENTAL ASSOCIATION.

Memory. — The term Memory, in ordinary lan-
guage, designates the faculty of retaining, repro-
ducing, and recognizing representations of past
experiences. These several features of memory
vary in degree of perfection in the same, and in
different individuals. Viewed as the capacity for
preserving our mental acquisitions this power has
been called the Conservative Faculty. It is an
essential condition of all knowledge. The simplest
act of judgment, as well as the longest chain of
reasoning, necessarily implies retention. But acqui-
sition plus conservation is not enough. During the
whole of our life the greater portion of our mental
possessions lie below the surface of consciousness,
and exist only in a condition of potential resusci-
tation. It is the power of recalling and recognizing
these dormant cognitions which completes and
perfects this instrument of knowledge.- The act
of recognition is radically distinct from the mere
re-apparition of an old mental state; but both have
been sometimes comprehended under the Repro-
ductive Faculty,

Aristotle distinguishes between memory [fxvr^^irj), the passive
faculty of retention, and reminiscence {avu^vrjo-n), the power of

J So SENSUOUS LIFE.

active search or recall. The division is analogous to that of
modern writers into spontaneous or automatic memory, and
voluntary memory, or the power of recollection. The operation
of reminiscence is compared by St. Thomas to that of
syllogising, a progress from the known to the unknown, from
the remembered to the forgotten. As it involves volitional
and rational activitv it is restricted to man, whilst memory is
common to the brutes. Hamilton confines the narne memory
to the retentive or conservative capacity of the mind, whilst
under the reproductive faculty he includes both reproduction
and recognition. The imagination proper, he describes as
the representative faculty.

Reproduction. — A brief study of our minds
reveals the fact that even spontaneous thoughts
and recollections of past events do not occur
completely at random. Our fancy can, it is
true, move in a very rapid and seemingly arbitrary
manner, whilst widely remote actions and episodes
often reappear in imagination in an unexpected and
disconnected way. Still, closer attention to the
reproduced states will usually disclose faint and
unobtrusive connexions binding together the links
of what looked like a haphazard series of thoughts.

Process of Recollection.— But it is in the act of

reminiscence or recollecttoii, in the sustained effort to recall
some past experience, we perceive most clearly that the
current of representations which pass before our con-
sciousness do not proceed in an entirely casual and
lawless manner. Starting from a vague notion of the
event which we wish to remember, we try to go back
to it by something connected with it in time, in place,
or by any other kind of affinity. We first endeavour
to place ourselves in the mental situation of the
original incident. Then we notice that by fixing our
attention on any particular occurrence we bring it into
greater vividness, and numerous attendant circum-
stances are gradually recalled. Our ordinary procedure
is accordingly to seize upon, and intensify by attention,

MEMORY. i8i

the force of that one of the newly-awakened recollec-
tions which we judge most likely to lead to the desired
end. When our gaze is focussed on this fresh centre a
new system of objects related by similarity, contiguity,
or contrast, begins to emerge from obscurity, and here
we repeat our process of choice, picking out again the
most promising train. By reiterated selections and
rejections of this kmd we approach gradually closer
and closer to the object of pursuit, until it finally flashes
upon us with a more or less lively feeling of satisfaction.
Throughout our investigation we must have had some
vague idea, some general outline of the experience of
which we are in search, in order to direct us along the
most likely paths. This is made evident in the final
act of recognition, for in this stage we become conscious
that the rediscovered fact fits precisely into the vague
outline still retained. The accompanying pleasure is
due to the perception of agreement between the new
and the old, together with the feeling of relief occasioned
by having the undefined want satisfied.

Laws of Association. — The study of such an
operation as that just described convinces us that
our recollections succeed each other not arbitrarily,
but according to certain laws. Careful observation
of our mental processes have enabled psychologists
to reduce such laws to a few very general principles.
These principles which condition the reproduction
of phenomena of the mind have been called the
Laws of Mental Suggestion or the Laws of the
Association of Ideas. The chief of these are :

(i) The law of similarity or affinity in character.

(2) The law of contrast or opposition in character.

(3) The law of contiguity, comprising association
{a) in space, and {h) in time.

Similarity. — The Law of Similarity expresses the
general condition that the mind in the presence of any mental

1 82 SENSUOUS LIFE.

state tends to repvoditce the like of that state in past experience;
or as it is sometimes enunciated, mental states suggest
or recall their like in past experience. The previous form
of expression, however, possesses the advantage of
calHng attention to a point frequently overlooked by
EngHsh psychologists, namely, that it is in the mind,
and not in the transient phenomena, the^ binding or
associating force dwells. An impression oridea, viewed
merely as an individual phenomenon, contains no reason
in itself why another mental event like or unlike it
should be its successor. It is only the permanence of
the Subject which renders association of the states
possible. The mind, retaining as habits or faint modi-
fications former experiences, resuscitates on the occur-
rence of similar or contrasted events the latent state,
and recognizes the likeness which subsists between the
new and the old. The vicious reasoning of sensation-
alist writers who explain both the mind and the material
world, including the human organism, as a product of
the association of ideas is thus obvious.

Examples of association by similarity are innu-
merable. A photograph recalls the original, a face
that we see, a story that we read, a piece of music or a
song that we hear, all remind us of similar experiences
in the past. Even the less refined sensations of touch,
taste, and smell, cause us to recollect like impressions
in our previous life. Painting, sculpture, the drama,
and the rest of the fine arts, seek to please by their
success in imitation. The pleasures of wit and humour,
the charm of happy figurative language in poetry or
prose, and the admiration won by great strokes of
scientific genius, are in the same way largely based on
the satisfaction of the tendency by which the mind is
impelled to pass from a thought to its like.

Contrast. — The Laiv of Contrast enunciates the
general fact that the mind in the presence of any mental state
tends to reproduce contrasted states previously experienced. Or
it may be formulated in the proposition that mental
slates suggest contrasted states of past experience. The idea
of prodigal wealth recalls that of needy poverty, cold
suggests heat, black white, virtue vice, and so on.

MENTAL ASSOCIATION, 183

From the beginning, however, this law has been felt
to be reducible to morS ultimate principles. In fact,
to declare broadly that mental states are inclined to
revive former perceptions both like and unlike them
would approach paradox, if not actual contradiction.
The truth is, this law in so far as it is mental and not
an effect of organic reaction is a result of the combined
forces, similarity and contiguity. This will be made
evident presently.

Contiguity. — The Laiu of Contiguity formulates the
truth that the mind in the presence of an object or events whethe-v
actual oy ideal, tends to recall other objects and events, fovnievly
closely connected in space or time with that now present. It is
often impossible to draw a rigid line between associa-
tions due to close connexion in time and those founded
on contiguity in space. When looked at from the
mental side, we say the subjective impressions occurred
simultaneously, or in close succession ; viewed from
the opposite standpoint, we say the perceived objects
were locally contiguous. Suggestion by contiguity
whether in space or time is the most important and
far reaching form of association. It is not confined
to cognitive acts, but includes emotions, volitions, and
external movements as well. It is the principle upon
which every system of education both mental and
physical is based ; and by the sensationalist school in
this country it has been erected into an omnipotent
agency through which all knowledge and belief regard-
ing space and time, mind and matter, have been
created. We have pointed out in treating of sense-
perception how the taste, smell, touch, and sight of
objects mutually suggest one another. Contiguous
association is also a leading source of our pleasures
and pains. The process of learning to walk, to speak,
and to write, and the acquisition of the various manual
arts, rest upon the tendency of acts which are repeated
in succession to become so united that each impels to
the reproduction of the next. Language is possible
because auditory sounds grow to be associated on the
one side with the visual image of the object, and on
the other with the complex cluster of motor or muscular

1 84 SENSUOUS LIFE.

impulses involved in the utterance of the name ; and
literature is intelligible only through the marvellous
command which repeated associations have given us
over the innumerable combinations of individual letters
which cover the page of a book.

Time order, — Although, as we have said, associations
in space are often intimately related to connexions in
time, there is one important feature in which these
latter differ from the former. Owing to the permanent
coexistence of the separate parts of an extended object,
and to our visual power of simultaneously apprehending
these parts, no particular point becomes endowed with
any special priority ; consequently we can in imagina-
tion, as in the previous reality, pass in any order from
each point to every other. But in serial states, where
each separate impression has dropped out of conscious-
ness before the appearance of the next, the whole force
of the association is to reproduce the mental states in
their original order of occurrence.

Reduction of these laws. — Contiguous sugges-
tion is an agency of such extensive range in mental
phenomena that some psychologists hold similarity,
contrast, and all other forms of association, to be
merely special applications of this ultimate principle.
Others, on the contrary, consider contiguity to be a
particular case of similarity — likeness in space or
time.

Contrast analyzed. — That the law ot contrast is resolv-
able we have before stated. Contraria sunt ejiisdem generis.
Contrast presupposes similarity in genus. There is no
disposition in the mind to pass from the idea of civili-
zation to that of liquid or of black, because there is no
relation of similarity between them. But there is an
easy transition in thought from civilization to barbarism,
from solid to liquid, and from black to white, because
each pair of terms refer to a common class. Still this
does not quite complete the explanation, as there may
be many species in the class, and there is no special

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. if 5

inclination felt to pass to intermediate objects, such as
from white to green or red. It is here the principle of
contiguous suggestion supplements that of similarity.
We are accustomed to meet in literature, in language,
and in daily experience, contrasted terms and objects
bound together in pairs ; and in fact the entire judicial
function of the intellect consists in the discrimination
of unlike things, and assimilation of those which are
like, so that we naturally acquire a facility for passing
from a notion to its opposite.

Attempted analysis of similarity. — The effort to reduce
similarity and contiguity to a single principle is not
quite so successful, though they are evidently connected.
Psychologists who maintain that contiguity is the most
general principle, explain suggestion by apparent
resemblance as really due to the fact that those features
in the present object which also existed in the former
object arouse by contiguity the parts which were
adjacent to them on that occasion. Thus, when tiie
face of a stranger reminds me by similarity of an old
friend, it is held that the process consists of a deeper
impression of the common features, which results from
the fact of these features having been previously per-
ceived, and then a consequent reinstatement of the
lineaments, formerly contiguous, whilst our interest
and attention is withdrawn from those adjacent in the
present experience.

The following analysis of Similarity is given by the
German psychologists Maas and Biunde : Let the face now
seen for the first time be called B. Let the former face
recalled through the resemblance of B be styled A. Let the
points common to both be called ;;/. Let the unlike features
peculiar to B be named b, and let those peculiar to A be
named a. Now, when B is observed, the familiar hut
unexpected feature in attracts notice, while the less interesting
b is ignored. But ni has been formerly frequently joined witli
a constituting the total representation A, and accordingly
bringing back its old associate it reinstates A. " When, for
example, I look at the portrait of Sir Philip Sydney, I am
reminded of its likeness to the portrait of Queen Elizabeth,
because of the ruff which is about the neck of each, which in
this case is the only common feature, and attracts at once the

iS6 SENSUOUS LIFE.

attention. The ruff brings back everything besides in Her
Majesty's portrait — the head-dress, the features, the sceptre,
the robes, &c., till the whole is restored."^ Mr. J. Ward on
similar lines contends that it is in previous contiguity alone
the associative or suggestive force lies, and that similarity is
only an incidental relation recognized after the reproduction
is accomplished.-

Attempted analysis of contiguity. — Writers who look
upon similarity as the ultimate law, describe contiguity
as merely a particular case of resemblance. No part of
the present representation, it is urged, can be "common"
to the previous mental state in the strict sense of being
numerically one and identical on the two occasions.
Even the mental states aroused by the contemplation
of the same object now and five seconds ago are two
really different conscious acts. But it cannot be denied
that an experience — a sensation, an intellectual cogni-
tion, or an emotion — often recalls a similar state that
occurred amid completely different surroundings at a
very distant period. There is, for instance, no con-
nexion of contiguity between the present perception of a
photograph seen for the first time and a friend's face
whom I have not met for twenty years. We must
therefore, it is argued, admit as an ultimate fact this
tendency of the mind to reproduce past experiences
connected with the present by likeness alone. More-
over, cases described as contiguous associations are
merely particular forms of similarity — likeness in space
or time. When, for example, a bridge recalls the image
of a house that used to stand hard b}^ the association
is said to be one of a partial resemblance between the
present and past mental states. The mind is at present
in a state like that in which it was before.

Herbert Spencer makes similarity the sole ultimate
principle : " The fundamental law of association is that each
(mental state), at the moment of presentation, aggregates
with its like in past experience. . . . Besides this there is no
other ; but all further phenomena of association are inci-
dental." Similarly Hbffdmg: " Every association by contiguity
presupposes an association by similarity, or at least an

1 Porter, op. cit. § 247. - " Psychology," Encyd. Brit.

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. iSf

immediate recognition. When the apple before me carries
my thoughts to Adam and Eve, this is because first — perhaps
so quickly that I am hardly conscious of it — I have thought
of the apple on the tree of knowledge. The association by
similarity lying at the root of association by contiguity may
easily escape our attention. But it is a link which cannot be
dispensed with." (Op. cit. p. 158.)

Hamilton originally accepted the analysis of Maas, and
enounced as the one comprehensive principle of Association
the Law of Redintegration or Totality : Thouf^lits suggest each
other which have previously constituted parts of the same entire or
total act of cognition.^ Moreover he traced the recognition of
this principle back to St. Augustine,^ and even to Aristotle.
Subsequently, however, in his work On Reid, Note D,-'"''--
Hamilton abandoned this view, and acknowledged both
Similarity and Contiguity as irreducible. He thus formulates
the two principles : (i) The Law of Repetition, or of
Direct Remembrance : — Thoughts co-identical in modification
{i.e. similar as acts of the mind) but differing in time, tend to
suggest each other. (2) The Law of Redintegration, of
Indirect Remembrance, or of Reminiscence : — Thoughts
once co-identical in time, are however different as mental modes,
again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which
they originally held. The terms Direct and Indirect mark the
fact that a mental state immediately or directly recalls its
like in the past, and mediately the unlike states formerly
contiguous to this restored element. This latest position of
Hamilton is akin to that of St. Thomas, as will be seen later.

Criticism. — It seems to us that similarity and
contiguity, though they are usually allied in their
operation, contain each a separate element of its own.
On the one hand, it is a fundamental irreducible law
that present mental states tend to awaken represen-
tations of their lihe in past life. On the other, these
reproduced representations usually call up nnlihe
adjacent elements, which formerly co-exited along
with them. The second fact cannot be really resolved
into the first, nor the first into the second. We may
of course manage to include both forms of suggestion
in one verbal statement, but their radical difference
will still remain. Though the adjectives " similar " or
"same" may be used to mark agreement of date as

3 Mctaph. Vol. IL p. 238. ^ Confessions, \. c. 19.

i88 SENSUOUS LIFE.

well as likeness of quality, we must not forget that
coincidence in time is something essentially different from
affinity in nature.

Physiological hypothesis. — It is suggested that the
physiological counterpart of the law of suggestion by
contiguity lies in the tendency of groups of cerebral nerve
elements which have acted together in the original experience
to do so again whenever any portion of the group is stimulated.
The hypothesis seem3 plausible though, of course, there is no
direct evidence on the point.

The physical correlate of the law oi similarity is supposed
in the same way to consist of a certain " sympathetic " power
of a present neural excitation to re-awaken to activity nervous
elements formerly excited in a similar way. The neural
tremor accompanying the original cognition left it is assumed
in the cerebral substance, an abiding disposition to repeat
itself; and the present similar excitation — presumably in
different cellular matter — it is supposed, may by a sort of
sympathetic influence evoke a rehearsal of the old movement.
This we confess seems to us much less satisfactory. In what
sense is the cerebral neural tremor corresponding to the
retinal image of a six-inch photograph peculiarly like that
excited by the original — a six-foot man — seen three months
ago ? How is this " sympathetic affinity " to be conceived ?
It seems to us that suggestion by similarity — where this
cannot be reduced to contiguity — involves the higher supra-
sensuous activity of the mind, to which the appropriate
cerebral action is unimaginable. Hence the difficulty.

Co-operative Associations. — The terms compound,
or complex associations, are used to designate those
forms of suggestion where two or more distinct lines of
connexion co-operate in the reproduction of a mental
state, or series of mental states. The word co-operative
appears to us to describe more accurately the nature
of this process in which several separate strands join
together to intensify the force of association. The
phrase, conflicting associations, will then designate with
precision those contrasted phenomena in which the
lines of suggestive force are divergent. Instances of

co-operative association are abundant ; in fact, we
rarely find suggestion acting along a solitary isolated
path. The recollection of a poem may be effected
partly by auditory associations of rhyme and metre,

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 1S9

partly by the succession of connected thoughts, and
partly by the visual picture of the page on which the
verses were printed. Most familiar acquisitions such
as walking, speaking, writing, brushing our hair, playing
the piano, are the result of the co-operation of parallel
series of tactual, motor, and visual or auditory series
of associated sensations ; and the great assistance
which local associations afford in resuscitating forgotten
events where the other links have become attenuated is
well known.

Conflicting Associations. — Conflicting or obstruc-
tive associations illustrate the incidental disadvantages
which we so frequently find attached to the working
of a generally useful law. Just as a desired recollection
may be facilitated by several convergent associations of
similarity or contiguity, so may it be impeded by their
divergence. A verse, or a word, which is connected in
a poem or speech with more than one context, frequently
tends to shunt us off the right track. The aim of the
riddle or conundrum is this very result. The recol-
lection of a name of which we possess the first letter
may be similarly obstructed ; and the accidental pre-
sence of any strong counter-association connected with
a present idea, may temporarily interfere with our
power of reminiscence. The best method of procedure
in such cases, experience teaches us, is to secure a new
unprejudiced start by turning away from the subject
altogether for awhile, until the vivacity of the connexion
between the obstructive word or idea and the divergent
series has diminished, or until we can hit upon some
independent line of suggestion when the pursuit may
be resumed with better prospects of success. The
sudden revivals of lost ideas, whilst we are immersed
in a new occupation, after a vainly protracted search,
are in this way explained. Psychologically misleading
associations were in the ascendant during our futile
struggles, and physiologically the perturbed state of the
brain rendered the reproduction of the neural correlate
of the desiderated representation impossible. But the
subsequent readjustment gave rise to the particular set
of conditions psychical and physical which made resus-

igo SENSUOUS LIFE.

citation feasible, and which, either automatically or
influenced by a lingering semi-conscious volition, dis-
interred the lost thouglit.

Secondary Laws. — In addition to these primary
laws of association or suggestion, there are certain
other general conditions determining the efficiency
of memory and recollection. Some, or all of these,
have been variously expressed under such titles as,
the law of preference, the secondary laws of suggestion,
and general conditions of acquisition and reproduction.
However they be described, they serve to explain
the varying force of associations not accounted for
by the other group. The leading principles in this
secondary class are: (i) Vividness of impression;
(2) Frequency of repetition; and (3) Recentness.

Vividness. — Assuming the action of the other laws
to remain constant, the deeper, the more intense, or the
more vigorous the original impression, the more perma-
nent is its retention, and the easier its reproduction.
The vividness of an impression is itself dependent
objectively on the inherent attractiveness or force of the
stimuli, and subjectively upon the energy of our voluntary
attention. The novelt}', beauty, or overwhelming power
of a single experience may give it life-long permanence ;
and deep interest or intense application of attention
may largely compensate for the absence of the other
conditions of reproduction. To awaken and sustain
interest must therefore be always a chief aim of the
teacher, as whatever is learned by this motive is both
acquired with greater facility and retained with greater
tenacity.

Frequency. — The influence of repetition need not
be dwelt on. By reiteration, especially at short
intervals, the feeble association created by the first
contiguous occurrence of two events becomes gradually
converted into an almost irresistible suggestive force,

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 191

and a frail link of similarity is changed into an iron
bond. It is by repetition that in the last resort all other
imperfections of memory must be made good.

Recentness. — The third law is also familiar. The
shorter the time that has elapsed and the fewer the
intervening impressions, the more easily a past thought
or series of thoughts is recollected. Consequently it is
important that the first lessons in a new subject be
repeated at brief intervals, otherwise the effect of each
impression will have completely faded away before the
next effort. The co-operation of one or more of these:
laws with one or more of the others will account for
variations in the suggestiveness or suggestibility of
particular mental states.

Order of reproduction. — Of two associated terms,
such as a name and its object, a sign and the thing:
signified, a means and its end, one ma}^ have far more
power of recalling the other than vice versa. This may
be due either to the customary movement of our atten-
tion in a regular order, as in the case of repeating the
alphabet, or to the direction whither our interest
naturally tends, as where symbols or means point to
the ultimate object. It may also be due to the circum-
stance that one of the terms has been met with more
frequently, or more recently than the other, or to the
fact that it is connected with a larger number of
co-operative threads of association now present.

Retention. — The problem of the conservation of
experiences has been as keenly discussed as that of
reproduction. That cognitions do de facto persist
in some form, whilst not realized in consciousness,
is indeed only a hypothesis, but yet one which is
irresistibly forced upon us. We have continuous
evidence that we can recall familiar past events,
and we are consequently convinced that they have
dwelt within us during the interval. The theory
offered by Aristotle and the schoolmen on this

192 - SENSUOUS LIFE.

subject was summed up in the phrase which
describes the memory as thesaurus specienim. By
species, as we have already stated, the scholastic
philosophers understood modifications which reflect
in a psychical manner external objects, and which
have been excited in the soul by the action of these
objects. These species or cognitional acts were
classed as sensuous or intellectual according as they
pertained to intellect or sense, and the mediaeval
psychologists taught that when experiences have
disappeared from consciousness the soul is endowed
with the capacity of retaining these modifications
as faint dispositions or habits. But the retention is
not solely mental ; the organism co-operates. The
soul is not a detached spirit, but an informing
principle dependent on the body which it animates.
Consequently the latter co-operates in conservation
and reproduction, just as in the original perception.
The physical impression, like the mental act, must
persist in a habitual manner ready to be recalled
into activity on an appropriate occasion.^

Ultra-Spiritualist theory.— Modern writers who
have departed from this view have commonly erred by

^ Cf. St. Augustine [Epist. ix. ad Neb. n. 3). " Itaque, ea quar
ut ita dicam, vestigia sui motus animus figit in corpore, possuni
et manere, et quemdam quasi habitum facere, quae latenter, cum
agitata fuerint, et contractata secundum agitantis et contractantis-
voluntatem ingerunt nobis cogitationes, et somnia." Also
St. Thomas : " Dicit (Aristoteles) manifestum esse quod oportet
intelligere aliquam talem passionem a sensu esse factam in anima
et in organo corporis animati, cujus quidem animas memoriam
dicimus esse quemdam quasi habitum, quae quidem passio est quasi
quaedam pictura. . . . Dicit autem in anima et in parte corporis;
quia cum hujusmodi passio pertineat ad partem sensitivam quae
est actus organici corporis, hujusmodi passio non pertinet ad solam
animam sed ad conjunctum." {Covim. De Memoria, i. 1. 3.)

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 193

accounting for memory as a property of the soul alone
or of the body alone. Sir William Hamilton looks on
all physiological hypotheses on the subject as unphilo-
sophical, and as affording no insight into the nature of
memory, and he asserts that " all of them are too
contemptible even for serious criticism."^ This remark
is perfectly just if the physical theory hy itself be
advanced as an adequate explanation of memory, that
is, apart from any retention by the permanent mind ;
but otherwise it is untenable.

Physiological basis proved. — That there is a subsidiary
concomitant process of organic conservation, on which the
mind is at least partially dependent, is rendered probable by
a multitude of facts, (i) In youth, while the organism is
most plastic, we are capable of acquiring easily the most
enduring habits and recollections. (2) The faculty becomes
impaired in later life as the organism grows less pliable.
(3) Injuries of the brain, fevers, and cerebral diseases,
frequently act in a striking manner on memory whilst the
other cognitional faculties remain unaffected. Determinate
periods of life, special kinds of experience, classes of words,
particular languages, certain parts of speech, and even indi-
vidual letters, have been suddenly erased by physical
derangements of the cerebrum. (4) Moreover, these losses
have often been suddenly restored on the recurrence of
abnormal cerebral conditions. (5) Finally, in ordmary experi-
ence health, vigour, and freshness of the brain are found to
be most important conditions of the acquisition of krttrvv ledge.

Hamilton's own theory is that of Herbart and many
German spiritualist philosophers. He explains memory,
in accordance with the doctrine of latent or uncon-
scious mental modifications, as a result of the self-
energy of the mind. Presentations or cognitions are
not passive impressions, but spontaneous activities of
the soul, exerted on the occasion of external stimuli.
As modes of a subject one and indivisible they cannot
be destroyed — a part of the ego must be detached or
annihilated if a cognition once existent be again
extinguished. The real problem with Hamilton, then,
is not that of remembrance, but of obliviscence ; and
this he explains as due to the gradual enfeeblement and

6 Metaphysics, Vol. II. p. 211.

194

SEISfSUOUS LIFE.

obscuration of former states owing to the rise of
successive activities into the limited sphere of con-
sciousness. This dehtescence or subsidence of the old
energies is continuous, but they are never completely
obliterated.

Regarding this doctrine we have room here only
to point out the erroneous idea involved in conceiving
a past act of perception as persisting in a merely
lowered degree of activity. In such a view conscious-
ness would be but an accident of cognition. This error
is traceable to the literal interpretation of metaphorical
language regarding the surface of consciousness. A
cognition cannot whilst retaining its reality as a cog-
nition, sink into unconsciousness, just as a balloon or a
diving-bell descends into denser or more profound
strata. The true conception of retention is the old one,
per modum hahitus. An act of knowledge when it has
passed out of thought is no longer an activity or energy;
as an act it has perished, but during its existence it
wrought an effect on the soul in the shape of a habit or
disposition, which on the recurrence of suitable con-
ditions is capable of giving rise to a representation of
the former state.

Purely Physical theory. — Far more seriously
erroneous, however, is the theory which, exaggerating
the capacity of the organic factor, would explain
memory in purely materialistic fashion. Dr. Bain,
Mr. Spencer, Dr. Maudsley, and M. Ribot, are well-
known representatives of this view. Memory is in this
hypothesis, ''per se a biological fact — by accident a
psychological fact." ^ To each cognitive act, sensuous
or intellectual, there corresponds a definite disturbance
of some group of nerve-fibres and nerve-cells in the
brain. Such a cluster of neural elements vibrating or
acting together in any way retain a tendency to act in a
similar way again. Lines of least resistance are formed,
and every repetition of a conscious act with its re-
grouping of the appropriate collection of cells gives
greater stability to the cerebral registration. These
organic modifications are, however, according to the
' Ribot, Diseases of the Memory, p. lo.

MENTAL ASSOCIAITON. 195

more recent exponents, to be viewed, not so much in
the Hght of mechanical impressions stamped upon the
substance of the brain, as "dynamical affinities" or
alliances, created between separate centres of activity
by means of which simultaneous re-excitations of the
original groupings may be secured. The revival of the
old neural tremor affords then, it is supposed, an
abundantly sufficient explanation of the phenomenon
of recollection. *' Memory is, in fact, the conscious
phase of this physiological disposition, when it becomes
active or discharges its functions on the recurrence of
the particular mental experience." ^

Recognition. — The weak point of this theory when
put forward as a complete explanation of memory is that
it simply ignores the essence of the problem — the act of
recognition. Apart from the insuperable difficulty due to
the physiological law of metabolism — the fact of per-
petual change going on in the material substance of the
body — this hypothesis fails to distinguish between the
reproduction of states like former ones and the identification
of this similarity. The problem to be solved is how
some striking experience, such as the sight of Cologne
Cathedral, the death of my father, a friend's house on
fire, the first pony I rode, can be so retained during a
period of fifty years that, when an old man, I feel
absolute certainty of the perfect agreement in many
details between the representation of the event now in
my mind and the original perception. The circumstance
that the passage of a neural tremor through a system
of nerve-fibres may leave there an increased facility for
a similar perturbation in the future, in no way indicates
how this second excitation or its accompanying mental
state is to recognize itself as a representation of the first.
To account for the facts there is required a permanent
principle distinct from the changing organism, capable
of retaining the old states in some form or other, and
also in virtue of its own abiding identity, capable of
recognizing the resuscitated image as a representation
of the former cognition. Given such a principle, the
persistence of physiological "traces" or "vestiges"
8 Dr. Maudsley, The Physiology of the Mind, p. 513,

[96 SENSUOUS LIFE.

may facilitate its powers of reproduction, and may
serve to account for differences in individual endow-
ments ; but without such an abiding mind the plastic
properties of the nerve are useless to explain the
phenomenon.

The fact of recognition is invariably overlooked in this
point of the controversy by the adversaries of mental reten-
tion. Thus Mr. Mark Baldwin asserts that a cognition is
"a mental product dependent upon a (cerebral) process, and
in the absence of this process it simply ceases to exist. The
true answer to the question, as to where the presentation is
in the time between perception and memory (reproduction) is
no where.'" (Op.cit.p. 156.)

To this it may be objected that it is by no means easy to
define precisely where the cognition is even when revived.
There is probably a commotion in some part of the cerebrum,
but obviously that is not the *' mental product." Secondly,
Mr. Baldwin is quite right in urging that the presentation no
longer exists in an actual condition. Certainly not, after the
Herbartian view, " sunk in sub-consciousness like a stone in a
lake." Still, the fact of recognition implies more than an
abiding modification of brain substance to connect the two
mental events. The act of recollection is not simply the
production of a mental state like the former due to the repe-
tition of a similar cerebral process. It is not merely " a really
new presentation " resembling the old image. It involves a
recognition of agreement between the present state and the
previous experience possible only if that experience has been
retained in some form or other by the agent who identifies
them ; and this agent is not merely an aggregate of cellular
matter. Whether we choose to speak of the retention as
accomplished through species, or " modifications," or " dispo-
sitions " wrought in the mind, the persistence of the effect of
the former mental act in the mind, and not merely in the
brain, is the only means by which we can rationally account
for the subsequent identification of the present with the past
experience.

Reminiscence. — Besides recognition, however,
the special form of active or voluntary memory termed
recollection, or reminiscence, refutes the materialistic hypo-
thesis. In this operation the mind controls and directs
the course of its ideas. The process involves reflexion,
comparison, and active intellectual cognizance of rela-
tions, whilst the free acceptance or rejection of selected

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. lay

lines of thought constitutes its most essential feature.
Now, at the very most, the purely ph3'sical theory
might account for the awakening of representations ot
former experiences by the accidental action of some
external stimulus which sets the group of nerves engaged
vibrating in tlie old way. But if there be no such
external stimulus how is the recollection to be ex-
plained ? Undoubtedly, faint sense impressions coming
from without sometimes resuscitate involuntary memo-
ries, but our every-day life assures us that long past
occurrences are also deliberately recalled by the mind
itself. It tells us that we can employ the laws of
association to reproduce at choice special series of
events, and that according as they arise we can again
select particular individuals from these series to form
new starting-points. But clearly the mere persistence
of modifications in the cellular substance of the brain
could not account for this operation.

It has been well said : '* The sensory'cell is not self-
acting ; it does not of itself originate sensation. . . .
And if it be not, we need, in default of impulse from
without, impulse from an inner sphere of experience,
where intellectual activity proceeds under laws quite
different from those which apply in connection with
purely sensor}^ action."^

Intellectual and sensuous memory. — This third element of
memory involved in the act of recognition introduces us to
the question : Is memory a sensuous or an intellectual faculty?
Although recollection in man commonly involves intellectual
activity, we have discussed memory here along with the
sensuous powers of the mind because a 1 ige portion of the
phenomena of this faculty do not transcend the order of
sensuous life ; and it is of the utmost importance that mere
increase in refinement or complexity should not cause sense
to be confounded with intellect, a mistake which is so often
made in English philosophical literature.

Dr. Bain, for instance, of his large volume on The Senses
and the Intellect, devotes the half entitled Intellect to expounding
the association of mental states. Now, in our view, this is in
the main what intellect is not. The laws of suggestion or
association are best exhibited in the purely automatic working

^ Calderwood, The Relations of Mind and Brain, p. 2S2.

198 SENSUOUS LIFE.

of reproduction, and they account for the various operations
of animal consciousness ; but they are in no way character-
istic manifestations of the superior rational activity which
constitutes intellect, though of course cognitions of an intel-
lectual order may suggest each other.

Neither the acquisition, nor the retention of sensuous
impressions, nor even their automatic reproduction under the
laws of suggestion, exceeds the range of sense. Nay, there
is nothing incompatible with the nature of an exclusively
sentient mind in the presence of a feeling that a revived
image is familiar or has been presented to us before. A man
whose intellectual activity is completely absorbed in some
abstract train of thought may make a complicated journey
through a city, or perform any other familiar mechanical
operation, guided by sensuous memory and the hardly noticed
impressions of various well-known objects. But besides such
processes as these, man can acquire, retain, and reproduce
rational cognitions ; he can recall past acts, sensuous or
rational ; he can formally or explicitly compare the present
representation with the past experience, and recognize identity
or difference between them ; he can form the notion of time ;
and he can by a reflective process of reminiscence localize an
occurrence at a determined date in the past. In all these
operations intellect is essentially implied, and consequently
v/e must admit a rational as well as a sensuous memory.

Scholastic controversy. — There has been much subtle
discussion among the schoolmen as to the forms and modes
of memory which are to be deemed sensuous or intellectual.
St. Thomas, in a well-known passage^° says: " Cognoscere
praeteritum ut prcEteritnm est sensus," but the " ut preteritum "
may have more than one signification. Suarez maintains that
" intellectus rem cognoscit cum affectionibus sen conditioni-
bus singularibus perfectius multo quam sensus ; " also that
" Sensus novit praeteritum tantum materialiter, intellectus
vero formaliter." Amongst recent text - books of note,
Lahousse asserts, " Absurdum est (dicere) memoriae sensitivae
proprium esse apprehendere prcetevitum detevminatum, iiti est
pycdievitiim,'" and he urges, " Ens prassens non apprehenditur
a sensu tanquam prassens ; apprehendi enim deberet ratio
praesentiae ut sic, quae ratio abstracta non attingitur a sensu."
Sanseverino defends a somewhat different view. St. Thomas
appears at times to say that past events are cognized as past
per se by sense, and only per accidens by intellect ; elsewhere,
however, he explicitly distinguishes between the remembrance
of a past object and of the percipient act by which it was
apprehended. The memory of the former he considers as
^0 Qu. Disp. de Vevit. q. x. a. 2, c.

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 199

per se sensuous, though per accidens it may belong to intellect.
The proper object per se of intellect is the essence or nature
of things without reference to present, past, or future. Time
is a particular determination merely incidental to an object,
and is apprehended by the universal faculty only indirectly
through reflexion. As regards a previous percipient act,
however, it can be known as past by the intellect not merely
thus per accidens, but per se. Still even here the definite
chronological situation, like every other individual determina-
tion, is only indirectly apprehended by intellect through
reflexion, and is accordingly merely per accidens the object of
that faculty. St. Thomas thus seems to teach that the
occurrence of a sensuous impression of an object may carry
with it the feeling that this object has been apprehended
before, and this feeling may even refer the occurrence to a
definite point of the previous time series, just as an external
sense may localize a body in space. The formal recognition,
however, of agreement between a present representation and
a past object or state must, on St. Thomas' principles, be
deemed an act of intellect. This is the feature of memory
most in Suarez' mind, and Dr. Gutberlet would apparently
account for some of the differences of opinion on the subject
by the term " memory " being used by other writers mainly
to signify reproduction apart from recognition. The reader
wishing to study the question at length may consult St. Thomas,
Sum. i. q. 79. a. 6, Qu. Disp. de Verit, q. x. a. 3, c, and De Mem.
et Rem. 1. 2 ; Suarez, De Anima, IV. c. x. ; Lahousse, Psych. III.
c. X. a. 5 ; Sanseverino, Dynam. c. vi. a. 2 ; Liberatore, Psych.
c. i. a. 7 ; and Gutberlet, op. cit. p. 108.

Qualities of good memory. — The estimation of
time, the localization of events in the past, expectation
and some other operations connected with memory, will
be more conveniently treated in a future chapter. But
we may add a word here on the qualities of a good
memory and the aim of the teacher with respect to this
faculty. Excellence of memor}^ is measured by facility
of acquisition, tenacity, and readiness of reproduction.
These properties frequently exist in the same person in
inverse degrees of excellence. The lawyer and the
actor attain great perfection in the rapidity with which
they can commit to memory the facts of a new case or
a part in a new play, but in a short time the whole
subject is again erased from the mind. The capacity
of memory varies much in different individuals, and

200 SENSUOUS LIFE.

history affords us many examples of powers that seem
to the ordinary mind marvellous.

Thus Ben Jonson, it is alleged, could repeat all that
he had ever written, and most of what he had said.
Scaliger learned by heart the Iliad and Odyssey in three
weeks, and the whole of the Greek poets in three
months. Pascal, it is said, could remember anything
he had ever thought. Lord Macaulay could after a
single attentive perusal reproduce several pages of a
book, and discovered by accident that he could repeat
the whole of Paradise Lost. Cardinal Mezzoffanti knew
forty-eight different languages and many dialects. ^^

Training of the memory forms an important part
of the first stages of all systems of education. The
teacher must here carefully distinguish between instruc-
tion or the storing the mind with useful information and
education proper or the development of mental facult}'.
Accordingly, although many of the earlier educational
exercises aim primarily at the acquisition of certain
necessary items of knowledge such as the alphabet,
parts of speech, meanings of words, tables and the like,
which must be learned by sheer force of repetition,
nevertheless the teacher's chief aim must be to cultivate
in the pupil a habit of judicious, not ot mere mechanical
memory. That is, he must accustom the child to
exercise remembrance by means of the internal or
rational connexion of ideas rather than by mere conti-
guous association. He must see that the subject-matter
is understood and not merely reproduced hy rote. Further,
he should profit by the teaching of physiology and
psychology: (i) to avoid over-estimating the feeble
powers of the very young ; (2) to allot the period when
the brain is physically in the best condition for the
work of learning by heart ; (3) to exercise the mind in
frequent repetition at short intervals in order to deepen
the first impression before it has faded away.^-

11 Cf. Hamilton, Metaph. ii. pp. 225 — 227.

^2 St. Thomas' rules for the cultivation of memory are a practical
embodiment of the Laws of Suggestion and admirably adapted to the
development of judicious memory. They are thus well summarized
in B. Boedder's Psych. Rat. § 249: — I. {Similarity). Similitudinibus
convenientibus minus consuetis res abstractas tibi declara. II. {Conti-

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 201

Hisk)rical Sketch. — The phrase, Association of Ideas, has
played such an important part in the history of Enghsh
Philosophy that it appears to us advisable to make a few
additional remarks on the subject. The reality of association
as a principle governing the faculty of recollection is undeni-
able, and has been recognized by philosophers from the time
of Aristotle. In the light, however, of a hypothesis put
forward to account for certain peculiar intellectual states, it
seems to have been first advocated in this country by Hobbes,
and later on with far greater ingenuity by Hume. It is in this
second sense that Associationism has become the central
tenet of the English school of thinkers which has thence
received its title.^^

Mental Association, as the universal condition of memory,
was distinctly expounded and reduced to the three general
laws of similarity, contrast, and propinquity in time, space, or
some extrinsic relation, by Aristotle. In a very erudite
article,!* Hamilton vindicates for the Greek philosopher the
honour of having first discovered and formulated these laws.
We can only afford to cite a few sentences freely translated
by Hamilton, but the whole chapter of the De Memoria et
Reminiscentia dealing with the subject is well worthy of study.
"Reminiscence," says Aristotle, "takes place in virtue ot
that constitution of our mind, whereby each mental movement
(modification) is determined to arise as the sequel of a certain
other. . . . When, therefore, we accomplish an act of remi-
niscence, we pass through a certain series of precursive
movements, until we arrive at a movement on which the one
we are in quest of is habitually consequent. Hence, too, it s
that we hunt through the mental train excogitating what we
seek from (its concomitant in) the present or some other {time),
and from its similar or contrary or coadjacent. Through this
process reminiscence is effected, for the movements {i.e.,
mental modifications) are in these cases sometimes the same,
sometimes at the same time, sometimes parts of the same whole,
so that (starting thus) the subsequent movement is already
more than half accomplished." ^^

St. Thomas, in his Commentaries, developes the doctrine of
Aristotle in a manner which exhibits close study of the nature
of mental association. The ultimate cause of remembrance,

gtiity). Cum ordine dispone quae memoria tenere cupis. III. {Attention).
Sollicite et nun affectu addisce, qua? cupis rememorari. IV. (Repetition).
Quae rememorari tua multum interest ea frequenter meditare. {Sum.
2a 2ae, q. 49. a. i. ad 2.)

^3 On this distinction, cf. " Mental Association," by Croom
Robertson, En eye. Brit.

1" On Reid, note D**. i" On Reid, pp. 899, 900.

202 SENSUOUS LIFE.

he repeats, lies in the native tendency of the mind to
reproduce representations in the order of the original impres-
sions.^*' He then passes on to amphfy Aristotle's treatment
of the mode of reminiscence, and to expound more fully the
general laws governing reproduction. The process of recollec-
tion may advance, he observes, along a time series of events,
from the recent to the most distant, and vice versa ; or starting
from a known object it may be guided by any of the three
indicated relations. At times remembrance is awakened by
force of similarity, as when thinking of Socrates we are
reminded of Plato, who resembled him in wisdom. At other
times the bond of connexion is contrariety, as when the
thought of Hector recalls that of his opponent Achilles.
Finally, the third principle of suggestion is vicinity in space,
or time, or some other form of propinquity. After illustrating
by examples these three general laws, he goes on to indicate
in a much clearer manner than Aristotle their further analysis
and reduction : In all three forms of suggestion the ultimate
ground of reminiscence lies in the connexion of the previous
"movements" of the soul. Association by similarity is due
to identity in mental modification subsisting between the
similar experiences. Contrast is based upon the simultaneity
of the two terms in apprehension. Local propinquity and
other modes of contiguity are merely cases of partial similarity;
impressions produced by adjacent objects overlap, and the
common part in the revived state reproduces its ancient
collateral features.^'' We have thus co-identity in nature and

^^ " Causa autem reminiscendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur
in anima ex prima impressione ejus, quod primo apprehendimus . . .
reminiscentias contingunt per hoc quod unus motus natus est post
alium nobis occurrere." [Ibid.)

^■^ " Hoc autem primum, a quo reminiscens suam inquisitionem
incipit, quandoque quidem est tempus aliquod notum, quandoque res
aliqiia nota. (i) Secundum tempus quidem incipit quandoque a nunc,
id est a prcesenti tempore, procedendo in prseteritum, cujus quaerit,
memoriam. . . . Quandoque vero incipit ab aliquo alio tempore . . .
et procedit descendendo. ... (2) Similiter etiam quandoque remi-
niscitur aliquis incipiens ab aliqua re cujus memoratur, a qua
procedit ad aliam, triplici ratione : {a) Quandoque quidem ratione
similitudinis : sicut quando aliquid aliquis memoratur de Socrate, et
per hoc occurit ei Plato, qui est similis ei in sapientia. {h) Quan-
doque vero ratione contrarietatis; sicut si aliquis memoretur Hectoris, et
per hoc occurrit ei Achilles, [c) Quandoque vero ratione propinquitatis
cujuscunque : sicut cum aliquis est memor patris, ei per hoc occurrit
ei filius. Et eadem ratio est de quacunque alia propinqiiitate, vet
societatis, vel loci, vel temporis ; et propter hoc fit reminiscentia, q^da
motus horiim se invicem conscquuntitr. [a) Quorundam enim prae-
missorum motus sunt idem, sicut prsecipue similium ; {d) quorundam

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 203

in time, or what Hamilton calls the laws of direct and of
indirect remembrance, laid down by St, Thomas as the two
general principles of association. Accordingly, notwith-
standing the contempt which writers of the Associationist
school have invariably exhibited towards the schoolmen, we
find in these terse remarks of St, Thomas, now over six
hundred years old, a statement and analysis of the Laws of
Association virtually as complete and exhaustive as that given
by any psychologist from Hobbes to Mr. Herbert Spencer.

Of the later scholastics, Vives goes most fully into the
treatment of this subject, and it is scarcely too much to say
that there is no form of association viewed as a condition of
memory which he has not expounded and illustrated,^^

The chief interest, however, in the history of the doctrine
of mental association centres in modern psychology ; and it
is there that we find association advocated not only as a
general condition of reproductive memory, but also as a
philosophic principle adequate to explain the constitution of
numerous important mental states. Locke, in the Essay, in
1685, contributed the phrase Association of Ideas, as the title
of a chapter dealing with peculiarities of character, but did
little more on the subject. Hobbes had previously made
occasional observations on the power of association, but it is
clear from the terms and phrases which he employs, that, in
spite of his vigorously expressed contempt for the schoolmen,
he silently borrowed from them on this topic.

In this country, nevertheless, it was not till Berkeley's
writings appeared (1709 — 13), and still more decidedly in
Hume's Essay on Human Nature (1728), that mental association
was insisted on as a virtually omnipotent principle in the
genesis of knowledge. But on the Continent, already in the
middle of the seventeenth century, Pascal, and after him
Malebranche, had indicated the extensive influence of mental
association ; and even Condillac was as early as Hartley, who

autem simid, scilicet contrarioriim, quia cognito uno contrariorum
simul cognoscitur aliud ; {c) quandoque vero quidam motus habent
partem aliorum, sicut contingit in quibuscunque propinquis, quia in
unoquoque propinquorum consideratur aliquid quod pertinet ad
alterum, et ideo, illud residuum, quod deest apprehensioni, cum sit
parvum, consequitur motum prioris, ut apprehenso prime consequenter
occurrat apprehensioni secundum." (St. Thomas, De Mem. 1. v.)

^^ Cf. Vives, De Anima, Lib. II. c. De Mem. et Rem. We have
not space to quote, but the reader will find a number of passages
cited from him in Hamilton's Notes on Keid, pp. 892, 893, 896, 898,
902, qo8. A very little study even of these extracts will show how
familiar to scholastic philosophers were many of the supposed
discoveries of Hobbes, Hume, and later associationalist writers.

104 SENSUOUS LITE.

is the recognized founder of the Associationahst school in this
country. In his Observations on Man (1748), in connexion with
a theory of neural vibrations, Hartley expounded a system
of mechanical association, in which imagination, memory,
judgment, reasoning, emotions, and passions, are all reduced
to associations of sensations. Later on in the century,
Associationism was advocated by Tucker in the science of
Ethics, and by Alison in the sphere of /Esthetics. Approval
and remorse, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, were all
analyzed into pleasant and painful sensations associated in
experience with certain actions and objects.

At the beginning of the present century James Mill, in
h.\s, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829), re-
expounded the doctrines of Hartley and Hume, and may be
styled the second founder of the school. Sensations, and
ideas, which are merely faint reverberations of defunct sensa-
tions, worked up in various ways by force of association, and
especially by that form of suggestion included under the laiv
of indissoluble association, account for the sum-total of our
mental possessions. Sensations or ideas, repeatedly recurring
together or in close succession, and never apart, tend to
combine in such an indissoluble or inseparable manner that one
necessarily or irresistibly suggests the other.^'^ By a species

^^ The terms indissoluble and inseparable are defective even as
expressions of the associationist view. It is not maintained that the
associated states are absolutely inseparable, since a reversal of
previous experience is always possible. The lai;i of irresistible
suggestion, advocated as a better title by Mr. Murray, would be a
less objectionable phrase to indicate the element of truth contained
in the doctrine. The powerful influence of continuous association
is indisputable, and the acquired perceptions of the senses which we
have discussed in an earlier chapter illustrate its action ; but mere
association is utterly unable to account for the unity of the mind,
or for the necessity of mathematical or metaphysical truths. The
phrase, mental chemistry, is also inappropriate and misleading. The
chief forms of mental action to which this name has been applied
are : (a) The asserted subjective creation of an imaginary material
world by the agglutination, solidification, and externalization of
sensations and ideas ; {b) the production of the alleged illusory
necessity pertaining to certain judgments, e.g., mathematical axioms.

(a) Now, subjective feelings do not solidify or crystallize into a
simulated material object. The true process, as we have shown in
chapter vii., is one of growth in the perfection of our knowledge of
real things. Successive sensations reveal new qualities of the object,
and gradually elaborate cognition. The object, vaguely and obscurely
apprehended in the primitive tactual or visual sensation, receives
more complete determination by each subsequent impression.

(b) That necessary judgments cannot be a result of association will
be shown in a future chapter.

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 205

of *' mental chemistry" the contiguous states fuse or combine,
so as to generate products utterly unlike the constituent
elements. The visual appearances of objects come thus to
suggest irresistibly their distance, and we imagine we see an
object to be hard, soft, hot, cold, rough, or smooth. By this
means are created such universal illusions, as the necessity
of mathematical judgments, the unity of the mind, and the
externality and permanence of a material world.

John Stuart Mill and Dr. Bain develope the same principles,
and enrich their treatment with numerous ingenious illus-
trations. The effect of hostile criticism from various stand-
points has been to modify very considerably the treatment
of Psychology by the more recent representatives of associa-
tionism. Dr. Bain's chief contribution to the resources of
the school was the allotment to the mind of a reservoir of
spontaneous activity continually fed by the accumulation
of superfluous muscular energy. By judicious management
of this new fund, many deficits in the sensist theory of both
the cognitive and volitional departments of mental life could,
it was believed, be made good.

In still greater contrast to the views of James Mill and the
earlier writers of the school, is the exposition of the Associ-
ationist system offered by Mr. Sully in his Outlines of Psycho-
logy. (Cf. cc. ix. X.) The old doctrine of a purely pa.ssive mind,
wherein sensations through a process of agglutination coalesce
into all kinds of intellectual products, is virtually aban cned,
and instead we have ascribed to the mind active powers of
attention, comparison, and judgment. This last act, too, is
not, as with Mr. Bain, the " fact of similarity or dissimi-
larity" — the capability of experiencing like or unlike feelings
— but the intellectual faculty of cognizing this relation of
likeness or unlikeness. These considerable improvements,
which bring the sensist theory of mental life more into
harmony with the results of actual observation, and help to
obviate some of the most telling objections urged against the
unreformed doctrine, are, on the other hand, very dearly
purchased from a logical point of view. It is difficult to see
how the fundamental article of the Sensist school — the tenet
that the mind is nothing more than a cluster or series of
feelings — can be harmonized with the imported doctrine,
which attributes to this "mind" the active power of dis-
criminating, combining, and organizing these states. The
truth is, the best part of Mr. Sully's description of mental
operations belongs to an alien conception of the mind, and
is not easy to reconcile with his general position as a sensist
philosopher. The elder Mill, Condillac, and the other earlier
advocates of Sensism, possessed at least the merit of under-

2o6 SENSUOUS LIFE.

standing and frankly attempting to face the real problem for
their school. Postulating only .those assumptions which were
legitimate to them, they sought to explain how, out of sense
impressions passively received from without, our illusory
belief in a permanent human mind, as well as in a material
world, could be produced. The result was, as is virtually
admitted by their descendants, a miserable caricature of the
observed facts. The modern representative of the school,
while accepting their fundamental doctrine that the mind is
nothing but an aggregate or series of feelings externally
awakened, nevertheless ascribes to this mind inherent activity.
Such a procedure, however, as was felt, I believe, by
the earlier associationists, is incompatible with the essential
principles of their system.

Obliviscence. — From the laws of memory the general
conditions of forgetfulness can be easily deduced. The
converse of the primary laws of suggestion may be formulated
in the statement that events unconnected by either similarity or
contiguity with present mental states usually lie beyond the sphere
of recall. The correlative of the secondary law is expressed
in the proposition that the tendency of an experience to lapse out
of memory is in proportion to the feebleness of the original impres-
sion and the infrequency of its repetition. The third law of
obliviscence enunciates the general fact, that a mental impres-
sion becomes obliterated in proportion to the length of time, and the
number and vivacity of the other mental states which have inter-
vened since its last occurrence or reproduction.

The phrase, Law of Obliviscence, is also employed by
J. S. Mill to describe an important element in the law of
" inseparable" association, viz., the general fact that "when
a number of ideas suggest one another by association with
such certainty and rapidity as to coalesce together in a group
all the members of the group which remain long without
being attended to have a tendency to drop out of conscious-
ness."^^ The evanescence of the separate letters and words
of a printed page leaving us in possession only of its general
purport is the favourite illustration. The phenomenon is
merely an instance of the law of inattention. The amount
of mental energy, and consequently the depth of the impres-
sion, devoted to the individual units is reduced to a minimum,
as the whole force of our thought is concentrated on the
meaning of the entire paragraph.

Readings. — On Memory, of St. Thomas, Comm. in Arist. De Mem.
et Reminisc: also Sum. i. q. 79. a. 6 and 7 ; Suarez, De Anima, Lib. IV.
c. 10; Hamilton, Metaphysics, Lect. xxx. xxxi. ; Carpenter, Mental

^^ Exam. c. xiv. p. 259.

MENTAL ASSOCIATION. 207

Physiology, c. x. On the Physiology of Memory, cf. Carpenter, op. cit.
pp. 436—448 ; Ladd, op. cit. Ft. II. c. 10, §§ 15 — 21 ; Farges, Le
Cerveau et VAme, pp. 322—328, Some good remarks on the
Materialist theory are to be found in Professor Calderwood's
Relations of Mind and Brain, pp. 272 — 84. On Mental Association,
cf. Hamilton, On Reid, notes D**, D***. On the Validity of
Memory, J. Rickaby, First Principles, Pt. II. c. vi. On Memory
and Empiricism, cf. Ward, Philosophy of Theism, pp. xiv. — xvii. and
64 — 67. For a collection of curious anecdotes illustrating various
aspects of those faculties, see Abercrombie On the Intellectual Powers,
Pt. III. sect. I.

CHAPTER X.

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT,

Sensuous Appetency.— In our classification of
mental activities we have marked off as standing in
strongest opposition to the cognitive operations of
the mind the class of states embracing appetites,
desires, impulses, volitions, emotions, and the like.
There is no accepted English term which accurately
expresses what is common to them all. The desig-
nation active powers, employed by Reid and Stewart,
ought obviously to include the intellect. Orectic
faculty — the literal transcription of the Aristotelian
term — is too unfamiliar. Hamilton gave currency
to the epithet conativCf which emphasizes the idea
of effort prominent in some of these acts ; whilst
others prefer the title appetitive faculty. These two
last names seem to us on the whole exposed to
fewest objections ; however, it should be borne in
mind that the phenomena of appetency include not
only states of yearning for absent pleasures, but also
the enjoyment of gratifications attained.

Appetite. — The term appetite was used in a very wide
sense by mediaeval writers to denote all forms of internal
inclination, comprehending alike the natural tendencies or
affinities {appetiius iiaitiratis) of plants and inorganic sub-
stances, which impel them towards what is suitable to their
nature, and the feelings of conscious attraction (appetiius
elicitus) in sentient and rational beings. The formal object

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT. 209

of the appetitive faculty in this broad signification is the good.
Under the good is comprised, not merely the pleasant, but
everything in any fashion convenient to the nature of the
being thus attracted. Continued existence, fehcity, develop-
ment, and perfection, together with whatever is apparently
conducive to these ends, are all in so far good, and conse-
quently a possible object of appetency ; whilst whatever is
repugnant to them is a mode of evil, and therefore a ground
for aversion or the negative activity of the same faculty.

Of conscious appetite the schoolmen recognized two kinds
as essentially distinct — rational and sensitive. The former
has its source in intellectual, the latter in sensuous, appre-
hension. The two faculties, however, do not act in isolation;
desires and impulses in the main sensuous often embody
intellectual elements, and we therefore deem it best to
postpone the chief portion of our treatment of appetency to
Part II. of the present book.

The scholastics also divided couative states into appetiius
cvncupiscibiles and appctitiis ivascibiles. The appetitive side of
the soul was investigated by mediaeval writers mainly from
the standpoint of Ethics or Moral Theology. The modern
branch of study known as ^Esthetics, the analysis of the
mental states aroused by the contemplation of the beautiful
and the sublime, and the dissection of our emotions, which
take up so much room in psychological treatises of the present
day, found little or no space in their speculations.

Modern writers commonly confine the term appetite to
certain organic cravings. These arise from the physical
condition of the body ; they are mainly of a periodically
recurrent character, and they are essential to the preser-
vation of the individual or the species. The chief forms
usually enumerated are those of hunger, thirst, sleep, exercise,
and sex. All these activities are of the lower order of mental
life, and have their source in sensation. Thus hunger springs
from the uneasy feelings of the alimentary canal arising from
privation of the nutriment on which its appropriate functions
are exercised. The craving for sleep or physical activity is
similarly awakened by fatigue or the consciousness of an
accumulation of surplus energy. Besides these peculiarly
organic appetites there are tendencies in all sentient beings
towards objects and actions in harmony with their nature or
some part of it. The appropriate satisfaction of such incli-
nations commonly awakens pleasure, whilst excess or defect
causes pain, and thus brings into play two great protective
agencies which guard the life of the individual and the race.
The gregarious instinct, maternal affection, feelings of anger,
jealousy, and fear, may also belong to the purely sensuous

210 SENSUOUS LIFE.

order of conscious life provided they contain no element of
reflective activity, and it is in this form they are exhibited
by lower animals.

Movement. — Appetency expresses itself in
motion. The tree pushes out its roots and opens
its leaves in search of nutriment. The animal,
stirred up by feeling, creeps, walks, runs, swims, or
flies in pursuit of its food. And man, too, is con-
stantly moving one or other of his limbs, or organs,
to gratify some need or desire. In later life, the
instant a volition is exerted, the appropriate move-
ment or chain of movements necessary for its
satisfaction follows with precision. Yet this has not
been always so. We know that our skill in hand-
writing, cricket, or skating, is the outcome of many
unsuccessful efforts ; and we have only to watch a
child of eighteen months toddling from one chair to
another to realize that even our most natural move-
ments have been very gradually acquired.

Voluntary movement analyzed. — If we analyze
any complex deliberate action of mature life, such as
tying our shoe-lace, putting a book on a shelf, or trying
to hit a ball at tennis or at cricket, we shall discover
that several distinct elements are involved. First, a
visual image of the contemplated act, its extent,
direction, and velocity, is formed. Accompanying this,
especially if the operation be unusual, there is a motor
representation, a faint imaginary rehearsal of the
movement, in which there is an estimate taken of the
quantity and quality of muscular effort to be employed.
Finally there is, at least in volitional acts, the Jiaf, or
act of the will, that discharges the motor energy into the
selected channels causing the imagined action to be
realized. The Will, of course, does not consciously pick
out the particular muscles to be exerted. It is only late

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT. 21 r

I . . . _

in life that the mind learns the existence of such
muscles. But past experience has revealed to us
different kinds of musculav feelings, and the will selects
which of these shall be re-exerted. The entire con-
sciousness arising out of volitional effort and muscular
strain has been called the feeling of innervation, and there
is much dispute as to its nature. Whatever be its
physiological accompaniments and the ingredients of
which it is composed, it is by controlling and varying
this innervation under the guidance of incoming sensa-
tions muscular, tactual, and visual, that the direction,
range, and rapidity of the movement is determined.
But how is this intelligent control of motor energy
evolved ? How does the infant come to be able to
select, not the right muscles, of which it may never know
anything, but the right muscular feelings to be stirred up
in order to accomplish a particular complex operation ?
This is the question of the development of the poi^^er of
locomotion. In order to answer it we must distinguish
several kinds of movements.

Automatic movements. — In the first place we
find that all living animal organisms perform certain
vital actions, independently of stimulation from without.
I The pulsations of the heart and the circulation of the
^ blood are perhaps the best illustrations of this class of
movements. They are called automatic. They are the
unconscious outcome of the living mechanism.

Reflex action. — There is another class of actions
which differ from the former in that they are occasioned
by peripheral stimulation. These are movements in
response to sensory impressions without the inter-
vention of any conscious effort — the involuntary reflexion
of an afferent impulse back along an efferent nerve,
e.g., winking, sneezing, swallowing. (See p. 46.) Such
movements are styled reflex ; but they often gradually
fade into the other groups, especially in acquired habits.
Original reflex actions are unlearned and involuntary,
though they may sometimes become subject to the will,
as in the act of coughing.

Impulsive action. — Yet another class of move-
ments are apparently common to man with all the

212 SENSUOUS LIFE.

lower animals from birth. They differ from automatic
movements in their irregularit}^, and from reflex action
in seeming to be occasioned not by external stimulation,
but by internal /^(f/mo'5. They are impulsive actions, and
chiefly out of these voluntary movements are developed.

Origin of voluntary movement. — How then are the first
impulsive acts of the infant converted into the freely directed
complex operations of later life ? Broadly speaking, two
theories prevail among modern psychologists. Primitive
impulsive action is of two kinds — random and instinctive. One
theory derives all voluntary action from the former, the other
insists on the important part played by the latter combined
with reflex movements.

Theory of random action. — Dr. Bain insists upon the exist-
ence of a fund of spontaneity in the infant organism. There
are exhibited, he urges, in children and young animals
a quantity of movements of an aimless character. Apart
from external stimulation and reflex action, when fresh and
healthy the young animal exerts its limbs, and frisks and
gambols in a purposeless manner. The living engine, in fact,
generates a surplus of motor power, which tends to relieve
itself in action of any kind. This is the source of the play-
impulse. Under the so-called " Law of Self-conservation,"
formulated in the statement that pleasure is accompanied with
heightened energy, and pain untJi lowered energy, this original
haphazard action assumes definite lines. Amongst the for-
tuitous movements some result in a pleasant experience, and
in consequence of the heightened energy tend to sustain
themselves, whilst painful actions, by the consequent lowering
of activity, become suppressed, " as when an animal moving
up to a fire encounters the scalding heat with its depressing
(sic) influence, and therefore has its locomotion suspended."^:
By repetition the lucky movements become associated with '
the pleasure attained, and after a time the mere idea of this
pleasure is able by force of this association to excite the
appropriate action to obtain it. When this stage is reached
we have, according to Dr. Bsiin, free voluntary control.

Objections to the theory. — Opponents object : (i) That both
the statement and application by Bain of the alleged Law are
untenable. Whilst pleasure commonly awakens desire for a
renewal or continuance of an act, it often tones down general
vitality. Pains, on the other hand, augment activity. Punish-
ment is a universally recognized means of stirring up energy ;'

^ Mental Science, p. 80.

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT. 213

whilst intense pleasures are frequently exhausting. (2) Even
granting the Law, as expounded by Dr. Bain, the fortuitous
pleasant and painful experiences arising out of random action
would be far too few to account for the rapidity of acquisition,
and for the complex character of many of the acts of ver^
early life both in animals and children. (3) Further, instinct, it
is urged, is proved to be as primordial a phenomenon as
random action, and if admitted to be a vera causa of complex
movements in the lower animals, it is unscientific to reject it
as an explanation of similar acts in man. (4) To us the most
serious error is the identification of voluntary — i.e., freely
willed movement with impulsive action merely moulded into
a definite shape by the strongest pleasure. Complex move-
ments of a well-trained dog are in this view the type of
voluntary action.^

Theory of instinctive action.— The opposite school insist
much on reflex action, and, since evolution and the doctrine of
heredity have become popular, still more on instinct as contri-
buting the chief materials towards the voluntary movements
of later Ufe. Amongst the impulsive actions both of the lower
animals and of the human infant are to be found, they urge,
a multitude of movements which exhibit a striking uniformity
or regularity throughout the species. They involve greater
complexity than in the case of merely reflex action. They
manifest an unconsciously purposive character. Finally, they
are " unlearned,'' or at least so rapidly acquired when the
organism is sufficiently mature as to be justly considered
innate habits. These constitute instinctive actions properly so
called. Thus ducklings, on leaving the nest, take to the
water and swim ; young swallows fly, and chickens, just out of
the shell, peck at insects with perfect accuracy. Similarly,
young pigs just born trot about, and calves and lambs
scramble to their legs after a few failures, and find their
mother's udder.^ To the human infant potentially endowed
with reason, and designed to be reared and instructed by
intelligent parents, fewer definite instincts are allotted by
nature than to the young animal, and nearly all these which
he receives need a longer time to develop. Still, recently more
exact and scientific observation of children has, it is main-
tained, established a sufficient quantity of instinctive action
to account for the growth of voluntary complex movement.

The most complex operation in the power of the infant
possessed at birth is the act of sucking. In addition to this

2 See Martineau, A Study of Religion, Vol. II. pp. 206-224;
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. II. c. v. § 4.

3 For a fuller treatment of this subject see the section on
Instinct in the supplementary chapter on Comparative Psychology.

£14 3EMSU0US LIFE.

there are enumerated as instinctive movements, though some
of them require from three to twelve months to manifest
themselves, the actions of grasping and pointing at objects,
of carrying objects to the mouth, of biting and chewing, of
crying and smiling, of turning the head aside with a frown, of
holding the head erect, of sitting up, of standing, of creeping,
and of walking. For many of these the appropriate muscles
and nerve-centres need time to mature, but when this period
has arrived, it is maintained, that the impulse to creep,
stand, or walk, shows itself with striking suddenness, and the
new aptitude is often perfected with a rapidity quite incom-
patible with the associationist theory of fortuitous successes.
Imitation. — The instinct to utter sounds is present from
the beginning, but the impulse to imitate sounds, as well as
other actions, appears later, and often quite abruptly. The
instinct of imitation, which exhibits itself in smiling, frowning,
laughing, and other gestures, in the dramatic impulse, and
the make-believe games of childhood, in the force of fashion,
and in the contagion of enthusiasm and panic, is one of the
greatest educative forces in human life. These various forms
of instinctive movement, it is argued, account sufficiently for
man's acquisition of a complete command over his power of
movement without appealing to the hypothesis of random
action.*

Growth of control of movement. Probable
theory. — It seems to us that the arguments adduced
in support of the latter view prove the insufficienc}' of
the " random" theor}^ The fact that all men walk upright.
is the outcome not of fortuitous action in all directions,
but of an instinctive impulse hereditary in the human
race. Yet such evidence does not exclude the agencies
of pleasure and pain, nor the effect of casual or unde-
signed experience in developing our powers to perform
definite movements, as is indeed fully admitted by the
leading advocates of Instinct. Voluntary action is
freely dcsived action. But desire implies a striving
towards a hno-wn good, towards 2i preconceived end. Volun-
tary movement therefore pre-supposes a representation
of the movement, or of its separate parts, not merely in
terms of visual, but of motor sensation. In order to

* See James, Vol. II. pp. 403, ff. ; Bain, Emotions and Will, II.
c. i. ; Preyer, The Mind of the Child, Part I. cc. xi. xii.; Baldwin,
Emotions and Will, c. xiii. ; Hoffding, pp. 30S — 312.

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT. 215

pronounce a word, or to swim, it is not enough to be
able to imagine the sound of the word, or the picture of
a man swimming, we must be acquainted with the
muscular feelings involved in such actions, and these
must necessarily, on their first occurrence, have been
not anticipated.

The child, subject to obscure feelings and cravings,
seeks relief in movements, some of a purely haphazard,
others of a vaguely purposive, or instinctive character.
Part of these actions turn out pleasant, whether acci-
dentally or because they satisfy an instinct, matters
not ; part of them result in pain. Whatever be the true
expression of Dr. Bain's Laii^ of self -conservation, and
whatever be the real effect of pleasure and pain on
general vitality, there is indisputably a tendency in the
living organism to prolong and repeat movements
which afford satisfaction, and to check those which
prove disagreeable. The infant rejoices to reiterate the
same sound, and the same movement of its arm or leg
again and again. With each successive repetition the
force of association between the muscular feeling and
the pleasant result increases, and each tends more and
more to suggest the other.^ However, the motor
feeling is less easily pictured by the imagination, and
much less interesting in itself than the agreeable result.
Accordingly its force in consciousness diminishes, and
after a time the wish for the effect results in the per-

^ As suggestion acts in the oi-der of the original experience, it
has been objected that an agreeable effect caitnot suggest the action
which caused it. But the original tendency to reiteration solves the
difficulty. Thus, suppose an impulse {a) finds vent in a motor'
feeling [b) which causes an agreeable experience [c) auditory-
tactual, gustatory, or visual. If the process is repeated in succes
sion a few times (as when an infant cries la, la, la) we have {a) [b) [c)
{a) (b) {c), Sec, in which, at every repetition, the agreeable effect (c),
precedes (a), and so tends in the future to suggest it. That is, the
representation of the pleasant effect will excite the impulse which
will in turn awaken the motor feeling, and so on, until a new presen-
tation intervenes, and inhibits the process. The tendency to
repetition may be due physiologically to the facility of adhering to
a nervous path once opened, or to the lively sensibility and unstable
condition of nerve-centres recently excited. Cf. Martineau, Vol. II.
pp. 208, 2og ; and James, Vol. 11. pp. 582 — 592.

2iC SENSUOUS LIFE.

formance of the action without any advertence to the
muscular feelings.

The earliest motor exertions will, of course, be very
simple, and the connexion between action and the
pleasing effect immediate. The child touches a smooth
object, and finds the experience agreeable ; or he utters
a cry, and rejoices in the discovery of his power of
noise. Later on his vague tentative efforts will result
in the combination of t\\o or more actions, and,
encouraged by his successes, he will gradually come to
perform more and more complex c perations, to conceive
more distant ends, and to be incited by the anticipation
of more remote results. As Professor Dewey remarks :
" The infant begins with a very simple and immediate
idea. His first efforts are limited to movements con-
taining very few elements, and the end of which is
directly present. The consciousness of an end which is
remote, and which can be reached only by the systematic
regulation of a large number of acts, cannot be formed
until the combination of motor impulses has realized
some such end."*'

Voluntary Action. — Freedom, however, means more
than complexity. So long as we merely have feeling
tending to issue into action, even though that action be
complex and towards a pre- conceived object, we have
not voluntary action strictly so called.*' Under the
influence of such unreflecting desires the somnambulist,
and in simpler cases the lower animals, perform elaborate
operations which are nevertheless involuniavy, not free.
In the earlier years of childhood all action is, of this
kind, completely determined by feelings and tempera-
ment. But later on, as experience extends and intellect
IS developed, conflicting motives and rival courses of
possible action emerge into consciousness. The child
finds himself able to inhibit particular impulses. The
power of reflexion awakens within him, and he becomes
aware that he can cJioose or decide which of the impulsive
tendencies he will approve, which of the competing
desires within him he will adopt and identify with

^ Psychologv, 3rd Edit. p. 381.
' That is in the modern sense — deliberate or free action.

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT, 217

himself.^ When this stage is reached, we have
voliintavy action in the true sense. But it should not be
forgotten that in such voluntary action the physical
movement is really carried out by the mechanism of
the organism working substantially in the same manner
as in purely impulsiva or automatic action, save in so
far as the discharge of physical energy is initiated or
modified by volition. Bodily movement is, in the
language of the schoolmen, actus imperatus, not acttts
elicitus — action commanded or sanctioned^ but not actually
exerted by the will.

A kindred treatment of this subject is thus sum-
marized by Professor Ladd : " The voluntary movements
of the body presuppose the impulsive, and yet they reach
far back into the obscurity of the earlier development
of consciousness. Strictly speaking, they imply the
presence in consciousness of two or more different or
conflicting ideas of mction, one of which rather than
the others is realized as a sequence of an act of
conscious choice. They imply then a considerable
development of the activities of ideation and volition.
Moreover, those movements, which are ordinarily called
voluntary, are really so only with respect to certain of
their elements ; they also contain elements which must
be classed as reflex, centrally coordinated, and impul-
sive. The term ' voluntary ' fitly lays the emphasis
upon the conscious act of choice ; and this in turn
implies ideas of various possible forms of bodily motion
gained by previous experience with the correlated states
of conscious feeling and conditions of the body as giving
rise to or modifying these states." ^

We may therefore classify movements according to
their origin, their voluntariness, and their conscious
or unconscious character thus :

** Lotze accurately observes: "An action is 'voluntary' in
case the interior initial state (impulse) from which a motion would
originate as a result does not merely take place, but is approbated, or
adopted, or endorsed, by the will. Every action is ' involuntary '
which mechanically considered issues from the same initial point,
and wholly in the same manner, but without having experienced
such approbation.''' {Outlines of Psychology , p. 87.)

^ Elements of Physiological Psychology, p. 528.

2is SENSUOUS LIFE.

W
>

/ (a) Automatic (unconscious and uncontrollable)

, 11 1 1 \ r Unconscious | . , ,

(b) Reflex (uncontrollable) -' Coj^scious Unvoluutayy.

1 (c) Impulsive or Instinctive j Uncontrollable I

(conscious) I Controllable ^ Voluntary.

((/) Volitional (conscious and controllable) J

Secondary Automatic action or Acquired Reflexes.— Volun-
tary actions, at first painfully learned, may now through
frequent repetition cease to require any conscious effort for
their performance, or at least for their continuation. They
thus become assimilated to .reflex or automatic action. The
child learnmg to play the piano has at first to make a
separate volitional effort to apprehend each note and to press
each key. Next, each movement suggests its successor
without any separate effort. Later on, even the intervening
sensory impressions drop out of consciousness; and the
process has passed into the condition of reflex action. Nay,
he may come to be able to play at sight a piece in which his
fingers execute extremely rapid combinations of movements
in response to the visual impressions of the notes, whilst his
attention is distracted by other thoughts. The^ tendency of
repetition to convert volitional into reflex action is one of the
most important agencies in the economy of our nature. The
whole effect of education depends upon it, and our entire
Hfe is an illustration of it. In walking, speaking, reading,
writing, in the various accomplishments, games, handicrafts,
in by far the greater part of the operations of our daily life,
from making our toilet in the morning to undressing at night,
we are ever performing inadvertently complex operations,
involving the deUcate coordination of many muscles, which
at first were accomplished with difficulty and perhaps after
many unsuccessful efforts. From the similarity of these
mechanical modes of action to unconscious vital movements
and sensori-motor actions they have been styled secondarily
automatic, and also acquired reflex actions.

Ideo-motor action.— Not only can movement be initiated
by vohtional effort, by sensory impressions and by associated
movements ; it can also be excited by the mere idea of the
action itself. Though advocated as a modern discovery, this
truth was not unfamiliar to the schoolmen.^^ We have seen
that in the deliberate performance of a movement we first
form a representation of that movement. Now it is a matter
of common experience that in proportion as the image—

?« See Pere Coconnier, L'Hypnotismc Franc, p. 346.

SENSUOUS APPETITE AND MOVEMENT. 219

especially the motor image — becomes more lively, it tends of
its own accord without any effort of will to pass into reality.
Vivid ideas tend to realize themselves. The physiological expla-
nation suggested is that the same nerve-centres which are
engaged in the actual sensation or movement are also the
seat of the representation, but excited in a feebler manner.
The thought of past sea-sickness awakened by the peculiar
smell of the ship's cabin has sometimes realized itself before
the ship has left the harbour. The sight of an object on the
floor moves an absent-minded man to stoop and pick it up.
Most of the movements in reverie, dreaming, somnambulism,
and the hypnotic state, are the outcome of motor ideas.
The overpowering force of the vivid idea of falling down
from a precipice or high building has probably been the
cause of many seemingly deliberate suicides. The temptation
sometimes awakened by express prohibitions and the fasci-
nation exerted by great crimes, and by the horrible, or the
disgusting, is similarly explained by the absorbing force of a
vividly suggested idea.

Expectant attention. — Intense anticipation causes us to
rehearse in imagination the movements as well as the sensa-
tions to which we look forward. Some at least of the
phenomena of "thought-reading" are thus explained. The
"subject" endeavouring to "will" or intently realize the
word or the action unconsciously guides the hand of the
"reader," or in some other way gives external expression to
the idea absorbing his mind. Mono-manias are often due to
the "possession" or "obsession" of the mind by some
" fixed idea " which, arising perhaps out of a morbid con-
dition of the brain, inhibits the corrective influence of other
intellectual acts and suspends volitional control. The patient
is often aware of the folly or the wickedness of the insane
impulse, yet feels unable to extinguish the craving to carry
out the suggestion.

Here, as in the case of sensori-motov action, the facility of
the transition from the mental state to the physical act
increases with repetition ; and in familiar acts the passage
from the idea to its realization is so easy and smooth that
some psychologists have made it a ground for denying that
voluntary or appetitive activity is ultimately distinct from
cognition. It is quite true that the will very frequently
effects its object indirectly by increasing the strength of an
idea through attention until this idea prevails over all other
ideas in the field of consciousness and then realizes itself in
movement. But the striving, the tension in appetency is
different in kind from the activity of cognition ; and the fiat
or veto which consents to or rejects a solicitation is quite

220 SENSUOUS LIFE.

distinct in nature from mere increase or diminution of
attention to the thought as a thought.

The question Jiow an unextended volition can move a
material limb brings us in face of a final inexplicability.
That the soul is endowed with a locomotive faculty is simply
an ultimate fact. Our life-long experience assures us that
mind and body do interact, but How we cannot tell.

Readings.— On Appetite, of. St. Thomas, Sum. i. q. 80; Suarez,
De Anima, Lib. V. cc. 1—4 ; Joseph Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, Pt. I.
c. iv. ; Farges, Le Cerveau et I'Ame, pp. 404 — 411; Dr. Stockl,
Lehrbuch d. Phil. §§ 18—20. On Movement, Farges, op. cit. pp.
233 — 273; Mercier, Psychologie, pp. 26^ — 280; Pesch, Institutiones
Psychologic^, §§ eej—eji ; Dr. Gutberlet, Die Psychologic, Pt. I. c. iii. ;
Ladd, op. cit. pp. 526—531 ; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, pp, 17—
23, 70-80, 100 — 107.

CHAPTER XI.

FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

Feeling. — A large portion of modern works on
Psychology is usually devoted to the treatment of
the phenomena allotted to the Faculty of Feeling.
The words, emotion, passion, affection, sentiment, and
the like, are employed to denote the acts of this
third mental power. We have deemed it on the
whole convenient to retain the term in common
use, though we deny the necessity of assuming
the existence of another ultimate faculty generically
distinct from those of cognition and appetency.

Terms defined. — The word feeling is used in several
meanings: (i) To denote certain kinds of cognitive sensations,
especially those of the faculty of touch. (2) To express the
pleasurable or painful aspect of all species of mental energy.
(3) To signify complex forms of mental excitement of a non-
cognitive character. (4) As equivalent to a particular kind
of rational cognition of an obscure character in which the
mind has vivid certainty without knowledge of the grounds of
this conviction. Emotion is employed as synonymous with
feeling in the second and third meanings, more especially in
the latter. Passion signifies an appetitive or emotional state,
where the excitement reaches an intense degree. Affection
usually denotes emotional states in which the element of
liking or dislike is prominent ; with some writers the term is
confined to acts having persons for their objects. Sentinieiit
signifies an emotion of an abstract or highly developed
character. In ordinary language, especially in the adjectival
form, it is contrasted with reasoned conviction and practical
activity.

222 SENSUOUS LIFE.

In dealing with tliis department of mental life we
believe that our best course will be to give here a short
treatment of feeling understood as the pleasurable or
painful tone of mental activities generally ; and in a
later chapter we shall examine in particular a few of
the more important states usually classed as emotions.

Aristotle's Theory of Feeling. — The subject of
the nature and conditions of pleasure and pain, like so
many other psychological problems, was grasped by
Aristotle, over two thousand years ago, with such
clearness and treated with such fulness that little of
substantial importance has been added by any modern
thinker. The doctrine of Hamilton or Mr. Spencer,
for instance, is merely the old theory in new phrase-
ology. We shall, therefore, adhere closely to the
account of the subject given by the Greek philosopher.

(i) Nature of Pleasure. — In opposition to Plato, who
held that all pleasure is merely a transition, a passage
from pain, and consequently of a negative or relative
character, Aristotle teaches that there are positive or
absolute pleasures. Admitting that the satisfaction of
certain bodily cravings, such as hunger and thirst,
produces agreeable feeling, he argues: "This does not
happen in all pleasures ; for the pleasures of mathe-
matical studies are without (antecedent) pain ; and of
the pleasures of the senses those which come by
smelling are so ; and so are sounds and sights, and
many recollections also, and hopes. By what then
will these be generated ? for there have been no
wants of anything to be supplied."^ Pleasure, in
fact, he repeatedly asserts, is a positive concomitant
or resulting quality of the free and vigorous exercise
of some vital energy. It is the efflorescence, the bloom
of healthy activity. To each faculty, whether sensuous
or intellectual, belongs an appropriate pleasure.
Vision, hearing, and the activities of the other senses,
are all productive of agreeable feeling, but still more so
is intellectual speculation.

(2) Intensity. — The intensity of the pleasure depends

^ EtJiics, Lib. X. c. 3.

FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 223

partly on the state of the faculty or habit which lies at
the root of the activity, partly on the nature of the
object which forms the stimulus. In proportion as the
energy of the faculty is greater, and its object more
fitted to elicit lively response, so is the pleasure the
keener. The most perfect pleasure results in the
greatest delight. Furthermore, pleasure is not merely
an effect of the exertion of the mental pov/er : it reacts
upon the energy from which it springs, stimulates that
energy, and perfects its development. Agreeable
feehng, in fact, is at once the result and the final
complement of vital energies.

Aristotle thus reasons : '' Since every sense energizes
with reference to its object, and that energizes perfectly
which is well disposed with reference to the best of all
the objects which fall under it, . . . this must be the
most perfect and the most pleasant; for pleasure, is
attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act
of intellect and contemplation ; but the most perfect is
the most pleasant, and the most perfect is the energy
of that which is well-disposed with reference to the
best of all the objects that fall under it. Pleasure,
therefore-, perfects the energy. But that there is a
pleasure in every act of the perceptive faculty is
evident ; for we say that sights and sounds are
pleasant ; and it is also evident that this is most so,
when the perceptive faculty is in the most efficient
condition, and energizes on the most suitable object." ^

(3) Duration. — The duration of a pleasure is similarly
determined by the nature of the stimulus and the con-
dition of the faculty. So long as a harmonious relation
subsists between them — so long, in fact, as the faculty
is fresh and vigorous and the action of the stimulus
suitable — the energy will be agreeable. For, there will
then be an easy spontaneous activity in harmony with
the nature of the mental power. But no human faculty
is capable of incessant exertion, and when an energy
becomes relaxed or fatigued, the corresponding pleasure
decreases, and will soon pass into the state of pain.

(4) Variation. — Hence the utility of change. It is

2 Ethics, Lib. X. c. iv.

bENSUOUS LIFE.

the decay of vital force during incessant action which
explains the charm of novelty. Whilst an experience
is new, the efficiency with w'hich our mental powers
are api)lied to it is at a maximum, but as time goes
on vigour diminishes, and the operation becoming
less perfect, the pleasure proportionately declines.
Agreeable feeling is, therefore, the concomitant of the
exercise of our faculties, as long as that exercise is
spontaneous and unimpeded.^

(5) Qitcility. — Pleasures, Aristotle further teaches,
may be held to differ in hind in so far as they are per-
fections of specifically different energies. Intellect and
the several senses are essentially different faculties,
their operations must similarly differ, and consequently
the pleasures which result from and perfect these latter
must also differ in kind. Conflicting pleasures, or
rather the pleasures of conflicting energies, neutralize
each other, and may even result in positive pain. This
follows inevitably from the nature of pleasure. For
when several faculties interfere with each other, their
energies are deteriorated, just as if they were improperly
exerted or acted upon by an unsuitable stimulus. But
when our activities are exhausted and impeded, the
resulting state is necessarily disagreeable. The moral
rank of the feeling is determined by that of the faculty
to which it belongs, superior energies begetting nobler
pleasures.

Nature of Pain. — From this analysis of pleasure we
derive at once a correlative doctrine of pain. The
latter mode of consciousness arises by excess or defect
in the exercise of a facult}', or by imperfection or

2 St Thomas thus paraphrases Aristotle: " Quaehbet operatic
sensus maxime est delectabilis quando et sensus est potentissimus,
id est optime vigens in sua virtute, et quando operatur respectu
talis objecti, id est maxime convenientis. Et quamdiu in tah dis-
cs itione manet et ipsum sensibile et animal habens sensum, tamdiu
manet delectatic. . . . Tamdiu erit delectatio in operatione quamdiu
de una parte objectum quod est sensibile vel intelligibile est in debita
ex positione, et ex alia parte, ipsum operans, quod est discernans
eplpsensum vel speculans per intellectum. . . . Et nullus continue
iredctatur, quia laboret in operatione quam co.isequitur delectatio."
{Eihtcs, Lib. X. lect. 6.)

FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 225

unsuitability in the nature of the object. Excess and
defectxniay refer either to the duration or to the degree
of the excitement. Both states are also dependent on
the natural scope and efficiency of the faculty, its
acquired habits, and its actual condition of health and
energy.^

Laws. — The above results may be enumerated in
the following general statements: (i) Pleasure is an
accompaniment of the spontaneous and healthy activity of our
faculties, and pain is the result of either their restraint or
excessive exercise. (2) Pleasure augments with increasing
vigour in the operation up to a certain normal medium degree of
exertion, and progressively diminishes after that stage is passed :
farther on the pleasure disappears altogether, and beyond this
line pain takes its place.

The reader can easily justify for himself the general appli-
cation of this law by reflecting on various activities, such as
those of physical pursuits, of the senses, of the imagination,
and of intellect. The most striking exception is found in the
case of a few experiences — e.g. disagreeable tastes and smells
— which appear to be unpleasant even in the faintest degree.
This circumstance is ascribed to the fact that some stimuli
have an essentially noxious or corrosive effect on the sense-
organ. The excessive or painful limit is thus virtually
identical with the threshold of consciousness. The number,
however, of such excitants is probably much less than is
commonly supposed. This is shown by the fact, that several
of our worst smelling and tasting substances — certain acids,
for instance — in diluted forms contribute to the production of
very agreeable mixtures.

The laws just stated are supplemented or qualified by
other subsidiary principles : (a) The Law of Change — variaiio
delectat. — Change is agreeable. There is a certain degree of
relativity in most of our pleasures. The hedonic quality of
an activity is increased by contrast with a previous state
of consciousness. Ttie pleasures of existence are augmented
by alternations of rest and exercise. Nature has given a
certain rhythmic constitution to our conscious life and the

^ " Operationes sunt delectabiles, in quantum sunt pyoportionata
et connaturales operanti: cum autem virtus humana sit finita, secun-
dum aliquam mensuram operatio est sibi proportionata ; unde si
excedat illam mensuram jam non erit sibi proportionata, nee delec-
tabilis, sed magis laboriosa et atta^dians." {Sunt. I-II, q. 32. a. i.
ad 3.)

226 SENSUOUS LIFE.

temporary repose of each faculty, or its cessation from one
form of exercise gives fresh zest lor another activity, (b) The
Laiv of Accommodation. — Continuous or frequent exercise dulls
and blunts the faculty. It becomes habituated to its stimulus,
unless prolongation of the stimulation results in inflammation
or some new disorder. The nervous reaction grows feebler
and the feeling of pleasure diminishes. Fortunately sensibility
to pain is also deadened. This is particularly observable
in sensations of taste. With frequent use stronger condiments
and stimulants are required to produce an equal effect.
[c] The Law of Repetition. — Whilst in accordance with the
principle just stated, continuous or frequent exercise tends to
diminish the pleasure of an activity, on the other hand
repetition of a neutral or even painful experience often
endows it with a new pleasure. Sometimes, indeed, the
reiteration of an action originally disagreeable creates a habit
that results in a strong craving for its exercise.

Feeling not a third faculty. — The explanation we
have given of the nature of pleasure and pain, enables
us to see the error of assuming a third faculty radically
distinct from cognition and appetency, in order to
account for the phenomena of feeling in this sense.
Pleasure and pain are not special products of a new
activity. They consist in the harmonious or in-
harmonious, the healthy or unhealthy working of any
and every mental power. We cannot separate the
agreeable or disagreeable character of our various
operations from these operations, and then set it up as
an act of a fresh facult3^ Pleasure and pain are merely
aspects of the fundamental energies of the mind. We
are warranted in postulating a special perfection in the
soul as a ground for tactual or gustatory consciousness,
but we may not gratuitously call into existence addi-
tional faculties to inform us of the varying perfection
of these activities. The pleasure which passes into
pain with increase of stimulation, is but the tone of the
function, not the manifestation of a new power.

Theories of Pleasure and Pain. — The ancient Greek views
on this subject, though often criticized as vague and imperfect,
contain, as we have observed, the main features of all sub-
sequent theories. Among modern writers, Spinoza insists on
the relative side of the phenomena, for him pleasure is
progress — " the transition from a less to a greater perfection."

FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN. 227

Kant inclines still more to the Platonic doctrine. He defines
pleasure as " a feeling of the furtherance or promotion of the
life-process ; " whilst pain is " the feeling of its hindrance."
But as such promotion implies hindrance to be overcome,
pleasure, he holds, always presupposes previous pain.
Schopenhauer and modern pessimists dwell much on this
negative aspect of pleasure. According to them all, agreeable
feeling is merely escape from pain by the satisfaction of some
want.

On the other side, Descartes, followed by Leibnitz, teaches
that pleasure consists in the consciousness of perfection
possessed. Hamilton, adhering more closely to Aristotle,
defines pleasure as " the reflex of the spontaneous and
unimpeded activity of a power of whose energy we are
conscious;" and pain as "the reflex of over-strained or
repressed exertion." Bain formulates his doctrine in the
" Law of Self-Conservation : " Pleasure is the concomitant of an
increase, pain of an abatement of some or all vital functions.
Recent physiological psychologists adopt the Aristotelian
conception of pleasure and pain, but emphasize in their
definitions what they assume to be the underlying organic
process — the integration or disintegration of the neural
elements employed, and the adjustment or maladjustment of
the organ to the stimulus or general environment. Thus
Grant Allen describes pain, as " the subjective concomitant of
destructive action or insufficient nutrition in any sentient
tissue ; " and pleasure, as " the subjective concomitant of
the normal amount of function in any such tissue." Whilst
Herbert Spencer would enlarge the generalization and adapt
it to the evolutionist hypothesis.^ With him pleasure is the
outcome of organic equilibrium, harmonious functioning. It is
the accompaniment of normal medium activity of an organ,
and is, consequently, beneficial. Excessive or defective
exercise, on the other hand, results in pain and so tends to
cause a return to equilibrium. The protective influence of
pleasure and pain is, therefore, he maintains, an agency
of the first importance in the struggle for life.

Criticism. — Whilst fully acknowledging the value of any
light to be gathered from physiology concerning the organic
conditions of pleasure and pain, especially of the sensuous
faculties, the psychologist may yet fairly object that the
account of the phenomena given by Aristotle in terms of con-
sciousness is both more appropriate in this science and more
defensible in itself, than these later physiological theories on

^ Cf. Baldwin, Emotions and Will, c. v. and Spencer, Principles of
Psychology, Vol. I. Part II. c. ix.

228 SENSUOUS LIFE.

the subject. Aristotle's doctrine receives immediate support
and confirmation from introspective observation, whereas
these " scientific " descriptions are still, to say the least, in
great part hypothetical. It is far from being proved that
even sensuous pleasure is invariably accompanied by integra-
tion or nutrition of the nervous mechanism, and that pain
always means physiological waste and injury. A large class
of pleasant stimulants may be injurious to vital functions;
several kinds of agreeable food are not wholesome, or at all
events not so in proportion to their pleasantness. Many
exciting pleasures are not beneficial, and they would seem to
involve disintegration and injury of neural tissue rather than
its reparation ; whilst other experiences and exercises not
immediately pleasurable are found to be wholesome. The
cerebral conditions of the higher rational and aesthetic feelings
are still more obscure. When the generalization is enlarged
in the interests of the theory of evolution, the exceptions
become still more numerous, and the asserted coincidence
between immediate pleasure and ultimate profit in the struggle
for existence can only be maintained by the introduction of
so many qualifications to meet each conflicting instance,
that our confidence in the universality of the alleged law, and
in the deductions derived from it, is seriously diminished.
Still the broad fact observed by Aristotle, and reiterated by
Christian philosophers from the earliest times, that pleasure
in general accompanies energies in harmony with the well-
being of the organism whilst pain results from what is
injurious cannot be gainsaid.

Readings. — For Aristotle's theory of Pleasure and Pain, see his
Ethics, Lib. X. cc. i — 5; St. Thomas, Comment. \\. i — g; Farges,
Le Cerveau, 6-c., pp. 412 — 419 ; and Hamilton, Metaphysics, 'Led. xliii.
The fullest exposition of the scholastic doctrine is given by M. J.
Gardair, Les Passions et la Volontc, pp. 117 — 190. On Feeling, cf.
Jungmann, Das Gemiith, §§ 53 — Co, 83, seq.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Book I.

Empirical or Phenomenal Psychology.
Part II. — Rational Life,

CHAPTER XII.

INTELLECT AND SENSE.

Erroneous Views. — Hitherto we have been treating
mainly, though not exclusively, of the sensuous
faculties of the mind ; we now pass on to the
investigation of its higher activities, and we at once
find ourselves in conflict with a number of philoso-
phical sects, ancient and modern, variously des-
cribed as Sensationists, Associationists, Materialists,
Phenomenists, Positivists, Empiricists, Evolutionists,
who differing among themselves on many points
agree in the primary dogma that all knowledge is
ultimately reducible to sensation. According to
them the mind possesses no faculty of an essentially
supra-sensuous order. All our most abstract ideas,
as well as our most elaborate processes of reasoning,
are but sensations reproduced, aggregated, blended,
and refined in various ways.

230 RATIONAL LIFE.

Terms explained. — These several names emphasize
special characteristics which are, however, all consequences
of the chief doctrine. The word sensationalism^ and its
cognates, mark the attempted anal3'sis of all cognition into
sensation. Materialism points to the fact that on the sensist
hypothesis we can know nothing but matter, and that there
is no ground for supposing the human mind to be anything
more than a function or a phase of an organized material
substance. PJienomenism calls attention to the circumstance
that by sense alone, and consequently according to the
sensational theory of knowledge, we can never know anything
but phenomena — the sensuous appearances of things. This
is the fundamental tenet of Positivism. We must cease from
all aspirations after Metaphysics or knowledge of ultimate
realities and confine our efforts to positive science — that is the
ascertainment of laws observable in phenomena. Empiricism
(e/x7reipta, experience) accentuates the assumption of this
school that all our mental possessions are a product of
purely sensuous experience. The stress laid by its leading
representatives in this country on the principle of mental
association has caused them to be styled the Associaiionalist
school. All psychologists who assume the Evolutionist hypo-
thesis to apply to the human mind without qualification or
reserve, as e.g. James and Mark Baldwin, even if they differ
in some points from the older sensationists, are practically at
one with them here.

Intellect essentially different from Sense. — In

direct opposition to this theory we maintain that the
mind is endowed with two classes of faculties of
essentially distinct grades. Over and above Sensibility
it possesses the power of Rational or Spiritual Activity.
The term IntcUect, with the adjective Intellectual, was
formerly retained exclusively to denote the cognitive
faculty of the higher order. The word Rational also
designated the higher cognitive operations of the mind,
but it frequently expressed all forms of spiritual
activit}^ as in the phrases Rational Will and Rational
Emotions. The term Reason is used sometimes to signify
the total aggregate of spiritual powers possessed by
man,i sometimes to mean simply the intellectual power

'^ In this general sense the possession of reason is said to separate
man from the brute. Kant means by Reason {Vernunft) the power
of immediately apprehending truth by iniuiticn, whilst Understand-

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 231

of understanding, and sometimes to express the parti-
cular exercise of the understanding involved in the
process of ratiocination, or reasoning. Reasoning and
Understanding do not, however, pertain to different
faculties. The former is but a series of applications, a
continuous exercise of the latter. The Rational Appetite
or Will is itself a consequence of the same power, so we
must look upon Intellect as the most fundamental of
the higher faculties of the soul. The words Intellect
and Intellectual we intend to retain exclusively for this
superior grade of mental life, and we shall thus avoid
the lamentable confusion caused by the modern use of
these terms as signifying all kinds of cognition, whether
sensuous or rational.

So far, however, we have merely asserted a differ-
ence in kind between Sense and Intellect ; it is now our
duty to prove our doctrine. By affirming the existence
of a faculty specifically distinct from that of sense, we
mean to hold that the mind possesses the power of
performing operations beyond the scope of sense. We
maintain that many of its acts and products are distinct
in kind from all modes of sensibility and all forms of
sensuous action whether simple or complex ; and that
no sensation, whatever stages of evolution or trans-
formation it may pass through, can ever develope into
thought. We have already investigated at length the
sentient life of the soul, and to it we have allotted the
five external senses, internal sensibility, imagination,
sensuous memory, and sensitive appetite. The supe-
riority of the spiritual life over these sensuous activities
will be established by careful study of the nature and
formal object of its operations.

Proof of doctrine. — Intellect we may define broadly
as the faculty of thought. Under thought we include
attention, judgment, reflexion, self-consciousness, the

ing {Verstand) is for him the source of the generalizations of thought.
Such a usage is still, however, contrary to ordinary language in
this country. The verb to reason and the participle reasoning show
that this term denotes not the contemplative, but the discursive
activity of the intellect. First truths are apprehended by the
understanding.

232 RATIONAL LIFE.

formation of concepts, and the processes of reasoning.
These modes of activit}' all exhibit a distinctly supra-
sensuous element ; and in order to bring out the differ-
ence between intellect and sense, we shall sa}' a few
words on each of these operations. We shall begin with
some observations on attention as the most convenient
introduction to the study of intellectual activity in
general, although the strictly supra-sensuous character
of Intellect is more clearly presented in some of the
other functions, especially in that of conception. We
shall however undertake a fuller investigation of atten-
tion in a future chapter.

Attention. — By attention is here meant the special
direction of the higher cognitive energy of the mind
towards something present to it ; or in scholastic
language appUcatio cogitationis ad ohjectum. The w'ord is
sometimes used in a vague sense to signif}^ the fact ol
being more or less vividly conscious of the action ot
any stimulus ; but in its strict signification it implies a
secondary act, an interior reaction of a higher kind
superadded to the primitive mental state. When from
a condition of passive sensibility to impressions we
change to that of active attention, there comes into
play a distinctly new factor. In the former state the
mind was wholly excited and aw-akened from without,
in the latter it presents a contribution from the
resources of its own energy. In this exercise of
attention an additional agency which reacts on the
existing impressions is evoked into life, and aspects
and relations implicit in the orginal impressions are
apprehended in a new manner. The mind grasps and
elevates into the region of clear consciousness hitherto
unnoticed connexions which lie beyond the sphere of
sense. It fixes upon properties and attributes and holds
them steadily up for separate consideration, while the
uninteresting qualities are for the time ignored.

This complementary phase of attention by which
the neglected features are ignored is called by modern
writers abstraction. It is the necessary counterpart of
the former. By the very act of concentrating our
mental energy on certain aspects of an object we turn

INTELLECT AKD SENSE. 233

away from others. Both the positive and the negative
side of the activity manifest its difference from sense.
Thus, suppose an orange has been lying on the table
before me. I have for some time been conscious of its
presence, but I have not specially directed my attention
towards it. Now, however, some circumstance or other,
a thought originating within the mind or a movement
without, awakens the intellect, and immediately the
object has a new reality for me. I advert to the shape
of the fruit, and, abstracting from its remaining proper-
ties, I notice its likeness to otlier objects described as
spherical. Again my attention centres on its colour,
and I compare its similarity in this respect with other
things present or absent. In like manner I may think
of its weight, its probable taste or smell, and compare
it under any of these respects with other fruits, neglect-
ing for the time all the rest of its attributes, or I niay
consider the object as a unity, a ivhole, a thing distinct
from other beings. Further, whilst attending to one
attribute apart I am fully aware of the existence of
others in the concrete object present to my mind. I
am quite conscious that the separation is purely mental,
and that the object of my thought does not exist in this
ideal and abstract manner in itself, or a parte rei. Now
in all these operations something more is implied than
sensation. A sensation can neither attend to itself nor
consciously abstract from particular attributes, and it
can still less apprehend relations between itself and its
fellows.

Comparison and Judgment— But when exercised
in explicitly comparative and Judicial acts, the supra-
sensuous nature of attention is even more clearly
manifested. We fix upon a certain attribute of two
or more objects, and comparing the objects pronounce
them to be alike or unlike in this feature. This judgment
is evidently distinct from the sensation or image of
either object, though it presupposes sensations or
images of both. It implies, in fact, a mental act
distinct from the related impressions by which the
relation subsisting between them is apprehended in
an abstract manner. To affirm that the taste of a

234 NATIONAL LIFE.

certain claret is like that of sour milk, or that the earth
resembles an orange, there is required in addition to the
pair of compared ideas a superior force which holds
them together in consciousness, and discerns the
relation of similarity between them. Neither the
mere co-existence, nor still less the successive occurrence
of two impressions, could ever result in the perception
of a relation between them, unless there be a third
distinct activity of a higher kind to which both are
present, and which is capable of apprehending the
common feature.^ A change in our feelings or sensuous
consciousness is possible, and as a matter of fact, often
takes place without the act of intellectual attention
which gives rise to the judgment. For the consistent
sensationalist, who necessarily dissolves the mind into
a series of conscious states devoid of all real unity, not
only is the conviction of personal identity throughout
our life a hallucination, but even the simplest act of
comparison effected between two successive ideas is a
sheer impossibility.

Necessary Judgments. — Among judgments in general,
which exemplify the activity of a higher power than sense,
there are a special class commonly spoken of as necessary
judgments, which demonstrate with peculiar cogency the
working of intellect. The mind affirms as necessarily and
universally true, that "two things which are equal to a third
must be equal to each other," that "nothing can begin to
exist without a cause," that " we ought never to do evil," that
"two straight lines can never enclose a space," that "three
and two must always make five," and so on of a variety of
other necessary propositions. A careful examination of
judicial acts of this kind will manifest that they express truths
of a different nature from that contained in the assertion or
denial of the existence or occurrence of a particular concrete

2 "A feeling qualified by a relation of resemblance to other
feelings is a different thing from an idea of that relation, different
with all the difference, which Hume ignores, bctxveen feeling and
thought, between consciousness and self-consciousness." (Cf. Green,
hitroduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, % 213.) The con-
founding of the sensuous capacity of experiencing like or unlike
impressions with the intellectual power of recognizing their likeness
or unlikeness was formerly a universal characteristic of the sensa-
tionist psychologists of this country.

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 235

fact. These truths hold necessarily and universally. They are
moreover objectively valid : they are independent of my per-
ceiving them. Their contradictory is absolutely unthinkable.
It is not merely that I cannot conceive — in the sense of being
able to imagine — the opposite. It is not that I am under a
powerful persuasion, an irresistible belief on the point. It is
not that one idea inevitably suggests the other. There is
something distinctly over and above all this.

The blind man cannot conceive colour. A few centuries
since most people would have found it hard to believe that
people could live at the other side of the earth without
tumbling off. On the other hand, a man's name, or his
voice, irresistibly revives the representation of his face ; and
the appearance of fire inevitably awakens the expectation of
heat. Yet in the former cases the mind after careful reflexion
does not pronounce the existence of an absolute impossibility,
nor does it assert in the latter a necessary connexion. We
cannot affirm them to be impossible or necessary, because
the intellect does not clearly apprehend any such impossi-
bility or necessity. But it is completely diiferent in the class
of the judgments we have indicated above. The moral law
must hold for all intelligence ; the principle of causality and
the axioms of mathematics, must be necessarily and every-
ivhire true. Now this necessity cannot be apprehended by
sense. The sensuous impression is always of the individual,
the contingent, the mutable. It informs us that a particular
fact exists, not that a universal truth holds. Snow may perhaps
be black, ground glass may be wholesome and nutritious,
and a number of the laws of physical nature may be changed
every twelve months in distant stellar regions ; but the truths
of arithmetic and geometry, the principle of causality, and
the moral law are as immutable there as with us. This
immutability is distinctly realized by the mind, and such
realization is certainly not explicable by mere sense.

Universal and Abstract Concepts. — It is, however,
in the formation of abstract and universal concepts,
which prescind from the particular determinations of
space and time, and thus completely transcend the
scope of sense that the spiritual activity of the Intellect
is best manifested."^ Abstract and universal concepts
we assuredly possess. They are the necessary materials
of science. Judgments, whether contingent or necessary,

•^ " Differt sensus ab intellectu et ratione quia intellectus vel
ratio est ufiiversitliion, quae sunt ubique et semper ; sensus autem est
siiigiilarium." (St. Thomas, De scnsu et scnsato, 1. i.)

236 NATIONAL LIFE.

presuppose them. Without them general knowledge
would be impossible; consequently we must be endowed
with some power capable of forming such ideas. But
in the sensationist catalogue of faculties no such power
is to be found. Ergo, that inventory is incomplete.

By no one has the inability of the imagination to
form universal notions and concepts been better shown
than by the writers of the sensationalist school itself.
Berkeley in a well-known passage clearly states the
nominalist argument declaring that whatever we
imagine must have some definite size, colour, shape,
and the rest. Therefore it is concluded we cannot
form any truly abstract or universal concept.^ The
legitimate inference, however, is something very different
— to wit, that the sensist assumption regarding the
nature of mental life is false. Since de facto we do
possess these abstract and universal ideas, and since
the sensationist view of the mind cannot account for
them, that conception of the mind must be wrong.
There is some faculty omitted from its list.

To establish the existence of these intellectual
Concepts or Ideas and their difference from sensuous
Images we can only indicate the marks by which they
are distinguished, and then appeal to each man's

^ "Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting
their ideas, they best can tell ; for myself I find I have a faculty
of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of those particular
things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and
dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper
parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the
hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted and separated
from the rest of the body. But, then, whatever hand or eye I
imagine, it must have some peculiar shape and colour. Likewise
the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or
a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a
middle-sized man." {Principles of Human Knoivledgc.) The passage
is directed against a confused paragraph in Locke's Essay, Bk. IV.
c. vii. § g. Berkeley confounds the phantasm of the imagination
with the intellectual concept. We cannot form an abstract or
universal phantasm ; but the intellect most certainly does appre-
hend universal ideas, which abstract from varying accidental
qualities. The ethical thesis, " Man is responsible for his acts,"
or any other such general scientific proposition, involves a notion
equally applicable to the straight or crooked, black, or white.

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 237

internal experience. The concept represents the nature
or essence, e.g., of man or triangle, in an abstract con-
dition, ignoring or prescinding all accidental indi-
vidualizing conditions. The image, on the contrary,
reproduces the object clothed with these concrete deter-
minations. The concept is universal (unum in pluribus),
capable of representing with equal perfection all objects
of the class — because it includes only the essential
attributes contained in the definition of the object.
The image, whether it be distinct or obscure, can truly
picture only one individual object of some particular
colour, shape, size, and the rest. The concept since it
merely includes the essential attributes is something
fixed, immutable, necessary. If changed in the least
element its nature would be destroyed. For the same
reason it is said to be eternal : not of course as a positively
existing being, but negatively as an intrinsic possibility.
It abstracts from all time, and there never was an instant
when it was impossible. The image, on the other hand,
is unstable, fluctuating with respect to many of its
component elements, and contingent. Blurred repre-
sentations of this kind have been styled "generic"
images, but they are in no true sense universal. They
are merely individual pictures of an indistinct or
obscure character. That these distinctions are real,
will become clear to each one who carefully examines
his own consciousness. When we employ the terms
man, triangle, cow, iron, virtue, me mean something.
These expressions have a connotation, a meaning which
is more or less perfectly apprehended by the mind.
Now that connotation as thus grasped in a mental act is the
general concept.

There commonly accompanies the use of these words a
sensuous image, picturing some individual specimen, or a
group or series of specimens ; but it is neither about these
individual examples, nor about the oral sound that our
judgments are enunciated. When we say, "The cow is a
ruminant," " The whale is a mammal," " The sum of the
angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles," " Truth is a
virtue," we speak not of the particular phantasm in the
nnagination, whether it be definite or hazy, and still less of
the vocal word. We do not mean tliis triangle, whale, or cow.

238 RATIONAL LIFE.

but every triangle, cvoy whale, and every cow. Whilst the
{a.ncy pictures an individual the intellect i'/un^s the universal,
and this thought is the general notion or concept. The state-
ment of certain nominalists that we have nothing in our mind
but a particular image made to stand for any individual of the
class practically concedes the whole case, whilst slurring over
the concession in the phrase which we have italicized. The
intellectual operation by which the essential features in the
particular specimen are apprehended and conceived as standing
for ^^ any individual'' of the class is precisely what constitutes
the universal conception. Exactly herein lies the abstraction
and generalization productive of the intentio universalitatis —
the universal significance of the general notion. The higher
faculty seizes on the essential attributes forming the common
nature of the class, and our consciousness of this common
nature as separately realizable in each member of the class
is the universal idea.

It was long ago justly insisted on by Plato, and before
him by Parmenides, that mere sense could never afford
general knowledge, and that without universal concepts
science is impossible. Pure and mixed mathematics no
less than chemistry and biology logically lose their rigorous
precision and universality as well as their objective validity
if the reality of general conceptions be denied. The pene-
trating mind of Hume, the acutest thinker of the sensist
school, clearly saw this, and accepted the conclusion that
even the mathematical sciences can only afford approximate
truth.^ The existence of universal ideas or concepts we must
thus consider as established.

Reflexion and Self-consciousness. — Lastly, the
act of reflecting upon our own conscious states is
essentially beyond the sphere of sense. We find that
"we can observe and study our own sensations, emotions,
and thoughts. We can compare them with previous

^ "-When geometry decides anything concerning the proportions
of quantity, we ought not to look for the utmost precision and
exactness. None of its proofs extend so far. It takes the dimen-
sions and proportions of figures justly, but roughly, and with some
liberty. Its errors are never considerable, nor would it err at all
did it not aspire to such absolute perfection." (Cf. Treatise on
Human Nature, p. 350 ; also 5;§ 273, 274.) Mill and later disciples
of the school, whose scientific faith is stronger than their regard
for consistency, try to give mathematics a more respectable appear-
ance. On the value of that attempt, cf Jevons, Contemp. Review,
Dec. 1877; Ueberweg's Log:ic, § 129, and Appendix, § 15; and
Courtney's Metaphysics of Mill, c. viii.

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 239

states, we can recognize them as our own ; and we
can apprehend the perfect identity of the subject of
these states with the being who is now reflecting
on them, the agent who struggles against a temp-
tation, and the agent who knows that he is observing
his own struggle. Every step of our work so far
has involved the reflexive study of our own states,
and consequently the exercise of an intellectual power.
To analyze, describe, and classify mental phenomena
an activity distinct from and superior to sense is
required, and it is only because we are endowed with
such a supra-sensuous faculty that we can recognize
ourselves as something more than our transient states.
The teaching of the sensist school from Hume to Mill
is logical at least on this point. They fully admit that
if their assumption is true, if the only cognitive faculty
possessed by the mind is sensuous in character, then it
follows that the mind must be conceived as nothing
more than sensations and possibilities of sensations.

Intellect a spiritual faculty. — These various forms
of mental activity, attention, abstraction, the perception
of relations, comparison, judgment, the formation of
universal and abstract conceptions, the intuition of the
necessar}^ character of certain judgments, and reflexive
observation of our own states, demonstrate the existence
in the mind of a higher cognitive faculty than that of
sensuous knowledge. This superior aptitude of the
soul is what the scholastic philosophers styled the
intellect; and they described it as a spivitiial or non-
organic faculty in opposition to sense, which they affirmed
to be organic, corporeal, or material. By these latter
epithets, however, they did not mean to imply that
sensuous life is similar in kind to the forces or properties
of matter, or to the physiological functions of the
organism. They merely intended to teach that all
sensuous states have for their proper objects material
phenomena, and are exerted by means of a bodily
organ. External and internal sensibility, imagination,
and sensuous memory are ail essentially or intrinsically
dependent on the organism. Thus sensations of touch,
or phantasms of colour, are possible only to a soul that

240 RATIONAL LIFE.

informs a body, and can only be elicited by modifica-
tion of an animated system of nerves. It is, therefore,
legitimate to say that the eye sees, and the ear hears,
or better, that the soul sees and hears by means of
these instruments. On the other hand, by describing
the activity of intellect as spiritual or non-organic, the
scholastics implied that it is a function of the mind
alone ; that unlike sentiency it is not exerted by means
of any organ.

Unity of Consciousness. — It seems to us incontestible that
when properly understood this is the true doctrine. It is
false to say that the brain thinks, or even that the mind
thinks by means of the brain, although we may allow the
phrase that it sees by the instrumentality of the eye or hears
by that of the ear.'^ To establish this it is only necessary to
revert to the points already considered. First, as regards
self-consciousness, the subject of this activity must be of a
spiritual or incorporeal nature. For in such an operation
there is realized a species of perfect identity between agent
and patient which is utterly incompatible with any form of
action that pertains to a corporeal organ. Thus, I find that
I can not only think or reason about some event, but /, the
being who thinks, can reflect on this thinking; and, moreover,
/ can apprehend myself who am reflecting, and who know
myself as reflecting, to be absolutely identical with the being
who thinks and reasons about the given event. But, evidently,
such an operation cannot be effected by a faculty exerted by
means of a material organ. One part of matter may act
upon another, it may attract or repel it, it may be "reflected "
or doubled back upon it : but the same atom can never act
upon, or reflect upon itself. The action of a material atom
must always have for its object something other than itself.
This indivisible iiuity of consciousness, exhibited in the act of
knowing myself, is therefore possible only to a spiritual agent,
a faculty that does not operate by means of a material organ.

Apprehension of the abstract and universal. — Again, the
characteristic notes of the organic or sensuous state consist

^ " When organs of understanding or of reason, instruments 0/ Judging
and thinking are spoken of, we confess that we have no idea either
what end such theories can serve, or what advantage there could be
for the higher intellectual life in all this apparatus of instruments.
None of these relating energies (rational activities) from whose
inexhaustibly varied repetition all our knowledge is derived can be
in the smallest degree promoted by the co-operation of corporeal
force " Cf. Lotze, Miciocosmus (English Trans.), p. 323.

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 241

in its representing a concrete material phenomenon, and in
its being aroused by the impression of the object on the
organ. The intellectual act, on the contrary, whether it
manifests itself in the shape of the universal concept, of
attention to abstract relations, or in the apprehension of
necessity, does not represent an actual concrete fact, and is
not evoked by the action of a material stimulus. The
formal object of sense is the concrete individual : that of
intellect is the abstract and universal. An organic faculty can
only respond to definite corporeal impressions, and can only
represent individual concrete objects. But universal ideas,
abstract intellectual relations, and the necessity of axiomatic
truths do not possess actual concrete existence, and so cannot
produce an impression on any organ. Yet consciousness
assures us that they are apprehended by us ; consequently, it
must be by some supra-organic or spiritual faculty. We
have thus proved the existence of a supra-sensuous or
spiritual form of life in the cognitive region of the mind :
later on, when dealing with Free-will, we shall establish in
the sphere of appetency a similar truth.

Intellect mediately dependent on the brain. —

In asserting that the intellect is a spiritual faculty,
we do not of course imply that it is in no way
dependent on the organism, any more than in main-
taining the freedom of the will we suppose this latter
faculty to be uninfluenced by sensitive appetite.
It is indisputable that exhaustion of brain power
accompanies the work of thinking ; but the fact
that the exercise of imagination or of external
sense forms a conditio sine qua non of intellectual
activity, accounts for such consumption of cerebral
energy. Although intellect is a spiritual faculty of
the mind, it presupposes, so long as the soul informs
the body, the stimulation of the organic faculty of
sense. This was expressed in the language of the
schools by saying that intellectual activity depends
extrinsically or per accidens on the organic faculties.
The universal concept, the intellectual judgment,

242 NATIONAL LIFE.

the act of reflexion, are not, like sensation, the
results of the stimulation of a sense-organ, but
products of purely spiritual action. The inferior
mode of mental life is awakened by the irritation of
sentient nerves, the superior activity is due to a
higher reaction from the unexhausted nature of the
mind itself; and the ground for this reaction lies in
the fact that the same indivisible soul is the root of
both orders of faculties. Intellectual cognition
always involves self-action on the part of the mind,
but the conditions of such self-action are posited by
impressions in the inferior recipient faculties. The
nature of the process will be more fully described in
chapter xv.

Balmez and Lotze on Sensationism. — The doctrine ex-
pounded in the present chapter is of such vital importance,
yet so completel}^ unfamiUar to the student whose reading
has been confined to the current psychological text-books of
this country, that we deem it well worth while, for the better
enforcement of our teaching, to cite a few passages from
foreign philosophers of note. We shall select for our puirpose
Balmez, the brilliant and original Spanish metaphysician of
the first half of this century, and Lotze, the ablest recent
representative of the combined Hegelian and Herbartian
schools, who in addition holds high rank in physiological
science.

In Chapter ii., Book iv., of his Fundamental Philosophy,
Balmez examines the sensational psychology of Condillac,
and his criticism of that author applies with equal justice to
the entire empirical school of this country from Hume and
Hartley to Bain and Sully. In the conception of the mind
held in common by all these writers sense is the sole parent
and source of all knowledge. There is no rational activity
essentially distinct from, and superior to, that of sense. The
formation of concepts, the operations of comparison and
judgment, and the application of thought in the act of
attention, are merely sensations coalescing or conflicting in a
fainter or more vivid stage. Balmez' observations on the
system of the original parent of French sensism will, conse-
quently, be very much to the Doint. After a brief account of

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 243

Condillac's hypothetical statue, which, at first endowed with
a single mode of sensibility, gradually developes higher forms
of mental power, the Spanish philosopher lays bare the
deficiencies of the sensist doctrine :

Attention. — " Condillac calls capacity of feeling, when applied
to an impression, attention. So if there be but one
sensation there can be but one attention. If various sensa-
tions succeeding each other leave some trace in the memory
of the statue, the attention will, when a new sensation is
presented, be divided between the present and the past. The
attention directed at one and the same time to two sensations
becomes comparison. Similarities and differences are per-
ceived by comparison, and this perception is a judgment. All
this is done with sensations alone ; therefore attention,
memory, comparison, and judgment are nothing but sensa-
tions transformed. In appearance nothing clearer, more
simple, or more ingenuous ; in reality nothing more confused
or false. First of all, this definition of attention is not exact.
The capacity of feehng, by the very fact of being in exercise,
is apphed to the impression. It does not feel when the
sensitive faculty is not in exercise, and this is not in exercise
except when applied to the impression. Consequently attention
would he nothing hut the act of feeling ; all sensation would he
attention, and all attention sensation ; a meaning which no one
ever yet gave to these words. Attention is the application of
the mind to something; and this apphcation supposes the
exercise of an activity concentrated upon its object. Properly
speaking, when the mind holds itself entirely passive it is not
attentive ; and with respect to sensations, it is attentive when
by a reflex act we know that we feel. Without this cognition
there can be no attention, but only sensation more or less
active, according to the degree in which it affects our
sensibility. If Condillac means to call the more vivid
sensation attention, the word is improperly used ; for it
ordinarily happens that they who feel with the greatest
vividness are precisely those who are distinguished for their
want of attention. Sensation is the affection of a passive
faculty; attention is the exercise of an activity.''

Judgment. — The difference between a sensation of more or
less vivacity and the intellectual act of attention is here
clearly exhibited, but the distinction between sense and
thought is made still more evident, when the Spanish
philosopher passes on to Comparison and Judgment : " Is the
perception of the difference of the smell of the rose and that o-t
the pink a sensation ? If we answer that it is not, we infer
that the judgment is not the sensation transformed ; for it is
not even a sensation. If we are told that it is one sensation,

244 RATIONAL LIFE.

we then observe that if it be either that of the rose or that of
the pink, it follows that with one of these sensations we shall
have comparative perception, which is absurd. If we are
answered that it is both together, we must either interpret
this expression rigorously, and then we shall have a sensation
which will at once be that of the pink and that of the rose,
the one remaining distinct from the other, so as to satisfy the
conditions of comparison ; or we must interpret it so as to
mean that the two sensations are united ; in which case we
gain nothing, for the difficulty will be to show how co-existence
produces comparison, and judgment, or the perception of the
difference. The sensation of the pink is only that of the pink,
and that of the rose only that of the rose. The instant you
attempt to compare them you suppose in the mind an act by
which it perceives the difference ; and if you attribute to it
anything more than pure sensation you add a facidty distinct
from sensation, namely, that of comparing sensations, and
appreciating their similarities and differences. This com-
parison, this intellectual force, which calls the two extremes
into a common arena without confounding them, discovers
the points in which they are alike or unlike each other, and,
as it were, comes in and decides between them, is distinct
from the sensation; it is the effect of an activity of a different
order, and its development must depend on sensations as
exciting causes, as a condition sine qua non; but this is all it
has to do with sensations themselves ; it is essentially distinct
from them, and cannot be confounded ivith them without destroying
the idea of comparison, and rendering it impossible. No judgment
is possible without the ideas of identity or similarity, and
these ideas are not sensations. Sensations are particular
facts which never leave their own sphere, nor can be applied
from one thing to another. The ideas of similarity and
identity have something in common applicable to many
facts. . . . Nor can memory, properly so called, of sensa-
tions be explained by themselves ; and here again Condillac
is wrong. The statue may recollect to-day the sensation of
the smell of the rose which it received yesterday, and this
recollection may exist in two ways : first, by the internal
reproduction of the sensation without any external cause, or
relation to time past, and consequently without any relation
to the prior existence of a similar sensation ; and then this
recollection is not for the statue a recollection properly so
called, but only a sensation more or less vivid; secondly, by
an internal reproduction with relation to the existence of the
same or another similar sensation at a preceding time, in which
Recollection essentially consists ; and here there is something
more than sensation— here are the ideas of succession, time,

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 245

priority, and identity or similarity, all distinct or separable
from sensations. Two entirely distinct sensations may be
referred to the same time in memory, and then the time will
be identical and the sensations distinct. The sensation may
exist without any recollection of the time it before existed, or
even without any recollection of having ever existed, conse-
quently sensation involves no relation to time." ''

Lotze. — We shall now turn to the German philosopher.
In one of the best pieces of Psychology which he has written
— the chapter on the " Mental Act of Relation," ^ Lotze
remarks : " The view which regards Attention as an activity
exercised by the soul and having ideas {i.e., sense-impressions,
images, &c.) for its objects, and not a property of which the
ideas are subjects, was right. The latter notion was the one
preferred by Herbart (and by the sensist school). According
to him (and them), when we say that we have directed our
attention to the idea b, what has really happened is merely
that b, through an increase of its own strength, has raised
itself in consciousness above the rest of the ideas. But even
were the conception of a variable strength free from difficulty
in its application to ideas, the task which we expect attention
to perform would still remain inexplicable. What we seek to
attain by attention is not an equally increasing intensity of
the represented content just as it is, but a grov/th in its
clearness; and this rests in all cases on the perception of
relations which obtain between its individual constituents.
Even when Attention is directed to a perfectly simple
impression, the sole use in exerting it lies in the discovery of
relations. ... If we wish to tune a string exactly, we
compare its sound with the sound of another which serves as
a pattern, and try to make sure whether the two agree or
differ. . . . On the other hand, there are moments when we
cannot collect ourselves, when we are wholly occupied by
a strong impression, which yet does not become distinct, because
the excessive force of the stimulation hinders the exercise of
the constructive act of comparison." ^

In an earlier part of the same chapter he establishes
still more clearly the supra-sensuous nature of Attention,
as manifested in comparison and judgment : " The con-
sciousness of the relations existing between various single
sensations (among which we reckon here the sum formed by
the sensations when united) is not given simply by the
existence of these relations considered simply as a fact. So
far we have considered only single ideas, and the ways in

' Fumiarncntal Philosophv, Vol. II. §§ 7 — 13.
** Metaphysics, Bk. III. » § 273.

246 RATIONAL LIFE.

which they either exist simultaneously in consciousness,
or else successively replace one another ; but there exists not
only in us this variety of ideas and this change of ideas, but
also an idea of this variety and change. Nor is it merely in
thought that we ought to distinguish the apprehension of
existing relations which arises from an act of reference and
comparison, from the mere sensation of the individual
members of the relation ; experience shows that the tivo are
separable in reality, and justifies us in subordinating the
conscious sensation and representation of individual contents
to the referring or relating act of representation, and in
considering the latter to be a higher activity, — higher in that
definite sense of the word according to ivhich the higher necessarily
presupposes tJie lower, but does not in its own nature necessarily
proceed from the lower. Just as the external sense-stimuli serve to
excite the soul to produce simple sensations, so the relations which
have arisen betiveen the many ideas, whether simultaneous or
successive, thus produced, serve the soul as a new internal stimulus
stirring it to exercise this new reacting activity. '^^ When two
ideas, a and b, have arisen as the ideas ' red ' and ' blue,' they
do not mix with one another, disappear, and so form the
third idea, c, of ' violet.' If they did so we should have
a change of simple ideas without the possibility of a com-
parison between them. This comparison is itself possible
only if one and the same activity at once holds a and b together
and holds them apart, but yet, in passing from a to b, is
conscious of the change caused in its state by these transi-
tions, and it is in this way that the new idea (concept), y,
arises, the idea of a definite degree of qualitative likeness
or unlikeness in a and b.

" Again : if we see at the same time a stronger light,
a, and a weaker light, b, of the same colour, what happens is
not that there arises in place of both the idea, c, of a light
whose strength is the sum of the intensities of the two.
If that did arise it would mean that the material to which the
comparison has to be directed had disappeared. The
comparison is made only because one and the same activity,
passing between a and b, is conscious of the alteration in its
state sustained in the passage ; and it is in this way that the
idea y arises, the idea of a definite quantitative difference.
Lastly : given the impressions a and a, that which arises from
them is not a third impression=2rt ; but the activity, passing
as before between the still separated impressions, is conscious
of having sustained no alteration in the passage : and in this

^^ Lotze's doctrine here is in strikingly close affinity to the
Bcholastic teaching on intellectual activity. Cf. also Microccsmus,
Bk. II. c. iv. § I. The italics throughout are our own.

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 247

way would arise the new idea y of identity. We are justified
in regarding all these different instances of y as ideas (concepts)
of a higher or second order. They are not to be put on a line
with the ideas (images) from the comparison of which they
arose." (§ 268.)

Again : " My immediate object is to indicate what
happens at least with such clearness that every one may
verify its reality in his own internal observation. It is quite
true that, to those who start from the circle of ideas common in
physical mechanics, there must be something strange in the
conception of an activity, or {it is the same thing) of an active
being, which not only experiences two states a and b at the
same time without fusing them into a resultant, but which
passes from one to the other and acquires the idea of a third
state y produced by this very transition. Still this process is
a. fact ; and the reproach of failure in the attempt to imagine
how it arises after the analogies of physical mechanics, falls
only upon the mistaken desire of construing the perfectly unique
sphere of mental life after a pattern foreign to it. That desire
I hold to be the most mischievous which threatens the
progress of Psychology." (§ 269.)

The Controversy concerning- Universals. — Different views
as to the nature of sensuous and intellectual cognition gave
rise to the great philosophical disputes as to the existence,
origin, and validity of General Concepts. These problems
ramify into Logic and Metaphysics as well as into Psychology.
The two former sciences are mainly concerned with deter-
mining the objective counterpart of such ideas ; the last with
their subjective reality and their origin. The solidarity of
these distinct questions, and the mutual interdependence of
the particular solutions advanced in regard to each, are,
however, only one more proof of the impossibility of isolating
psychology from philosophy. Modern writers often express
surprise at the intense interest these discussions once aroused.
But the reason is obvious to any one who understands their
real significance. They are of vital importance to epistem-
ology, or the theory of knowledge, and consequently to every
system of Metaphysics and Theology,

Extreme Realism.— One school, represented by Plato in
ancient Greece, taught that universals {unum in piuribus)
existed formally as universals outside of the mind; that corres^
ponding to every general idea, such as genus, species, triangle,
animal, man, truth, &c., there exists somewhere beyond
this world of changing phenomena, a reality which is
formally and actually abstract and universal — universalia
separata. This doctrine was refuted by Aristotle and rejected
by St. Thomas and the vast majority of the schoolmen. But

'248 RATIONAL LIFE.

a kindred theory, maintaining that universals exist really in
things — formally as universals — antecedent to and independent
of our minds, was advocated by William of Champeaux
(died 1 121), and by a few other scholastic philosophers.
In this view, numerically one and the same essence is
common to all the individuals of a species — the humanity of
Peter is identical with that of Paul. This form of exaggerated
realism was seen to lead inevitably to Pantheism ; and so it
soon fell into disrepute. It has not been explicitly defended
by any school for some centuries past, yet certain forms of
modern German idealism have very close affinity to it.

Nominalism. — At the extreme opposite pole of philoso-
phical thought is Nominalism, the logical outcome of sensa-
tionism. For it the only universality lies in the word.
Outside of the mind there exists nothing but singular concrete
objects. Groups of these resemble each other in certain
qualities, and we ticket them with a common name. They
are apprehended in individual sense-impressions and repre-
sented by individual pictures of the imagination. These
latter vary in distinctness, but whether clear or obscure,
vague or definite, fluctuating or comparatively stable, each
such image at any given time is capable of representing but
one object. It is necessarily singular ; the word or common
name alone is universal in that it impartially stands for any
member of the class. This theory — that universals exist
neither in material things nor in the mind, that they are
mere words, flatus vocis — formulated in the eleventh century
by Roscellinus has been the common doctrine of sensationist
psychologists, from Hobbesto Bain and Sully.

Conceptualism. — In opposition to Nominalism, Conceptual-
ism maintains that the mind has the power of forming
genuinely universal concepts ; that is, ideas capable of truly
representing every member of a given class. The Conceptualist
agrees with the Nominalist in denying the existence of any
form of universality outside of the mind ; but on the other
hand he teaches that the mind has the power to construct
truly universal notions, quite distinct from the images of the
imagination ; and in proof of the existence of such universal
notions, he employs most of those arguments which we our-
selves adduce, although he does not follow some of them out
to their legitimate consequences. Conceptualism has varied
much in the hands of different writers, from Abelard (1079 —
1 142) to Kant and Lotze, and from these to more recent repre-
sentatives like Mr. Stout and Dr. J. Ward ; but they all agree
in rejecting that mechanical view of the mind which lies at
the basis of sensism and nominalism, and which conceives all
cognition as the product of the automatic composition and

INTELLECT AND SENSE. 2.19

conflict, agglutination and counteraction of sensuous impres-
sions, and they ascribe to the mind, under one form or another,
an inherently active power of co-ordinating and combining
individual sense impressions by means of these universal
notions which it constructs. For our own part, whilst we
gladly acknowledge the good wori< which Conceptualism has
done by its criticism of both Nominalism and Ultra-Realism,
we must insist on its deficiency in failing to recognize in
reriim iiatura real objective foundation for our universal ideas.
The a priori element in knowledge is exaggerated. The
universal concept is, in most of these systems, conceived as
a too purely subjective creation of the mind — a mental
abstraction devoid of a true foundation in external reality.
All knowledge becomes in their view essentially relative and
limited to our own mental states.

Moderate Realism. — There remains the doctrine of
Moderate Realism, taught in ancient times by Aristotle, and
in the middle ages by St. Thomas and the vast majority of
the schoolmen. This theory is generally ignored by modern
writers, who almost invariably represent the Scholastic
Philosophers as adhering en masse to the extravagant realism
of Plato or of William of Champeaux. Yet the well-known
fact that Aristotle ruled supreme in the schools from the
twelfth to the sixteenth century ought to have preserved even
those who never read a scholastic work from so egregious an
error. Moderate Realism holds with Conceptualism against
Nominalism that not only the common name of the members
of a class is universal, but that there are truly universal-
concepts, not mere sensuous images or phantasms, whether of
a singular or confused generic type. Secondly, it teaches
against both Conceptualism and Nominalism that there is a
real objective foundation for this universal concept, in the
perfectly similar natures of the members of the same class.
The essence, the constituent features, the nature, type, or
ideal plan, of man, triangle, silver, is repeated and contained
equally in each concrete sample of the class, however much
these may accidentally differ. It is, of course, numerically
different, and individualized by particular determinations in
each instance. But considered in the abstract apart from
these individual determinations it might equally well be
realized in any member of the class. The essence is thus
said to be potentially universal, and the concept of such an
essence can be employed to represent truly all the possible
members of the class. It is upon the perfect similarity of
natures in all the members of a class thus grasped in a
universal concept that the objective validity of science rests.
Cieneral notions are therefore not purely mental figments;

250 RATIONAL LIFE.

they are intellectual constructions, but reposing on objective
foundations in the real order of things. Moderate Realism
accordingly agrees with Nominalism and Conceptualism in
condemning the extravagant realism which maintained the
existence of universals formally as universals outside of the
mind. Universal ideas are abstractions, but still they have a
genuine basis in reahty, and it is for this reason that mathe-
matics and the other sciences have real validity. Such is the
doctrine of Moderate Realism advocated by Aristotle and
St.Thomas,^^ the only theory, we believe, at once in harmony
with introspection and capable of affording an adequate
groundwork for mathematics and the other sciences.

It is so satisfactory to find our teaching confirmed by such a
prominent and thorough-going sensationalist as G. H. Lewes,
that we shall cite him at length. We do this all the more
gladly as he acknowledges that the nominalist view of Mill
and Bain would render mathematical science indistinguish-
able from a series of worthless propositions deduced from a
collection of artificial definitions and arbitrary postulates :
"To the geometer the circle is not a round figure visible by
his eye, but a figure visible by his mind in which all the radii
from the centre are absolutely equal ; it is not this particular
circle, it is the ideal circle."^^ Again: "The objects of
mathematical study are reals in the same degree as that in
which the objects of any other science are reals. Although
they are abstractions, we must not suppose them to be
imaginary, if by imaginary be meant unreal, not objective.
They are intelligibles of sensibles ; abstractions ichich have their
corcretes in real objects. The line and the surface exist, and
have real properties, just as the planet, the crystal, and the

^^ " Unitas sive communitas naturas humanse non est secundum
rem, sed solum secundum considevationem." (St. Thomas, Sum. Theol.
I. q. 39, a. 3.) " Universalia secundum quod sunt universalia non
sunt nisi in anima. Ipsae autem naturae, quibus accidit intentio
universalitatis sunt in rebus." (St. Thomas, D^/i;?/;;^, lib. ii. lect. 12.)
" Ipsa natura cui accidit vel intelUgi, vel ahstvahi, vel intentio univer-
salitatis non est nisi in singularibus. Sed hoc ipsum quod est
intelligi vel abstrahi vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. . . .
Humanitas quas intelligitur non est nisi in hi.-^c vel illo homine ; sed
quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus,
quod est ' ipsam abstrahi,* ad qnod sequitur intentio universali-
tatis, accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu."
{Sum. Theol. I. q. 85, a. 2, ad 2.) " Humanitas enim est aliquid in re,
non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis quum non sit extra animam
aliqua humanitas multis communis: sed secundum quod accipitur
in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio
secundum quam dicitur species." {Id. I. Dist. ig, a. 5, ad i.)

^'^ Problems of Life and Mind, Vol. I. p. 344.

INTELLECT AND SENSE.

2SI

animal exist and have real properties. It is often said, ' The
point without length or breadth, the line without breadth,
and the surface without thickness are imaginary ; they are
fictions, no such things exist in reality.' This is true, but
misleading. These things are fictions, but they have a real
existence, though not in the insulation of ideal form, for no idea
exists out of the mind. These abstractions are the limits of
concretes. Every time we look on a pool of water we see a
surface without thickness, every time we look on a parti-
coloured surface we see a line without breadth as the limit
of each colour. Both surface and line as mathematically
defined are unimaginable, for we cannot form images of them,
cannot picture them detached; but that icJiich is tinpicturable
may be conceivable, and the abstraction ivhich is impossible to
perception and imagination is easy to conception. It is thus that
scnsibles are raised to intcUigiblcs, and the constructions of
science — conceptions — take the place of perceptions. But
the hold on reality is not loosened by this process. When we
consider solely the direction of a line we are dealing with a
fact of Nature, just as we are dealing with a fact of Nature
when we perform the abstraction of considering the move-
ment of a body irrespective of any other relations. . . . Not
only is it misleading to call the objects of Mathematics
imaginary, it is also incorrect to call them generalizations.
They are abstractions of intuitions. Any particular line we
draw has breadth, any particular circle is imperfect ; con-
sequently generalized lines and circles [scil., by imagination
= generic images) must have breadth and imperfection.
Whereas the line or circle which we intuit mathematically
is an abstraction from which breadth or imperfection has
dropped, and the figures we intuit are these figures under the
form cf th3 limit." {Id. 420.)

The student will find further information on this question
in our historical sketch in the next chapter.

Readings. — On the essential difference between Intellect and
Sense, cf. St. Thomas, De Anima, Lib. III. 1, 7 ; Contra Gentiles,
Lib. II. c. 66; Boedder, Psych. Rat, §§ 106 — 112; Mivart, On
Truth, c. XV. ; Balmez, Fundamental Principles, Bk. IV. ; Kleutgen,
Phil. d. Vorzeit, §§ 33 — 39. The universal concept is admirably
treated both by Abbe Piat, LTdee, pp. 50 — 64 ; iSo — 220 ; and by
Fere Peillaube, Theorie des Concepts, cc. 2, 3 ; see also Logic (present
series), cc. 7, 8. Green's Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human
Nature contains an able examination of Sensism,

CHAPTER XIII.

CONCEPTION. ORIGIN „OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS.
ERRONEOUS THEORIES.

Origin of Ideas. — We have shown in our last
chapter that certain mental products are essentially
distinct from those of our sensuous faculties and
must be due to some higher power of the soul. The
question next arises : How are these supra-sensuous
results effected ? This is the problem of the Origin
of Intellectual Ideas. Epistemology, or the branch
of Philosophy which investigates the validity of
human knowledge in general, is peculiarly interested
in this question. For upon the answer given by
the Psychologist as to how our conceptions have
originated may seriously depend the Philosopher's
decision as to their worth and truth. The chief
solutions advanced are, (i) the hypotheses of Innate
Ideas, and a priori "Mental Forms ; (2) Empiricism
or the sensationalist theory; and (3) the Peripatetic
doctrine. The first exaggerates the contribution of
the mind to a maximum. The second reduces it to
a minimum. The third whilst deriving all know-
ledge from experience insists upon the important
part played by the rational activity of the mind in

CONCEPTION. 253

the elaboration of knowledge. It will be dealt with
in the next chapter.

Furthermore, either in connexion with the
doctrine of innate ideas, or independently of it,
some modern philosophers have sought to solve
the problem of knowledge by metaphysical hypo-
theses concerning the relations subsisting between
the human mind and the Deity. The chief of these
have been the theories of Divine Assistance,
Ontologism, Pre-established harmony, and Monistic
Pantheism. We shall give a brief sketch of each.

Theory of Innate Ideas. — A common characteristic
of many philosophers who justly insist on the spirit-
uality of the soul is to unduly exaggerate the opposition
between mind and body, and some of them are inclined
to adopt an extravagant dualism, denying the possibility
of any mutual interaction between the spiritual and
material substances. Supra-sensuous mental pro-
ducts, such as the ideas of being, imity, the true, the
good, necessary truths, and the like, cannot, these
philosophers maintain, have been originated by sensuous
observation ; they are presupposed in all experience
and transcend it. They must consequently have been
innate or inhorn m the mind from the beginning, ante-
cedently to all acquired knowledge. Such, in a word, is
the case for this theory.

Disproof. — There are numerous fatal objections to
it. Firstly, it may be rejected as a gratuitous h3'pothesis.
Unless it be demonstrated that some portion of our
knowledge cannot be accounted for by the combined
action of sense and intellect, the assumption of such a
native endowment is unwarranted. But this demon-
stration is impossible. Moreover, the genesis of vastly
the greater portion of our knowledge can be traced to
experience, and there is every reason for supposing
that the residual fraction has arisen in the same way.
Secondly, by the very nature of the case there can be no
evidence of the existence of any ideas antecedent to

254 RATIONAL LIFE.

experience. Thirdly, all our earliest ideas are of objects
known by sensible experience, it is about such sensible
material objects our first judgments are elicited, and
to these we always turn to illustrate our loftiest and
most abstract conceptions. The words, too, employed
to express supra-sensuous realities are primarily drawn
from sensible experiences and material phenomena.
Moreover, persons deficient in any sense from birth are
deprived of a corresponding class of ideas. But these
facts are obviously in conflict with the supposition of a
supply of ready-made supra-sensuous cognitions from
the beginning. Lastly, we may add that the tendency
of physiological science is to make the doctrine of the
mutual independence of body and soul less tenable
every succeeding day.

Kant's doctrine and the other theories which we
have mentioned must be dealt with separately.

Empiricism. — The Sensationist oi Empiricist theory
of knowledge stands in the completest opposition to the
views of Kant, and of the supporters of innate ideas.
Starting from the assumption that sensuous and
intellectual activity are essentially the same in kind,
the aim of the former school is to make it appear that
universal and abstract concepts, necessary judgments,
self-consciousness, and all our higher spiritual cogni-
tions are merely more complex or refined products of
sense. The logical corollary of this theory, though
not usually brought prominently into notice, is the
repudiation of the spirituality of the soul, or at all
events the denial of all rational grounds for belief in
this most important doctrine. If all mental operations
are of a sensuous organic nature, then evidently there is
no reason for asserting that the soul of man is a
spiritual principle of an order superior to that of the
brute. The method of the empiricist is, on the one
hand, to depreciate the value of those peculiar charac-
teristics which mark ofi" our intellectual acts ; and, on
the other, to exaggerate the capabilities of sense.
Universal concepts are either confounded with the
concrete phantasms of the imagination, or their
existence is boldly denied. The necessity of axiomatic

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, 255

judgments is explained as the effect of customary
experience ; and the notion of Self is analyzed into
a cluster of conscious states. All our cognitions, in
fact, are merely more or less elaborate products evolved
by the automatic action of association out of sense
impressions and their reproduced images. As the
mind itself is only the resulting outcome, the aggregate
of sensuous states, it can of course be endowed with no
superior active force capable of uniting, comparing, or
in any way working upon the materials of sense. This
indeed is the fundamental defect of empiricism. It
ignores the active energy of intellect with which the
mind is endowed, and consequently it can give no
adequate account of those higher intellectual concep-
tions on which we dwelt in the last chapter.

Historical Sketch of Theories of General Knowledge.

The advantage to the student of Psychology of even
a rough idea of the history of speculation on the subject of
Intellectual Cognition justifies us, we believe, in giving a
compendium of the leading theories on the question, together
with a few brief critical remarks on the most important
points.

Innate Ideas: Reminiscence: Ultra-realism, — The originator
of the hypothesis of Reminiscence was Plato. The sensible
world is for him no true world at all. It is merely a congeries
of transient phenomena which changing from moment to
moment never really are. The real world, that which alone
truly ^'5 and does not pass away, is disclosed to us in our
intellectual ideas. Such universal concepts as being, unity,
substance, the beautiful, reveal to us, obscurely indeed, but still
with truth, the immutable and the necessary. Now these
spiritual notions cannot either directly or indirectly be
derived from sensuous perception ; they are natural endow-
ments of the soul, retained by it from a previous existence.
Truth, goodness, humanity, beauty, and the rest, however,
do not possess merely a subjective existence, as abstract
concepts in the mind. They formally exist as imiversals in
the genuinely real world of which the present material
universe is only a faint imperfect reflexion. In that celestial
land the human spirit formerly dwelt, and there contemplated
these ideas or abstract essences as they exist in themselves.
For some crime, now unknown, it was evicted from its true
home and incarcerated in the prison of the body. Although

RATIONAL LIFE.

much the greater part of its ancient knowledge was
obliterated, there yet remained in a dormant condition traces
of the mental acts by which the soul in its previous life
contemplated the real ideas. These imperfect mental states
are the universal ideas of our present experience, and they
awake on the occasion of sensuous perceptions. They are
not, however, in any way produced by, or elaborated out of
these latter. They are merely evoked from the inner
resources of the mind on the occurrence of corporeal pheno-
mena, which in a shadowy manner resemble the original
types — the Real Universals.

Criticism. — We have here the doctrine of exaggerated
realism. In this form it implies two distinctive tenets : (a)
the reality of universals ds such— Univevsalia extra rem vel
ante rem ; and {b) the existence of innate ideas by which these
are revealed. The former is a logical or metaphysical
problem, and for a complete discussion of the subject we
refer the reader to other volumes of the present series.^ The
second is properly a psychological question. Plato is un-
doubtedly right in accentuating the vital importance of the
intellectual elements of knowledge, but the assumption of a
pre-natal existence is arbitrary and untenable, whilst the
doctrine of real universals is laden with absurdities. The
only proofs urged in favour of the hypothesis of innate ideas
are the peculiar supra-sensuous character of intellectual
representations, and the fact that the answering of children
to judicious interrogation seems to show that they are
possessed of such ideas before they can have formed them
from experience. The first argument, however, has no force
against the Aristotelian theory, which accounts for supra-
sensuous ideas, as the result of the higher spiritual faculty of
the mind apprehending the universal nature of real sensible
objects. The second difficulty founded on the "heuristic"
method of instruction is also ineffective, for this regulated
process of interrogation is either virtually a means of teaching
and communicating the idea in question, or the latter is of
such a simple character as to be formed in at least a vague
manner in our earliest experience.

Descartes (1596 — 1650). Instead of explaining innate ideas
as " reminiscences " of cognitions of a previous life, Christian
philosophers conceived them as inscribed by God on the
soul at its creation. The earliest important thinker among
modern philosophers supporting the hypothesis of innate
ideas was Descartes. For him soul and body are two

^ Cf. Logic, c. viii. and the First Principles of Knoivledge, Pt. II.
c. iv. A good sketch of Plato's Philosophy is given in Stockl's
History of Philosophy, g§ 29, 30.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 257

substances connected, indeed, at one point in the brain, as
the soul is situated in the pineal gland, but mutually inde-
pendent of each other. They are completely opposed to
each other in nature and have nothing in common. The
soul is simple; its essence is thought. The essence of matter
is extension. Accordingly real interaction between them is
impossible ; and their seeming mutual influence can only be
explained by Divine intervention, though this consequence
became clearer in the hand of Descartes' followers. He
divides ideas into three classes, adventitious ideas gathered by
sense-perception, /«2d;7/o2<5 ideas constructed by the imagina-
tion, and innate ideas possessed by the mind from the dawn of
its existence. Without these latter science would be impos-
sible. Among them are the ideas of the infinite, of myself, of
substance, and, in fact, all universal notions expressive of
metaphysical realities. These ideas are in no way caused by
external objects, but merely wake up into life on the occasion
of the sensuous perception of the latter. Yet, they truly
represent the essences of such objects, since God has
ordained them for that purpose. These innate ideas are at
times described as real representations, " entities," effected
by God; though later on, under the exigencies of contro-
versy, they were reduced to mere dispositions or tendencies
of the mind. The former tenet is, however, more conform-
able with his general view. Even the " adventitious " ideas
are not the result of the immediate action of material objects
on the mind. Soul and body are so contrasted in Descartes*
view that, as we have observed, interaction seems impos-
sible, and his theory of sense-perception is therefore confused
and inconsistent. At times he conceives the act of appre-
hension as a mental state excited by God on the occasion of
the physical impression reaching the brain, whilst elsewhere
he seems to consider the perception as an intellectual infer-
ence from a subjective effect to an objective cause.^

2 Descartes is remarkable not so much for his treatment of the
oyigin of knowledge as for his attempted proof of its validity. To
build philosophy on a secure basis he starts with a process 01
methodical or simidated doubt. I can doubt, he says, the veracity
of my senses, mathematical axioms, the existence of the external
world, &c., &c. ; but I cannot doubt that I think, and to think I
must exist. Cogito ergo sum, is thus the first fact and the last truth
in Philosophy. To advance further a criterion or rule of certainty
is required, and by studying the one unassailable truth, this
criterion is discovered to consist in a peculiar clearness of apprehen
sion. I am indubitably certain of my own existence, because
I clearly perceive that my doubt or thought involves it. What-
ever, then, I have a clear idea of, is to be considered true. The next
R

258 RATIONAL LIFE.

Geulincx (1625 — i66g), a disciple of Descartes, frankly
faced the difficulty resulting from this extravagant dualism^
and formally advocated the doctrine of " occasionalism " or
'■'■ Divine assistance.''^ He boldly denied the possibility of
efficient action between body and mind. Changes in the one
are but the " occasions " of the production by God of appro-
priate changes in the other. Our ideas of external objects
are excited not by the objects, but by God Himself. Similarly
in the case of all other secondary causes the Divine interven-
tion or assistance is the only real efficient agency.

Ontologism. — The consequences of the Cartesian oppo-
sition between soul and body developed by Geulincx, were
carried still further in Malebranche's (1638— 1715) mystical
theory of a Vision en Dieu. Corporeal objects cannot effect
impressions on an unextended mind so as to generate ideas
of themselves in the latter. But as it is a limited being, the
mind cannot derive such ideas from itself. It therefore
beholds them in another spirit — the Infinite Being. God
contemplates all creatures reflected in His own essence. All
created beings have their types and exemplars in the Divine
ideas which are identified with the essence of God. Male-
branche thus improves on Plato. The ideas are no longer
separate entities ; they are one with the mind and nature of
God. Since we exist in God as in the place of spirits, there is
no reason why we should not have an immediate knowledge
or intuition of Him. '•^ Dieu est tres ctroitemcnt uni a nos dines
pay sa presence, de sortc qu'on pent dire qu'il est le lieu des esprits,

step is to guarantee the validity of this criterion. I find within me
a clear idea of an Infinite Being. Whence is this ? (a) Clearly not
from a finite creature ; and mc>reover (b) the idea of an Infinite
Being involves all possible attiibutes including existence. Ergo,
such a Being really exists. The idea of infinite also clearly implies
perfection and veracity ; but a veracious God cannot have created
me for perpetual and necessary deception. When, therefore, I
have a clear idea, I must be in possession of truth. Scientific
certainty is now restored, and the construction of a bridge from the
subjective to the objective world eftected. I have a clear idea of
mathematical axioms, of the physical universe as extended, &c., &c.
There are several fatal objections to the doctrine of Descartes,
(i) The system of Methodical Doubt leads logically to absolute
scepticism. We cannot prove the veracity of our faculties ; if we
start with even fictitious doubt we can never recover certainty of
any value. (2) The criterion of "clear " ideas is vague, indefinite,
and worthless. (3) His attempted justification involves a vicious
circular argument. The existence and veracity of God are proved
by my possession of a clear idea, and again the validity of my clear
ideas is itself established by the veracity of God. For a full
treatment of Descartes' System, cf. Rickaby, First Principles, c. ix.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 259

dc memequc les espaccs sont en iin sens le lieu des corps.'" {Recherche
de la Verite, Lib. III. Pt. 2, c. 6.)

We have not, however, a complete comprehension of the Infi-
nite Being. Nor do we behold Him absolutely as He is in Hitnself,
but only as He is in relation to creatures. (This thought was
developed by later ontologists, as in Gioberti's teaching that
the primary act of intelligence is the apprehension of God as
creating existences ; and Rosmini's virtual identification of
our intuition of the ideal, or possible being, with that of the
Infinite Being.) The Divine ideas, in fact, mediate between
our minds and material objects : We see all things in God.

Criticism. — The doctrine that the Infinite Being is the
immediate and proper object of human cognition, and the
source of our knowledge of all other things, is called Ontolo-
gisni. It is exposed to several fatal objections : (i) The most
careful reflective examination of our consciousness fails to
detect the alleged intuition of God. (2) The intuition of God
as having relation to creatures would involve an immediate
apprehension of His essence. (3) All our knowledge starts from
the sensuous perception of material objects, and from these
our analogical conceptions of immaterial beings are formed
by abstraction and exclusion of imperfections incompatible
with supernatural existence. Moreover, we invariably turn
back to sensuous cognitions to illustrate our more abstract
notions, which would not be the case if the Infinite immortal
being were the primitive and proper object of our intellect.
(4) The theory rests on a false assumption of a mere acci-
dental union existing between soul and body, and is in conflict
with the intimate relations subsisting between our sensuous
and intellectual knowledge. (5) All forms of ontologism which
teach that the immediate objects of our perception are not
material creatures, but the ideas or the essence of God incline
on the one hand towards the idealism of Berkeley, and on the
other towards the pantheism of Spinoza, as they tend to
identify the visible universe with God Himself.

In favour of ontologism it is urged that it accounts for the
universality, necessity, and eternal character of our intellectual
ideas, as they possess these properties in God; and, in
addition, it explains the presence of the conception of the
Infinite Being in our minds. The answer is, that these facts
can also be accounted for by intellectual abstraction and
reflexion exercised on the data supplied by sense, without
gratuitously assuming an immediate vision of God.

Christian Philosophy has always taught that the essences
of created beings are faint infinitesimal reflections of arche-
typal ideas in the Divine Mind. The eternal intrinsic
possibility of each object, the ideal plan which when actuahzed

26o RATIONAL LIFE.

makes up its essence, has its ultimate foundation in the
eternal essence of God, contemplated by the Divine Intellect
as imitable ad extra. It is realized in the physical order by
the creative act of the Divine Will ; and it is discovered by
our intellect in the creature, as we perceive the plan of the
artist in his work. Ontologism thus inverts the true order of
knowledge. We do not descend to a knowledge of the thing
through the Divine Idea, but we ascend to the Divine Idea
from the thing.

Pantheistic Monism. — Notwithstanding his exaggerated
dualism, Descartes' inaccurate definition of substance as, "that
which so exists that it stands in need of nothing else for its
existence," his denial of all real causal action by creatures,
and his reduction of the essence of matter to extension, and
that of the soul to thought, contain the germs of the pan-
theistic Monism developed by the Jew, Baruch Spinoza (1632 —
1677). The fact that the exposition of mental life given by
various popular writers on empirical psychology at the
present day admittedly results in Spinoza's monism, is our
excuse for devoting here some space to the founder of modern
pantheism.^ His system is elaborated in his chief work, the
Ethica, in geometric fashion from a few definitions and axioms:
Substance is "that which exists in itself, and is conceived
by itself, i.e., the conception of which can be formed without
the aid of the conception of anything else." It follows from
this definition that there can be only one substance, self-
existing and infinite. Attribute is "that which the mind
perceives as constituting the essence of substance." A mode
is " the accident of substance, or that which is in something
else through the aid of which it is conceived." The one
absolutely infinite substance is constituted by innumerable
relatively infinite attributes, of which only two are known to
us. These are extension and thought. They manifest them-
selves in finite modes which comprise the universe of physical
things and minds with which we are acquainted. Every
particular existence is only a modification, an individualiza-
tion of the universal substance. Neither human souls nor
material objects are self-subsistent; they are merely transitory
modes, or as recent writers say, " aspects " of the one
infinite being. This one eternal, absolute substance is God.
This God is the immanent indwelling, self-evolving cause of
the totaUty of things. It is neither intelligent nor free. All
things are identified in it. God and the universe differs
merely as natiira naturans and natura naturata. The Divine
substance evolves itself according to the inner necessity of

3 Cf. Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. II. p. 369; Hoffding, Outlines
of Psychology, p. 68.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 261

its being, and this is the only " freedom " which it possesses.
The laws of nature are absolutely immutable. They proceed
from the essence of God with the same necessity as its
geometrical properties flow from the essence of the circle or
triangle. Divine action is not in view of ends ; there are no
final causes.

Thought never acts on the extended, nor matter on mind.
Both harmoniously develop their serial changes in parallel
lines, but in mutual independence. The dualism of Descartes
is thus retained, but only to be unified in the identity of the
infinite substratum. The soul is the " idea " — the subjective
aspect — of the body. They are really one individual thing
differently conceived. Both are merely modes or phases of the
Divine substance ; the one of the attribute of thought, the
other of extension.* All things are animated, though in varying
degrees of perfection. The supposed freedom of the human will
is an illusion. Every incident in the history of the universe is
necessarily evolved out of the infinite substance, and so has
been inexorably predetermined from all eternity. Good is that
which is useful to human well-being ; evil is the reverse. Since
the soul is merely an aspect of the body, immortality in the
form of a continuity of personal life after dissolution of the
body is of course impossible. The individual will be re-
absorbed in the omnivorous infinite substance. We are only
" tiny wavelets on the great ocean of substance, we roll
our little course, and sink to rise no more." Such is the
philosophical conception of the human soul, of God and of
the universe, to which much of the current psychology is
designed to conduct the reader. It, therefore, seems desirable
that the student should clearly understand whither he is to be
led by the " new Spinozism."

We cannot enter into a criticism of pantheism here. It
suffices to say that Spinoza's theory is entirely built up out of
his definitions and axioms, and that these have been shown
to be inaccurate and untenable by many writers ; whilst even
in his demonstrations the author does not consistently adhere
to them.'^ The identification of God with blind necessarily-
evolving all-devouring substance is little, if at all, preferable
to bald and naked atheism. The fatalism involved in the

•* " Mens (humana) at corpus unum idemque sunt individuum,
quod jam sub cogitationis, jam sub extensionis attribute concipitur."
{Ethica, Pt. II. Prop. 21.)

^ Cf. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 200 — 205, and 449 — 460 ;
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theories, Vol. I. pp. 234 — 370; Saisset,
Modern Pantheism, Vol. I. pp. 92 — 160. Ueberweg's History of
Philosophy, Vol. II. pp. 55, seq. , also contains some good criticisms
of Spinoza's system.

262 NATIONAL LIFE.

system is subversive of tiie notions of responsibility, merit,
duty, and sin, good and evil, together with all moral ideas.
Finally, the belief of mankind in a future life is an idle
dream.

Leibnitz (1646 — 1716). — In marked opposition to the sensa-
tionism of Locke on the one hand and to the monism of Spinoza
on the other stands the German Leibnitz. Agreeing with the
Cartesian view of the soul as essentially active, he defended
the existence of innate ideas against the English empiricist ;
whilst instead of the one universal substance of the Jewish
pantheist he substitutes an infinite number of individual
substances, monads. Retaining the excessive dualism of
Descartes, with its inevitable denial of interaction between
soul and body, yet seeking to avoid alike the continuous
series of miracles required by the doctrine of " Occasion-
alism," the mysticism of the Vision en Dieii, and the fatalistic
Pantheism of Spinoza, Leibnitz invented the ingenious
theory of Pre-established Harmony. The universe he holds to
be composed of an infinite number of monads. These monads
are simple unextended substances, energetic atoms, endowed
with forces analogous to the ideas or emotions of the mind.
A laiv of continuity in the form of a continuous gradation in
stages of perfection holds universally throughout creation
from the lowest and most imperfect to the highest created
monad. God is the primitive, uncreated, infinite monad.
Spirits and human minds are single monads of high rank.
Material substances, including the human body, consist of
aggregates of inferior monads. There is no real transient
action between different monads. The existence of each is
made up of a series of immanent changes developed in
harmony with those of the rest of the universe of monads.
The states or "ideas" of each monad reflect, more or less
clearly in proportion to its rank, the condition of all other
monads. Each monad is thus a mirror of the universe — a
microcosm imaging the macrocosm. The soul and body of man
have been so created and mated by God as to run, like two
clocks started together, through parallel series of changes.
Since all monads have been originally created with appro-
priate initial velocities and corresponding rates of develop-
ment, Leibnitz holds that all the phenomena of perception
and volition are adequately accounted for. Such is the theory
of Pre-established Harmon)-.

The principle of sufficient reason, that nothing can happen
without a sufficient or determining reason, plays an important
part in his scheme. The Divine and the human will alike
require a determining ground for every act. The creation of
the present out of all possible worlds which hovered eternally

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 263

before the mind of God, is optimistically explained by its
being the absolutely best. Its evolution is the gradual
realization of a Divine plan.*^ Descartes' mechanical doctrine
of inert matter, Locke's conception of a purely passive
recipient mind, and the pantheistic monism of Spinoza in
which all existing beings are resolved into mere modes of
one infinite substance, are thus replaced by a system in which
all reality, whether spiritual or material, is transformed into
a hierarchical multiplicity of living forces. To Locke's
aphorism. Nil est in intellect u quod non fuerii pvius in sensu,
Leibnitz replied. Nisi intcllectiis ipse, defending the inherent
activity of the mind, and ascribing to it an original fund of
native endowments. Intellectual ideas and fundamental
principles must be innate, for they could not have been
generated by sensuous experience. We find them within us
as soon as we attain to perfect consciousness ; and they have
the character of universality and necessity, while sense dis-
closes only the particular and the contingent. We possess
the ideas of God, of our own Ego, and, consequently, of
duration and of change, none of which are in any way
derivable from experience. Still, like Descartes, Leibnitz at
times tones down the theory of innate ideas until it almost
vanishes. The ideas do not exist as actual cognitions from
the beginning; neither quite as pure potencies. They are
best described, comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des
habitudes, on des virtualites natnrelles, et non pas comme des
actions. They exist merely as unconscious perceptions until
they are evoked into the stage of apperception ; that is, until

^ Hence Leibnitz is commonly spoken of as an Idealist. The
ambiguity of this word should be carefully borne in mind by the
student. Idealism or rationalistic idealism in one usage is equivalent
to Teleologism, and denotes the view that the world is governed by
an idea or plan. Aristotle and theistic philosophers are idealists
in this sense, though they may believe in the existence of a real
material world. A special form of this teleological idealism is
optimism, which maintains the ideal perfection of the world. Idealism
in another signification, or Phenomenal Idealism, as we have explained
in a previous chapter, means the theory which denies all material
reality. We can only know ideas, viz., sensations, phenomena, &c.
Hume and Dr. Bain are idealists in this sense. Idealism in the
first signification is opposed to a purely mechanical theory of the
genesis and conservation of the world ; in the last to realism, or
the assumption of the existence of a real extra-mental world. The
term Realism is also ambiguous. It is employed (i) in the sense just
mentioned to signify the doctrine of a real independent world, and
(2) as opposed to Nominalism and Conceptnalism to denote the theories
(exaggerated and moderate realism) which maintain the objective
validity of general notions. Cf. First Principles, Ft. II. cc. ii. iv.

264 RATIONAL LIFE.

they are formally realized in consciousness. However,
although there appears to be placed a distinction between
the origin of intellectual ideas and the acts of sensuous
apprehension, the theory of Pre-established Harmony
necessarily makes them both equally the result of a purely
subjective evolution of the native possessions of the mind.

Criticism. — The system of Leibnitz is a beautiful and
ingenious creation of a great intellect, but fanciful and
incredible in the highest degree. As regards the special
question of perception, the hypothesis of a universe of
isolated monads working out independent lines in pre-
established harmony is gratuitous, incapable of proof,
and impossible to reconcile with the veracity of God or
the Freedom of the Will. The sole ground of the creation
of this world is, Leibnitz teaches, its superior rationality,
its absolute consistency, and inner perfection. Yet when
examined, it turns out to be a gigantic sham. " While none
of its members condition each other, everything goes on as if
they did."" With all the semblance of real unity and inter-
action, the parts possess no more genuine connexion than the
incidents of an unreal dream. As regards the wavering
exposition of the nature of innate ideas by both Descartes
and Leibnitz,^ it maj^ be observed, that, if all which is claimed
to be innate is the capability of forming ideas out of materials
presented by sense, then the doctrine is correct ; but if
instead it is held to be purely out of the mind's own resources,
apart from any real co-operation of external objects, that
our ideas are evolved, then all the objections to the innate
theory already indicated stand. There can, moreover, be
advanced no reason, which does not involve flagrant petit io
principii, for asserting that innate ideas truly represent the
objective world; and the logical outcome is therefore subjec-
tive idealism. For Leibnitz, especially, it is peculiarly inde-
fensible to assume the real existence of the material world
which, in his view, effects no real change in our mental states.
Nay, were it annihilated it would not be missed ! This
amazing consequence is worth remembering in view of the
frequent advocacy at the present day of theories of psycho-
physical parallelism, which similarly deny all interaction
between mental and bodily processes.

Rosmini (1797 — 1855) I'educed the stock of innate cogni-
tions to the single conception of ideal being, which he considers
to be a mental form, a condition of knowledge, and the light

' Cf. Lotze, Metaphysic, § 79.

8 Cf. Liberatore On Universals (Trans.), pp. 78, 90 — 102; also
Stockl, Geschichtc dcr Neucren Philosophie, Vol. I. § 78.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 265

of reason. This idea is involved in every other idea and
judgment, and so must precede them all. By the application
of this innate form to our sensations sensuous apprehension
is converted into the intellectual perception of objective exist-
ence. Against this single idea, all the old objections to the
larger hypothesis still hold. Moreover, the alleged combi-
nation of the intellectual form with the sensation presents to
us a very obscure and dubious conception, and affords an
extremely unsatisfactory account of the objective reality of
our knowledge of being. The inference from the universality
of the idea of being in our cognitions to its innate origin is
unwarrantable. Every perception contains this idea, because
every external object apprehended involves this attribute. It
is a form of all knowledge, a datum of all cognition, but not
therefore an innate form, a subjective datum. This idea is
generated at the dawn of intellectual life, though at first it is
presented in the vaguest and most ill-defined form. Finally,
if this idea which is predicated of all real objects be, as
Rosmini in his later writings implies, an intuition of the
Infinite Being, the doctrine leads to Pantheism.''

Innate a priori Mental Forms. — Excited by the thorough-
going scepticism of Hume, which destroyed the possibility of
knowledge, Kant (1724 — 1804) attempted to elaborate a theory
of cognition which, combining the elements of truth possessed
by Locke, Descartes, and Leibnitz, would afford a solid basis
for science. The chaotic and conflicting systems of specula-
tion with which Germany has been deluged during the past
century are very significant evidence as to the amount of
success attending Kant's eftbrt.

His chief works are the Critique of the Pure Reason and

^ Besides the arguments in favour of innate ideas indicated in
the brief accounts given of the above writers, it has been urged : (i)
that thought is essential to the human mind, and so must have been
ever present ; (2) that at all events the desire of happiness, which
involves many ideas, is innate ; (3) that axioms or first principles,
intellectual and moral, are known by all from an early age, and
must therefore be implanted from the beginning. It may be
replied: (i) that \.h.e faculty of thought is essential to the soul, and
possibly the exercise of its vegetative or sentient functions may be
continuous, but there is absolutely no evidence that actual thought is
essential ; (2) that the aptitude or disposition to seek happiness
when occasions are presented to us, is indeed innate ; but this is quite
different from innate actual desires or cognitions of particular forms
of happiness; (3) that such universal cognitions are also merely
the result of our common faculties. Given certain experiences, the
intellect of man is at an early age capable of discovering by
observation, comparison, and reflexion, simple and obvious truths.

266 RATIONAL LIFE.

the Critique of the Practical Reason. The former treatise
comprises an examination into the origin, extent, and hmits
of knowledge. Tlie first step in Philosophy must be criticism
as opposed to dogmatism on the one side, and to scepticism on
the other. By criticism Kant means an attempted scrutiny
into the range and validity of our knowledge. Dogmatism, he
maintains, assumes while scepticism rejects, alike unwarrant-
ably, the veracity of our faculties. Kant's criticistn results in
the denial of real knowledge of everything transcending
experience. There is a purely subjective or mental co-efficient
in all cognition which destroys its validity. This is especially
illustrated in synthetic a priori judgments. Judgments are
either synthetic or analytic. The latter, always necessary in
character, are formed by mere analysis of the subject, e.g.,
the whole is greater than a part. Synthetic judgments may be
either a posteriori and contingent, e.g., England is a naval
power; or a priori and necessary, e.g.. Nothing can begin to
exist without a cause. Two straight lines cannot inclose a
space. How are these synthetic a priori judgments possible ?
Whence is their peculiar necessity and their universality ?
This is the problem attacked by the Kantian philosophy.
These judgments are not, it is asserted, derived from mere
experience ; for mere empirical generalizations can never
attain this absolute kind of certainty. Yet they are not purely
analytical or verbal propositions. Synthetic a priori judgm.ents
are effected, Kant answers, by the action of certain innate
mental forms which condition all our knowledge.^** Whatever
is presented to the mind is moulded by these forms of the
Ego, and unified in the transcendental unity of apperception, thsit
is, in the permanent activity of the pure original unchange-
able self-consciousness. Human cognition is an amalgam of
two elements, a product of two co-efftcients — the form {die
Form) due to the constitution of the mind, and the matter
{der Stoff) due to the action of the external object. We can
only know the phenomenon — the mental state resulting from
both factors. To the noumenon, the Ding-an-sich, the thing in

^•^ Kant thus agrees with Descartes and Leibnitz in maintaining
that universal and necessary axioms cannot be gathered from
external experience, but must have their source in the original
furniture of the mind itself. Whilst, however, the latter philoso-
phers ascribe to these cognitions, in spite of their subjective origin,
real or ontological validity, Kant more logically renounces this
tenet. Previous to Kant a priori knowledge meant knoidedge of
effects from their causes. He has arbitrarily changed the meaning of
the phrase to mean knowledge the necessity of which he asserted
to be due solely to the mind, and so to be independent of experience.
Cf. Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil. Vol. H. pp. i6i, 162.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 2Gj

itself, we can never penetrate. It is only revealed to ns as
shaped by the a priori fonn of the mind.

In Perception the a priori element is exhibited, as we have
described at length in chapter vi. in the sensnous intuitions
of space and iime, which mould our external and internal
sensibility.^^ The acts of the Understanding, which unify the
chaotic manifold presented by sense, are conditioned by
another class of twelve purely mental forms called categories.
These notions are a priori. They " lie ready in the under-
standing from the first." Things in themselves have not
unity, plurality, substantiality, causality, and the rest. These
categories are true not of the noumenon, but only of the
phenomenal object — that which appears in consciousness.
We are subjectively necessitated to think of change as under
the law of causation, of accident as inhering in substance,
and so on ; but we have no ground for supposing such to be
the case with the Ding-an-sich. With respect to General
Notions, Kant's doctrine involves a form of Conceptualisni
maintaining in opposition to Nominalism, the truly universal
character of concepts ; whilst on the other hand it denies the
extra-mental validity ascribed to them by Moderate Realism.

Finally, the activity of the Reason which still further
unifies the data offered by Sense and Understanding is also
conditioned by three purely subjective Ideas. They are the
psychological idea of the Soul, as the thinking substance ; the
cosmological idea of the universe as a totality ; and the idea of
God. These a priori conceptions apply to corresponding real
objects no more than the other forms and categories. They
are the source of inevitable illusions occasioning "paralo-
gisms " and " antinomies," or contradictions of the pure
reason itself. In particular the empty idea of the Ego is the
basis of the deceptive pseudo-science of Rational Psychology,
The conclusions of this science are all based on the ille-
gitimate application of the purely formal or subjective notion
of substance to the Ego as a noumenon. In deducing the attri-
butes of simplicity, identity, individuality, we invariably fall
into a paralogism confounding the Ego as logical subject of a
proposition with a real substance. We mistake the merely
formal, subjective unity of Self for that of a real indivisible
being. The aspiration to reach a knowledge of things-in-
themselves is doomed to failure : we can only know phenomena

^'^ The a priori form of space generates the necessity and
universality of all geometrical judgments, the form of time does
the same for arithmetical propositions — such at least is Kant's
view as interpreted by Hamilton, Mansel, Kuno Fischer, and others.
Mr. Mahaffy, Critical Philosophy, p. 64, contends that both sciences
were in Kant's opinion based on the intuition of space.-

268 RATIONAL LIFE.

■ — things when shaper! and coloured by mental forms. The
outcome of the criticism of the Pure Reason then is the
repudiation of knowledge regarding whatever transcends
experience.

The Critique of the Practical Reason contains Kant's moral
system — stoicism of a rigorous type. He there seeks to
restore in the form of belief what he has previously demolished
as rational cognition. Though the existence of the Deity, the
immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will are
incapable of proof, if not also replete with contradictions, yet
their admission is exacted by the needs of our moral nature.

Criticism. — (i) It has been forcibly urged against Kant's
system as a whole that the central problem of the Critique —
the question whether our faculties can attain real truth — is
based on an erroneous view of the proper aim and method
of Philosophy. The dogmatical standpoint is the only one
which can be consistently maintained. We must from
the beginning, under penalty of absolute scepticism and
intellectual suicide, assume the capacity of the mind to attain
real truth. Every attempt to demonstrate the veracity or
the mendacity of our faculties must involve either a vicious
circle or a contradiction. Thought, as Hegel argued, can
only be scrutinized by thought, and to require a criticism of
thought antecedently to the acceptance of its validity is
like refusing to enter the water till we are able to swim.^-

(2) The proof of the subjectivity of the categories and ideas
rests largely on the analogy which holds between them and
the forms of sensibility, Space and Time, the subjective nature
of which is supposed to be already established. For a refuta-
tion of this latter point we refer the reader back to pp. 118
— 121. Kant's various illustrations of synthetic a priori judg-
ments are reducible either to contingent a posteriori generali-
zations or analytical truths. For a brief treatment of this
question we refer the reader to the volume of this series on
Logic, pp. 61 — 67. An elaborate justification of our assertion
will be found in Balmez, Bk. I. c. xxix., and Harper's Meta-
physics of tlic School, Bk. IV. c. v.

(3) Kant's argument against Rational Psychology is based
on his peculiar theory of knowledge and the assumption of
his complex scheme of forms, categories, and ideas interven-
ing between the mind and its cognition of itself. Accordingly
it shares the fate of that theory. But even if the mind
enjoyed only a mediate or representative perception of

^- Cf. Lotze, Mctaphysic, §§ 8, 9. For a general justification of
the doctrine of Philosophical Method asserted here, see Rickaby,
First Principles of Knowledge, cc. vi. vii.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 269

external reaJity its knowledge of its own states and of itself as
existing in these states is immediate. We do not deduce the
substantiality of the soul from an a priori conception of
substance ; nor is our conviction of its simplicity, abiding
identity and individual reality based on a paralogism. We
have an immediate intellectual apprehension of the mind in
its oivn operations. Self-consciousness combined with memory
reveals the mind to us as an indivisible reality which remains
the same amid a succession of varying feelings, which is the
connecting-point of all thoughts, the subject of real activities
and modifications, and knowing itself distinguishes itself from
all other beings. The unity of the mind is not merely formal.
This mind, self, or ego cannot be an empty illusory idea, or a
pure nothing. The nature of self-consciousness will be care-
fully-investigated in a future chapter.

(4) Kant's assumption of the existence of an external
noumenon in any shape, is inconsistent with the reduction of
the principle of causality to an a priori form. We are justified
in believing in an external reality as the cause of our sensa-
tions only if the principle of causality is really valid, applicable
to noumena, and not a purely subjective illusion.

(5) Finally, as a barrier against the scepticism of Hume,
and as a solid basis for science, the Critical Philosophy is a
complete failure. Hume analyzes all knowledge into transitory
mental states ; and necessary truths into irresistible subjective
beliefs generated by customary associations. The substitu-
tion by the German philosopher of 7iecessary hut stiW purely
subjective laws or forms of thought for such beliefs, does not
really touch the sceptic. Inasmuch as these laws inhere in
all human minds and condition all experience, Kant calls
them at times objective and universal as opposed to individual
variability, but still they are merely mental. They might, it
is true, explain the harmony of the activity of human minds,
were these isolated from the physical universe and occupied
solely in deducing mathematical theorems from abstract
axioms. But Astronomy, Geology, Physics, Chemistry,
Physiology, assume and verify the reality of laws other than
the creations of the mind. They assert unmistakably that
there are real powers acting upon us and upon each other in
space and time, according to laws which we know : they show
us that different minds agree in their representations of such
modes of action : and they demonstrate that these regular
modes of action continue unchanged in the absence of all
human minds. Science, in fact, assumes, and the verification
of its predictions justifies the assumption, that the laws of
cognition mirror the laws of real existence. Kant denies this,
and his substitution of innate and necessary but still purely

270 RATIONAL LIFE.

subjective forms of knowledge for the subjective beliefs of
Hume, does not afford a whit more solid ground for
science. ^■^

Later German Idealism. — That the intermediate position
between dogmatism and scepticism assumed by the Critical
Philosophy is untenable was speedily demonstrated by the
logic of histor}'. Like every system of partial scepticism it
inevitably leads to universal doubt and only awaited the
thinker sui^ciently consistent and audacious to draw the
final conclusion. If such irresistible convictions as those of
the reality of space, time, causality, unity, personal identity,
and the rest are to be deemed illusions, then not only the
instinctive beliefs and yearnings on which Kant would rest
the existence of God and a future life, are worthless, but also
our persuasion of the extra-mental existence of things-in-
themselves is unjustifiable. J. G. Fichte (1762 — 1814) boldly
took this last step, and even in Kant's lifetime logically
deduced from his master's principles consequences from
which the author of the Critical Philosophy shrank as false
and pernicious.

If the formal element of cognition, space, causality, and
the rest be a purely subjective creation, argued this uncom-
promising thinker, why may not the matter of knowledge, and
consequently the noumenon itself be also a mental fiction ?
Accordingly he concluded as the simplest explanation that
both matter and form of knowledge are the product of the
activity of the Ego. The manifold contents of experience,
just as well as the a priori intuitions and categories of cognition
are furnished by a creative faculty within us. Only the Ego
is ; what seems the non-ego is only its own self-limitation.
Each human mind, or finite ego is, however, merely a mode
of the Absolute Ego which is ever opposing itself to itself.

Empiricism. — In complete opposition to Kant and the
defenders of innate ideas stands the Empiricist school.
Previous to Kant and Hume, in his Essay on the Human
Understanding (i6go), John Locke sought " to inquire into the
origin, certainty, and extent of knowledge, and the grounds
of belief, opinion, and assent." This work is the fountain-
head of modern sensism, empiricism, materialism, and

13 Readings on Kant, Kleutgen, op. cit. §§ 337 — 368; Balmez,
op. cit. Bk. I. c. 29, Bk. III. cc. 16, 17, Bk. VII. cc. 12 — 14;
Martineau, A Study of Religion, Vol. I. pp. 70 — So; T. Pesch, S.J.,
Kant et la science moderne; Peillaube, op. cit. Pt. II. c. 2; Piat,
op. cit. pp. 140 — 180; Ueberweg, Logic, §§ 36 — 44; History of
Phil. Vol. II. pp. 159, seq., especially the notes; Dr. Stockl,
Geschichte, Vol. II. ; and Dr. Gutberlet, Logik und Erkenntnisstheoric,
pp. 185—204.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 271

phenomenal idealism.'* Locke starts with the rejection of
innate ideas or innate principles in any form. The mind is
originally a tabula rasa, a clean slate on which nothing is
written. The sources of all our knowledge are external
sense-perception and reflexion or internal perception. Nil
est in intellectu quod non fiicrit prius in sensu. Knowledge
consists in the perception of agreement or difference hetween
our ideas. The ultimate elements of knowledge are ideas
received through the senses. These aggregated in various
ways form compound or complex ideas, which are divided into
three classes, modes, substances, and relations. Ideas of
primary qualities of bodies — extension, solidity, figure, &c.,
are like their objective correlates, but ideas of secondary
qualities, taste, colour, &c., are not. By reflexion or internal
sensibility we know our volitions and feelings. By internal
and external sense combined, we form ideas of power, unity,
and the like. Substance, the self-subsisting substratum which
we imagine to be the support of the qualities of bodies, is a
mental fiction. It cannot be apprehended by internal or
external sense ; but, as we are unable to imagine that the
ideas we perceive by our senses inhere in nothing, we suppose
the existence of a substratum which binds them together.

Influence. — Locke's influence in Philosophy has been great
mainly in two directions. On the one hand he gave a powerful
impulse to Empirical Psychology, and on the other his
defective analysis of our mental endowments resulted in a
sensationalism which rapidly developed into materialism and
scepticism. The stimulus given to the study of mental
phenomena should within its own sphere have been a real
gain to Philosophy, but occurring unfortunately at an epoch
when Metaphysics had fallen into discredit, the use and value
of this method in the treatment of metaphysical questions
proper became absurdly over-estimated. Accordingly, most
modern thinkers from Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, to Mill
and Mr. Spencer, have been led to devote a prodigious
amount of labour to the obscure question of the origin of
knowledge, and then, on the strength of some very dubious

" The student is sometimes confused by the assertion that a
particular tenet leads both to idealism and to materialism. The
explanation is that the one is a deduction of Epistemology, the other
of Rational Psychology. The former refers to the nature and validity
of knowledge, the latter to the constitution of the soul. Thus, as we
show elsewhere, the sensist philosopher in expounding his theory of
cognition must dissolve the material world into a series of conscious
ideas, whilst in dealing with Rational Psychology, he must reduce
the mind, that is, this series of conscious states, to an aspect
or function of nerve matter.

272

RATIONAL LIFE.

solutions therein adopted, to determine authoritatively the
validity or invalidity of all our cognitions and beliefs.

As regards particular tenets of Locke we have only space
to remark: (i) that his conception of the mind as a passive
recipient tablet, and his non-recognition of its supra-sensuous
activity, are fatal blemishes to his psychology ; (2) that as a
consequence he can give no adequate account of all our most
important notions, such as those of God, self, substance, and
the various intellectual operations insisted on in a previous
chapter; (3) that his view of knowledge as the perception
of agreement or disagreement between ideas and not things,
and his doctrine of mediate perception leads inevitably to
subjective ideaUsm. If we can only know our mental states,
then we have no knowledge of the existence of a material
world beyond these states. (4) His use of the important
word idea is fatally ambiguous throughout his whole work,
and he similarly confounds mental with merely intra-organic
phenomena. The vital deficiencies in his doctrine of sense-
perception and in his conception of intellect were evinced in
the next generation by the Idealistic and Sceptical deductions
of Berkeley and Hume on the one hand, and by the Sen-
sualism of Condillac, Helvetius, and the French MateriaHsts
on the other.15 Both Berkeley and Hume ignore the essential
difference between sense and intellect, but as we have already
sketched their systems (pp. 108— no), we must omit them
here. The most thoroughgoing disciple of Locke in this
direction was the French philosopher Condillac. He omits
Locke's second source of experience, reflexion, altogether, and
endeavours to build up the edifice of knowledge by external
sense alone. Hartley, in this country, similarly conceived
the mind as a passive recipient something, in which by
association our sensations and phantasms combine, coalesce,
and become refined into spiritual cognitions. It will, how-
ever, be most useful to pass on to the latest representatives
of the Sensist school, and we shall take Bain and Sully as its
leading present advocates.

Recent Nominalism. — The following account of Conception
and Judgment is given by Dr. Bain : " We feel identity among
stars in spite of their variety, the things thus identified make
a class, and the operation is called classifying." " We are
able to attend'^^ to the points of agreement of resembling things

15 The best examination in English of Locke's system is,
perhaps, that from the Neo-Hegelian standpoint, contained in
Green's' Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. Cf.
also Stockl's Geschichte. §§ 32—45-

1'' True, we are capable of attention, but this implies more than
sensibility.' Again, what are " points of agreement " ? Clearly not

THEORIES OE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 273

and to neglect the points of difference, as when we think of
the roundness of round bodies . . . this is named the power
of abstraction." Nevertheless " abstraction does not consist
in the mental separation of one property of a thing from the
other properties, as in thinking of the roundness of the moon
apart from its luminosity, . . . such a separation is imprac-
ticable:' We merely " imagine a thing in company with
others having the attribute in question, and affirm nothing of
the one concrete thing which is not true of all the others."
We sometimes seem to approach to an abstract idea, but it
is really impossible. Even in geometry the concrete lines and
figures are a necessity. " Length is the name /or one or more
things agreeing in the property so called, and the property is
nothing but this agreement." " The only generality possessing
separate existence is the Name. General ideas separated from
particulars have no counterpart in Reality (as implied in
Realism), and no Mental existence (as affirmed in Con^
ceptualism). . . . Neither can we have a mental Conception
of any property abstracted from all others; we cannot
conceive a circle except as of some colour and some size ; we
cannot conceive justice except by thinking of just actions."
Logically enough, then, following out the principles of
sensism, he holds also that " the existence of a supposed
external and independent material world is the crowning
instance of the abstraction converted into the separate
entity."!^

Criticism. — Such is Bain's psychology of universal con-
cepts, and we shall now comment on it. The expressions,
" feeling " or " sense of difference or identity," are inaccurate
if used of the comparative act in the same meaning as when
applied to the consciousness of the original sensations. The
perception of agreement or difference is an intellectual cogni-
tion. If " we are able to attend to the points of agreement ol
resembling things, and to neglect the points of difference,"
then it is not true that " we cannot make a mental separation
of one property of a thing from other properties." Attention
to one particular aspect of objects and neglect of the rest
constitutes precisely the mental separation of the former

a concrete quality, like a taste or smell, capable of stimulating a
sensuous faculty. " Agreement " is a relation between perceived things
and, consequently, its apprehension requires the exercise of an
additional activity superior to that engaged in the two or more
existing impressions. This activity must hold the two separate
impressions together and discern the relation of likeness or
unlikeness between them.

1'^ Mental Science, Bk. II. c. v.

274 RATIONAL LIFE.

property ; and in this the essence of abstraction consists. It
is, moreover, on the exercise of this intellectual faculty that
the science of geometry, and, in fact, all general knowledge
depends. We attend to those features of our figure which
are common to all the class, and we omit the rest. Our
demonstration proceeds solely from the attribute or group of
attributes which are contained in the concept of the species
of figure with which we deal ; and if we allow any accidental
qualities to intrude, our proof may become at once vitiated.
It is, of course, indisputable that we cannot picture by the
imaf^ination length separated from the line, or surface from
the plane; but this does not prevent us from thinking the
length whilst we ignore the other qualities. When I prove a
thesis in geometry regarding the length of some line, I fix my
attention solely on the length of the imperfect line before me,
although of course my senses must apprehend it as possessing
breadth. Now, this act of attention is a thought, a cognition
presenting to me that something which forms the subject of
my elaborate demonstration — a universal idea : and the
denial either of its abstract character or of its real objec-
tive foundation annihilates the science of Geometry. (See
p. 250.)

Dr. Bain's definition of length as " the name of one or
more things agreeing in this property," illustrates well the
violence that must be done to common language and common
thought in order to adapt them to the needs of the Sensist
Psychology. Length is not the name of things — the fishing-
rod, the piece of string, and the River Thames — any more
than motion is the name of the steam-engine, the swallow,
and the perambulator. It is simply the name of a common
property which the mind can consider and reason about
"irrespective of any other relations." It is quite true that
we cannot form a sensuous image or phantasm of a circle
except of some particular colour, size, &c., and it is also true
that the intellect cannot elicit a universal idea without the
presence of a concrete image ; but given this latter, we can
contemplate in thought the specific or universal features
abstracting from those which are individual.

The comparative or judicial activity of the mind Dr. Bain
resolves into the Law of Relativity. (See p. 91.) He holds that
" the really fundamental separation of the Intellect is into
three facts called (i) Discrimination, the sense, feeling, or
consciousness of difference. (2) Similarity, the feeling or
consciousness of agreement, and (3) Retentiveness, or the
power of memory or acquisition. These three functions,
however, much as they are mingled in our mental operations,
are yet totally distinct properties, and each the groundwork

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 275

of a distinct structure. . . . They are the Intellect, the whole
Intellect, and nothing but the Intellect."

The attempted reduction of Intellect to a mere phase of
the Law of Relativity lies open to the fatal objection that it
confounds in the crudest manner two essentially distinct
things — capacity for discriminable feelings, and the power of
discriminating between them. Bain's language concerning the
so-called "facts" of discrimination ignores the radical diver-
sfty between the mere occurrence of unlike feelings and the
comparative act of the higher faculty by which that unlike-
ness is cognized. Transition from one feeling to the other,
change from one state of consciousness to another, is very
different from the intellectual act of attention by which we
may and do at times recognize that transition, and compare
those states. Among low stages of animal life we frequently
find the keenest susceptibility to different sensations. But the
intellectual perception of them as different is wanting. The
same objection appHes to his treatment of the " fact " of
agreement.

With regard to the third " fact " or "function " he is even
less happy. " Retentiveness " strictly understood means
simply the' persistence in the mind or body of a disposition
towards the re-excitation of a state which has once occurred.
Now this capability of conservation or resuscitation is not a
specially intellectual or cognitive property at all. If, however,
it is to be interpreted more largely as involving recognition
and equivalent to " memory," then it is clearly not simple or
ultimate in Dr. Bain's sense, but is in part made up of the
other " fact " or cognition of agreement.

Dr. Sully, who is at present probably the most popular
representative of the Sensist school, seems to have felt the
inadequacy of the account of our knowledge given by his
predecessors. In chapters ix. x. of his Outlines of Psychology,
he analyzes and describes the process of thinking. Some of
his remarks there appear to us accurate enough ; but usually
when this is the case they seem to be inconsistent with
his Sensationalist assumption that " all mental activity is of
one and the same kind throughout its manifold phases.'' (p. 26.)^'^

^8 The phrase "manifold phases" is happily vague; but in
substance Mr. Sully adopts the sensist principle that at bottom all
mental life is essentially of one kind — sensuous consciousness. How
the admission of a power of " active self-direction " (p. 73) and of
those various activities involved in comparison of impressions,
cognition of relations, and reflexion on states of self (cc. ix. x.) is
to be reconciled with this view, he does not attempt to explain.
For our own part, we cannot easily imagine a more fundamental
difference in kind than that between the sensibility exhibited in

276

NATIONAL LIFE.

We can only cite a few typical phrases which will nevertheless
sufficiently justify our observations: "All thinking is repre-
sentation hke imagination, but it is of a different kind."
" Thinking deals with abstract qualities of things— that is,
aspects common to them and many other things, e.g., the
possession of life."

These statements are true, but directly opposed to
Nominalism, involved in Sensism, and frankly accepted by
Dr. Bain. If " thinking is representation like imagination,
but of a different kind,'' and if " abstract qualities of things,
that is, aspects common to them and many other things," can
be thus represented in thought, then evidently the Sensist
tenet that there can be no really general notions or concepts,
and that the only thing which is universal is the word or
name, is abandoned. Again : thinking, " like the simpler
forms of cognition, consists in discrimination and assimi-
lation, in detecting differences and agreements," but " it is
of a higher kind involving much more activity of mind. . . .
All thinking involves comparison. ... By an act of com-
parison is meant the voluntary direction of the attention to
two or more objects at the same moment, or in immediate
succession, with a view to discover differences or agreements."
This power he holds to be beyond that of even intelligent
brutes. Here, again, the description is correct, but utterly
incompatible with the empirical conception of the mind as a
mere collection of impressions.

Generic Images. — In treating of the nature and origin of
universal ideas. Dr. Sully adheres to Nominalism. He seeks,
indeed, to improve that doctrine, which has suffered some-
what severely under recent criticism, but yet accepts the old
sensist view, which confounds the phantasm of the imagina-
tion with the intellectual concept. He defines the concept as
"the representation in our minds answering to a general
name, such as sailor, man, animal." But, " what is in the
mind is a kind of composite image formed by the fusion or

passive sensations awakened by the reception of concrete im-
pressions, and the active and reflective energies exerted in reflective
attention to, and comparison of, these impressions. If there is a
mind in the sense of a real unit, an abiding energy, endowed with
intellectual or spiritual as well as sensuous powers, then it is con-
ceivable that such a mind should be capable of reacting through its
superior faculty, and of attending to, comparing, and reflecting
upon the sensuous impressions which it has received. But if all
mental life is essentially one in kind, and the mind itself but the
series of sensuous states, then, where this active self-direction and
this reflective comparing force is to come from, we confess ourselves
unable to conceive.

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 277

coalescence of many images of single objects, in which indi-
vidual differences are blurred, and only the common features
stand out prominently. . . . This may be called a typical, or
generic image.''

The Generic Image, like a composite photograph, is, in
fact, the residual effect of a series of impressions of similar
objects; the common lineaments are deepened whilst the
marginal and accidental variations annul each other, leaving
a vague outline. Dr. Sully believes that this generic image
offers " a way of reconciHng the opposed views. As generic it
differs in an important way from the detailed particular image.
As an image it meets the contention of the nominalist that all
ideation is at bottom imagination." {The Human Mind, p. 346.)

Criticism.— (i) This remark suggests the impression that Dr.
Sully has missed the significance of the controversy. Which-
ever side be right, the dispute between Nominalists and their
opponents is by no means so puerile. The difference between
the Sensationist conception of mental action and that of the
Kantian, Aristotelian, and other schools, which maintain the
reality of universal concepts, is of too fundamental a character
to be so easily bridged over. The hypothesis that the
universal concept is a decayed, worn-down image, instead of
being a distinct and definite phantasm, as implied by earlier
empiricists, is not hkely to win realist converts. (2) As a
matter of fact, this " generic " image is as far removed from
the universal concept proper as is a vivid definite image. It
is merely a confused fluctuating phantasm with the indi-
viduahzing characteristics partially obliterated ; a _ sort of
mean or average picture, somewhat as a figure seen in a fog.
But though imperfect and indistinct, it is still a representation
of a particular character. When the mathematician proves a
theorem concerning the triangle, whether the diagram on the
black-board be clear and distinct, or faded and obscure, it is
in itself equally individual; but it assists the intehect to hold
before its gaze throughout the process the complexus of attri-
butes which constitute the essence and nature of triangle— the
concept of triangle. The phantasm of the imagination,
whether vivid and definite, or vague and " generic," performs
a similar function, but in itself it is as individualistic as the
figure on the black-board.i^ Xhe concept alone is truly
universal, since it alone really and completely applies to all

19 " L'image generique d'homme, represente des traits qui ne
sont pas communs a tous les hommes ; tous les hommes n'ont pas
un age moyen, une taille moyenne. Les enfants et les vieillards les
grands et les petits des deux sexes sont des hommes, et la represen-
tation qui les embrassera tous pourra seule etre appelee generale et
universelle ou simplement concept." (Peillaube, op. cit. p. 66.)

278 RATIONAL' LIFE.

possible members of the class. The concept too may be
quite distinct while the image is confused ; and the former is
stable whilst the latter varies from moment to moment. (See
above, pp. 237.) (3) Furthermore, it may be urged that the
generic image hypothesis is in conflict with the results of more
careful investigation into the working of the imagination. It
is clear from Galton's inquiries that people vary enormously
with respect to the vividness of their power of imagination
and visualization of past experiences. The best images which
many can form of absent individual objects, such as their
breakfast-table, their bed-room, or their father, are of the
vague "generic" type; whilst others profess to be able to
call up representations of these objects which rival the
original perceptions in liveliness and accuracy of detail.
When men think or reason about general classes of objects,
the indistinctness of their images naturally varies with their
individual powers of visualization. Some men apparently
employ much more distinct and vivid phantasms than others;
but the concept may be equally perfect and universal in both.
It can hardly be maintained that hazy images or confused
perceptions conduce to greater perfection of scientific notions,
yet this seems to be the logical consequence of the recent
theory which would reduce the general concept to the vague
and generic rather than to the clear and distinct phantasms of
the imagination. The truth is, it is radically different from both.^*'

^•^ Mr. G. F. Stout argues very effectiv^ely against the " generic "
image theory : "We may fairly, say that all images, as compared
with percepts, are vague, and it does not appear that the images
which are treated as representatives of a class, are more obscure
than others, or that they have a different kind of obscurity. If I
trace in my mind's eye the course of a river, or a particular walk
which I have taken, and if I do not make any extraordinary effort
to recall details, the images which pass through my mind are mere
outline sketches, in which certain characteristic features of objects
have a certain prominence, whilst the rest is left vague. Yet the
ideal train is wholly concerned with particulars, d^nd not with univer-
sals as such. Suppose that, on the contrary, I desire to bring before
my mind the general characters distinctive of the kind of substance
called " chalk." ... I find that the kind of image which suits my
purpose best, is one which is more definite and detailed than those
which serve my turn in recalling a series of particular facts. On
the whole, the obscure and fluctuating character of a mental image
seems rather to unfit it as a vehicle of generalization. , . . The
marginal obscurity makes the whole picture evanescent and fluctu-
ating. In many instances a percept better fulfils the function of a
class-type than a pictorial representation." (Analvtic Psychology,
Vol. II, pp. 180, 181. Cf. Peillaubc, Tltcorie dcs Concepts, pp. 57 — 68;
al.so Clarke, Logic, c. 7; and Kleutgen, op. cit. § 802.)

THEORIES OP CEMERAL KNOWLEDGE. 279

Positivism. — Sensationism and Empiricism, as we have
seen, lead as surely to phenomenism, or the denial of all
knowledge of things in themselves, as Kantianism. This
doctrine of nescience, which is now the creed of a large
number of scientists as well as professional philosophers,
received its most formal enunciation in the Positivism of
Auguste Comte (1798 — 1857), This is the substance of the
French philosopher's teaching : Metaphysics, or the investi-
gation of the first cause of things, of their inner nature and
last end, is a chimerical science. Human reason can never
learn anything about God, the soul, man's origin or destiny :
consequently Natural Theology and Rational Psychology are
alike illusory. Agnosticism, in fact, describes the true philo-
sophical attitude. The absolute in every form is unknowable ;
cognition is limited to the relative, the phenomenal. Theism,
atheism, pantheism, materialism, and spiritualism, are
equally irrational and indefensible. All attempts to search
after the ultimate causes of phenomena must be condemned
as worse than useless. All metaphysical entities, such as
substance, cause, faculty, force, should be banished from our
minds as empty and unreal phantoms. The aim of the
human intellect must henceforth be to observe, analyze, and
classify facts, to register the succession and coexistence of
phenomena, and then to generalize by induction so as to
formulate their laws ; but never may it seek in its reasonings
to transcend the field of experience. Laws of phenomena
constitute the goal of human science. Phenomena alone are
real, useful, positive. Positive science is therefore the science
of phenomena ; and the function of the Positive Philosophy
consists in the classification and methodizing of the
sciences.

The sciences Comte arranges according to their com-
plexity after a hierarchical plan. Ascending in serial order
from the simpler, more abstract and prior in order of time,
they are thus placed : mathematics, astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology, and sociology. Each depends upon all
the others which precede it. Psychology is merely a branch
of biology, to be investigated by objective methods (see
pp. 21, 22) ; whilst ethics is a department of sociology.

The other leading feature in Comte's system is the
historic conception of the three states. The human mind
in its development necessarily passes through three stages :
the theological, in which it explains natural phenomena by
the interference of personal agents — supernatural beings : the
metaphysical, in which it accounts for phenomena by meta-
physical entities, occult causes, and scholastic abstractions —
such as substances, forces, faculties, and the like ; finally, the

28o RATIONAL LIFE.

positive period, at last happily arrived, in which man abandons
all such futile investigations and confines himself to formu-
lating the laws which connect phenomena.

Later on Comte, acknowledging the necessity of an object
to satisfy the religious instincts of man's nature, crowned
his system by the invention of a curious species of religion —
the worship, with an elaborate ritual, of Humanity in general.
This last production of his speculative genius, however, met
with acceptance among very few of his followers. Indeed,
here in England the Positive Philosophy has experienced very
severe criticism at the hands of Spencer, Huxley, and others
who themselves profess many of its chief doctrines. In morals
Comte insisted much on altruism — aiming at the happiness not
of self but of others — as the ethical end of life. Christianity
fosters selfishness, and so the disappearance of Christian and
Theistic belief will lead, he prophesies, to great purity and
perfection of general morality.

Criticism. — We have to deal only with the psychology
of Positivism. It is needless to do more than recall the utter
failure of Comte's attempt to discredit introspection and to
degrade the science of the mind into a branch of cerebral
physiology. The practical outcome of his teaching is
materialism. As to Comte's oft-repeated assertion, reiterated
by his followers, that we can never know anything of the
absolute, but only of the relative ; it is a piece of dogmatism
deriving its chief plausibility from an ambiguity we have
before alluded to, in such terms as absolute, noumenon,
phenomenon, and relative. (See pp. 158, 159.) If by
" absolute " or " noumenon," be meant some element of
reality which never stands in any relation to our faculties,
and so never reveals itself to the mind, then it is obvious we
can never know that " absolute " or " noumenon." But, if
under the term " absolute " be included, as these writers
intend, active essences in the world around us, agents
which really cause and do not merely precede events, an
abiding being v/hich is the real subject of our evanescent
conscious states as well as the truly absolute, the primary
cause and last end of finite perishing creatures ; then,
assuredly, the human mind can attain knowledge of the
" absolute." Reason knows the absolute by the very fact
that it cognizes the relative to be relative. Knowledge of the
relative, as such, involves as its necessary consequence
knowledge of the absolute. It is because it recognizes the
ere itures and events of the physical world along with its own
states and acts as relative that the mind is led to the discern-
ment of the absolute author in the one case, and the per-
manent ground in the other. The phenomenal, the changing,

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 281

the relative are all unthinkable without the real, the permanent
— the absolute, if we choose to call it.^^

The prohibition of Positivism to search for knowledge of
anything beyond the region of sensible experience is arbitrary
and vain, whilst Comte's prophecies regarding the quiescence
of the human mind in the positivist creed are already
notoriously falsified. The principle of causality appeals to the
reason both as an objective, transcendental law, embracing
all contingent existence, and as an imperative, insatiable
impulse in the quest of truth. The instinct to seek out the
ultimate ivhy as well as the how is the essential outcome of
the rational constitution of the human mind. It is this inap-
peasable curiosity which most of all distinguishes man from
the brute animal ; and has been the motive power which
has effected every great advance in the extension of human
knowledge. The view, therefore, that the highest develop-
ment of human reason can content itself with the mere
accumulation, registration, and generalization of sensible
facts, and can remain in stolid indifference to all those great
problems which have engrossed the loftiest intelligence from
Plato and Aristotle to St. Thomas and Dante, and again
from these down to Newton and Leibnitz, is possible only to
a mind blinded by anti-theological prejudice.

The Origin of Axioms and Necessary Truths : Associa-
tionist Theory. — Besides universal concepts, necessary truths,
and especially those which have been called synthetic a priori
judgments, have been advanced in proof of the existence of a
supra-sensuous faculty. Examples of these are the axioms of
mathematics : " Two things which are equal to a third are
(necessarily) equal to each other; " "Equals added to equals
give equals ; " " Two straight lines cannot inclose a space ; "
the principle of causality : " Nothing can begin to exist
without a cause;" and also self-evident ethical maxims:
" Right ought to be done ; " " Ingratitude is wrong," and so
on. These judgments, we maintain, affirm necessary and

"^ On the distinction between the Absolute simpUciter — God, and
the absolute secundum quid, or in a certain respect, that is, finite
substances viewed as wholes in themselves apart from particular
sets of relations, see Kleutgen, op. cit. § 542 ; also Vallet, Le Kantisme
et le Positivisme, c. iv. Martineau's Types, Vol. I. Bk. II. contains
one of the best reviews of Comte in English. The reader will find
a good account of Positivism in Auguste Comte, sa Vie, sa Doctrine,
and Le Positivisme depuis Comte, by P. Griiber, S.J. A. J. Balfour's
Defence of^ Philosophic Doubt and Foundations of Belief contain admir-
able criticism of the methods, assumptions, and consequences of
Positivism,

282 RATIONAL LIFE.

universal truths. They must hold ahcays and everywhere, even
in the most distant parts of the universe. God cannot infringe
them. The peculiar necessary character of these propositions
Kant sought to explain, as we have seen, by the hypothesis
of subjective forms or laws inherent in the constitution of the
mind. Empiricism endeavours to account for this necessity by
mental association. The axioms are, it is asserted, mere
generalizations from continuous experience. They have
been reached by observation and comparison of the empirical
facts around us, and they may be legitimately extended by
inference throughout the world of our experience, but beyond
this we cannot assert that they must hold. In distant stars
2 + 3 may equal 4.

Historically, Hume was the first to try to systematically
account for the necessity of these judgments by sensuous
experience. Our conviction as to the necessity of the
principle of causality, and our belief in the reality of some
sort of influx of the cause into the effect, he explains as the
result of custom. Reiterated observation of one event following
another begets the delusion that there is some sort of nexus
between them ; while there is really nothing but succession.
Later sensationalists with much ingenuity extended the appli-
cation of this principle ; and the Law of Inseparable, Indis-
soluble, or Irresistible Association was claimed to be an
instrument capable of accounting for all our most important
intellectual principles. The leading modern representative
of the school on this question is J. S. Mill. In his Logic, and
in his Examination of Sir IV. Hamilton's Philosophy, he pro-
pounded and defended the doctrine that all so-called necessary
truths, mathematical axioms among the rest, are merely
generalizations from sensuous experience, and their seem-
ingly necessary character is only an instance of inseparable
or irresistible association between the ideas of the subject and
predicate which is created by their repeated conjunction.
Dr. Bain adopts the same view, and speaks in the most
confused manner of the various doctrines opposed to the
Empirical theory.-'^

" Mental Science, Bk. I. c. 6. He there confounds in an aston-
ishing fashion the hypothesis of innate ideas, the Kantian system of
a priori forms, and the intuitional theory as held by writers like
Drs. W. Ward, M'Cosh, and the great majority of modern anti-
phenomenists. The innate hypothesis maintains that the mind is
endowed from its birth with a disposition to evolve these cognitions
purely from its own nature. External occurrences may be the
occasion, but they really contribute nothing towards the genesis of
these principles. Innatism differs from the Kantian view by ascribing
real extra-mental validity to these first truths. Tho intuitional

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 283

The Associationist doctrine will be best exhibited by
a few citations from Mill, on Mathematical truths:
"What is the ground for our belief in (mathematical)
axioms ? What is the evidence on which they rest ? They
are experimental truths, generalizations from experience." '-^^
Accordingly it follows " that demonstrative sciences {e.g..
Geometry) are all without exception inductive sciences ; that
their evidence is that of experience." They cannot be
legitimately extended to " distant stellar regions," for we are
not justified in assuming the uniformity of nature far
beyond our experience, and axioms based on such experience
are limited to the regions where we know such uniformity to
prevail.2* The " feehng of necessity" with which mathe-
matical and metaphysical axioms are affirmed, is a product
of association. To say that a proposition is necessary is
another way of saying that its contradictory is inconceivable ;
and this is precisely'the effect to be expected from associa-
tion. "We should probably be able to conceive a round
square as easily as a hard square or a heavy square, if
it were not that in our uniform experience at the moment
when a thing begins to be round it ceases to be square, so that
the beginning of one impression is inseparably associated
with the departure of the other. . . . We cannot conceive
two and two as five, because an inseparable association
compels us to conceive it as four. . . . And we should
probably have no difficulty in putting together the two ideas
supposed to be incompatible {e.g., round and square, &c.), if
our experience had not first inseparably associated one with
the contradictory of the other." -^ Many such inseparable

theory teaches, indeed, that the mind is endowed with a native
faculty for the apprehension of such verities, but it denies that they
are purely subjective contributions. They have their origin in
experience, but neither their necessity nor universality are based
upon mere reiteration of experience. The human intellect, when an
appropriate object is presented to it, perceives certain necessary
relations holding between subject and predicate. It then affirms the
proposition as necessary, because it is compelled not by any a priori
form, or innate idea, but by the objective necessity of the relation which
is seen to hold in the reality.

23 Cf. Logic, Bk. II. c. V. § 4. It should not be forgotten that the
genesis and validity of a belief are different questions. Still, as we
have before ur^jed, they are often intimately connected, and the
range and application of a conviction may vitally depend on the
mode of its origin— a truth which the reader will perceive by
comparing the Kantian, Empiricist, and Intuitional theorie.s,

-* Logic, Bk. III. c. xvi. j- 4.

?5 Exam. (2nd Edit.) pp. 68, 6g.

284 RATIONAL LIFE,

associations are, he argues, effected by experience. Dark-
ness is necessarily associated in the minds of children and
timid persons with terror. We cannot revisit the scenes
of particular events without recalling them. The ancients
could not conceive people living at the Antipodes, from their
habitual experience that objects so situated would fall off.
Now, mathematical axioms and the other primary truths are
perpetually forcing themselves on our notice, and are con-
sequently eminently calculated to generate subjective
necessities of the character ascribed to them. It is, therefore,
illogical to postulate any other origin for these truths, since,
like all the rest of our knowledge, they can be accounted for
by association and sensuous experience. We have stated
the doctrine of Associationism upon this subject at length,
because it was considered for a number of years to be the
greatest achievement of the Sensist school, and because its
untenability, in spite of all the ingenuity devoted to its
elaboration, shows the utter insufficiency of the Empirical
theory of knowledge.

Criticism. — (i) In the first place the term inconceivable,
as has been pointed out by every successive writer on the
subject, is grievously abused. This word may signify among
other meanings, (a) unpicturable by the imagination, e.g., red
by the blind ; {b) incredible, though not intrinsically impossible,
e.g., a race of horned horses; (c) positively unthinkable, in the
sense that the proposition so characterized is seen to be
necessarily false. Now, throughout Mill's whole treatment
of the question, even after hostile criticism had forced him to
advert to the ambiguity, he confounds these various meanings
of the term in a manner which fatally vitiates his reasoning.
Frequency of association may beget in the mind an incapacity
to separate two states of consciousness, and long continued
experience or absence of experience may make something
inconceivable in the sense of (a) or {b), which is not so in that
of (c). In affirming that two things, each equal to a third,
must always and everywhere equal each other, that 2-1-3 =
4-1- 1, or, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause, we
enounce a judgment the reversal of which is not merely
inconceivable through an incapacity of the mind : it is
positively perceived to be absolutely impossible. On the other
hand, it was always easy to imagine men at the opposite side
of the earth, but unfamiliarity with the notion of its rotundity,
or of change in the direction of gravitation, rendered the
suggestion very difficult, though not impossible, to believe.

(2) To the assertion that the " peculiar feeling of necessity "
which marks these axioms is just what would be produced by
association, we reply that it is not a matter of subjective

THEORIES OE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 285

feeling at all, but an intelligent insight of objective necessity.
In my present mental and bodily constitution I am necessarily
pained by extreme heat or cold. I am forced to feel certain
tastes as agreeable or the opposite ; and I cannot imagine
sensations afforded by a different set of faculties from those
with which man is endowed. But reflexion tells me that this
necessity or incapacity is subjective. The facts might be
reversed. On the other hand, in contemplating the proposi-
tion that two things which are each equal to a third must be
equal to each other, I am conscious not merely that I must
believe this truth, like any contingent experience, but also
that it must objectively and necessarily be so; that it can
never be reversed.

(3) Again, many of these necessary truths are perceived
to be such too early in life and too rapidly to be ex-
plained by accumulated experience. Mill was driven illogically
to abandon the doctrine that it is by real experience of
external nature we are gradually convinced that two straight
lines cannot inclose a space, and to adopt the intuitional
theory that by reflexion on the ideas of straight lines we
can form that judgment. His attempted justification was
that the clearness with which the imagination can depict
geometrical figures rivals that of actual experience ; but this
certainly does not hold for many arithmetical and algebraical
judgments.2<5 'pj^g proposition that 4 + 5 = 6-f3, when once
clearly comprehended in a single experiment, is cognized to
be necessarily true, though we may never have noticed the
fact, or juxtaposed these ideas before in our Hfe. Similarly,
the still more universal truth x-\-i-\-y — i=x-\-y. The pro-
position that a trilateral figure must be triangular, is also
seen to be necessarily true, as soon as it is reflected upon,
although these ideas may never previously have been com-
pared.

(4) On the other hand, there are numerous cases where
two facts have been uniformly conjoined throughout our
entire experience, and yet they are not apprehended by the
mind as necessarily connected. I have, for instance, always
found fire possessed of the property of warmth, yet I can easily
believe that this property can be suspended or separated
from it, " while by mere consideration of the ideas," without
having once experienced some particular mathematical truth,
such as that 2-f9 = 3-f8, "I am convinced that not even
Omnipotence could overthrow that equahty ; . . . that which
I have never experienced I regard as necessary ; that which
I have habitually and unexceptionally experienced, I regard as
contingent. Most certainly, therefore, mere constant uniform

*6 Cf. Dr. Ward's Philosophy of Theism, Vol. I. pp. 55, seq.

286 RATIONAL LIFE.

experience cannot possibly account, as Mr. Mill thinks it does,
for the mind's conviction of self-evident necessity."-'

Evolutionist Theory.— The Sensist teaching on the origin
of necessary truths has assumed a fresh shape in the hands
of those writers of the school who maintain the human
intellect to have been evolved from that of a non-rational
animal. In its present garb the theory claims to possess the
combined merits of the hypotheses of innate ideas, of a
-brinri forms of thought, and of inseparable association, while it
escapes their deficiencies. Mr. Herbert Spencer is the leading
advocate of the new form of the old creed. In his view
axiomatic truths, both scientific and moral, are products of
experience extending back through the history of the race.
The so-called necessities of thought have been produced by
association working not merely through the short life of the
individual, but away back through the millions of generations
of ancestors which have intervened between man and the
original protozoa. Mental associations contracted in the
experience of each individual modify his organism. These
modifications are transmitted by heredity, and appear in the
offspring as mental tendencies or predispositions. They
continue to accumulate and increase in every successive
generation, until the intellectual deposit takes final shape
as a necessary law of thought or a form of the mind. Space,
time, causality, duty, are complex notions which have been
elaborated during the long ages of ancestral experience.
*' They have arisen from the organized and consolidated expe-
rience of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed their
slowly developed nervous organizations . . . till they [i.e.,
mental acquisitions embodied in nervous modifications) prac-
tically became forms of thought apparently independent of
experience." 2^

2" Ward, Ibid, p 49. Cf. M'Cosh, Exam, of Mill, c. xi.

2s See Spencer, cited by Bain, op. cit. p. 722. Comparison of
the evolutionist doctrine with other theories concerning the origin
and nature of these primary truths is interesting : A. The Evolu-
tionist maintains, (i) the existence of obscure innate ideas or
cognitions, as (2) an organic inheritance, (3) from a lower iorm of
life, (4) acquired by sensuous experience, during a vast period
(5) and therefore of eminent validity within the field of possible
experience: B. Plato upheld (i) innate -ideas or cognitions, as
(2) faint spiritual vestiges (3) of a previous life, of a higher grade, but
(4) not derived from sensuous experience, (5) and therefore of eminent
validity: C. Descartes and Leibnitz defended (i) innate ideas or
cognitions, as (2) divinely implanted in the mind, (3) and therefore
of eminent validity : D. Kant held (i) innate forms, (2) antecedent
to and conditioning all experience, (3) and therefore subjectively

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 287

Criticism.— The eagerness with which the new theory has
been received by disciples of the Sensist school shows how
utterly inadequate the old Associationist view was felt to be,
even among the circle of its own advocates. Yet careful
examination of the subject has convinced us that the solitary
argumentative superiority the new doctrine possesses over its
parent is that of removing the question from the region of
rational discussion, and situating it where proof and disproof
are alike impossible. This, however, is hardly an excellence
which the empiricist can consistently admire. The only
criterion which he recognizes is that of experience ; the first
condition of a hypothesis, capability of verification. Now,
there is no theory, however wild, that has yet been broached
on the subject — not even that of the ante-natal existence of
the soul conjured up by the poetic fancy of Plato — which is
more utterly beyond the possibility of scientific proof than the
new doctrine. If it has to be admitted by positivist psycho-
logists that it is practically impossible to get reliable evidence
concerning the earlier mental states of the infant, it can hardly
be disputed that the nature and development of the intellectual
and emotional faculties of our remote ancestors of pre-human
times are completely shut out from our ken.-^ Geology and
Palaeontology may throw light on the anatomic structure of
the earlier forms of animal life, but their mental endowments
cannot be deduced from their fossil remains. Consequently,
any hypothesis put forward as to the character and growth
of the notion of space, time, causality, and morality in the
alleged transitional species of past ages is as much outside
the pale of science, as are the habits and customs of the
natives of Sirius. The earlier sensationists, defective though
their system was, at all events appealed in great part to a
tribunal before which evidence could be tendered, and they
at least professed to base their creed upon the facts of human
consciousness; but, as Dr. Martineau forcibly urges, "their
modern followers take refuge from this strong light in an
earlier twilight where nobody can tell exactly what goes
on. ... If Hobbes, as often happens, gives us a piece of
droll psychology, every one who knows himself can tell
whether it is true or false, and lay his finger on any distortion
it contains. If Darwin describes the inward conflict of an

necessary within the field of possible experience, but (4) of no real
validity as applied to things-in-themselves : H. Associafionism denies
innate ideas in any form, and ascribes the necessity of these cogni-
tions to the constant experience of the individual's own life.

-^ Cf. Groom Robertson, "Axioms," Encycl. Brit. (9th Edit.;,
also Sully, Sensation and Intuition, pp lo — 13,

288 RATIONAL LIFE.

extinct baboon, he paints a fancy picture of what remains for
ever without a witness." ^^

Furthermore, the doctrine of transmitted hereditary ex-
perience as appUed to necessary truths rests on a profound
psychological misinterpretation of their character. It is
credible that an instinct, or a tendency towards a particular
species of emotion or action can be inherited ; but the in-
tuition of necessary truths is something essentially different.
We have before pointed out that we do not apprehend the
necessity of an axiom from any blind incapacity or negative
limitation of thought ; on the contrary, it is the translucent
self-evidence of the truth itself which extorts assent. We
may in our present constitution be necessarily pained by
extreme cold and heat, we may necessarily relish honey, or
enjoy the scent of the rose, yet that these things are necessarily
so for all consciousness we do not judge ; but, that two things
each equal to a third are equal to each other, we not only
necessarily affirm, but affirm as necessarily holding in all
being, and for all intelligence. Assent to self-evident axioms
is, then, not a blind instinct due to habit either inherited or
acquired, but a rational apprehension of intelligible relations
objectively true.

Again, the hypothesis is exposed to the objection, quod
nimis probat nihil probat. If it is true that ancestral experience
has been transmitted in this way, we ought to find (a) innate
cognitions of a large number of other phenomena, and (b)
a more perfect knowledge of space and other native endow-
ments in the human infant than in young animals of inferior
species. Now as regards {b), although we do not see sufficient
evidence for denying to babies an intuitive though vague
perception of extension, it would seem to be certainly estab-
lished that chickens and young pigs apprehend space from
the first with an accuracy scarcely attained by the fully
developed man. As for (a), if it is true that the peculiar
feature of necessity pertaining to these truths is due to the
uniform experience of our ancestors, registered and trans-
mitted in nervous tissue, it is not easy to see why such
judgments as that "fire burns," "stones fall to the ground,
and sink in water," "timber floats," "night follows day,"
and the like, have not a similar character. These proposi-
tions must represent a pretty uniform experience of our
ancestors for a long way back in the series, while the number
of occasions on which it was cognized that 7 + 5 = 3 + 9, or
the number of times when the idea of " trilateral " was com-
pared with that of " triangular " and found to be conjoined in

2^' Types of Ethical Theories, Vol. II. p. 340,

THEORIES GF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 289

experience, cannot in the pre-mathematical age have been
very frequent ; yet the former are perceived to be contingent,
the latter necessary.

Another difficulty may be urged as to the nature of that
experience which generates these mental forms. What is
the "environment," the " cosmos," that has been gradually
creating these necessities of thought ? All forms of sensism
logically reduce space and extension to muscular feelings.
Such a "cosmos" is, however, obviously of too shadowy a
character for the needs of evolutionism. Mr. Spencer,
indeed, here postulates an infinite unknowable energy as
eternal ; but other disciples, such as Mr. Sully, though
sympathetic on many points, look upon this assumption as
a surviving relic of the vulgar anthropomorphic instinct.'*^
Anyhow the difficulty remains : do these necessities which
get translated into our consciousness condition that objective
energy in itself? If so, then we would seem to have got the
admission of objective necessary truth which holds for all
being, and which reveals itself to the mind.^^ If not, what
right is there for assuming that the action of this eternal
energy was universally uniform throughout all past time ?
There remains, finally, the insuperable objection that the
soul being a spiritual principle, as we shall prove hereafter,
cannot have been inherited from non-rational animals.

Intuitionalist Doctrine. — The true view lies between
Innatism and Empiricism. Although all knowledge starts
from experience, it is false to assert that all axioms are mere
forniulce summing up a gathered experience, whether of the
individual or of the race, and that our knowledge is limited to
the range of such experience. Necessary truths may be either
self-evident or deduced from such by demonstration. The
former are called Axioms. Of these the most universal and
fundamental is the Principle of Contradiction : Nothing can
both be and not be at the same time. To the ordinary human
mind^^ the theorems of Euclid are examples of the second class.

^^ Op. cit. pp. 20 — 22. ^■- Cf, Martineau, Ibid. pp. 356 — 358.

■^ Necessary truths were termed by the Schoolmen per se Jiota ;
and were held by them to be analytic in a broad sense. That is, of
such a nature that a full analysis of the subject and predicate
reveals their mutual implication. When this implication is not
immediately obvious, as, e.g., in the proposition, " The square of the
hypothenuse must equal the sum of the squares of the sides of a
right-angled triangle," it was said to be per se nota quoad se, in
contrast to self-evident axioms, which are per se nota quoad nos. Thus
St. Thomas : " Quselibet propositio, cujus predicatum est de ratione
subjecti, est immediata et per se nota quantum est de se. Sed
quarundum propositionum termini sunt tales quod sunt in notitia

250 RATIONAL LIFE.

The self-evident necessary truths which comprise the
various axioms are discerned by rational or intellectual intuition :
that is, by simple consideration of the terms that is of the
objects of thought about which they are affirmed. Just as
we are capable of perceiving contingent impressions by
sense, we have also the power of apprehending the natures
of things, and the necessary relations which these involve
by the intellect. These intellectual intuitions start from
sensuous-perception of single objects, and it is only later
on by a deliberate reflex act that the universal truth which
these particular cases contain is formally generalized. Thus
when Aristotle says that Axioms — Dignitates, as the school-
men quaintly translate them — are reached by induction,
he does not mean that they are generalizations formed
by prolonged and reiterated comparison of individuals, but
that experience of some particular examples is needed to
enable the intellect adequately to comprehend the two terms.
When this is effected, the necessary and universal judgment
emerges spontaneously as an intuition. We are not endowed
at birth with a collection of these simple general cognitions,
but with an intellectual aptitude for their easy and rapid
discovery in concrete cases. This natural aptitude, universal
in the human race, the scholastics called the Hahitus princi-
piorum. Thus, to take a particular example, I do not begin
life by an intuitive recognition of the abstract universal truth.
What is greater than the greater is greater than the less; but,
observing A to be greater than B, which latter I also know to
be greater than C, I intuitively recognize as a self-evident
necessary truth that A must be greater than C, becoming
at the same time implicitly aware of the universal principle
exemplified. Afterwards, by a deliberately reflexive act,
I elevate this implicit cognition to the rank of the explicit
or formally universal truth — every such A must be greater
than C. I have thus reached the Axiom without a pro-
tracted comparison of a large number of A's with C's.
The process is similar in the discovery of the Principles

omniuni, sicut ens et nniini, et alia quae sunt entis in quantum ens.
Nam ens est prima conceptio intellectus. Unde oportet quod tales
propositiones non solum in se sed etiam quoad nos, quasi per se
nota^ habeantur ; sicut quod non contingit idem esse ct non esse, et
quod iotum sit niajus sua parte. Unde et hujusmodi principia omnes
scientiae accipiunt a metaphysica, cujus est considerare ens sim-
pliciter et ea quce sunt entis." {Post Analytic, I. lect. 5.) He also
points out that cognition of such necessary principles varies with
the actual development of individual minds: " Intellectus principi-
orum consequitur ipsam naturam humanam quae aequaliter in
omnibus invenitur . . . et tamen secundum majorem capacitatem
intellectus, unus magis vel minus cognoscit veritatem principiorum,
quam alius." {Sum. 2-23?, q. 5, a 4, ad 3.)

{

THEORIES OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 291

of CGuiradiction and Causality. Neither is a mere generali-
zation from a multitude of observations, and neither is held
in an abstract form by the child. But having intellectually
apprehended in particular sensuous experiences the notions
in the one case of '-being" and in the other of "thing
beginning to exist," there is needed only an easy effort of
reflexion upon the notions employed in the singular com-
parison to intuitively recognize the Axiom/''* Afterwards in
complicated reasonings I may recur to the general rule to
justify a particular step about which I am dubious, but the
relation is first apprehended in the singular experience. ^'^
Truths of this character are rightly termed transccndenial.
They are not limited to the field of observed phenomena.
They underlie and extend beyond experience ; and they con-
stitute a body of knowledge of an entirely distinct order from
that comprised in the experiential sciences.

Readings. — Perhaps the best history of Theories of Knowledge is
that contained in the first volume of Erkenntnisslehrc, von Al. Schmid
(Munich). The literature on the nature and origin of Necessary
Truth is abundant. Essays i, 2, 4, and 5, in Dr. Ward's Philosophy
of Theism, Vol, I. are exhaustive. See also Kleutgen, op. cit. §§ 288—
309; Dr. M'Cosh, Exavi. of Mill, cc. xi. xii. and Intuitions of Mind,
passim; and Mr. Courtney's Metaphysics of Mill, cc. vii. viii.

^' " Intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex
ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis convenit homini quod statim,
cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne
totum est majus sua parte ; et simile est in ceteris. Sed quid sit
totum et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelli-
gibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas, et propterea, Aristoteles in fine
Posteriorum ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex
seusu." (1-2, q. 51, a. i.) Just as being stands first, according to
St. Thomas, in the order of conception, so is the principle of con-
tradiction— the opposition of being and non-being — primary in the
judicial order: "In prima quidem operatione (apprehensio) est
aliquod primum quod cadet in conceptione intellectus, scil. hoc
quod dico ens ; nee aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi nisi
intelligatur ens : et quia hoc principium : Impossibile est esse et non
esse simid, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium : Omne
totum est majus sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis, ideo hoc
etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione
intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nee aliquis potest,
secundum banc operationem intellectus, aliquid intelligere nisi hoc
principio intellecto." {Metaphys. Lib. IV. lect. 6.)

35 Cf M'Cosh's Intuiticns of Mind, Bk. i. Pt. I. c. ii. §§ 3, 4. The
Aristotelico-Scholastic doctrine concerning the nature and origin
of axiomatic truths is admirably expounded by T. de Regnon, SJ.,
Mctaphysique dcs Causes, Livre I. cc. 2, 4, 5.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCEPTION: ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS

{continued).

Summary of past Chapters. — In chapter xii.we
proved that sensuous and intellectual activit}^ differ
in kind. We defined intellect as the *' faculty ot
thought," including under thotcght, conception, judg-
ment, reasoning, supra-sensuous attention and self-
consciousness. In chapter xiii. we have sketched at
considerable length the attempts made by the chief
modern schools of psychologists to explain the
relations between sensuous cognition and thought,
and to trace the origin of the latter. It will be now
our own duty to face this latter question, and
examine more closelv the nature of our intellectual
operations.

Thought an Activity. — If we analyze a process of thought,
we shall observe, in the first place, that it is in a marked
manner an activity. Even in simple sensations, such as those
of sight, there is genuine psychical activity of a certain kind ;
for the mind truly reacts to the physical stimulus by a con-
scious state. Still, compared with thought, sensuous life is
relatively recipient and passive. In thinking, however, as in
recalling a train of reasoning, in following an argument or in
solving a mathematical problem, we are conscious of the
mind as active. It attends to certain objects and abstracts
from others; it brings together difterent ideas and compares

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 293

them ; it resolves complex conceptions into simpler elements;
it judges, infers, and generalizes; and throughout all these
operations, even when proceeding automatically or ^yithout
voluntary effort, this rational consciousness is of an eminently
active character.

Thought Universal.— But a far more important feature of
thought is that it deals with general relations and abstractions.
Whilst sensuous apprehension is confined to the individual
and concrete, thought can lay hold of the abstract and the
universal, or of the general aspects of things. Images and
representations of particular objects, it is true, accompany
our thinking; and when the subject of consideration is
singular, or when a train of thought consists mainly of the
reminiscence of concrete experiences, the intellect indirectly
apprehends singular events.^ Still the direct object of intel-
lectual activitv, even in particular experiences, is the universal
and abstract. ' Introspection informs us that in all thinking
operations the mind seizes on general features of things, their
agreements or differences, the relations of cause and effect,
of substance and accident, of unity, plurality, and connexions
in space or time. The study of thought expressed in language
makes this clear, for the common nouns, adjectives, and
verbs, as well as prepositions and adverbs, all symbolize
universal notions and abstractions— but abstractions having
their foundation in reality.

Take, for instance, a newspaper article, and analyze it.
You will find that it is composed of reasonings or argu-
ments. These are resolvable into several separate judgments
enunciated in propositions ; and these last are ultimately
reducible to terms and single words expressive ot general
ideas or concepts. When thus analyzed the proposition —
e.g., " Liberty is a natural right," yields four such universal
notions, and " Bread is cheap," gives three. It is the
function of Psychology to study the nature of these intel-
lectual processes; and, accordingly, in this chapter we
purpose to treat of the formation of universal notion'- or
concepts.

Conception: Two Questions. — When investi-
gating the formation of concepts, it is important
to distinguish two separate, though connected
questions : — How are they elaborated ? and How

1 " Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi univer-
salitim. Indirecte autem et quasi per quamdam reflexionem potest
cognoscere singidare." (St. Thomas, Qq. disp. Be verit. q. 8, a. 14.)

^94 NATIONAL LIFE.

are they originated ? The former may be stated
thus : Given the most rudimentary and indeter-
minate acts of intellectual apprehension, what is the
process by which these are developed and elaborated
into the clear and distinct universal concepts, the
specific ideas, and scientific notions of later life ?
The other is : — How are these primitive intellectual
data themselves obtained ? Or : How is the rational
faculty of the mind evoked into activity and made
cognizant of the object which stimulates the sense? -

Elaboration of Universal Concepts. — Intuitive
Abstraction and Generalization: In mature life the per-
ception of a single specimen is often the occasion of
our forming a truly universal idea. For instance,
whilst visiting the Zoological Gardens, an unfamiliar
object presents itself to my senses and awakens an act
of intellectual attention. I at once apprehend it as a
large - dark - hairy- skinned - hump - backed - long - necked-
four-footed-self-moving thing. The complex idea thus
awakened in my mind was termed by the schoolmen a
direct or potentially universal concept. Considered
abstractly in itself it is neither universal nor singular.
The same holds true of any simple idea given in an act
of any direct perception, such as that of colour or taste. ^

- The above distinction may be useful to the reader of the
Scholastic manuals. Under the heading Origin of Ideas, these works
discuss the second question, whilst English text-books of Psychology
confine themselves exclusively to the first.

^ "The conception of an abstract quality is, taken by itself,
neither universal nor particular. If I abstract zvhitc from the rest
of a wintry landscape this morning, it is a perfectly definite con-
ception, a self-identical quality which I may mean again ; but as I
have not yet individualized it by expressly meaning to restrict it to
this particular snow, nor thought of the possibility of other things
to which it may be applicable, it is so far but a floating adjective."
(James, Vol. I. p. 473.) Compare St. Thomas: "Si quaeratur
utrum ista natura (natura humana considerata modo absoluto ut
abstracta) possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia
utrumque est extra conceptum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi
(humanitati) accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de ratione ejus nun-

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 295

I may now, by an act of reflective consciousness, turn
my attention back from the thing to the idea, and whilst
considering the idea advert to its susceptibihty of
being reaHzed or reproduced in an indefinite number of
similar beings. In this second stage the idea has
become a perfectly general concept, called by the
schoolmen a reflex universal. The object before me may
happen to be a unique monster ; but, nevertheless,
it suffices for the formation of the logically-universal
concept.

It is not necessary for me to see and compare several
examples of the class. I have not to await the automatic
evolution of a generic image by the fusion of a succession of
impressions. The mind's spontaneous power of abstraction
and generalization, when once awakened, can itself construct
the universal notion. The single experience reveals to me
the union, and, therefore, the compatibility of the collection
of notes which constitute the concept ; I perceive its internal
possibility, and advert to its susceptibility of multiplication.
The idea, however, thus rapidly formed may not represent
accurately any existing class of object ; it most probably does
not correspond to an actual species. The colour or the size,
for instance, which enter into my representation may be
accidental or even peculiar to the particular animal before
me. The idea is truly general, but the generalization is pre-
cipitate, and probahly false if supposed to represent the
actual order of the physical universe. It possesses what Abbe
Piat calls Viiniversalite de droit, but not yet riiniversalite defait.
It is a logical, not a scientific universal. It has to be per-
fected by protracted experience, which involves, on the one
hand, a diligent observation of new examples, and on the
other, reiterated reflective consideration and readjustment of
the idea, so as to adapt it more closely to the facts.'*

quam posset esse una, quum tamen una sit secundum quod est in
Socrate. Similiter si unitas asset de intellectu et ratione ejus, tunc
esset una et eadem natura Socratis et Platonis, nee posset in
pluribus plurificari." {De Ente et Essentia, c. IV. Cf. Rickaby, First
Principles, p. 316. )

■* " Considerons par exemple la couleur d'une boule d'ivoire.
Par elle-meme cette couleur est la qualite de cette boule, un mode
indissolublement lie a cette boule, n'existant et ne pouvant exister
qu'en elle. Mais qu'une fois cette couleur soit le terme de mon
intelligence que je n'en aie pas seulement la sensation, mais encore
I'idee, aussitot et par le fait raeme, avant de savoir si cette qualite se

296 RATIONAL LIFE.

Furthermore, in +' j act of apprehension, whicli seemed so
rapid, we cognize the object as dark-coloured, hairy-skinned,
self-moving, and the Hke. But each of these adjectives
expresses a universal notion, and the complex conception of
the camel is thus easily attained, only because we are already
in possession of the more elementary ideas, of which it is
constituted. In mature life cognition is often a process of
rt?-cognition, perception an exercise of apperception; we
comprehend an object by bringing it under a class, or a
system of intersecting classes with which we are already
famiUar. But we must not be misled by this fact into the
error that all cognition is classification.-'' The notion of being,
which is the most primitive, the most indeterminate, and the
widest of all ideas, and which, moreover, enters into all our
intellectual cognitions, is not the outcome of a process of
comparison, but of intellectual intuitionS' The same is true of
simple ideas presented in direct acts of apprehension, though
the exigencies of language force us to express the experience
in the form of classification. In the mental act itself, we may
simply intuit an object or attribute, which may or may not be
familiar ; but if we seek to put the thought into words, it must
be in terms symbolic of recognized classes — e.g., "That is
scarlet," or " This is painful." Moreover, the nature of
mental action must be the same in kind throughout man's
life, although intellectual activity is very faint and feeble in
the early stages of its exercise ; at all events, any con-
rencontre ailleurs dans la nature, je la vols applicable a une infinite
d'autres boules d'ivoire et peut-etre aussi a une infinite d'autres
corps. II en est de meme de toute substance, de tout mode, de tout
rapport, de tout ce que nous connaissons. Un objet quelconque qui
penetre dans notre conscience empirique, acquiert sous le regard de
notre conscience rationelle et du premier coup une sort iVuniversalite
qui va jusqu' a I'infini. Dans tout individu donne, I'intelligence
decouvre une essence et dans cette essence la possibilite de se realiser
dans tons les temps et tous les lieux autant de fois qu'on le voudra.
Au-dessus de riiniversalite de fait il-y-a VnniversaUte de droit., dont le
propre est d'etre essentielle a I'dee ; Xo^iqne, 3.hso\\.\e." IL' Intellect
Actif, p. 82.)

^ Herbert Spencer's laboured assault on the possibility of a
notion of the absolute {First Principles, pp. 79—82) is based on this
fallacy. "God being unclassable," is not thereby "unknowable.".
We can conceive Him as a unique Being, possessed of intelligence,'
power, and holiness without limit; and our conception, though
inadequate, is good so far as it goes.

^ " In his autem quae in apprehensione homlnum cadunt quidam
ordo invenitur nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione est ens
cujus intellectus includitur in omnibus qu;vcumque quis appre-
hendit." (St. Thoma"=;, Sum. Thcol. 1-2, q. 94, a. 2.)

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 297

jectures we make as to the developme ^t of rational cognition
in childhood must be based on what w^. know of the working
of the human mind at a later period — but, of course, corrected
and qualified by all relevant facts that we can gather from a
diligent study of infant life.

Intellectual Apprehension.— At what age intel-
lectual cognition proper begins it is impossible to
determine. The sensuous faculties must, however,
have attained a certain maturity before the liigher
functions of the mind are evoked into activity.
Careful observation seems to establish that the
primitive consciousness of the infant is an ill-defined
sensory continuum, a mass of obscure homogeneous
feeling in which there is little advertence to differences
of objects or sensations. (See p. 151.) With frequent
exercise and varied experience in the manner already
described, the sensuous powers develop until they are
sufficiently perfect to minister to intellectual cogni-
tion. When this stage is reached the intellectual act
elicited must be the same in kind as that which the
mind exerts in later life. It must be an act of intel-
lectual apprehension, but of course of the vaguest
character. The widest and most indeterminate con-
ception under which we can cognize any object is that
of betJig or thing. The earliest intellectual cognition
elicited by the child is, therefore, the apprehension of
an object as a being, or rather as an ens extensnm — a
stretched-out-thing, whilst vague intuitions of moving-
being, coloured - being, resisting - being, are almost
simultaneously reached. It takes in objects as
confused ivholes before it discriminates their separate
parts. It perceives them as totalities before dis-
tinguishing their various attributes. But the process
by which the vague notions thus reached are contracted
and enriched, are analj^zed, clarified, and perfected is 11

merely the reiterated exercise of this same intellectual ||

power of apprehensive attention. ||

Comparative Abstraction. — Attention is especially „

awakened by repetition of an experience, especially if
this be connected with the child's own physical
comfort or pleasure. The frequent re-appearance of

298 RATIONAL LIFE.

some object excites interest. The sensuous perception
becomes more perfect ; the image produced in the
imagination more distinct. Suppose, for instance,
that some agreeable phenomenon, as, e.g., a bright red
garment or a cup of milk breaks in from time to time
upon the drowsy consciousness of the infant ; the
pleasure occasioned \vill stimulate attention to the
object ; the recurring incident or group of incidents
will be noticed, and observation will be concentrated
upon them. This focussing of attention on part of an
experience has as its counterpart abstraction or precision,
that is, the temporar}' withdrawal of our mental gaze
from the elements unattended to. Still, the contraction
of our attention to one object or part of an object is not
so complete as to result in the entire ignoring of its
surroundings. Indeed, with repetition of the experience
the surroundings themselves become matters of interest,
and the variations which accompany the constant factor
begin to be discerned more and more clearly. Whilst
some attributes presented in the original vague act ot
apprehension recur regularly, others are intermittent
or disappear. The red garment first observed when
stretched-out is afterwards noticed folded in various
ways, and its shape is different. The milk is now hot,
now cold, sometimes sweetened with sugar, some-
times not, and the like. The notion of sameness amid
change is being evoked, and this leads the child to
compare.

Comparison and Discrimination. — Comparison
plays a considerable part in the elaboration of our con-
cepts ; but it implies their previous existence in at least
a vague form. The mind cannot compare unless b}- an
act of apprehension it is already in possession of the
terms to be compared. Partial variation accompanying
partial sameness in the objects of experience stimulates
the judicial activity of the mind, which at first acts
feeblv, but with increasing firmness and distinctness
as the faculties develop. Discrimination involves
analysis, the splitting-up of the perceived object into
its constituent elements ; whilst this very process of
separation pre-supposes an intuitive synthetic grasp of

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 299

tlie object as ^ ?c'/;tV^ in the original conception, which
is now reahzed with greater distinctness. The shape,
colour, temperature, and softness of the garment, and
the sweetness, temperature, and colour of the milk are
distinguished as attributes of the perceived object, and the
cliild is perfecting its notion of unity and coming to
realize the difference between substance and accident in
the original vague ens externum. It should not, however,
be forgotten that the recognition of sameness involves
■memory ; and that although the natural tendency of the
mind is in the beginning altogether objective, there
must be an implicit awareness of its own enduring
existence, developing in the consciousness of the child
concomitantly with its cognition of the persistence of
external things.

But the infant's experience is not limited to
the recurrence of the same individual objects. He
perceives different beings resembling each other in fewer
or more features ; and his attention is called to the
recurrence of a common element in quite different
situations. Thus, after he has grown familiar with the
red garment, he observes a red table-cover or a red
neck-tie, and adverting to the similarity not unfre-
quently manifests his satisfaction at the discovery.
This is an important epoch in the elaboration of the
general concept, for such an experience stimulates
in a livel}^ manner the abstractive power of the
intellect, and incites the infant mind to consciously
consider and dwell upon the conception redness in a
conjpletely abstract state.

Generalization. — The transition to the perfectly
general concept, the formally reflex universal idea, is
now very rapid. The child having observed tliis red
colour in different objects, and conceived it in the
abstract by a further reflective act, considers it as
capable of indefinite realization in other objects.
The mind exerts its synthetic power and constructs
new specimens, all embodying this attribute, and con-
sciously adverts to the fact that it may be predicated of
them all.

As we have already pointed out, the formation of a

3O0 RATIONAL LIFE.

general concept is quite possible in mature life after a
single perception ; and the operation may be similarly
within the power of the child at a very early date.
Nevertheless, it seems to us more probable that the
reflective consideration of the concept involved in the
act of formal generalization is ordinarily excited in
the infant by the comparison of different objects and the
discovery of a common attribute in several individuals.
But the view of the older empiricists that generali-
zation is simply the outcome of an accumulation oi
experiences is utterh^ erroneous. The active generali-
zing impulse is innate in our rational nature. Na}^
experience is needed not to stimulate and excite, but
to check and moderate this generalizing tendency.
The chief use of reiterated observation is rather
to correct and verify than to generate universal con-
ceptions.

Precisely the same functions of the intellect —
attention, abstraction, analysis, synthesis, comparison,
and discrimination — are employed in fashioning the
notions of science and those of ordinary life ; and their
work in both cases is the same — to correct, adjust, and
verify the vague idea generated spontaneously by the
mind's own activity operating on concrete individual
facts. Science is, after all, but a further elaboration
and systematization of our ordinary cognitions, em-
ploying more careful methods of observation.

Let us, for example, trace the growth of the idea of cat.
By its repeated appearance before the infant pussy excites
attention, and is apprehended as a white-fonr-legged-self-
moving-thing. On subsequent occasions it is observed standing,
moving, sometimes mysteriously crumpling itself up and sitting
down, sometimes lying seemingly dead on the hearth-rug. The
image of pussy is by this time very distinct, but the concept is
still very imperfect. It is merely that white-four-legged-self-
moving-thing-which-does-curious-acts. Still the mind can
and probably does generalize it. The child is quite prepared
to apply the notion to an indefinite number of white, self-
moving quadrupeds. Later on a black cat intrudes, and the
general likeness in form, movement, and habits, is recognized,
whilst the mind is disconcerted by the startling dissimilarity
in colour. The notion of cat has now to be enlarged to accom-

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 301

inodate itself henceforth to all hues. Next day the child
observes a St. Bernard's dog, and manifests his appreciation
of the similarity in this new self-moving quadruped. For him
it is a big cat. If a second dog now appear, the original
idea is seen to embrace two classes of objects. The concepts
of dog and cat are distinguished and contrasted; attention is
directed to their points of agreement and difference, and
both notions become speedily well defined. The shape of the
cat, its furry skin, its stealthy movement, its peculiar cry, are
combined and held together by a synthetic intellectual act,
and the concept of cat is formed and ready to be contrasted
with the idea of dog, or sheep, or to be inductively applied to
all future cats. The child's comparatively clear conception
of these domestic animals are thus elaborated out of the
primitive, ill-defined, and obscure apprehension of four-legged -
self-moving-being. Increasing experience continues to perfect
these conceptions, of the nature of common objects until the
average knowledge possessed in the child's social environment
is reached, when progress ordinarily stops, and his ideas
become practically fixed. Thus, the conceptions of cat and
dog, bread and butter, are approximately the same among
most people of the same degree of culture.

Commonly, however, when a special branch of
science is undertaken, there is at once a new start, and
an enlarged field of possible knowledge concerning the
things of which it treats opens out before our minds.
Still, the process is fundamentally of the same kind,
and the clear, distinct, and rich conception which the
chemist possesses of the nature of wafer, as composed
of oxygen and hydrogen and exhibiting a thousand
affinities and properties which distinguish it from other
species of things, is only a better elaborated form ot
the infant's idea of the disagreeable thing in which he
is daily washed." In fact the growth of our intellectual

"* Mercier justly insists : " Nous n'arrivons pas subitement a
Vessence spi'cifiquc des choses : nous commencons par saisir leurs
qualites, comme quelque chose de concret et de subsistant, nous ne
distinguons pas de prime abord, entre la substance comme telle et les
accidents qui I'affectent et y sont inherents, entre les qualites con-
tigentes et les caracteres neccssaircs, c'est-a-dire, \es proprii-tcs natuvelles
ou les notes essentielles du sujet que nous voudrions pouvoirdcfinir. . . .
Ce n'est que plus tard, par voie de comparaison et an moyen de
I'induction .... que nous approchons d'une maniere mediate, de la
connaissance de I'csscnce specifique des etres et de ce premicv fond
substanticl qui demeure invariable che^ eux a travers les variations

302 RATIONAL LIFE

knowledge Is a continuous descent down Porphyry's tree.
Each step augments what logicians call the compre-
hension or connotation of our subjective conceptions ; that
is, it increases our knowledge of the essential attributes
of the being represented by our idea, whilst on the
other hand it lessens the extension or field of objects to
which the idea can be applied.

Thought and Language. — Naming. — The group
of attributes summed up in a concept thus formed
could, however, neither be retained in the memory nor
communicated to others unless they were embodied in
some definite sign. Hence we mark them with general
names. This is the final act of denomination^ the import-
ance of which in the growth of knowledge and the
elaboration of our concepts of specific essences, it
would be difficult to exaggerate. The recurrence of
the name will awaken in the future b}^ association
sensuous images of the individual objects perceived in
the past, but its essential functions are to hold together
and express the nucleus of attributes which constitute
the common nature apprehended in the universal
concept. Hamilton has characterized words as the
" fortresses of thought," and the phrase very fitly
indicates one of their most important duties. They
establish our command over conceptions which have
been gained by a protracted experience and might
otherwise be soon lost. By definition a term is made
to signify a determinate group of properties which we
have frequently found together. It registers the result
of a long series of observations ; it is readily repre-
sented in imagination, and serving as a general symbol,
it is handled with the greatest ease in our reasoning

incessantes de leurs accidents." {PsycJwIogie, p. 345.) Similarly
Coconnier : " Examinez les idees que vous faites des difterents
etres, et vous verrez que vous les avez toutes constituees a I'aide
des notions transcendentales et communes de i'ontologie, notions
generales d'etre, de substance, de qualites, de cause, d'action, de
space, etc. D'apres cela nos idees des choses materielles sont
comme autant de faisceaux, de concepts additiones, reunis et
groupes en autant dediverses manieres que nous connaissonsd'etres
materiels differents." {L'Ame humaine, p. 130. Cf. Feillaube, Thcoric
des Concepts, pp. 302, 303, 32G, 332—335.)

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 303

processes. These great advantages of language in
relation to complex ideas are conspicuously illustrated
in sciences like Botany and Chemistry, the nomenclature
and terminology of which have been formed on syste-
matic principles.

Communication of Ideas. — But the value of words is even
more obvious as instruments of communication, for which
purpose, indeed, they were primarily invented. Here the con-
dition of the child who comes into the possession of a language
already made is obviously very different from that of a human
being huilding up a system of speech for himself. The former
receives an enormous gratuitous gift of precious conceptions
to be appropriated with the least possible labour. The child
born into the inheritance of a cultivated language starts from
a level which has required numberless generations of great
minds to build up; and just as cities, roads, railways, and
machinery are contributions of the labours and the genius 01
past centuries towards his material welfare, so the vocabulary
of which he is put in possession with almost equal facility is
an accumulated legacy of incalculable worth in the enrich-
ment of his intellectual life.

Ideas prior to Words. — Useful, however, as language is for
the development and perfection of thinking, thei e is no
evidence that it is absolutely necessary to thought. Tlie idea
precedes the word ; the latter is invented to express the
former. The child is possessed of many simple ideas before
he can give utterance to them by oral sounds. Deaf mutes
are proved to have performed many intellectual operations
before they employ any kind of signs to express them.
Nevertheless, it is probable that in normal life no lengthy
chain of thought is carried on without the mind assisting itself
by the use of words which, in the case of the dumb, are
replaced bv movements, images, or physical symbols of some
other sort.^

Second Question. — Origin of Ideas. — Having thus
described at length what seems to us to be the most
common process b}^ which the primitive vague intel-
lectual apprehensions of being, extended being, moving
being, coloured &£^ni>;r-'-aftd' the" like, are contracted and

^ Max Muller, who argues for the inseparabihty of thought and
language, gives a history of the dispute in his Science of Thought,
pp. 32 — 64. Cf. also Mivart, On Truth, c. xvi.; James, Vol. II.

355—358-

304 RATIONAL LIFE.

elaborated into the specific ideas and scientific con-
ceptions of later life, the question still remains : How
are these most indeterminate notions themselves
originally obtained ? What are the relations between
the sensuous and the rational functions of the mind in
the initial act of intellectual cognition ? Some able
scholastic psychologists reply that the operation is
incapable of further analysis. Consciousness assures
us that the intellect lays hold of the abstract and
universal aspect in the concrete sensible phenomenon ;
but we cannot penetrate beyond this ultimate fact/^
The schoolmen, howeveir, in general, answered this
question by the theory of the Intellectus A gens, therein
developing the Aristotelian doctrine of the abstractive
activity of the intellect. This theory is thus an attempt
to explain Jiow intellectual activity is evoked, and in
what ivay the primitive abstractive operation is exerted.
It is therefore a hypothesis put forward to give a fuller
account of certain well established facts ; and its value
is to be measured like that of any other hypothesis by
its success in explaining the phenomena. It accord-
ingly stands on quite a different level from that of the
tenet that intellect is a spiritual abstractive faculty
essentially different from sense. This latter doctrine
we believe to be a demonstrated truth, whilst the
former can only claim to be a probable or plausible
theory ; and it seems to us very important to recognize
clearly the relatively subordinate character of this very

^ Dr. G. Hageman thus writes: "The soul must be endowed
with the facuhy of abstraction. The mind immediately abstracts the
essence of the object, just as in sense-perception the soul imme-
diately apprehends the stimulus. But we are just as incapable of
obtaining an insight into the process of the spiritual abstractive activity as
of deducing the nature of sensuous activity from the essence of the
soul." (Psychologic, §. 93, Sechste Auflage, 1897.) Similarly Abbe
Piat : " Notre avis a nous, est que I'acte original par lequel I'intel-
ligence opere sur les donnees empiriques, resiste, comme I'emotion
ou I'acte libre, a toute definition vraiment positive ; il y reste uii
n'sidu impenetrable." {L'Idee, p. 244 ; cf. L'lntellect Actif, pp. 134, 135.)
"Patet nil certum remansisse apud Scholasticos in hac difiicili
quaestione, nisi solam formationem harum idearura per vim abstrac-
tivam intellectus . . . Quicunqueenim per vim intellectus abstractivam
idearum originem explicat, verc intra schclam viaiiet." (P. J. Mendive,
S.J., Psych ologia, p. 301.)

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 305

speculative discussion. Modern writers with the most
superficial information regarding mediaeval thought, are
wont utterly to mistake the weight assigned to different
questions ; and they would fain identify the fate of the
grand fabric of the whole scholastic S3'stem with a few
ingenious and very speculative solutions of subtle meta-
physical problems of comparatively inferior significance.
Accordingly, with fair warning to those not familiar
with the Scholastic Philosophy that this is amongst the
most obscure and difficult of the discussions of the
schoolmen, we shall give an exposition of the subject
for the sake of those who may wish to go deeper into
mediaeval metaphysics.

Aristotelico-Scholastic Theory of Abstraction. — This starts
from the truths already established, that in mature life the
mind is in possession of truly abstract and universal ideas
which transcend the range of the lower or organic faculties,
and thus force upon us the admission of a higher, supra-
sensuous power. These ideas represent under an abstract
and universal form the essence or nature which exists indi-
vidualized by material conditions in sensible objects. We
have thus two grades of cognitive faculties, sense {aia-Orjais],
the lower ; and intellect (vovs), the higher or spiritual power.

I. Formal objects of Intellect and of Sense. — The formal object
of sense — that which it is ordained to apprehend — is some
particular phenomenon, some concrete quality or material
thing. The formal object of intellect is being in general, the
essence or quiddity of things in its widest sense. i*^ Within the

^'^ The student must be constantly on his guard against inter-
preting "essence" to imply all that is contained in "specific
nature." Amongst its synonyms in scholastic literature are : Quod
quid est ; or, What any thing is ; the Quidditas, Whatness, Washeit,
rh rl liv fJvai; or the nature of an object, the ratio interna, la raison
intime, the realized idea or plan, the actualized internal possibility
of a thing, the sum of the notes which constitute it. Every positiv^e
answer to the question, What is that ? reveals the essence. The
answer may vary in definiteness from: "It is something," to
" It is a dark-extended-four- footed-long-necked-hump-backed-hairy-
skinned-self-moving-being." The former expresses the essence in
its most indeterminate form ; the latter approximates towards the
conception of the specific essence of a camel. Some of the above
synonyms — e.g., nature, are more frequently used to designate the
specific essence ; but there is no fixed usage. When it is said
that the intellect abstracts the essence, this term must be understood
in its widest sense ; the more determinate specific essence, as before
stated, is attained by observation, comparison, and induction.

3o6 RATIONAL LIFE.

sphere of being is included substance and accident, body and
spirit, creator and creature, actual and possible reality ; in
fact, everything capable of being in any measure understood.
It is under this aspect that every object of thought is
apprehended, it is the simplest and widest of notions, and
into it all notions are finally resolved. But, although the
formal object of intellect embraces all forms of being, yet the
human intellect has for its connatural, inimediate, or propor-
tionate object) the abstract and universal essences of sensible
or material things. The connatural object of a faculty signifies
that towards which it directly tends, as opposed to that which
it can cognize only mediately and indirectly, or by analogy.
God and other pure spirits are thus not the connatural object
of the human intellect. They are known not by intuition,
but by inference and analogy ; whilst our earliest intellectual
ideas are all of sensible objects.

2. All knowledge starts from experience. — At the beginning of
life the mind is in a purely potential condition with respect
to knowledge. There are no innate cognitions, whether sen-
suous or intellectual. The mind is described as a tabula rasa —
a clean tablet on which nothing is yet written — although this
term is not completely appropriate, since such a tablet is
entirely passive, whilst the intellect is endowed with an
innate, or a priori active power of modifying itself, so
as to generate abstract or immaterial representations oi
sensible objects. In order to apprehend any of these objects,
there must be wrought in the mind a form, modification, or
determination by which it is assimilated to the object. This
modification or form, is called the species impressa, and we
have described in chapter iv., how material objects acting
upon the senses produce modifications by which the lower
faculties are determined to the sensuous apprehension of these
objects. But for intellectual cognition the higher faculty must
be similarly determined by a form of a higher order — a
species intelligibilis impressa — to elicit a conception of the
universal nature or essence of the object.

3. Intellect us Agens. — The action of the material object
awakens sensuous perception, which results in a concrete
phantasm of the object in the imagination from which the
intellectual concept is derived. But neither this sensuous
perception of the object nor the resulting phantasm can
directly effect the species intelligibilis impressa or generate an
intellectual concept. They only contribute the " material "
elements or conditions to the elaboration of the concept. For
neither the physical thing nor the phantasm can directly
reveal itself to the cognitive intellect. Both are individual,
concrete, material, whilst the object of the intellect is

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 307

universal, abstract, and immaterial. They contain, indeed, a
universal essence, but individualized in its material deter-
minations. It is in this state only fundamentally universal,
and therefore not apt to be immediately taken up into the
intellect. It is, according to the scholastics, as yet only
potentially intelligible, somewhat as red or green is only
potentially sensible in the dark ; it needs to be made actually
intelligible, in order to be apprehended by the intellect. It
has to he abstracted ^^ from its individualizing corporeal con-
ditions. Indeed, it was the conviction of this incapacity
of the sensible material thing to directly manifest itself to
the intellect and thus modify the spiritual faculty that induced
Plato to assume the existence of real abstract immaterial
essences separate from sensible phenomena.

It is in order to account for this modification of the
spiritual faculty, or, which is the same thing, for the excita-
tion of the intellect to the generation of the abstract repre-
sentation of the essence existing individualized in the
phantasm that the schoolmen ascribe to the intellect not
merely the capacity of being modified so as to represent the
various objects in an abstract or spiritual manner, but also an
active energy or force of its own, which is chief agent in the
production of this modification. The only other alternative

^^ It should be noted that the schoolmen employed the words
abstraction, and, to abstract, in the converse signification of that
which has prevailed since Kant. With modern writers intellectual
abstraction primarily signifies the ignoring or omission of the
attributes not attended to ; with the schoolmen it was understood
to primarily mean the positive side of the operation — the assumption
by the mind of the part selected, of the attributes which are attended
to. A process of abstraction, therefore, formerly signified the
taking up of something : now it would signify the neglect of some-
thing. (Cf. Logic, present series, pp. 102.) Still, by the " abstraction "
of the essence or species from the sensuous representation, the
schoolmen did not mean the physical extraction of certain parts of
the latter, but the reproduction of its essential features in an
abstract manner in a higher form of consciousness. Thus, Suarez :
" Observandum est, speciem non dici abstrahibilem, vel abstrahi, a
phantasmatibus, quasi ipsa species prius esset immixta phantas-
matibus, unde postea separetur ab intellectu agente, ac transferatur
in possibilem ; hoc enim puerile esset cogitare. . . . Intellectum
ergo abstrahere speciem, nil est aliud quam virtute sua efficere speciem
spiritualem repraesentantem eandem naturam, quam phantasma
repraesentat, modo tamen quodam spiritual! ; illaque elevatio a
materiali repraesentatione phantasmatis ad spiritualem repraesenta-
tionem speciei intelligibilis dicitur abstractio ; ex quo aperte constat
abstractionem non esse actionem distinctam a productione speciei."
{De Anima, Lib. IV. c. 2, § 18. Cf. Sum. i. q. 85, a. i, ad 3, 4.)

3oS RATIONAL LIFE.

is to assume that the intellect is determined to apprehend its
object by an external spirit, angelic or divine. This, however,
is a fanciful and gratuitous hypothesis incapable of proof,
and in conflict with much of the evidence adduced against the
doctrines of innate ideas and of ontologism. We are, they
argue, thus compelled to attribute the generation of intellectual
ideas to an inherent force of the intellect itself, which, reacting
on the occasion of sensory stimuli, effects in itself the modifica-
tion by which the object is apprehended under a universal
aspect. This force is the active intellect, the Intellectiis Agens.
They define it as : /I certain instinctive spiritual force or energy of
the mind, which acting spontaneously on the presentation of objects
in the imagination, generates ''species intelligibiles'' of them, or,
an active faculty whereby the intellect modifies itself so as to
represent in a spiritual or abstract manner ivhat is concretely
depicted in the phantasm.

The argument is put briefly by other scholastics thus:
Neither the object itself, the sensuous impression, nor the phan-
tasm can generate species intelligibiles, by which the intellect
is determined to cognize the object, for this modification is a
spiritual accident, and none such can be produced by material
agencies. It is a fundamental axiom, that no being can efl"ect
in another what is not contained in itself, either formally
or eminently, and a spiritual accident is contained in a
corporeal agent, neither formally nor eminently. Therefore,
the modification of the intellectual faculty must be imme-
diately due to a spiritual, not an organic agency.^'^

4. Intellect us Possibilis. — The mind's capability of being
modified so as to express the essence of the object in a
concept is termed the intellectus patiens vel possibilis. It is the
intellectus patiens which formally understands. The intel-
lectus agens must be conceived as instinctive or blind ; its
" abstractive " action is productive of intelligence, not formally
intelligent itself. Its function is to effect the modification by
which the act of intelle tual consciousness is immediately
awakened.^"' It may be here asked if the action of the intel-
lectus agens be instinctive, why does it issue into the precisely
appropriate activity ? Why does it effect exactly the right
modification to represent the object of the sensuous impression

^- Cf Kleutgen, op. cit. §§ 18—32, 45—49, 776, 777 ; also Peillaube,
op. cit. pp. 294 — 300.

^^ The different functions ascribed to the intellectus agens and
patiens illustrate the scholastic distinction between an active and a
passive faculty. Both together constitute the actually intelligent
mind ; but the former actuates its object, makes it pass from a
potential or virtual condition to one of actualization, whilst the latter
ii actuated by its object.

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 309

when the latter cannot directly act upon it ? The answer lies
in the fact that both sense and intellect have their source in
the same indivisible soul, which is so constituted that on the
stimulation of the former the latter sympathetically responds
by a higher reaction of its own — somewhat as the appetitive
faculty, which conceived as such is blind, tends towards an
object apprehended by a cognitive faculty as good. In both
cases it is the soul itself which acts through the faculty.

Distinction between the Active and Passive Intellect. — It was
disputed among the schoolmen, in what way and to what
extent the intellectus agens is to be distinguished from the
intellectus patiens. The Arabian philosopher Avicenna and
certain of his disciples interpreted Aristotle's somewhat
obscure language on the point, to mean that the intellectus
agens is "separate" not merely from the human body, but
also from each individual soul. They, accordingly, conceived
this power, after a pantheistic fashion, as one universal spirit,
which in some mysterious way operates upon the passive or
recipient intellects of all men. This gratuitous and fanciful
hypothesis was unanimously rejected by the schoolmen, who
all deny to the intellectus agens any existence separate from
the individual soul. But here the agreement ends. The
majority conceive the intellectus agens and intellectus patiens as
two real subjectively distinct faculties of the soul, on the
ground that they are opposed as agent and patient, mover
and moved. The function of the one, it is urged, is to effect
the species impressa, whilst that of the other is, when thus
modified, to apprehend the object. Other scholastic philo-
sophers, however, argue very forcibly against this multipli-
cation of faculties as excessive. They object that the
hypothesis of two intellects is unnecessary, and they maintain
that these terms only designate different aspects or aptitudes
of the same power. The name, intellectus agens, denotes the
mind as capable of modifying itself, whilst the intellectus patiens
signifies the same mind considered from the other standpoint
as capable of being modified. In this view they are sub-
jectively merely virtually distinct powers.^'*

5. Species Intelligibiles: Verhuni Mentale. The modification
of the mind viewed as wrought in the intellectus patiens
by the intellectus agens, constitutes the species intelligibilis
impressa. The union of this species imprcssa with the intel-

^^ " Intellectus agens rcalitev a passibili non distinguitur. Nam
intellectus dicitur agens, quatenus actionem cognoscitivam producit ;
patiens vero, quatenus banc ipsam actionem in se recipit hsec autem
duo munera ad unam et eandem potentiam pertinent." (J. Mendive,
S.J., Psychologia,% 514. Cf. Boedder, op. cit. §§ 162,163; Pesch,
op. cit. §838.)

3IO RATIONAL LIFE.

lectits patiens results in the conception of the abstract essence,
the generation of the abstract idea of the object, which is
called the species intelligibilis expressa, inasmuch as it is the
intellectual expression of the object. The same act looked at
under a somewhat different aspect as the realization or utter-
ance of the thought of the object by the mind to itself is called
the verbiim mcntale, or mental word.^'^ Finally, this same product
considered as the intellectual expression of the essence of the
object abstracted from the individualizing notes which accom-
pany it in the physical world is called the direct, or potential
universal. It is not as yet an actually or formally universal
concept. It prescinds alike from universality and individuality.
It merely expresses in an indeterminate manner the essence
of the object, omitting all individualizing conditions. More-
over, it is not the object of cognition, but the instrument or
means by which the intellect apprehends its object. It is the
medium quo, not the medium quod percipitur.

Formally Universal Ideas. — It is only by subsequent re-
flexion that this potentially universal concept, thus reached
by the spontaneous, direct, abstractive action of the intellect
is elaborated into the reflex ov formally universal concept of the
logician. The schoolmen, as we have already observed, are
extremely brief on this latter part of the process ; but under
the term "reflexion,' they must intend to include conscious
abstraction,^" ideal comparison, involving analysis and
synthesis, and also generalization. For, in the reflective
operation by which the primitive abstract conception is

^•^ The allusions of modern writers to the vcrhuui mentalc of the
schoolmen exhibit an amusing ignorance of the meaning of the term.
The phrase simply signifies with mediaeval writers, the mental act
corresponding to a common noun — e.g., triangle, man, responsi-
bility. These words, it may be presumed, have a meaning or con-
notation. The thought by which the mind comprehends that
meaning is the verhum mcntale, just as the vocal sound by which it
communicates this thought to another mind is the verhum orak.

^^ The reader must be careful to distinguish two forms of
" abstraction" in the scholastic account of the process. The first
consists of the initial act spontaneously exerted by the intcUectus agens.
It is instinctive being preceded by sensuous but not by intellectual
cognition. It is called "abstraction," because it effects ihe abstract
representation of the concrete object. It is not preceded by but
productive of the abstract concept. In the second stage the intellect
already in possession of this representation consciously adverts to
the essential features contained in it, whilst it deliberately ignores
or withholds attention from concomitant accidents. The first stage
is an act of instinctive election by the intellect, the second is one of
conscious selection. (Cf. Peillaube, ibiil. pp. 293 — 300, also Boedder,
op. cit. §§ 159—163.)

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 311

formally universalized, it must be held before the mind by a
deliberate act of attention. The collection of notes, which
constitute its internal possibility, must be consciously realized,
and then it must be judged capable of representing an inde-
finite number of ideal or imaginary individuals, or of being
actualized in the various possible members of a class. But
such ideal comparison and generalization is the natural
outcome of our rational nature ; it may take place with great
rapidity, and the. constant check of careful observation and
experiments is needed to secure that our conceptions and
generalizations are in harmony with reality, after the manner
described in the earlier part of this chapter.

Summary. — The scholastic theory, then, may be thus
briefly stated : An object produces an impression on a sen-
sitive faculty. This results in a sensuous phantasm in the
imagination, and here the work of the lower power ends.
Since, however, in man the sensuous faculties of cognition
have their source in a soul also endowed with intellectual
aptitudes, the latter now issue into action. The presence of
the phantasm forms the condition of rational activity, and
the intellect abstracts the essence ; that is, by its own active
and passive capabilities generates the concept which expresses
in the abstract the essence of the object. By a further
reflective act it views this abstract concept as capable of
representing any member of the class, and thus constitutes it
a formally universal idea.^''

^' Mercier formulates the scholastic doctrine in the three fol-
lowing propositions: (i) " U intelligence est originairement en puissance
a regard de son acte de pensee ; pour qu'elle soit en etat d'accomplir
son acte, il faut qu'elle soit informee par une espece intelligible
(species intelligibilis), substitut del'objet a connaitre. Aussi I'entende-
ment, s'appelait-il, dans I'ecole, intellect possible ou potentiel. (2) La
formation de I'espece intelligible demande t(ne double cause, I'image (le
phantasma) fournie par I'acte del'imagination, et une force d'abstrac-
tion appelee intellect actif ov intellect agent, capable de degager I'image
de ses caracteres d'individuation et de rendre ainsi I'objet assimil-
able par la puissance cognitive de I'entendement. L'image est
ainsi la cause instrumentale — i.e. la cause efficiente subordonnee ;
I'intellect actif, la cause principale de la production de I'espece intel-
ligible. (3) Lorsque la puissance intellectuelle est informee par
une espece intelligible appropriee a sa nature et qui lui rend I'objet
present, elle passe de la puissance a I 'acte, elle se dit a elle-meme ce que
la chose est [quod quid est) ; en un mot, elle connait. La connaissance
ou la pensee n'est pas, en effet, autre chose que cette parole mentale
qui nous dit ce que quelque chose est." [Psychologie, pp. 321, 322.)
The phantasma is rather causa formalis vel exemplaris than efficiens.
The true causa principalis is the soul, or rather the man; but the
intellectus agens may fairly be described as the cliief active energy
(agens principalis) in the process. (Cf. lioedder, op. cit. §§ 167.)

312 RATIONAL LIFE.

Doctrine of St. Thomas.— For the convenience of the
student desirous of a better understanding of the scholastic
philosophy, we shall here give a selection of extracts from
St. Thomas bearing on this abstruse and difficult question.
We shall mark them with numbers corresponding to the
paragraphs in our own exposition. It will, however, be
useful to premise them by the explanation of certain scholastic
terms and phrases.

The Intellcctus Agens is said : (i) to convert or diyect itself
towards the phantasm {se convevtere ad phantasma), and (2) to
abstract from it the essence (abstrahere essentiam), or, (3) to
iUuminate and make actually intelligible what is, potentially intel-
ligible in the phantasm ; moreover, (4) throughout the process
the intellcctus agens is chief agent (a^^n5^n«c//»a/^), while the
phantasm is viewed merely as an instrumental agent {agens
instrunientale). This metaphorical language is used in order
to elucidate by analogies what is involved in the single
instantaneous act : (i) Indicates that the concept formed by
the intellcctus agens is of the object represented by the
phantasm. The intellect is likened to a painter who turns
towards the object he is about to copy. (2) Since the concept
formed by the intellect expresses the essential attributes of
the phantasm they are said to be abstracted from the latter.
(3) Here the intellcctus agens is likened to the sun illuminating
colours indiscernible in the darkness though potentially dis-
tinguishable. The phantasm contains potentially universal
relations individualized in concrete material conditions, and
the activity of intellect evokes them into the light of actual
consciousness. (4) The intcllectus agens is termed agens princi-
pale, inasmuch as it plays the most important part in the
operation, being causa efficiens.

Extracts. — i. Id quod est primo, et per se cognitum a
virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium ejus objectum. {Sum. Thcol.
I, q. 85, a. 8.) Primo autem in conceptione intellcctus cadit
ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est in
quantum est actu unde ens est proprium objectum intellcctus,
et sic est primum intelligible, sicut sonus est primum audibile.
(i, q. 5, a. 2.)

2. Intellcctus autem humanus, qui est infinuis in ordine
intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectionc divini intel-
lcctus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium ; ct in principio
est sicut tabula rasa, in (pia nil est scriptum, ut Philosophus
dicit. (I, q. 79, a. 2.) ♦

3. Hoc quilibet in se ipso experiri potest, quod quando
aliquis conatur aliquid intclligere, format sibi aliqua phantas-
mata per moduni exeniplorum, in (piibus (juasi inspiciat,
quod intelligere studet. . . , Particulare autem appro-

ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. 31 j

hendimus per sensum et imagiriationem, et ideo necesse est,
ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum pro-
prium, quod convertai se ad phantasniata ut speculetur naturam
universalein in particular! existenteni (i, q. 84, a. 7.) :

Phantasniata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente, et iterum
ab eis per virtutem intellectus agentis species intelligibiles
abstrahiintuv ; illuminantur quidem, quia sicut pars sensitiva
ex conjunctione ad intellectuni efficitur virtuosior, ita phan-
tasniata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia, ut ab
eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahuntur ; abstrahit autem
intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus,
in quantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus
in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus
conditionibus secundum quarum similitudines intellectus
informatur. (i, q. 85, a. i, ad 4.)

4. Necessitas ponendi intellectuni possibileni in nobis fuit
propter hoc, quod nos invenimur quandoque intelligentes in
potentia, et non in actu. Unde oportet esse quandam
virtutem, quae sit in potentia ad intelligibilia ante ipsum
intelligere, sed reducitur in actum eorum cum sit sciens, et
ulterius cum sit considerans. Et hsec virtus vocatur intellectus
possibilis. (i, q. 54, a. 4.)

5. Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso, quod intelligit,
procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae,
ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens.
Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat et dicitur verbum
cordis significatum verbo vocis. (i, q. 27, a. i.)

Species intelligibilis non est objectum in quod feratur
cognitio. . . . Dicenda est species intelligibilis se habere ad
intellectuni, ut quo intellectus intelligit. . . . Sed quia intel-
lectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem
intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem, qua intelligit ; et sic
species intellecta est secundario id quod intelligitur ; sed id,
quod intelligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis est
similitudo. (i, q. 85, a. 2.)

Readings. — The most complete treatment of the whole subject
is to be found in Peillaube's Tlicoric des Concepts, Existence, Origine,
Valenr. Fiat's L' Intellect Actif and L'ldee contain valuable matter;
the latter work largely repeats the former. Mercier's Psychologie,
pp. 300 — 350, is good. Cf. Liberatore On Univcrsah (Trans.), Op. II.,
and Psychologia, c. iv. art. 6, and Boedder, PsycJiologia, c. iii.

CHAPTER XV.

JUDGMENT AND REASONING.

Under the term thinking, besides the formation of
concepts, there are included the operations of judg-
?nent and reasoning or inference. The&e several pro-
cesses are, however, merely different exercises of the
.same faculty, the intellect. As we have already in
chapter xiii. dwelt on some of the most important
aspects of judgment, we shall handle this subject
briefly here. We shall also in the present chapter
examine the special features of the form of judicial
activity exhibited in belief and conscience.

Definition of Judgment. — A judgment is that
mental act which is signified in an oral proposition,
such as, "Gold is heavy." It has been defined as the
mental act by which ive perceive the agreement or disagreement
hetiueen two ideas, and also as the mental act by iz'hich some-
thing is asserted or denied, St. Thomas himself defines it
as an act of intellect whereby the mind combines or separates
two terms by affirmation or denial. If the first definition
is employed, it should be remembered that the word
" idea" here means, not the state of consciousness, but
the objective concept [conceptus objectiviis), the attribute in
the external thing corresponding to the subjective idea.
Locke and some other modern writers have taught that
the formal object of the judgment is the agreement or
disagreement, the congruence or conflict of two sub-
jective notions. This is an error based on a false view

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 315

of the nature of cop^nitive consciousness. The most
essential feature of all knowledge, except of course that
which is reached by introspection, is its objective
import. But in man the judicial act is the type of
perfect knowledge, and accordingly carries in its con-
stitution in an especial manner this reference to external
fact. In the assertions, "Water rusts iron," "Some
sausages are not wholesome," " Trilateral figures are
triangular," very little reflexion reveals to us that we
do not merely allege a relation between the two con-
ceptions juxtaposed in the mind. We mean to affirm
that something does or does not hold without the mind,
in rerujH natura.'^ Furthermore in asserting that something
holds objectively, w^e implicitly affirm that our subjective
mental act truly mirrors this external situation. It is
in this concomitant affirmation of conformity between
the judicial act and its objective correlate that formal
truth or falsity lies. For this reason truth and falsehood
in the strict sense belong only to judgments and not to
mere conceptions.

Analysis of the Judicial Process.— In the formal act of
judgment we can distinguish several elements or stages,
though it would not be possible to separate all of them : (i) The
apprehension of the thing or object about which the judgment
is made; (2) the separation or separate grasp of the two
terms — the two aspects or phases of the thing which are to
be compared; (3) their juxtaposition; (4) the perception of
the agreement or disagreement of the juxtaposed concepts ;
and (5) the concomitant awareness that the mental juxta-
position of ideas corresponds to the objective reality. It is
true that in easy spontaneous judgments some of these
elements are so rapidly slurred over as to be scarcely dis-
coverable. But if the reader reflects upon a judgment
deliberately given in answer to such a question as : Is the
prisoner guilty ? he will be able easily to distinguish these
several elements. Or, let us suppose the judgment to refer

1 This doctrine, which is the common teaching of St. Thomas
and the leading scholastics, has been re-discovered by modern
logicians during the last forty years. Mill devoted considerable
pains to establish it against Hamilton and the conceptualist
logicians. (Cf. Logic, Bk. I. c. v. and Exam. c. win.) The student
will find this subject treated in the volume on Logic of the present
series, Pt, II. c iii-, and in the volume on First Principles, c. ii.

3i6 RATIONAL LIFE.

to some concrete fact or event, as, for instance, the snow-
covered ground, or a moving train. I first perceive the
object as a unity or totality. The primitive act of appre-
hension is indistinct. I am only imphcitly conscious of the
predicate ; that is, I do not as yet formally distinguish it from
the other attributes which constitute the object. I then by
a selective act of attention analyze the object. I mentally
separate one attribute from the rest. I abstract or lay hold,
as it were, of the colour or motion by one concept, and the
earth or the train by another. I next combine them by an
act of synthesis ; that is, I consider them separately as dis-
tinguished from each other yet in connexion with each other.
In doing so I perceive the relation of agreement between
them. I realize that the predicate is a closer determination
of the conception representing the subject, and that the
attribute, quality, or aspect of the thing for which it stands is
really part of the thing apprehended under another form as
subject. In this act I am aware that my mental synthesis
of subject and predicate reflects the real union of the object
with the attribute. It is in this last act that assent is per-
fected. This feature is more clearly discerned in formal
comparison of universal notions, as e.f^., A square is a rect-
angular figure, or, The diamond is hard, than in judgments
immediately occasioned by external perception. In the
latter, the element of simple apprehension is more prominent,
consequently the mental attitude is more objective, and the
concomitant implicit consciousness of the mind's own action
is fainter though still really there. (See p. 52.) This last
element of the judicial process is particularly emphasized in
Ueberweg's definition of judgment as, "the consciousness of
the objective validity of a subjective union of conceptions
whose forms are different but belong to each other." ^

Judgment thus involves both analysis and synthesis — the

2 Logic, § 67. Similarly Bradley, Principles of Logic, cc. i. ii.
Cf St. Thomas: "Per confirmitatem intellectus et rei veritas
definitur. Unde conformitatem istani cognoscere est cognoscere
veritatem. Hanc autem nullo mode sensus cognoscit. Licet enim
visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non taraen cognoscit compara-
tionem, quas est inter rem visam, et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea.
Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilcm cognoscere
potest : sed tamen non apprehendit earn, secundum quod cognoscit
de aliquo quod quid est. Sed quando judicat, rem ita se habere,
sicut est forma, quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et
:licit verum. Ethoc facit compoiioido, et dividendo. . . . Ideo propric
loquendo Veritas est in intellectu componente, et dividente non
lutem in sensu, nee in intellectu cognoscente (juod (juid est {i.e., m
actu simplicis apprehensionis)." [Suju. i. q. 10, a. 2.)

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. V7

breaking up of the original presentation and the TCiiniting of
its parts, which are now exphcitly cognized as distinct
constituents of the total object. Herein hes the efficacy of
the judicial activity of the mind in developing our knowledge.
The highest function of intelligence is not judging or reason-
ing, but intuition. It is because of the obscurity and inade-
quacy of the intuitions of the human mind that our
conceptions have to be perfected by this analytic and
synthetic activity — dividendo et componendo, as the schoolmen
taught. Could we obtain a comprehensive conception of the
nature of the triangle or of carbon, by simple apprehension,
the laborious comparisons and reasonings of the geometrician
and the chemist would be unnecessary.^ The starting-point
of the judgment is a percept or a notion apprehended in an
indistinct or undeveloped form. The result is the same
percept or notion, but possessed in a more distinct and
perfect manner. A proposition containiu;^ a complex predicate
as, for instance : The orange is a yelloic, spherical, sweet, juicy
fruit, really expresses the result of many judgments. All
our conceptions, both scientific and vulgar, are, as we have
already seen (pp. 297 — 302), elaborated by successive acts of
discrimination and assimilation in this way. Judgnient is
not merely automatic fusion or association of ideas, still less
of concrete impressions. It involves active abstraction. In
all propositions the predicate is a universal term, and even in
singular judgments the subject is considered under an abstract
aspect. The mind holds the two concepts together hut apart;
it unites them whilst keeping them distinct. It retains hold of
both throughout the entire operation. The force of attention
to the two compared ideas is constantly varying, the subject
being vividly realized at one moment, the attribute or quality
at the next. But neither can completely fade out of con-
sciousness during the process; otherwise, the judicial act
would be impossible. The faculty of Retention is as essential
a condition of judgment as that of Assimilation and Discrimi-
nation. Herein lies evidence of the indivisible unity of the
mind as a real persisting being. Two successive impressions
or "sections" of a "stream of consciousness" cannot compare
themselves with each other. Nor could a third born after
the death of both do so, unless it be the act of a real abiding

3 " Si intellectus noster statim in ipso principio videret con-
clusionis veritatem, nunquam intelligeret discurrendo, vel ratio-
cinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis
subjecti haberet notitiam de omnibus, quae possunt attribui subjecto,
vel removeri ab eo, nunquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo
sed solum intelligendo quod quid est." [Sum. i. q. 88, 4.)

3i8 RATIONAL LIFE.

agent which was the subject of its two predecessors, and is
capable of resuscitating them.

Affirmation and denial. — It has been maintained
by some writers that the act of judgment is something
really distinct from and superadded to the perception
of the agreement or disagreement of the subject and
predicate. When the reasons for assent are not strictly
cogent, a voluntar}^ element undoubtedly enters into
affirmation or denial. But in those judgments in
which the truth is evident, the assent, it seems to us,
is necessaril}^ included in the perception of the relation
between subject and predicate. The mental act by
which I apprehend that 2 + i =3, or, that " snow is not
warm," involves the mental assertion of the truth, and
this is the judgment.

Assent and consent. — A far graver error, however, is that of
Descartes and his followers, who confounding assent with
consent teach that "affirmation, denial, and doubt are different
forms of volition."* It must be admitted that will and
intellect act and react upon each other in the most intimate
manner. Whilst the will is moved to desire through the
apprehension of motives by the intellect, the intellect is itself
moved to observation and study by the effort of the will.
In many acts of judgment it is the faculty of vohtion which
directs and concentrates attention upon the attribute or
relation that is the matter of the judicial act. If the truth be
evident, the will is powerless ; but if it be not evident, the
will may largely influence assent, either by withdrawing
attention from the considerations in favour of one side and
focussing it upon those which tell for the other, or by directly
impelling the mind to assent and embrace an opinion whilst
the evidence is felt to be insufficient. It is in this way that
the will is so often the cause of error.^

•* " Cupere, aversari, affirmare, negate, dubitare sunt diversi
modi volendi." {Princip. I. § 32.)

*' St. Thomas succinctly defines the influence of volition upon
intelligence thus: "Actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter :
Uno mode, quantum ad exercitiiim actus; et sic actus rationis
semper inipeyari potest ; sicut cum indicitur alicui, quod attendat,et
ratione uiatur. Alio modo quantum ad ohjectum ; respectu cujus
duo actus rationis attenduntur. Prima quidem, ut veritatem circa
aliquid apprehendat : ct hoc non est in potestate nostra ; hoc enim
contingit per virtutem alicujus luminis vel naturalis, vel super-
naturalis, ct ideo quantum ad hoc actus rationis non est ni

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 319

Further, there is a certain affinity in character betwc-tn
the act of judgment and vokmtary election. The assent
inchided in the former causes the cessation of intellectual
activity in the adhesion of the understanding to the truth
possessed, somewhat as a voluntary choice results in the
quiescence of the appetitive faculty in the fruition of its
appropriate object. The sense of liberation from the dis-
agreeable suspense of doubt by complete assent is thus often
akin to the relief from the hesitancy which precedes the
formal act of consent. Nevertheless, judicial activity is the
immediate function of the Intellect, not of the Will. The act
of judgment though often, in scholastic language, imperatus
a voluntate, — commanded by the will, — is always elicitus ab
intellectu, exerted by the intellect. Assent differs essentially
from consent. The former is intellectual acquiescence in
something as true : the latter is voluntary complacency in
something as good. The cognitive faculty accepts or submits
to what is imposed upon it : the appetitive faculty stretches
after and embraces what is suggested to it. The end and
purpose of the former is the expression or representation of
some kind oi being ; that of the latter, the attainment, or enjoy-
ment of some form of action. We may be compelled to assent,
but consent is always voluntary. Truths and facts that are
disagreeable may be evident ; whilst projects which win our
approval may have but a doubtful chance of success. When,
however, we pass from the speculative to the practical or
moral order, assent of the intellect to the rightness of action
imposes special moral obligation on the will, whilst our
judgments assume a distinctly moral character. The judg-
ment that a certain line of conduct is obhgatory commands
and moves us to embrace it with our will and carry it out
in action.*"

potestate nostra, nee imperari potest. Aliiis autem actus rationis
est, quum his, quae apprehendit, assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia
apprehensa, quibus natiiraliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima
principia, assensus talium, vel dissensus non est in potestate tiostra. . .
Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intel-
lectum quin possit assentire, vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel
dissensum suspendere propter aliquam causam : et in talibus assensus
ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit. '
{Sum. 1-2. q. 17, 6 )

*^ Olle Laprune, in his valuable work, De la Certitude Moyalc,
thus writes: "Assentiment, en soi, n'est pas cunscntcmcnt. On nu
declare point une chose vraie parce qu'on le veut : I'acte de volonte
n'cst pas dans la decision meme par laquelle on prononce sur la
vrai et le faux. Hors le cas ou une ccrtaine obscurite fait naitre
des difficultes que la volonte doit surmonter, la decision ii'cct pas,

320 RATIONAL LIFE.

Reasoning defined. — Besides conception and
judgment there remains a third function of the
intellect, that of reasoning or inference. It may
be defined as, that operation by ivhich ivc derive a
new judgment from some oilier judgment or judgments
previously known. When we pass from a single
judgment to another involved or contained in it,
the act is styled an immediate inference. Thus,
from the proposition, "All men are mortal," we
immediately conclude, " Some mortal things are
men." When we proceed from two or more judg-
ments, to a new judgment following from their
combined force, we have mediate inference. Mediate
inference is also defined as, that mental act by which
from the comparison of two ideas ivith a third we
ascertain their agreement or difference.

Analysis of Ratiocination. — Reasoning, being an
exercise of judgment, is a more complex process of
analysis and synthesis, divisionis et compositionis. From
the proposition S is P I infer : Not-P is not S, and : At
least some-P is S, by deliberate consideration of what is
contained in the concepts S and P. This is still more
obvious in mediate inference, or reasoning strictly so-
called, in which the synthetic activity of the mind is
more prominent. Here the problem is to determine

en soi un acte libre. C'est la lumiere qui determine I'assentiment:
on affirme ou Ton nie legitimement parce qu'on voit qu'il faut
affirmer ou nier, et Ton n'est pas libre de le voir ou non. On est
seulement libre de regarder, ce qui est autre chose. . . . Vassentiment
est involontaire, mais le consentement qui s'y ajoute, ou plutot qui y
est implique, est volontaire. Le consentement, c'est ceite accep-
tation de la verite, dont nous parlions tout a 'heure ; ce n'est point
I'acte meme d'assurer ou de nier, lequel est dicte pour ainsi dire
par la verite, mais c'est la rtponse de I'ame a cette voix superieure."
(p. 64.) For some admirable remarks on the right relation of Will
to Intellect in Philosophy, see also Mr. Wilfrid Ward's excellent
little work, The Wish to Believe.

yVDGMENT AND T^EASONING. 32.

some relation between S and P whilst we are unable
to compare them immediately. We shall attain our
purpose if we can find a suitable middle-term — a medi-
ating notion — which will serve to connect them, some-
what as a common-measure. The type of the argument
is: S is M, but M is P, therefore S is P. Analysis of
S has revealed M, whilst further analysis of M and
comparison of it with P has disclosed a relation of
identity between these also. We now hold that S is P
because it is M, which is identical with P. The identity
of P wdth M is the logical ground or reason why we affirm
P of S. Reasoning, then, in addition to analysis and
synthesis involved in all judgments, includes identifica-
tion, or the explicit perception of an element implicit in
the previously known relations. The synthesis in the
conclusion is the formal evoking of this implicit relation
into consciousness. This perception of the conse-
quence or logical nexus expressed by the words there-
fore, since, because, etc., is the essence of reasoning, and
is possible only to a rational being.

Logicians have disputed as to which of the laws of
thought is to be deemed the most fundamental and
universal principle of reasoning. To us it seems that
different axioms are more immediately applicable for
the justification of different forms of inference, whilst
the denial of any one of the laws of thought would lead
immediately to the destruction of all reasoning. Still,
the principle of identity, which on its negative side
involves the principle of contradiction, has strong claims
to be deemed the most universal and ultimate law of
rational thinking. That A is A, that A thing is identical
with itself, that Whatever is, is, must be held to be the
supreme canon of consistency. Our terms must retain
the same meaning, our concepts must remain unchanged,
the data which we handle must persist unaltered
throughout our discourse, or no conclusion can be
drawn. S is inferred to be P only because, whilst both
S and P continue identical with themselves, they are
also identical with the same M.

Deduction and Induction.— If the movement of
the mind is from a wider to a narrower truth, from a

322 k AT ION A L LIFE.

law to particular facts, or to a narrower law, the mental
operation is called deductive reasoning ; if the reverse, it
is characterized as inductive. Thus, in the syllogism :
All bodies containing carbon are combustible ; but diamonds
contain carbon ; therefore diamonds are combustible^ we argue
deductively. On the contrary, if from perceiving that
iron, gold, silver, lead, and copper sink in water, I
conclude that all metals sink in water, I am said to
argue inductively, and in the given case falsely. From
the present psychological point of view, however, the
distinction is unimportant. The reasoning in every
case is the establishing of a relation between two
notions by the mediation of a third notion. The hitting
upon this middle-term is the ever-recurring problem of
scientific discover}^ as its accurate determination and
definition is the essence of scientific proof. To isolate
the attribute M, which constitutes the reason, ground,
or cause of P, and is implicit in the complex concrete
S, is the work of the insight of the Man of Genius.
And the human race has to wait for a Newton to detect
amid the infinite complexity of two such diverse
phenomena as the falling apple and the circumvolving
moon the hitherto invisible M — the force of gravitation.
Implicit reasoning". — Were it not for the danger of
rousing the ire of the logician, the psychologist might
define the syllogism as that particular form of reasoning
which mankind do not use. In ordinar}^ literature, in
conversation, or in his natural processes of thinking,
man never formulates an inference in the shape of
major, minor, and conclusion. The most common form
of argument is the enthymcme, in which either the con-
clusion or one of the premises is suppressed. Very
often the conclusion comes first, and one of the premises
is merely invoked to justify it ; whilst not infrequently
the inference emerges into consciousness with so tran-
sient and so indistinct an apprehension of the reasons
upon which it rests, that it seems doubtful whether they
have ever been reall}' perceived. Indeed, it is often
impossible to draw an}^ but an arbitrar}' distinction
between simple external perception, judgment, and
reasoning. Thus, whilst walking on Wimbledon

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 323

Common, I observe an object amongst some furze at a
little distance. After a few seconds of attentive
observation, I mentally pronounce the object to be a
deer most pvohably escaped from the neighbouring park. The
judgment that the object is a deer, I call a perception;
the opinion that it has escaped from the park, I call an
inference. Yet the former act of assent, like the latter,
is due to a process of reasoning from past recollections
and present apprehension of shape, colour, movement,
limbs, antlers, etc., performed sub-consciously with such
rapidity that I arrive at the conclusion without being
aware of the steps by which it has been reached.
Many of these data will, however, be at once consciously
realized if the decision is challenged.

Inferences concerning the concrete facts of life are
nearly all of this kind, and the conclusions which we
form from moment to moment are generally the result
of a mass of reminiscences, perceptions, feelings,
opinions, facts, and experiences of every sort, mingled
together with a complexity that defies analysis, or at
all events renders adequate exposition in logical form

I impossible. The diagnosis of a malady by the doctor,
the decision of the authorship of a painting by an art
critic, the prevision of the market by the man of
business, the divination of the coming storm by the

I" sailor, and our own appreciations of the characters of
our intimate friends, whether we call such judgments
- acts of intuition, tact, or perceptions of common-sense,
are all in their origin based on acts of observation and
ratiocination which have become so easy and rapid that
at last the intermediate links and reasons cannot be
discovered without considerable effort. The strength
h of the great majority of our beliefs on familiar subjects
so far outweighs the grounds which we can assign for
them, that when we attempt to formulate an argument
m abstract logical shape, they seem to be unfounded
prejudices. My conviction, for instance, that my father
would not calumniate me, that England is an island,
that the ^neid was not written in the Middle Ages,
could receive no adequate justification if I had to
express the grounds for it in syllogistic form. Yet my

324 RATIONAL LIFE.

assent may be perfectly rational, and in no way
exceeding the evidence.

The Logic of real life. — Newman's Grammar. — It is in
the rare skill with which he expounded, and the clearness
and felicitous richness with which he illustrated this wide
field of our actual rational life, that Newman's great contri-
bution to Logic and Psychology lies — a work the value
and wide-reaching influence of which have been but very
inadequately recognized by English psychologists and
logicians. The multifarious and complex character of the
evidence which underlies our religious and moral convictions
in particular, is shown by the superior force of the cumulative
method of arguing over formal syllogistic proof in these
departments, especially when it is used to stimulate our own
implicit reasonings. This is well exemplified by Newman in a
passage cited from Pascal: "' Consider the establishment of
the Christian religion,' says the French philosopher. ' Here
is a religion contrary to our nature, which establishes itself in
men's minds with so much mildness, as to use no external
force ; with so much energy, that no tortures could silence its
martyrs and confessors ; and consider the holiness, devotion,
huniiUty of its true disciples ; its sacred books, their super-
human grandeur, their admirable simplicity. Consider the
character of its Founder ; His associates and disciples,
unlettered men, yet possessed of wisdom sufficient to con-
found the ablest philosopher ; the astonishing succession of
prophets who heralded Him ; the state at this day of the
Jewish people who rejected Him and His Religion ; its per-
petuity and its holiness, the light which its doctrines shed
upon the contrarieties of our nature; — after considering these
things, let any man judge if it be possible to doubt about its
being the only true one.' This is an argument parallel in its
character to that by which we ascribe the classics to the
Augustan age. . . . Many have been converted and sustained
in their faith by this argument, which admits of being power-
fully stated; but still such a statement is after all only
intended to be a vehicle of thought, and to open the mind to
the apprehension of the facts of the case, and to trace them by
their implications in outline, not to convince by the logic of its
mere wording. Do we not think and muse as we read it, try
to master it as we proceed, put down the book in which we
find it, fill out its details from our own resources, and then
resume the study of it.""

The great mass of our practical, moral, social and political
as well as scientific faiths have their sources in informal and

'' Grammar of Assent, pp. 306 — 308,

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 325

implicit inferences of this kind ; and it is by working through
such channels rather than by formal arguments, that perma-
nent real assents are obtained. By controversy a man is
rarely persuaded of anything except of the truth of his own
view. Philosophical positions rushed by a logical assault are
not permanently retained. Intellectual assent extorted at the
point of the syllogism soon rebels. It is by the gradual
process of sapping and mining that convictions are subverted
and conversions effected. It is by famine that beliefs are
starved and atrophied. And such is the infirmity of the
human mind, that unless it be frequently reinforced, it will
be compelled by the slow but constant pressure of the siege
all around to capitulate and surrender its most cherished,
perhaps even its best warranted faiths.

Thought differently viewed by Psychology and Logic. —
Although the diverse standpoints of the Logician and the
Psychologist with respect to mental phenomena in general
have been already indicated (pp. 7, 8) their different ways of
regarding thought in particular seem worthy of notice here.
Whereas thinking constitutes in the language of the Schoolmen,
a common "material object"' for both, the " formal object,"
that is, the special aspect under which they consider this
phenomenon is essentially different in the case of each. The
aim of Logic is primarily practical — to secure truth in our
judgments and reasonings: that of Empirical Psychology is
speculative — to study and describe these operations as mental
facts interesting in themselves, apart from their veracity or
falsehood. To attain its end Logic seeks to determine the
various ideal forms or types of valid inference. For this
purpose, by an act of abstraction it considers concepts,
judgments, and reasonings, //; facto esse, as the scholastics
said, that is, as finished products — portions of thought
crytallized into solid pieces. It classifies concepts according
to their meaning, content, and extent. It examines the several
possible forms of judgments, their import, quantity and
(juaHty, in order to define their mutual implications. It
studies their various legitimate combinations in which con-
sistency of thought is maintained, and it then forinulates
precepts — rules of the syllogism and canons of induction — by
which fallacies may be avoided and correctness in judging
and reasoning preserved.

Empirical Pyschology, on the other hand, is directly con-
cerned only with the actual behaviour of the intellect. Its
desire is to ascertain how men do reason ; not how they ought
to reason. It considers our conceptual, judicial, and ratio-
cinative acts not as solidified abstractions, but as they really
do occur in a fliiid condition forming continuous portions of

326 RATIONAL LIFE.

the current of our mental life. It observes them in fieri — in
the making. It endeavours to analyze them in order to
discover their genesis and their relations to emotions, desires,
and other conscious states. Whilst Logic considers almost
exclusively the objective meaning of our intellectual acts
Psychology is specially interested in their subjective source and
their inner nature. Whilst the former science limits itself
to the investigation of the structure — the Morphology, as
Bosanquet calls it, of mature explicit thought, and confines
itself to judgments characterized by certainty; the latter
studies the growth and development of thinking in all its stages,
whether implicit or explicit, and attends alike to all forms
and degrees of assent. Finally, the philosophical or rational
Psychologist is specially interested in the functional activities
of the Intellect as affording valuable evidence for important
metaphysical conclusions as to the inner nature of the mind.

Belief. — There has been much discussion during
the past two centuries as to the nature of belief. In
general the tendency has been to exaggerate its claims
at the expense of knowledge, and then by representing
it as irrational to destroy the foundations of all certitude.
Belief has been variously assigned to the cognitional,
emotional, and volitional faculties ; and its sphere has
been made to comprehend all forms of assurance, from
trust in human or divine testimony to convictions
of the validity of primary truths. Amongst English
Psychologists at the present day it is generally set in
simple contrast to Imagination, as signifying assent to
objective reality.

Historical Sketch. — With Hume who, here as elsewhere,
saw more clearly and accepted more heroically than any ot
his followers the conseauences of Sensism, all assertions,
except those regarding purely ideal truths, are expressions
of belief. Although we may be said to knoic that " equals
added to equals give equals," and all propositions deduced
from this, we can only be said to believe that real material
objects exist. The principle of causality too, is not a
cognition, but a. persuasion or belief. Furthermore, when belief
is analyzed, it is found according to Hume to consist in
the '* superior force or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or
steadiness " of those ideas which are believed to be objec-
tively valid. He sometimes speaks in a vague way of an
element of " sentiment " forming the essence of belief, but he
finally defines the latter act as '• a lively idea related to or

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 327

associated with a present impression." With my present
vision of a distant tree there is associated a " Hvely idea " of
tactual and other sensations. My beUef in the reahty of the
object is merely the superior vivacity by whicli this " lively
idea " surpasses the creations of fancy. This explanation is
inadequate. Independently of the fact that Hume charac-
terizes as belief what should be properly described as
knowledge, the resolution of belief into mere intensity of
imagination is refuted by everyday experience. The scientist
is assured of the existence of infinitesimal vibrations in an
unimaginably elastic medium ; and we all, in fact, believe in
numberless objects of which we can form none or but the
faintest ideas, whilst we hold to be unreal many things which
the imagination represents with the greatest distinctness.

James Mill also calls cognition of external reality belief;
and in a similar manner would reduce this mental act to an
"inseparable" or " indissoluble association" between ideas.
Belief in the events of to-morrow, in ghosts during darkness,
in a real external world, and in my own past experience,
are all merely instances of continuous association. A
present impression irresistibly arouses another by associa-
tion, and that association constitutes belief. Against this
view may be urged two objections. First, the assenting act
of the mind, in which the essence of belief consists, is
confused with the causes of that assent. Though associations
may generate belief, they are not thereby the belief itself.
Secondly, in many cases where association has begotten a
deception, the mind may discover its error and disbelieve in
the illusion although the association remains, as in the case
of the apparent fixity of the earth.

Dr. Bain formerly identified belief with readiness to act.
He held that belief is " in its essential import related to
Activity and Will," and that in fact it is merely a "growth
or development of will under the pursuit of immediate ends."^
Subsequently, however, he abandoned the old view, and now
looks on the phenomenon as a fact or " incident of our intel-
lectual nature, though dependent as to its force on our active
and emotional tendencies." '^ The chief factors in its
development are innate "spontaneity" and "primitive
credulity." Dr. Bain's attempt merely adds to the list of
failures, (i) Readiness to act may be sometimes, though it
is not always, a test or indication of belief, but it is poor logic
to confound the sign with the thing signified, or the effect

8 Cf. Mental Science, Bk. IV. c. viii. (ist Edit.)
^ Cf. Note appended to last edition of Mental Science ; see also
Emotions and Will (3rd Edit.), p. 536.

328 RATIONAL LIFE.

with the cause. (2) Again, so far from its being a growth of
our active voHtional power, the essential feature of the act
of beHef is in many cases the passive or recipient attitude
of the mind. (3) The analysis of belief into "primitive
credulity " savours suspiciously of the vicious circle. For
the sensist, who denies knowledge of aught except sensations,
and who must logically reduce the external world to an
aggregate of mental states, the problem here is to explain
the act termed " belief," which is involved in external per-
ception and memory, but absent from imagination. Now,
to resolve belief into a group of elements including "primitive
credulity," is to resolve it into a tendency to believe too easily,
plus some other factors This obviously is no real analysis.
The simple truth is tnat the acquiescence of the mind ii:
its own cognitions cannot be resolved into any simpler act.

Three questions concerning Belief. — To secure
clearness it is needful to separate three distinct
questions : (A) What mental states are to be comprised
under belief? or, How is it demarcated from knowledge?
(B) What are in general the mental causes, or conditions
which most influence belief ? (C) What are the usual
psychical effects and manifestations of belief? ^^

(A) Nature of Belief. — Belief is opposed to doubt
rather than to disbelief: for frequently to disbelieve a
statement means positive belief in its contradictor\\
If a proposition is presented to us and neither the
grounds for nor against it compel assent, there arises
a state of intellectual hesitancy in which the mind is
unable completely to adhere to one side or the other
from fear of the opposite being true. This is the
condition of positive doubt — a mental attitude that is
generally disagreeable, since the mind naturally seeks
its appropriate good in the assured possession of truth.
When the motives in "favour of one alternative seem
stronger tlian those on the other side, the mind tends
in the direction of the former, but still with a lurking
fear that the latter may be true. This acceptance of
a proposition based on a probability, that is, on motives
not excluding all reasonable anxiet}' as to the possi-
bility of error, is called an opinion. In opposition to

" Cf. Professor Adamson, " Belief," Encyd. Brit. (9th Edit.)

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 320

both doubt and mere opinion, the term belief is used to
include many forms of assent.

Belief and Knowledge.— (i) In a very wide and vague
sense of the word belief is made to embrace every form of
cognition. Belief in its own validity is in fact an aspect or
essential feature of all knowledge. Hamilton takes advantage
of this usage to found cognition upon belief — but with grave
peril to the certainty of all knowledge. (2) The word belief
is also used to express the various degrees of assent, falling
somewhat short of full certainty, with which the mind may
adhere to a proposition ; belief is here equivalent to a very
probable opinion. (3) Again, from time immemorial, this
word has been used to denote the acceptance of a truth on
testimony. (4) Lastly, the term is also employed by
psychologists to designate a large class of convictions in
which our acquiescence may be so complete as to exclude
all reasonable doubt, but which yet in ordinary language are
frequently distinguished from knowledge. The chief assur-
ances of this class would seem to be firm assents where the
evidence, though sufficient to afford certitude, has not been
analyzed or clearly realized in consciousness. Apart, therefore,
from that inaccurate usage according to which we are
described as believing axiomatic principles or that our know-
ledge is true, we find three classes of judgments in which the
mental state is called belief. We are said to believe {a) that
a penny will not turn up heads six times running ; {b) that
there were two revolutions in England during the seventeenth
century; and also (c) such statements as that trains will run,
that newspapers will be published, and that bridges will bear
us up to-morrow. Regarding the first and second classes,
there is no difficulty; probable opinions and trust in testimony
may be rightly described as belief and easily distinguished
from knowledge. The appropriateness of applying the term
belief to the third class of assurances — a class roughly
equivalent to what Cardinal Newman calls " simple assents "
as opposed to "complex or reflex assents" — is not so clear.
The principal objection to ranking these mental states as
belief lies in the difficulty of determining how much formal
analysis or conscious realization of the grounds of a conviction
is necessary to constitute it a cognition. The chief justifi-
cation for such a course is based on the obscure and
indistinct manner in which the evidence is apprehended.

Under Knowledge we would include (i) all truths of the
necessary order seen to be immediately or mediately evident ;
(2) all truths of the physical or contingent order revealed in
my own experience, whether as (c.) facts of internal conscious-

33d RATIONAL LIFE.

ness, (b) facts given in external perception, or (c) recollections
of memory ; (3) all truths explicitly inferred by logical
reasoning from such known facts. Thus I kuoK> the mathe-
matical axioms and all theorems which I have deduced from
them by formal reasoning. I know that calumny is wrong.
I also know my own feelings. Further, matters-of-fact, objects
and events in the external world disclosed to my own
observation, my personal identity, and past experiences
recollected by memory should be included within the sphere
of knowledge. That I have an extended body, that my house
contains two storeys, that I am the same being who opened
Mill's Logic about two minutes since, are all matters ol
cognition. Lastly, I k)ww all truths which I have consciously
reasoned out from these more immediate cognitions. What
is knowledge to one man may therefore be belief to another.

Both compared. — We do not imply that such precision
as this can be observed in everyday language. We merely
seek to define a distinction vaguely felt, and confusedly
indicated in ordinary modes of expression, but which points to
real and important psychological differences. If we accept
this defineation of the fields of knowledge and belief, or even if
we confine belief to the two smaller classes — probable opinion
and trust in testimony — we see the motive for the frequent
description of the one as intelligent, the other as comparatively
blind, although both acts pertain to the intellect. Cognition
requires that the truth assented to be mediately or immediately
intrinsically evident. Belief, at least in the narrower sense,
has for its object the inevident, or what is but extrinsically
evident.'^ In the former state there is always full assent ; in
the latter acquiescence may at times be only partial. In the
one case we are completely determined by the objective
evidence or reality of the fact ; in the other we may be
largely governed by volition, emotion, and other subjective
dispositions of the soul. It is this element of truth which
lies at the root of Hamilton's statement : " Knowledge and
Belief differ not only in degree but in kind. Knowledge is a
certainty founded upon insight ; belief is certainty founded
upon feeling. The one is perspicuous and objective, the
other obscure and subjective." It is true that knowledge is
eminently rational, whilst belief may be largely instinctive or
emotional ; still, possibility of error can at times be as
securely excluded in states of mind justly called beliefs as in

^' In scholastic language a truth is said to be intrinsically evident
when by its own nature it enforces assent. It is cxttinsicaUv evident
if necessarily acquiesced in by virtue of authority or testimony in
its favour. For a treatment oi evidence as the criterion of certitude,
cf. First Principles of Knoivlcdge, c. xiii.

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 33I

the clearest knowledge. Since, however, thq essential feature
in the mental state of belief is the admission by the intellect
of some truth impressed upon it, those psychologists misread
consciousness who ascribe the act itself to the voluntary or
affective faculties.

From this demarcation of knowledge and belief it will
follow that truths transcending phenomenal experience,
such as the existence and attributes of God, the nature
of the soul, the reality of a future life, and the like, when
demonstrated by strict logical reasoning from evident facts
and principles, can be kmnvn as well as believcdP The term
faith is more especially employed to signify belief in supra-
sensible things on the authority of Divine Revelation. Such
supernatural belief requires, according to Catholic Theology,
the co-operation of grace, and exceeds in both reliableness
and dignity the avouchments of natural intelligence.

(B) The Causes of belief. — The forces which
determine belief are manifold. Looking from the
outside at our beliefs as a system — the complexus of
views, opinions, and convictions possessed by each of
us, on moral, religious, social, scientific, and political
matters — we are forced to admit that they are very
largely the result of our intellectual environment or what
Mr. Balfour happily styles the "psychological atmos-
phere" or "climate" in which we live. If we turn to
the particular acts of judgment exercised from day to
day throughout our lives, it is clear that our inherited
character as well as our acquired habits of thought
have an important part in determining assent wherever
the evidence is not conclusive. Still it is in the proxi-
mate conditions of belief that the psychologist is most
interested ; and these may be classed as (i) Intellectual,
(2) Emotional, (3) Volitional.

(i) Intellectual factor.— Amon°^st the causes of belief must
obviously be included reasons. A reason may be described as
any motive which involves an essentially direct appeal to
intelligence. When a particular consideration influences the
intellect indirectly through feeling or will it is so far forth a
non-rationa) cause of belief. But as the same object may
move the intellect both directly and indirectly, it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether a particular motive is to be

See Olle Laprune's able treatment of this subject, De la
Certitude Morale, pp. gi — 117.

332 RATIONAL LIFE.

classed as a reason or as a cause, or as both reason and cause
of belief.i^ Reasons which are exphcitly reahzed in conscious-
ness, if sufficient to necessitate assent, result in knowledge,
not mere belief. The most extensive and iuiportant class of
our convictions, as we have already observed, are probably
those inferences which are drawai from premises abundantly
sufficient in themselves to warrant the conclusion but not
formally realized in consciousness. It is the intellectual
power of forming such conclusions easily, rapidly, and
surely, which Newman termed the Illative facility or the
Illative sense. And however this intellectual activity be
best characterized, that it has played an immense part in
the building up of our entire system of beliefs, he demon-
strated beyond dispute.^* Special aptitude for rapid inferences
form su( h evidence, particularly in regard to the effect
upon others of our words and actions, is often called tact. In
addition to the intellectual element of quick appreciation,
this term also implies the faculty of prompt and appropriate
responsive action ; for, fineness of touch refers not only to
the discriminate capacity of the sense, but to its delicate
efficiency in modifying the materials handled. Where the

^2 The distinction between reasons and causes of belief is brought
out with admirable clearness in Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief :
" To say that I believe a statement because I have been taught it,
or because my father believed it before me, or because everybody
in the village believes it, is to announce what everyday experience
informs us is a quite adequate cause of belief — it is not, however,
per se, to give a reason for a belief at all. But such statements can
be turned at once into reasons by no process m.ore elaborate than
that of explicitly recognizing that my teachers, my family, or my
neighbours, are truthful persons, happy in the possession of adequate
means of information — propositions which in their turn of course
require argumentative support. Such a procedure may, I need
hardly say, be quite legitimate ; and reasons of this kind are
probably the principal ground on which in mature life we accept
the great mass of our subordinate scientific and historical con-
victions." (p. 220.) It is worthy of note here that in the justilication
of our beliefs, when we get back to first principles, the reason and
cause coalesce. Thus, the ultimate reason for the acceptance of
mathematical axioms is that they are truths which revealing them-
selves to the intellect by their own evidence inevitably cause or
command assv^nt.

^■* See especially chapters viii., ix. of the Grammar of Assent.
The value of that contribution to Philosophy is best estimated by
the prominence in all subsequent apologetic literature of the
argument which justifies our religious beliefs by showing that our
most assured practical and "scientific" convictions are based on
intellectual data and processes of precisely the same kind.

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 333

evidence is not rigorously conclusive it still may render a
particular alternative probable ; and here either intellect or
uill may be the determinant of the resulting belief. Other
things equal, the force of our conviction tends to be in pro-
portion to the weight of the evidence. Frequent repetition
of contiguous experiences generates an expectation that the
one will be in future followed by the other, and superior
vividness of an idea often produces a belief in its objective
reality. Nevertheless we sometimes disbelieve in those phan-
tasms which are most vivid, and contrariwise are convinced
of the objective truth of faint ones.

(2) Emotional sources of belief cannot be completely
separated from those described as Intellectual, since most
emotions are based on intellectual representations. Still,
there is a sufficiently well marked distinction for the purposes
of our classification. Bound up with the social instinct, there
is an innate impulse to trust human testimony. Children are
proverbially credulous, and it is only a sad experience which
unwillingly forces us to be chary of putting too great faith in
our neighbour's word. Again, all emotions — especially those
of hope and fear — which have the power of arousing in us a
hvely picture of any event, thereby tend to create a belief in
its occurrence. Applied to our own actions this law is
expressed in the axiom that " Beliefs tend to realize them-
selves." On the other hand, sorrow, melancholy, and those
feelings which depress psychical life produce despair and
disbelief in the wished-for good, or a hopeless conviction of
the coming ill.

(3) Volitional Element. — The effect of the Will on belief
has always been recognized :

The wish was father, Harry, to that thought,

is but the particular application of an adage far older than
Shakespeare. The emphasis laid on the merit of Belief by
all Christian teachers from St. Paul downwards, impHes that
assent is largely under the control of the Will. The forces
modifying belief which have their root in the appetitive side
of our nature may be classed as, (a) natural or indehberate,
and {h) volitional or deliberate. As regards {a), we readily
believe what we desire, unless the wish be intense, when our
anxiety makes us over-exacting as regards the evidence either
for or against our hopes. We are easily convinced that our
ideal heroes possess every virtue. We have, partly by
character, partly by education and habit, become possessed
of a number of cherished fancies on various subjects. What-
ever conflicts with these, though the evidence in its favour
be strong, we are impelled to distrust : what harmonizes

334 RATIONAL LIFE.

with them, however improbable, we readily admit. We have
called these beliefs indeliberate, inasmuch as they come into
play without any positive effort on our part, but of course
they may have serious responsibilities attached ; and when in
certain subjects reason declares that our beliefs or disbeliefs
have been misplaced, we may be under a weighty obligation
to assume the unpleasant task of uprooting the prejudice.
(b) Belief, as we have seen, is often under the influence of
Free-will in the exercise of judgment. A change in our
convictions cannot of course be at once effected by a single
volition. But by deliberately fixing our attention on the
arguments favourable to one side of a question and averting
it from those on the other, we may in time come to adhere to
what we at first discredited, or what is in se least probable.

(C) Effects. — The effects of Belief are frequently, though
not always, manifested in movement. Readiness to act is a
common sign of conviction, and this is probably the source
of Dr. Bain's error on the subject. Nevertheless, from many
of our beliefs, it requires a very forced and artificial inter-
pretation of consciousness to elicit any reference at all to
action. Thus my belief that William the Conqueror invaded
England a.d. 1066, or that there is hydrogen in the sun, or
that I read a play of Shakespeare yesterday, contains no
tendency to action that I can discover. On the other hand,
the acceptance of depressing truths, instead of originating
movement, often results in complete mental and bodily
prostration. Still, in the larger number of cases belief is
followed by action, and of course action must always pre-
suppose belief in the reality of the environment. The active
temperament is usually sanguine. The energetic man is not
given to despair, but easily acquires confidence in new
projects. Acting on mere opinions soon transforms them
into steady convictions, which conversely strengthen the
impulse to activity. " Courage is half the battle," expresses
the psychological truth that confidence in our own prowess
is eminently calculated to express itself in vigorous action.

Conscience. — The Moral Faculty is simpl}^ the
intellect directed towards the moral aspects of
action, and hence styled the Moral or Practical
Reason. It is not a different power from the
Speculative Intellect. The terms Speculative and
Practical qualify merely diverse exertions of the
same faculty. By the former the mind discerns

JUDGMEyiT AND REASONING. 335

truth and falsity, by the latter the rightncss and

wron^ness of conduct. An action viewed simply

as a fact is the object of the intellect. The harmony,

however, of such an act with human nature and its

relation to a given end are but special accidental

aspects of the same reality. Consequently, as

St. Thomas argues, there is no reason why the

rational faculty which apprehends the being of an

act cannot consider its htness for an end, its

harmony with nature, or its moral rightness.

Scholastic view of Conscience. — Two elements contained
under the vague modern term Conscience are carefully dis-
tinguished by the sclioolmen as Syiidcrcsis and Cunscicntia.
They attributed both, however, to the same ratio practica.
Synderesis denotes the innate disposition or habit by which we
are enabled rapidly and easily to apprehend the primary
precepts of the Moral Law, when the suitable experience
occurs. Thus the practical maxims that " Right ought to be
done," and that " Ingratitude is wrong," when observation
has enabled us to comprehend the terms, are intuitively
perceived with the same certainty as the speculative axiom
that " Equals to the same are equal to each other," and the
like. Conscicntia is defined as the exercise of the Practical
Intellect in applying the general precept to a particular case.
It is, in fact, the cognitive activity exhibited in the ethical
syllogism by which the moral quality of any act is deter-
mined— e.g. {Major) To relieve parents from suffering is right
(Synderesis). (Minor) This act does so. Ergo. This act is
right (Conscientia). This doctrine affords an easy solution
of conflicting moral judgments. For even if the general
principle is fully grasped, there may be error in its appli-
cation ; as when some barbarous tribes insert as minor in
the above syllogism, " To kill parents in times of famine or
sickness is to relieve them.'' Again, the special aptitude or
disposition by which we are inchned to apprehend general
axioms may be corrupted or perverted by education, tradition,
evil passions, extreme intellectual and moral degradation due
to climatic conditions or to the severity of surroundings, and
the like.

Theories concerning Conscience. — The chief
hypotheses on the subject of moral cognition

336 RATIONAL LIFE.

advanced during modern times are those of the
Moral Sense, of Associationism, of Evolutionism,
and the doctrine of Moral Reason, which is a
return to the Scholastic view.

Moral Sense doctrine. — The theory of a Moral Sense was
first advocated by Shaftesbury (1671 — 1713), and afterwards
in a more decided form by Hutcheson (1694 — 1747). In this
view, Conscience is conceived as a Sense analogous to that
of taste or hearing. It is described as a special original
aptitude of the mind capable of feeling the moral quality of
actions, just as the tongue discerns the sweetness of sugar.
Its perceptions, like those of our other senses, are accom-
panied with pleasure or pain according to the goodness or
badness of the acts. The peculiar character of its object,
the uniformity throughout the race of its decisions on the
primary principles of morality, the promptness and ease with
which they are formed, and the early age of their appearance,
— all these features point, it is urged, to the original and
native character of the endowment. At times, however,
defenders of the Moral Sense identify it with the instinct of
Benevolence, with our ^Esthetic Sensibility, or even with
the Moral Reason proper.

Hume (171 1 — 1776) verbally adopted the Moral Sense, view,
but resolved that power into two factors, Reason and Sentiment.
Reason, which plays an inferior part, can possess no motive
power, but only assists in ascertaining the useful or harmful
consequences of different acts. The chief element, then, in
Conscience is Sentiment or Feeling, and this has its root in
Sympathy. This latter principle Adam Smith (1723 — 1790)
practically constituted the foundation of ethical distinctions,
and the source of all moral approval or disapproval.

Criticism. — Although the Moral Sense school was right in
denying the associationist analysis of moral intuitions,
their description of Conscience is open to grave objections,
(i) The assumption of an additional new faculty is gratuitous.
The intellect or reason which perceives the self-evident
necessary truth that " Equals added to equals give equals,"
is the same power which cognizes the vaHdity of the self-
evident moral axiom that " We should do as we believe we
ought to be done by." (2) The representation of this special
aptitude as a sense is highly objectionable. A sense is
organic ; it acts instinctively, blindly ; is is essentially irra-
tional. But moral judgments above all others claim to be
the voice of reason, the revelation of the spiritual faculty of

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 337

the soul. (3) A sense or instinct is essentially a subjective
property or disposition. Its co^'nitions are relative to the
constitution of the organism. It pretends to no universal
or absolute validity. Its action could conceivably be reversed
by Almighty God. Animals might have been created to
relish salt, dislike sugar, and so on. But moral perceptions
are not acts of this kind ; they, like the fundamental intel-
lectual intuitions, disclose to us necessary, absolute, and
universal truths which hold inviolable for God Himself.

(4) The formal object of a sense is, moreover, always a
concrete individual fact. In relation to this object the sense
operates invariably and infallibly, and it is not capable of
transformation by education ; but the moral relations
expressed in the primary ethical principles do not partake
of such a concrete individualistic character. In addition
Conscience is subject to error and perversion, and it requires
I)roper training to exercise its functions in a perfect manner.

(5) Finally, the authority implied in the decisions of the Moral
Faculty completely separates it from all forms of sensibility.
An ethical sense "might be the root of impulses to certain
kinds of action, but it could neither impose nor disclose
obligation.

Ethical terms defined.— The confusion between the intel-
lectual, emotional, and appetitive elements involved in the
exercise of the Moral Faculty has been the cause of so much
error that besides criticism it is needful to distinguish these
several factors carefully. Moral Intuition is the percipient
act by which the truth of a self-evident moral principle is
immediately cognized. The name is also apphed to the
discernment of the moral quality of a particular action ;
perhaps this exertion of the Practical Intellect, as well as
moral decisions based on longer processes of reasoning, may
be best designated Moral Judgment. Moral Sentiment is not
an ethical cognition, but ttie attendant emotion— the feehng of
satisfaction or remorse, of approval or disapproval excited by
the consideration of a good or bad action by myself or some-
body else. The term Moral Instinct is employed to denote
a native disposition towards some class of socially useful acts,
e.g., gratitude, generosity, &c. Such natural indehberate
tendencies do certainly exist, but they are not truly moral
any more than the sympathetic impulses of brutes. It is
only when approved by reason and consented to by will that
they become moral in the strict sense of the word. Moral
Habits, that is, dispositions acquired by intelligent free
exercise, are moral in the fullest sense.

Associationist Theory. — The chief attack, however, on the
Mornl Sense doctrine came from the disciples of Hartley and

338 RATIONAL LIFE.

Bentham. The Sensationist school necessarily adopted
utility as the foundation of morality, and sought to resolve
moral distinctions into feelings of pleasure and pain. Con-
science, it is held, is not a simple original faculty, but a
complex product derived from experience of the agreeable
and disagreeable results of actions. The child is 1. dined up
to obedience, and the idea of external authority is formed
in its mind. Certain acts are associated with punishments,
others with rewards. Affection towards the person of the
superior, social sympathy and reverence for law, as well as
fear of retaliation and enlightened prudence, all gradually
amalgamate to produce that indefinite mysterious feeling,
attached to the acts of the moral faculty. The essential
constituents of conscience are, therefore, the faint traces of
pleasurable and painful consequences which have been
associated in past experience with particular kinds of
action.

Criticism. — The objections to this theory are numerous :
(i) It does not account for the very early age at which moral
judgments are formed, nor for the ease and readiness with
which they are elicited before any proper estimate of the
utility of various classes of acts can be attained. The child
is able, while still very young, to distinguish between 7.7s/ and
unjust punishment, and thus to apply a moral criterion to the
very machinery by which its moral notions are supposed to
be manufactured. (2) The Utilitarian hypothesis again does
not account for the absolute authority attributed to moral
decisions by the fully developed human mind. (3) Nor does
it explain the peculiar sanctity attached to moral precepts.
Mere experiences of utility, mere impulses towards pleasure
or from pain would never generate the axiom. Fiat justitia
mat cccluni. (4) It does not account for the universality of
this reverence in regard to at least some moral distinctions ;
nor for the universality of ethical notions exhibited in terms
to be discovered in every language, and found in the customs,
laws, and religions of all nations. In spite of wide diversities
of opinion as to ichat is right, there is the unanimous con-
^iction that right ought to be done. (5) Again, the notions o'
duty and utility are not merely radically different, but ofter
stand in opposition. If apparent self-sacrifice is seen tc
be designed for gain, its virtue disappears. (6) Logically
followed out, this theory annihilates the chum to authority
of conscience, which prescribes the observance of certain
intrinsic distinctions of human action. (7) As a final proof
of the utter inadequacy of association and personal experi-
ences of pleasure and pain to generate conscience, it may
be noted that since the Evolutionist hypothesis has been

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 339

invented, the representatives of Sensisni, almost to a man,
now admit that the tlieory nfaintained so confidently by their
school twenty years ago is completely insufficient.

Origin and Authority of Moral Judgments. — In connection
with the associationist theory it has been maintained that
the character of the moral faculty is in no way aft'ected by its
genesis. Dr. Sidgwick justly holds that the existence, origin,
and validity of moral cognitions are three distinct questions ;
but he errs in teaching that the two last are completely inde-
pendent of each other. He asserts {a) that the validity of
any cognition is not weakened by its late appearance in life ;
{b) that the mere derivation of moral perceptions from
simpler elements cannot render them untrustiijorthy, nor their
innate character establish their infallibility; (t;) that conse-
quently Ethical science is no more concerned with the origin
of Conscience than Geometry with that of Spatial Percep-
tion.i^ This doctrine draws its chief plausibility from an
ambiguity contained in the words "validity" and "trust-
worthiness." These terms as predicated of intellectual
cognition mean that the perception in question agrees with
an objective fact universally admitted. As applied to moral
cognition they mean that the judgments of conscience possess
authority. They signify that these acts (a) reveal to us law of
a transcendent and sacred character, and (/3) thereby impose on
us an obligation to special kinds of action or abstinence,
iy) independent oi pleasurable and painful consequences. Obviously
then : (i) The essence of genuine analogy with mathematical
knowledge is wanting. (2) The vital objection is not to the
■late date assigned to the appearance of moral notions, but to
the materials out of which they are supposed to be manu-
factured. (3) The real question is, whether the supremacy
and holiness claimed for the deliverances of conscience are
justified by genuinely objective moral distinctions, or are
merely illusory products containing only sensational and
emotional elements of a non-moral kind. If the latter alter-
native be true, their pretended sovereignty is obviously but
an illegitimate usurpation. If, as Dr. Martineau puts it, " the
conscience is but the dressed dish of some fine cuisine, if you
can actually exhibit it simmering in the saucepan of pleasure
and pain, the decorous shape into which it sets ere it appears
at table, cannot alter its nature or make it more than its
ingredients." ^^ Similarly, from the opposite standpoint ot"
Physical Ethics, Mr. Sidgwick's view has been attacked on
the ground that the pretensions put forward on behalf ot
conscience are very different from those of the spatial faculty,

1^ Methods, lik. III. c. i. § 4. i*^ Types, Vol. 11. p. 14-

340 RATIONAL LIFE.

and that the ultimate grounds of MoraHty are disputed, while
those of Mathematics are agreed upon.

Evolutionist Hypothesis. — The Evolutionist doctrine of the
Moral Faculty varies from that just described merely by
enlarging the period during which the pleasurable and painful
consequences of conduct have been at work, so as to include
not the life of the individual only, but also that of the race.
Conscience is a species of instinct analogous to the vctricviiii;
disposition in a well-bred game dog. It embodies the experi-
ences of pleasure and pain felt during the numberless ages of
the gradual evolution of man. These, it is asserted, have
been by degrees organized and accumulated through Natural
Selection, and transmitted by heredity from parent to off-
spring in the form of physiological modifications. The theory
thus claims to reconcile the Moral Sense doctrine with that of
the Benthamite school ; or at all events to combine the
elements of truth supposed to be contained in both. On the
one hand, it recognizes the native or instinctive character ot
moral intuitions and sentiments, whilst on the other it ulti-
mately bases all moral distinctions on the pleasurable and
painful consequences of action, and teaches that Conscience
is a complex product derived from these latter.

Criticism. — As this account of the Moral Faculty forms
part of the general theory of the Origin of Necessary Truth
advocated by Evolutionist Psychology, we refer the reader
back to our discussion of the v/ider subject. Here, however,
we may observe in addition: (i) that the new hypothesis is
exposed to all the most weighty objections advanced against
the old Associationist doctrine, except that based on the
readiness with which moral cognitions are elicited, and the
early age at which they appear ; (2) that moral intuition is
not of the nature of a sensitive instinct, but of an intelligent
apprehension ; (3) finally, that Conscience or ethical notions
are the most unlikely product that can well be conceived to
arise by Natural Selection. Even in tolerably civilized stages
of society, the utility of moral sensibility to the individual in
the stru^'glefor life is very problematical. A fortiori amid the
ijiternecine war and conflict of the supposed pre-human
stage, where, in the words of Hobbes, " fraud and force " are
the "cardinal \irtues," the chances should be enormously
against the development of self-sacrifice.^''

^^ Concerning the antliority left to conscience in this account t)f
hs genesis, Mr. Balfour writes thus ; " Kant, as we all know, compared
the Moral Law to the starry heavens, and found them both sublime.
It would, on the naturalistic hypothesis, be more appropriate to
compare it to the protective blotches on the beetle's back, and to
find them both ingenious, But how, on this view, is the ' beauty of

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 341

The fact that within a tribe or nation some of the moral
virtues are of evident advantage in the struj^gle with other
tribes makes no real ditterence, unless we assume, against the
whole teaching of evolution, the sudden causeless appearance
of the moral instinct throughout the majority of the indi-
viduals of the tribe. If " the weakest to the wall " is the one
supreme Law of Nature, if Natural Selection is the great
foice of evolution, then the occasional individuals varying
slightly in the direction of conscientiousness would be inevit-
ably eliminated in the perpetual struggle for existence within
the limits of their own savage tribe, before the dubious utility
of their incipient moral dispositions could be extended to the
tribe as a whole, and render it superior to other less moral
races. If an unprejudiced mind considers how intensely
difficult it is, even at the present day, when we are in posses-
sion of all the moralizing agencies of religion, education,
language, literature, public opinion, and governmental
authority, to quicken the moral sensibility of the individual
or of the nation, he must surely see that in the alleged
pre-human stage, when not a single one of these forces
were present, and when the conditions of existence com-
bined unanimously in the opposite direction, the natural
growth of conscience must have been absolutely impos-
sible.i^

holiness ' to retain its lustre in the minds of those who know so
much of its pedigree ? In despite of theories, mankind — even
instructed mankind— may, indeed, long preserve uninjured senti-
ments which they have learned in their most impressionable years
from those they love best ; but if, while they are being taught the
supremacy of conscience and the austere majesty of duty, they are
also to be taught that these sentiments and beliefs are merely samples
of the complicated contrivances, many of them mean and many of
them disgusting, wrought into the physical or into the social
organism by the shaping forces of selection and elimination, assur-
edly much of the efficacy of these moral lessons will be destroyed,
and the contradiction between ethical sentiment and naturalistic
theory will remain intrusive and perplexing, a constant stumbling-
block to those who endeavour to combine in one harmonious creed
the explanations of Biology and the lofty claims of Ethics." (Op.
cit. pp. 18, ig.)

i« Mr. Lecky has justly remarked that, "Whether honesty is or
is not the best policy, depends mainly on the efficiency of the
police," a social factor seemingly not very perfect in those pre-
historic times of which Herbert Spencer aftbrds us such detailed
information. Bain argues forcibly that " the Moral Sentiment is
about the least favourably situated of all mental products for trans-
mission by inheritance." The chief grounds on which he does so
are: (i) Comparative infrequency of special classes of moral acts

342 RATIONAL LIFE.

Intuitionalist Views. — Writers of the Intuitionalist school
subsequent to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson modified the
doctrine of the Moral Sense, so as to remove its most obvious
defects. Thus Reid and Stewart, who accept the term,
describe the faculty as of a rational character. It is a specie;!
innate power, fi^iven at first only in germ and requiring
training and cultivation, but nevertheless capable of revealing
the objective moral qualities of actions. The term Moral
Sense, however, has been used in such a variety of significa-
tions, and is so liable to suggest an erroneous view of the
nature of moral perception, that we believe Conscience will
be best described as the Moral or Practical Reason. It
should alwajs be borne in mind that while on the one hand
the moral faculty is a cognitive power identical with the
intellect, its proper object differs in kind from mathematical
relations and purely speculative truths.

Kant, identified Conscience with the Practical or Moral
Reason. It was, however, conceived by him not as a
cognitive faculty making known to us an external law pre-
scribed from without, but as an internal regulative force
which itself imposes commands on the will. Man is thus
asserted to be a law to himself. This doctrine, based on the
so-called autonomy of the reason, confounds the function of
promulgating a law with the office of legislation, and gives a
defective account of the nature of authority and of the
ultimate grounds of obligation. P>ut criticism of this theory
would lead too far into Ethics : and for a treatment of this
subject we must refer the reader to the volume on Moral
Philosophy of the present series.

Is Conscience a Spring- of Action ? — The confusion preva-
lent in modern ethical speculation regarding the connexion
between Conscience, Reason, Intellect, and Moral Sentiment
has given rise to a warm psychological dispute as to whether
Reason can be a spring of action. Cudworth (1617 — 88) and
Clarke (1675 — 1729), the ultra-intellectual moralists, identified
the moral faculty with Reason in its narrowest sense, assimi-
lating the activity of Conscience to the cognition of purely
speculative truths. Interpreting Reason in this restricted

" We are moralists only at long intervals, . . . we may be hours
and days without any marked moral lesson." (2) Complexity. "The
moral sentiment supposes a complicated situation between human
beings apart from whom it has neither substance nor form" [i.e.,
in the Utilitarian system). (3) Disagreeableiiess of duty. "We do
not readily acquire what we dislike, . . . mankind being naturall)
indisposed to self-denial are on that account slow in learning good
Moral habits, and are not generally in an advanced state even at
the last." (Emotions and Will, 3rd Edit. pp. 55—57 )

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 343

signification, Hume argued that it c^n have no influence over!
the will, and therefore is not a spring of action. He, conse-
quently, assigned to sentiment the chief place in the consti-
tution of the moral faculty. Later philosophers, wishing
to defend the rationality of morality, opposed this vicM
Dr. Sidgwick thus argues : (i) The chief part of moral per-
suasion appeals to Reason. (2) " Reason prescribes an end.'' ,
The judgment, "This ought to he done," stimulates the will
to action. The moral sentiment may co-operate, but the
cognition of Tightness of itself really impels to action.''-*
Dr. Martineau, on the other hand, defining a spring of action,
as "an impulse to an unselected form of action," excludes
both Prudence and Conscience from the list of active forces.
Moral Reason merely decides which of two rival impulses is
the higher, which is to be preferred. It is a "judge," not an
" advocate." The motive power lies solely in the impulses.

Criticism. — There is an element of truth contained in both
views, and the dispute seems to us to be in part verbal. Moral
perception is an act of the Reason, and this is in itself a
cognitive, not a conative or appetitive faculty. It is primarily
recipient, not impulsive. On the other hand, in apprehending
an action as right, obligatory, agreeable, or useful, the intellect
stimulates the will to action, and thereby becomes a motor
agency. The propelling force thus lies primarily in the
quality of the object apprehended, and not in the intuition
viewed merely as a cognitive state. A spring of action is thus
a mental state tending of itself to issue into action, while an
ethical cognition in virtue of the objective moral law which it
reveals is an apprehensive act which may originate or check
such an impulsive state.

Butler's Doctrine. — Among English moralists of last century
the ablest defender of the authority and rationality of Con-
science, and the writer who returned most closely to the
teaching of St. Thomas and the great Catholic philosophers
of the middle ages, was Butler (1692 — 1757). The attention
which had been devoted to the empirical study of the mind
by his immediate predecessors, however, caused him to lay
great stress on inductive arguments. And we beheve wc
may suitably close the present chapter with a passage of hi^s
which admirably epitomizes the psychological grounds b
which the existence of truly moral intuitions is established :
" That which renders beings capable of moral government
is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of per-
ception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and
actuated by various instincts and propensities : so also are

'9 Methods, Bk. I. c. iii. § i.

344

RATIONAL LIFE.

we. But additional to this we have a capacity for reflecting
upon actions and characters, and making them an object to
our thought ; and on doing this we naturally and unavoidably
approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being
virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious
and of ill desert. That we have this moral approving and
disapproving faculty is certain from our experiencing it in
ourselves, and recognizing it in eaCh other. It appears from
our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and dis-
approbation of even feigned characters : from the words right
and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many
others of like signification in all languages. . . . It is manifest,
great part of common language and of common behaviour
over the world is formed upon supposition of such a moral
faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense,
or Divine reason. Nor is it doubtful in general, what action
this facultv, or practical discerning power within us, approves,
and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been dis-
puted wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt
there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there is in
reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that
which all ages and all countries have made profession of in
public : it is that which every man you meet puts on tlie
show of: it is that which the primary and fundamental laws
of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it
their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon
mankind, namely, justice, veracity, and regard to the common
good." (Cf. Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue.)

Readings. — On Judgment and Reasoning, cf. St. Thomas, Sum. i.
q. 79. a. 8; Suarez, De Aniwa, III. c. 6; Rickaby, First Principles,
Pt. I. c. ii. ; Kleutgen, op. cit. §§ 133 — 146; Clarke, Logic, Pt. II.
c. iii. On Assent and Consent, Olle ha.prune, De la Certitude Morale,
c. ii. ; Wilfrid Ward, The Wish to Believe. On Implicit Reasoning,
Newman, op. cit. cc. viii. ix. ; also Dr. W. G. Ward's Phihsophy
of Theism, Essays XV. and XVI. On Belief and Knowledge, OIU-
Laprnne, op. cit. cc. iii. — v.; Newman, op. cit. cc. iv. vi. vii.;
Rickaby, op. cit. Pt. II. cc. vii. viii. On Conscience, St. Thomas,
Sum. I. q. 79. a. 9 — 13; J. Ming, Data of Modern Ethics Examined,
c. xii. ; Moral Philosophy (present series), Pt. I. c. viii. §§ i, 2.

CHAPTER XVI.

attp:ntion and apperception.

Attention. — We have confined the term attention
to the higher order of mental activity. The word
is, however, frequently employed to denote mere
intensification of sensuous consciousness. In this
sense a dog or a cow is said to attend when it is
excited, by the approach of some object, to watch
or listen ; increased activity of the sensuous faculties
of man may similarly be named attention. Still,
careful introspection assures us that in an act of
attention proper there is something more than
augmentation of the previous sensation.^

Attention and Sensation. — Suppose that I am
suffering from toothache ; I can advert to the pain or
try to turn my attention away from it. But this atten-
tion is not the same thing as the feeling. I can direct
my observation to the peculiarly aching character of
the latter. I can consider its likeness and unlikeness
to the sensation of a burn or a needle-prick ; I can
estimate its superiority in intensity over previous states.
In fact, I am conscious throughout of exerting a cosr-
nitive activity distinct from the mere sensation, and
this presupposes before it can operate the sensation
or its reproduced image. Increased intensity of a

^ On attention to sensuous impressions, see pp. 232, 243 — 246.

346 RATIONAL LIFE.

sensation is not identical with tlie act of attention,
though the former may often awake the latter. For wc
can attend to the w^eaker of two impressions, and the
vividness of a sensation occasionally obscures the re-
lation or special aspect which is at the time the formal
object of the act of attention.

Attention and Volition. — Neither is attention
merely a volition or act of will. On the contrary', it is
that upon which the conative act is exerted. It is
cognitive energy directed by the will to an existing
experience. Thus, in attending to a toothache, the act
of the will is not, " I wish to feci more pain or less
pain," but " I wish to turn my attention towards or
from this pain," " I wish to have a clearer and more
distinct consciousness of this state." Becoming an
object of thought, the feeling may subsequently become
an object of will ; and, as a rule, the increased clearness
and force of a conscious state effected by attention
augments its motive power and reacts upon the conative
activity of the mind.

Attention interrogative.— In becoming attentive
we pass into an attitude of inquiry or expectation, and
this is characteristic of the mind throughout the whole
period. Mr. G. Stout accurately describes this phase
of the mental state : " Between a protracted train of
thought which lasts for an hour and a transient act of
attention which lasts for only a few seconds, there is in
this respect only a difference of degree, not of kind.
Whenever we attend at all, we attend to some object,
and it is the essence of the process that, in and through it,
our apprehension of this object shall become, or at least
tend to become, more full and distinct. For this reason
a certain prospective attitude of the mind is charac-
teristic of attention. Attendere originally means to
expect or await. This prospective attitude is for the
most part interrogative. The interrogation in its more
primitive phases is dumb, and to express it in language
is to falsify it by giving it a fictitious definiteness. But
with this reservation we may say that it corresponds to
the question : What is that ? or simply, What ? " ^

- Analytic Psvcliolooy, Vol. I. p 1S4.

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 347

That is, literally, in scholastic language, it is the con-
centrated activity of the intellect seeking to apprehend
the Quidditas. Accordingly we shall wisely return to
the old definition, and define attention as : Applicatio
cogitationis ad ohjecfa, or the special application of intel-
lectual energy to any object.

Voluntary and non-voluntary Attention. — The phenomenon
of attention takes two forms according as the exciting cause
is the mind itself or something presented to the mind. In
the former case we are conscious of a certain self-direction ot
the mind towards a particular object. We interfere with the
automatic current of our thoughts, and turn them into a new
channel. This is effected by fixing upon some particular
section of the series, and dwelling upon it. This act of
attention at once increases the force of the selected idea, and
raises into consciousness other ideas of various kinds with
whivh it is connected. We then again choose which of these
new lines of thought shall be followed, and so change the
original course of the stream. This is an exercise oi voluntary
attention. The completeness of control over our own
thoughts, the success which we can command in the expul-
sion or detention of a particular mental state, varies at
different times and in regard to different objects. A represen-
tation of the imagination, a strong emotion, a worrying train
of thought, no less than some distracting external stimulus,
may at times render nugatory repeated efforts to apply our
minds to some other topic. It is tliis experience of resistance
which affords us the most convincing assurance that we have
a real power of free voluntary attention, for it reveals to us
in the clearest manner the difference between automatically
drifting with, and actively struggling against the natural
current of thought. It brings into distinct consciousness the
exertions of real personal choice. The conditions influencing
our command over attention are, accordingly, twofold. On
the one side are the varying degrees of attractiveness per-
taining to the object ; on the other is the energy of the mind.

Non-voluntary Attention. — Attention, however, is often both
awaked and continued without any effort of the mind. Ot
this non-voluntary activity we can distinguish two grades.
Sometimes the process of attention, though not due to special
volition, flows along in a smooth, facile manner, without an}-
consciousness of constraint. This is spontaneous, or automatic
attention. On the other hand, there are also occasions when
we feel our attention to he extorted from us, or constrained
against our will, when an idea forcibly intrudes into our

348 RATIONAL LIFE.

consciousness, and defies our best attempts to eject it. This
advertence against our will is invuluntary attention in the
strict sense. Extreme instances are the "fixed ideas," and
hallucinations of the insane. Serious enfeehlement of volun-
tary control of attention is generally among the symptoms of
approaching mental derangement.

Laws of Attention. — Intensity. — The general con-
ditions of Attention have been described by some
psychologists as Laws ; and they may be thus briefly
formulated: (i) Involuntary, automatic, or reflex
attention, is determined as regards both its force and
direction, by the comparative attractiveness of the
objects present to the mind. (2) Voluntar}' attention
is determined {a) by the energy of the mind at the
time, (h) by the inherent attractiveness of the object,
and (f) by extrinsic motives, or relations of the object
with other desirable things which may influence the
will. Thus the student's power of keeping his intellect
fixed upon his work depends on the nature of the
subject ; on the present intensity of his desire to pass
his examination ; on the fresh and healthy condition
of his brain ; on the native energy of his mind, and
on his acquired habits of steady concentration.

Duration.- — In the first stage of the exercise of
voluntary attention repeated struggles are often
necessary ; but when interest is once awakened the
activity becomes self-supporting, and further volitional
effort is needless. Still attention, whether voluntary
or involuntary, is of an essentially variable character.
It flows in waves rather than in a constant level stream,
and soon grows feeble unless revived b}" a new effort
or by a change of object. When a man is said to keep
his attention concentrated or fixed for a long time on
a single object, he really follows out a train of ideas
related to the object.

Extent. — The force of attention is limited in range
as well as in duration ; and another law supposed to
express the relation between extent and intensity of
attention was formulated in the old aphorism : Plurihus
intcutns minor est ad singula sensiiSy or the intensity of attention
varies inversely as the arc:i of objects over whicJi it ranges.

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 349

This statement refers rather to sensuous than to intel-
lectual cognition. In so far as it applies to the latter,
it defines not the force of a single act of attention,
but the general efficiency of mental energy during a
longer or shorter period.

Whether we can attend simultaneously to more than
one object has been much disputed ; and, as is usual
in such cases, the disputants often differ as to what
they mean by ** attend " and *' one object." Experiments
like those of Hamilton, indicating how many pebbles a
man can perceive at a single glance, obviously have to
do with the perfection of eyesight, rather than with
the range of attention. It is clear that we can be
sentiently aware of sounds, colours, temperature, and
pressure at the same time. But intellectual attention,
even when engaged in comparison, apprehends its
objects in the form of a unity of some sort. The focus
of attention seems to be at any moment a single thought,
though that thought may carry a fringe of relations
and a nucleus of elements dimly felt to be distinct from
each other ; ^ and in the process of analysis the mind
passes from one to another in rapid succession.

Effects of Attention. — Intensification. — The most
obvious eftect of an act of attention is to intensify the
mental state towards which it is directed, whether that
state be a sensation, an idea, or an emotion. At any
moment of our waking life we are subject to a mass
of impressions, tactual, auditory, and visual, pouring
into the mind through the several senses. Most of
them are so feeble as to escape notice in the crowd.
But when I direct my attention, for instance, to the
pressure of the ground, or of the chair, or to the colour
of the table on which I am writing, the sensation

^ This seems to be the view of St. Thomas : " Intellectus
cjuidem potest simul multa intelhgere/^r modum unius non autem
per modum multorum. . . . Partes, e.g., domus, simul cognoscuntur
suh qiiadiim confnsionc, prout sunt in toto." {Sum. i. q. 85, ad 3.)
Compared objects, he teaches, are simultaneously apprehended
"sub rationc ipsius comparationis." Similarly Mr. Stout: "The
essential is that, however manifold or heterogeneous the objects
of my thought may be, I must, in thinking of them, simultaneously
think of some relation between them." (loc. cit. p. 195.)

350 RATIONAL LIFE.

emerges at once into vivid consciousness. The possible
augmentation of the feeling is, however, limited. We
cannot increase the blueness of the sky, nor the loud-
ness of a sound, nor the weight of a pound above what
corresponds to full normal stimulation. But it is
probable that organic pain may be increased by a
certain physical effect of attention which seems to
react on the nerves and blood-vessels of the locality
on which observation is concentrated.

Expectant Attention. — The intensification of the force
of phantasms of the imagination is still more remark-
able; and, as we have already indicated, is often the
cause of illusion. Since the reproduced images probably
occupy the same cerebral centres as the original motor,
visual, or auditory sensations, revival of the image
involves a rehearsal of the former neural tremor, and
in proportion as the representation becomes more vivid
the nervous excitation grows in strength until it may
issue into an actual repetition of the former experience.
This also explains the shortening of reaction-time in
psychometrical experiments when a definitely known
event is looked for. Thus, if I am expecting to per-
ceive a particular colour, the visual faculty is adjusted
for its immediate reception and the appropriate brain
cells under the action of the imagination are in a con-
dition of nascent excitement ready to respond like hair-
trigger pistols to the faintest stimulation. In fact " pre-
perception," or the ante-dating of a phenomenon, is not
an uncommon illusion when expectation of a particular
event is in an acute stage.

Distinctness. — But more important from an intel-
lectual point of view is the increased distinctness which
attention sheds upon its objects. It affects this by
clarifying the relations of which the observed phenomenon
is the centre. It brings under our notice the various
threads by which this object is interwoven with the
web of our already acquired knowledge. Relations of
similarity and contrast, of causality and dependence,
of action and reaction, rational connexions of every
kind to which mere sensuous intuition is blind, reveal
themselves beneath the light of this higlier mental

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 351

energy, and what was before a confused mass of
sensuous impression, becomes now a consciously unified
object — a well defined thing.

Attention and Genius. — This illuminating power of atten-
tion by which the obscure and dimly discerned relations of
certain ideas are elevated into vivid consciousness is the great
parent oi invention and discovery. By continued fixation of our
intellectual gaze upon an object, its connexions with its
surroundings become more clearly realized ; possible explana-
tions of particular facts suggest themselves ; and their validity
is verified or disproved b}^ reasoning out the consequences.
The importance of this faculty in original work of all kinds
is so great, that in many celebrated definitions we find genius
and poii>er of attention made synonymous with each other.
Thus Hamilton teaches that "the difference between an
ordinary mind and the mind of a Newton consists principally
in this, that the one is capable of the application of a more
continuous attention than the other." {Metaph.\o\. I. p. 256.)
Helvetius defined genius as "nothing but continued atten-
tion"— line attention suivie ; Buff'on as une tongue patience.
Newton ascribed his own successes to patient attention more
than to any other talent ; whilst the definition of genius
by another great mind as, " an infinite capacity of taking
pains," is well known. This complete identification of the
two aptitudes is an error. Recent writers justly insist on
the spontaneous non-voluntary character of the outpourings
of genius; whilst Mr, F. Myers and certain German philoso-
phers would connect this faculty with a somewhat mystic
theory of a subconscious mental life, — a second subliminal or
subterranean personality which occasionally emerges above
the surface of consciousness in dreams, hysteria, and the
hypnotic state. The truth seems to be that, although genius
has its source in the native endowments of the mind, its
most impressive and fruitful achievements are only accom-
plished by the exercise of a rare degree of sustained con-
centration, whilst this very concentration is possible only to a
prolific intellect rich and fertile in ideas.

Retention. — A further effect of attention is increased
retentiveness. Events not attended to fade so quickly
from memor}^ that, as in the case of automatically
winding one's watch, a man is often completely
oblivious of the action immediately afterwards. If we
wish to fix in our mind a line of poetry, a person's
address, or his face, we concentrate our attention on

352 RATIOXAL LIFE.

the object to be remembered. In doing so, we not only
prolong and intensify the impression, but we associate
it with other experiences, we assimilate it into the
general system of our mental life. In Herbartian
language, we apperceive it. Attention thus both accele-
rates mental acquisition and secures permanence.
Twenty repetitions of a lesson whilst the mind is
careless and inattentive have not the efficiency of one
performed when our whole energy is concentrated on
the subject in hand.

Physiological conditions.; — Regarding; the physiological
counterpart of attention there is much speculation and little
knowledge. Evidence of a general character renders the follow-
ing statements probable : (i) During periods of intellectual
concentration there is an increased flow of blood to the brain
and heightened activity of the cells which compose the
cortical substance. (2) The adjustment of the sense-organs
and the bodily strain which often accompany a process of
attention involve an innervation of the cerebral motor-centres
subservient to these particular movements. (3) Direction of
attention to a particular sensation seems to stimulate circula-
tion and neural functioning throughout the portion of the
organism, central and peripheral, engaged in the experience.
(4) The same seems to hold in regard to reproduced images
when they are the object of attention. Thus, if I fix my
thought on some particular word, the appropriate ideational
motor and auditory centres, that is, the group of cerebral
cells which minister to the production of this particular sound,
are probably excited to greater activity. These various
physical changes are, however, the ejfed rather than the cause
or neural correlate of the act of attention proper. Of the
latter nothing is really known as certain.

Physiological manuals not infrequently indulge in graphic
accounts of " attention-centres," and of successive groupings
of neural currents in cerebral stations arranged in an ascend-
ing order of dignity and complexity like local, provincial, and
city telegraph offices, with a great presiding metropolitan
centre in the frontal region of the brain. Such descriptions
are purely mythological. They may, of course, afford help
to the imagination — like a coloured picture of an angel.
But unless the reader is reminded that they are mere con-
jectures without any evidence, or even prospect of evidence,
to establish their truth, they are sure to mislead. The sort
of knowledge which we really possess concerning the brain
will be>"dicated in our section on the localization of cerebral

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 353

functions. If certain areas of the cerebral matter are stimu-
lated or extirpated, certain corresponding movements and
sensations and images are excited or inhibited. Ihat is
almost the sum total of present scientific knowledge concerning
the subject.

Pleasure and Pain. — The relation of attention to
feeling can be readily gathered from Aristotle's theory
of pleasure and pain, given in an earlier chapter.
Pleasure accompanies spontaneous or easy volitional
attention, increasing in proportion to the vigour of the
activity until the energy becomes strained or fatigued.
On the other hand, forced attention, thwarted attention,
and the struggle against distraction, monotony, or
weariness are painful experiences. Novelty pleases,
both by affording pleasant relief and by awakening a
fresh energy. If a particular exercise of attention prove
agreeable, the activity is stimulated and increased ;
if it result in pain, especially of a monotonous character,
the exertion is depressed. I3ut acute pain tends to focus
upon itself the whole available energy of consciousness
and thereby to inhibit all other intellectual operations.'*
Such cases, however, are rather instances of purely
painful feeling in which rational activity proper is
suspended. Fixed ideas, disagreeable recollections,
and sharp griefs often exert a violent painful fasci-
nation on the mind, which renders it almost impossible
to get rid of the unpleasant thought.

Interest. — We attend readily to some subjects because
they are interesting; and they possess interest because
they afford us pleasure or a particular kind of pain.
Some psychologists would completely identify interest
and attention, maintaining that to attend to an object
and to be interested are the same thing. Still, ordinary
language recognizes a difference. Whereas attention is
transitory, interest may be permanent ; thus we can retain
interest in a science to which we have not devoted
attention for a considerable period. Moreover, we
easily concentrate our attention on a particular subject

4 " Si sit dolor intensus impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid
addiscere posset. Et tantum potest intendi quod nee etiam
instanti dolore potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius
scivit." (St. Thomas, Sum. 1-2. q. 37. a. i.)
X

354 RATIONAL LIFE.

because it interests us ; it is not immediately interest-
ing because we direct our attention towards it. Common
thought in fact seems to identify interest with a pecuHar
attraction exerted by certain subjects of consideration
in virtue of associated pleasurable or painful experi-
ences in the past. Thus, even an elementary knowledge
of Botany or Geology gives a new "interest" to a
walk in the country, and the fact of having read one
of Scott's novels makes Edinburgh quite a different city
to the visitor.

Education. — From all this we see the importance
of the mental function of attention from an educa-
tionalist standpoint. Without some degree of attention
intellectual acquisition of any kind is impossible ; and in
proportion as this power is brought more under com-
mand, so is progress more rapid and more solid. The
child at first finds great difficulty in controlling his
attention, especially for any length of time. It is, there-
fore, the office of the teacher to help these first feeble
efforts by awakening interest in the pupil's tasks. Skill
in illustrations that are homely 3^et novel, ingenuity
in connecting the lesson, or parts of it, with subjects of
the child's previous experience or reading — especially
with the stories in which he hc.s taken pleasure — ^judg-
ment in changing the subject, or enlivening it by a joke
or anecdote when the class is growing weary, tact in
utilizing incidental points that turn up to enforce some
practical or moral truth, are all so many means ot
stimulating and sustaining attention. But the educa-
tion of the faculty of attention is even more important
as a part of moral training. It is by control of our
attention that we can determine which of two con-
flicting motives shall prevail. B}^ the free effort of our
attention we keep steadily before our minds the claims
of dut3s or the consideration of permanent happiness
when impulse surges up within, or seductive pleasure
assails us from without ; and the strong-willed man is he
who can keep his attention riveted to some abiding
rational motive that gives stability to his deliberately
formed resolve, and thus remains unshaken by gusts of
passion or transitory cravings of sense.

ATTENTION AND APTERCEPTION . 355

Are there Unconscious Modifications of the Mind ? — Con-
nected with the topic of attention, is that of latent mental
operations. Notwithstanding the superstitions dread of meta-
physics, which infects all recent psychology, no really
intelligible answer can be offered to this much discussed
question unless we know what is meant by " mind " and by
" modification of mind ; " and these queries inevitably carry
us into Philosophy. If we start with the great majority of
empirical psychologists by defining the mind as "the entire
collection of our conscious states," or " the total stream ot
our conscious life," then obviously an affirmative reply would
involve a contradiction in terms. Or even if prescinding from
the inquiry as to the nature of the soul, we define a " mental
modification" as a " conscious state," there can be no further
dispute. Still such a summary disposal of the question
merely ignores a very genuine problem. But if by mind, or
soul, we understand a real beiiif^ other than the series of
" phenomena " or " conscious states," and if we then propose
the inquiry thus : Do there take place any real activities, processes,
or energizings of the mind of which ice are completely unconscious ?
the question is no longer meaningless.

In the first place, that some mental operations happen
without their being apprehended by the explicitly reflex
activity of ^^'//-consciousness is indubitable. For instance,
the self-conscious element in the percipient act of the
spectator who watches the finish of an exciting race is
reduced to nil. It is also indisputable that there enters
into the texture of our normal conscious existence a
multitude of sub-conscious, or obscure mental processes
so dim and indistinct as to be at best only very faintly
realized. Our emotional temperament and our normal moral
disposition is largely determined by such sub-conscious influ-
ences. But when we come to the question as to the reality
of latent activities of the mind completely below the surface
of consciousness, there is no longer agreement among
psychologists. The following arguments have been ad-
vanced :

For Unconscious Modifications.— (i) The reality oi minima
visibilia, audibilia, etc.— the fact that our ordinary sensations
of sight, sound, and the rest, arise out of an aggregate of
elementary impressions occasioned by combinations of
stimuli separately unperceivable. Thus the leaves of the
forest, individually indiscernible, each contribute to the
general presentation of colour. Neural excitations that are
iust too feeble or too brief to result in a sentient state which
rises above the threshold of consciousness must, it is main-
tained, have a real effect upon the mind. (2) That such an

356 RATIONAL LIFE,

effect though unconscious is real, it is urged, is often proved
by the effect of the sudden cessation of the unobserved
stimulus. Thus the miller, though unconscious of the sound
of the mill-wheel, is awakened at once by its stopping.
(3) The effect of a mere act of attention in evoking into
distinct consciousness experiences hitherto unnoticed, as for
instance a headache, or the pressure of my back against
the chair, points to their previous reality as mental impres-
sions though unconscious. (4) The facts of habit, acquired
skill, and dexterity. Complex operations seemingly automatic
which were originally effected by conscious effort must, it is
alleged, be still performed under the guidance and control of
the mind though acting unconsciously. Similarly unconscious
inferences enter into our acquired perceptions. (5) The
effects of unconscious trains of thought by which reminis-
cences of events long forgotten, or unnoticed at the timxC, or
the solution of problems are suddenly presented to the mind.
(6) Abnormal phenomena of hysterical patients, deferred or
post-hypnotic suggestions, somnambulistic feats, negative
illusions, or artificially induced anaesthesia — in a word, a
multitude of actions fulfilling the conditions of "having all
the characteristics of a psychological fact save one — i.e., they
are always unnoticed by the agent himself at the very time
when he performs them."^

Against such Modifications. — It is argued (i) that the
facts of minima sensibilia merely prove that the normal
physical stimulus of a sensation must possess a certain quan-
tity of strength before consciousness is awakened, but when
that limit is passed the eftect produced is of a completely new
and completely different kind. It is always unlawful, as Mill
has shown, to ascribe separate fragments of such a total
" heteropathic effect " to separate fragments of the cause.
Similarly, though successive increments of heat will finally
cause ice to melt and then to boil, or dynamite to explode,
we cannot legitimately conceive each small addition of heat
as producing a corresponding small part in the liquefaction,
evaporation, or explosion. (2) The positive effect of the
sudden cessation of a stimulus is explained by the consider-
able change thereby wrought in the tension of the nervous
mechanism, which has become adapted to the regular action
of the stimulus. (3) Attention can undoubtedly increase our
sensibility to impressions of all kinds, but this only shows, it
is maintained, that the particular experience was felt in a
faint degree before ; or that it is only imder these new
psychological conditions it begins to exist. (4) The pheno-

Cf. Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psycliologiquc (Edit. 1898), p. 225

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 357

mena of habit, automatic action, acquired perceptions, and
the hke, may be ascribed not to psychical, but to physio*
logical dispositions, which by frequent repetition of a series
of movements become organized and embodied in the
nervous system in such a manner as to be able to bring about
the final result without the concomitant action of the mind
during the process. (5) Sudden reminiscences, and dis-
coveries, the effects of seemingly unconscious trains of
thought, and the like, may be similarly explained as due to
unconscious cerebration. The neural processes in the brain
being once set in motion may run their course unconsciously
till the particular cerebral situation is reached which forms
the appropriate condition for the final mental act. Or, it may
be held that the intermediate mental links do actually appear
in consciousness, but that, like the perceptions of the sepa-
rate letters of a word, they are too fleeting and of too little
interest to be remembered. The phenomena of dreams,
somnambulism, hypnotism, and the like, are similarly ex-
plained as actually felt at the time, but lost by inattention and
rapid obliviscence.

These explanations seem to us to afford an intelligible
interpretation of most of the facts adduced. Nevertheless,
provided it be recognized that no composition, amalgamation,
or coalescence of unconscious units can constitute a conscious
state, we do not see any conclusive reason for denying the
reality of unconscious activities of the human mind. Further-
more, adopting the Aristotelico-scholastic theory that the
Soul is a substantial principle at once the source of vegetative,
sentient, and rational life — a doctrine which we will establish
in Rational Psj^chology — this view seems to be forced upon us.
Latent modifications of the mind must be admitted at least
as dispositions, habits, or species impresses, to account for the
possibility of recognition and ordinary knowledge. The vital
processes of the potentics vegetativce — the vegetative functions
of the Soul — are normally unconscious ; and the scholastic
conception of the nature of the action of the intellectiis agens
seems also iu harmony with the doctrine of unconscious
mental energies.*^

Apperception.— (S'rt/^;T^vo/;' = to notice with attention.) —

^ The literature on this subject is abundant. The modern
scholastic writers who have treated it most fully are Sanseverino,
Dynam. pp. 944—982 ; Farges, op. cit. pp. 295—307, 390—395 ;
Mercier, La PsycJioIogje, pp. 154, seq. ; Gutberlet, Die Psychologic,
pp. 49 — 59, 166, seq. See also Hamilton, Metaph. "Vol. I. pp. 338,
seq.; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, c. xiii.; Mill, Exam. c. xv. ;
James, op. cit. Vol. I. pp. 162 — 175 ; Mark Baldwin, op. cit. pp.
45 — 48; Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme Psychologique, pp. 223 — 304.

358 NATIONAL LIFE.

Historical Sketch. — Recent ps3'chology dwells much on the
"apperceptive" activity of the mind ; and Herbart's disciples
in psedogogic literature are copious in illustrating the mental
processes now designated by that word. As it is connected
with the present subject we shall treat it briefly here.
Leibnitz, who seems to have been the first to employ the
term apperception, understands by it strong distinct percep-
tions, as opposed to petites perceptions — obscure or unconscious
impressions. He only means by it developed self-consciousness
or rejlex cognition. Kant, borrowing the term from Leibnitz,
employs it to signify///^ innate unifying activity of self-conscious-
ness, which in his theory of knowledge plays so important
a part in combining the chaotic manifold impressions of
sense. This self-consciousness he does not conceive like
Leibnitz, as emerging with the development of mental life,
but as an original endowment, an a priori transcendental
condition of all rational experience. Apperception with
Herbart and his followers means the appropriation of fresh
presentations or perceptions by groups of similar ideas per-
sisting in the mind from previous experience. Writers of
this school have usefully enforced the truth that every
cognition leaves a certain vestige or residual effect in the
mind, which modifies its future percipient acts. A newly
imported elephant, for instance, is apprehended quite
differently by a London child, a zoologist, an African hunter,
an ivory dealer, and a menagerie proprietor. The powers
of vision may be approximately equal in all of these observers,
yet the total cognition will be different in each case, because
of the different mental habits of each.

This principle was familiar to the scholastics in the well-
known axiom, Umimquodqiie recipitur secundum modum reci-
pientis ; but they did not consider to what extent the recipient
mind may be accidentally modified by experience, — nor how
much its percipient powers are enriched with the growth of
knowledge from infancy to manhood. Herbart, therefore,
notwithstanding his mythological account of " masses of
concepts" which apperceive each other, and push each other
above or beneath the " surface of consciousness," did useful
work for educational theory in emphasizing the influence of
pre-existing knowledge in the process of cognition.

Definition. — Psychologists are not at present agreed as to
the precise meaning to be allotted to the term. Perhaps
amongst the best definitions of the process is that of Karl
Lange : '■''Apperception is that psychical activity by which indi-
vidual perceptions, ideas, or idea-complexes are brought into
relation to our previous intellectual and emotional life, assimi-
lated with it, and thus raised to greater clearness, activity, and

ATTENTION AND APPERCEPTION. 359

significancey^ Apperception is iu fact equivalent to conscious
assimilation in a wide sense. It includes identification, recoj;-
nition, classification, understanding, interpretation, and all
forms of knowledge in which a new idea or group of ideas
is incorporated with an existing group/^

Nature of the process. — For instance, on awaking I dimly
see a strange object in the middle of my room. In the
obscurity it resembles a very big dog with an enormous head.
It might be a lion couchant, except that there are no wild
[ nimals in the neighbourhood. After straining my eyes in
vain to discover what it can be, I wearily desist. Suddenly
I recollect having last night left my umbrella open in order
to dry. I now look again and apprehend tho object quite
distinctly, though the room is as dark as before. The head
and shoulders of the monster are formed by my umbrella ;
the body is my half-open portmanteau. I have identified,
recognized, apperceived, the mysterious being. Or to borrow
another example cited by Mr. Stout : Robinson Crusoe and
his man Friday suddenly perceive a ship off the shore. To
the savage it was " only a dark and amorphous blur, a
perplexing, frightening mass of details." To the old sailor
Crusoe, on the contrary, it is, in spite of his poorer eyesight,
"an object." It is a unity; all its parts combine to make
a symmetric whole which coalesces with a representation
latent in his mind. It fuses with, or is subsumed under a
familiar generic notion : it is classified as " Ship." It is

' Cf. Apperception, p. 41. According to this view, all perceptions
except the first simple sensations involve apperception. The chief
distinction lies in the fact that the latter term accentuates the
element of assimilation with previous acquisitions. Lange gives a
useful historical account of apperception in Pari III.

^ Mr. G. Stout, in his able and interesting chapter on the subject
{Analytic Psychology, Vol. II. c. vii.), distinguishes apperception from
mere assimilation, as involving attention and a " noetic " or conscious
appropriation of the new element which is absent from the latter :
" Where attention is not present, there is no apperception but mere
assimilation, because there is no noetic synthesis. Thus, in
automatic actions, the impressions which guide us are all assimi-
lated, but not apperceived. . . . Unless there is some difficulty to be
overcome, mere assimilation and association fulfil the office of
apperception. . . . For the most part, the perceptions of size, shape,
and distance depend on processes of relative suggestion which are
independent of apperception, except in the earlier stages of mental
development." (p. 118.) The distinction is convenient for some
purposes, but very difficult to maintain owing to the imperceptible
degrees by which cognitive appropriation fades into mere automatic
coalescence. If rigidly adhered to, it would exclude from apper-
ception much of what is usually ascribed to that process.

360 RATIONAL LIFE.

apperceived. Or, on reading a work on Psychology, I find
apperception described as noetic assimilation, noetic incor-
poration of a new fact. Suppose I have not met this
adjective before, I feel puzzled, probably irritated, as the
chapter proceeds and sundry possible meanings vaguely
suggest themselves to my mind. At last I recur to my Greek
and recall that voelv signifies to perceive. Immediately, the
meaning of noetic as percipient, cognitive, becomes clear.
I understand, I apperceive it, successfully. Guessing a riddle,
solving a problem, harmonizing conflicting evidence, con-
struing an author, are all illustrations of apperceptive activity.
In fact, every advance in knowledge in which the new fact
is consciously combined with former experience is included
under the term.

Apperception and Education. — The chief merit of the
Herbartian school is their constant insistence on the metho-
dical or systematic direction of apperception throughout the
whole course of education. Each piece of fresh knowledge
must be thoroughly, consciously incorporated and assimilated
with knowledge already firmly possessed. Mere mechanical
memory is to be reduced to a minimum, whilst "cramming,"
that is, the hurried piling into the mind of disconnected
parcels of information which are not properly digested and
interwoven with cognitions and ideas already thoroughly
comprehended, is to be condemned as most injurious to
mental development.

Readings. — Besides the references given, see also on Attention,
Balmez, op. cit. Bk. IV. §§ 7 — 11 ; Carpenter, o^\ cit. c. iii. ; Ladd
Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 534—543.

CHAPTER XVII.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL COGNITION : SELF,
AND OTHER IMPORTANT IDEAS.

Reflexion and Self-Consciousness. — Attention
end reflexion have been sometimes contrasted as the
direction of cognitive energy outwards and inwards.
The two terms may thus be conveniently dis-
tinguished for some purposes, but it should be
remembered that they really denote, not separate
powers, but diverse functions of the same intel-
lectual faculty. Reflexion is nothing else than
attention to our own states ; and this operation
constitutes the exercise of self-consciousness. Self-
conscionsness may be defined as the knowledge which
the mind has of its acts as its own.

Grades of Consciousness. — We can discern
different forms which the reference of a state to a Self
assumes in the several stages of mental life. In the
merel}^ sentient existence of the infant or brute animal,
there is no cognition of a self. There is only conscious-
ness of sensations, emotions, and impulses. But these
states are not apprehended as abstract qualities. They
could not be felt as states without a subject or states of
no subject. Animals are pained or pleased, suffer or
are satisfied ; and this can only be because the pain or
pleasure felt is theirs, and is felt by them. The sentient
being is conscious that it is pained ; but it does not in

362 RATIONAL LIFE.

any way distinguish between the pain as a state and
itself as a subject of that state. It feels the state to be
its own, yet never formally cognizes it as its own.

When, however, we reach the grade of intellectual
life we meet with a distinctly new fact. We find an
agent which not only is, acts, and feels, but which
knows that it is, which is aware that it is the cause of
its acts, and which recognizes that its feelings are its
own, though not itself. But this final stage of self-
knowledge and complete recognition of its own per-
sonality is probably not reached by the child until its
mind has attained a considerable degree of development.

Growth of the cognition of Self. — The infant at
first leads the life of the merely sentient animal. The
topography of even its own organism seems to be onl}^
gradually ascertained. Throughout the first year the
child pinches, bites, and strikes its own body and other
objects indifferently. Sometimes it continues these acts
whilst crying from the pain.^ By the end of the first
year, however, its organism comes to be pretty sharply
distinguished from other objects. As experience extends
and the mental faculties ripen, memory comes into play;
and although the attitude of the child's mind is still
mainly objective, awareness of a Self present in its
various states becomes more and more completely
awakened into life. The material organism is still the
most prominent element in the representation of Self.
Indeed, as it is an essential constituent of the human
person, the body always remains a chief feature in what
we may call the abstract or quasi-objective conception
of our personality. It is the centre of all the child's
pleasures and pains, the source of all its impulses, and
the focus of all impressions. It is, too, the subject and
object of all its sensations of double contact, and the
one enduring figure ever obvious in the field of vision.
When the child, early in the third year, speaks of itself
in the third person, it is probable that the bodily self
is still uppermost in its thought, although a full self-
conscious cognition of its own Ego is often possessed,
whilst the use of impersonal language in regard to

* Cf. Preyer, The Development of the Intellect, pp. 1 89— 206.

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 363

itself may be retained, especially when this practice
is encouraged.

Still, the child could never come to know that it is a
Self //'^;;/ the outside by merely elaborating a generalized
conception of its body connected with its past history.
This may be a preparatory or concomitant process; but
the real discovery of every Self must he from ivithin — the
apprehension of the Ego hy itself and in its states. As the
thoughts of pleasures and pains repeated in the past
and expected in the future grow more distinct, the
dissimilarity between these and the permanent abiding
Self comes to be more fully realized. Passing emotions
of fear, anger, vanity, pride, or sympathy, accentuate
the difference. But most probably it is the dawning
sense of power to exert energy or to resist and overcome
rising impulse, and the dim nascent consciousness ot
responsibilit}^ which lead up to the final revelation,
until at last, in some reflective act of memory or choice,
or in some vague effort to understand the oft-heard " I,"
the great truth is manifested to him : the child enters,
as it were, into possession of his personality, and knows
himself as a Self-conscious Being. The Ego does not
create but discovers itself. In Jouffroy's felicitous phrase,
it " breaks its shell," and finds that it is a Personal
Agent with an existence and individuality of its own, standing
henceforward alone in opposition to the universe.-

The developed Mind's consciousness of Itself. —
Once arrived at the stage of formal or complete self-
consciousness — to which the Scholastics chiefly confined
their attention — the mind habitually becomes cognizant
of itself in its acts. Cognition of self is thus not innate,
as some have erroneously maintained. Even during
mature life, in the absence of all particular psychical
operations, there is no apprehension of self. On the
other hand, the mind's cognition of its existence is not

2 J. F. Ferrier insisted with much force upon the leading part
the exercise of free-will plays in the realization of our personality.
{Introd. to the Philos. of Consciousness, Pt. V.) The primitive conception
of Self must be feeble and obscure, but it grows in strength and
distinctness. Jean Paul Richter gives a vivid description of how
" the inner revelation, '/ am /,' like lightning from heaven," flashed
upon him. But such infant psychologists are unhappily rare.

364 RATIONAL LIFE,

of the nature of an infeyence from its activities — to be
formulated in Descartes' Cogito ergo sum. The true
view was clearly and concisely stated by St. Thomas.
The mind apprehends itself and perceives its existence in its own
acts.^ This perception is of a concrete reality. In
becoming conscious of a mental state, I become aware
of the Self as the cause or subject of the state, and of the
state as a modi^cation of the Self. Such self-conscious
activity may appear either as an implicit concomitant
awareness of self during a mental process ; or it may be
the result of a formal reflective act in which the mind
deliberately turns back on itself. In the former case
the vividness wuth which the self is presented varies
much in different acts. Frequently, when our interest
is keenly excited by some external object, or when we
are under the influence of certain strong emotions, the
notice of Self becomes so faint as practically to dis-
appear, though memory assures us that these acts were
ours. But there are other mental processes in which
we are as certainly cognizant of the Self as of the state.
This is especially the case in active operations, whether
of thought or of will. In a difficult effort of attention,
for instance, I am distinctly aware that the act is mine,
and that it is freely elicited and sustained by me. . It
is, however, in the deliberately reflective acts of self-
consciousness that the cognition of the Self and of the
states as distinct from the Self becomes especially clear,
as is seen in the introspective observation of any mental
phenomena.

Still, the knowledge of the mind immediately pre-
sented in such internal perception is ver}^ limited and
imperfect. The mind thus ascertains directly that it
exists, that it is a unity, that it abides, and that it is
different from its states. But it cannot in this way learn
what is its inner constitution — whether, for instance, it is
material or spiritual. Introspection merely furnishes
the data by diligent study of which, combined with

'■' " Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem qua aliquis con-
siderat se in actu animam habere, sic dico quod anima cognoscitur
per actus suos. In hoc enim ahquis percipit se animam habere et
\'ivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia hujus-
modi vitac opera excrcere." {De Vcritatc, q. 10, a. 8.)

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 365

reflexion and reasoning upon the facts supplied by
other sciences, we can define and determine the real
nature of the human soul — the chief problem of Rational
Psychology."*

Abstract Concept of Self. — After the realization of its
personality has been attained in fully developed self-con-
sciousness, we must still carefully distinguish between the
mind's immediate perception of itself in its operations, and the
abstract quasi-objective notion of his own personality habitually
possessed by every human being. The former is an act of
concrete apprehension, in which I cognize myself as real
cause, or subject of my operations or states. The abstract notion
of my personality, on the other hand, is a conception of a highly
complex character. It is an intellectual abstraction formed
out of the concrete perception of self combined with remem-
bered experiences of my past life. It is commonly viewed by
me in a quasi-objective manner. It includes the self, but
accentuates the states of self. It gathers into itself the
history of my past life — the actions of my childhood, boy-
hood, youth, and later years. Interwoven with them all is
the image of my bodily organism ; and clustering around are
a fringe of recollections of my dispositions, habits, and
character, of my hopes and regrets, of my resolutions and
failures, along with a dim consciousness of my position in
the minds of other " selves."

Under the form of a representation of this composite sort,
bound together by the thread of memory, each of us ordinarily
conceives his complete abiding personality. This idea is
necessarily undergoing constant modification ; and it is in

^ Here again St. Thomas, with his wonted precision, clearly
distinguishes the two questions : " Non per essentiam suam, sed per
actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster. Et hoc dtipliciter : Uno
quidem viodo particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato per-
cipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc, quod percipit se intel-
ligere. Alio modo in universal!, secundum quod naturam humanae
mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. . . . Est autem differentia
inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente
habendam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus,
ex quo mens percipit seipsam ; et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per
suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam
non sufficit ejus praesentia sed requiritur diligcns et subtilis inquisitio.
Unde et multi naturam animse ignorant ; et multi circa naturam
animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit de tali inqui-
sitione mentis : Non velut absentem se quaerat mens cernere, sed
praesentem se curet discernere, id est, cognoscere differentiam suam
ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere quidditatem et naturam suam."
{Sum. I. q. 87. a. i.)

366 RATIONAL LIFE.

comparing the present form of the representation with the
past, whilst adverting to considerable alterations in my
character, bodily appearance, and the like, that I sometimes
say: "I am completely changed;" "I am quite another
person," though I am, of course, convinced that it is the
same " I " who am changed in accidental qualities. It is
because this complex notion of my personality is an abstrac-
tion from my remembered experiences that a perversion
of imagination and a rupture of memory can sometimes
induce the so-called " illusions or alterations of personality,"
— a subject which will be discussed in Rational Psychology.

Unity, Continuity, Discontinuity of Consciousness. — Fully
developed self-cognition presents to us in its perfect form
what is called the unity of consciousness, but which might
perhaps be more accurately described as the consciousness of
Self as a unitary being. This feature of mental life should be
carefully distinguished from continuity of consciousness, with
which it is not necessarily connected. When viewed in
retrospect our past conscious life, at first sight, seems to
have been one continuous whole without gap or break. And
when we examine recent portions of our waking existence,
we find that there is a real continuity between successive
states. In contrast to the old associationism which dwelt
on the " mental chemistry " by which originally separate
"impressions" were supposed to be fused together, Dr. James
Ward insists much on the truth that consciousness at any
given time is a " presentation continuum " of which the parts
simultaneous or successive are not separated " as one island
is separated from another by the intervening sea, or one note
in a melody from the next by an interval of silence." ''
Although the context of consciousness is constantly altering,
so much abides the same alongside of the changing element,
that there seems to be no break or interruption. Accordingl}-,
consciousness is frequently likened to a stream.

We must, however, not be misled b_v this figurative
language into forgetting that consciousness is not really con-
tinuous. At least once every twenty-four hours there is a
chasm — an interval of something " disparate from con-
sciousness." Our mental life, as a whole, is made up of parts
separated not merely as the notes, but as the successive
tunes of an orchestra by long intervals of silence. It is no
more a continuous stream of consciousness than a year is a
continuous stream of daylight. Further, even in our conscious
life, the most important factor both in its intellectual develop-
ment and in its moral worth lies not in the continuity of

^ "Psychology," Encycl. Brit. p. ^5; of. G. Stout, Manunl of
Psychology, p. 72.

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 367

conscious states ; but in that real indivisible unity which binds
the series of processes into an individual self. By this unity
of consciousness we mean the fact that our various mental
states, simultaneous and successive, continuous or discrete,
present and past, like and unlike, are all apprehended as
combined and centred in that one indivisible point which we
call Self. Or, from another point of view, we may describe
it as that unifying activity of intellect which refers all states
to the conscious self. A horse, perhaps even a worm,
resembles man in continuity, but not in unity of consciousness.
On the other hand, were man's conscious activity broken by a
hundred complete gaps each day, provided that the U7ider-
lying unity were preserved, the development of rational Hfe
could proceed as at present. It is this indivisible unity and
not the continuity of consciousness which renders possible
comparison, judgment, reasoning, and recognition of identity
between the present and the past. It is this same unity
which gives a meaning to expectation. This it does too, as
well in the appetitive as in the cognitive sphere of life. My
desires, resolutions, hopes, and fears all have to do with a
future in which this same indivisible / am to be engaged. The
continuity or cessation of consciousness during the inter-
vening period is of httle concern, but the identity of the
present self, who is now conscious with the self of the future
experience, is felt to be of vital interest. The importance of
this distinction between unity and continuity, and the fact
that mental hfe is not merely a stream of consciousness, will
become evident when we examine Professor James's theory
concerning nature of the mind in Book II.

Genesis of other Ideas. — Besides the idea of Self,
there are certain other conceptions of such philo-
sophical importance that at least a brief treatment of
their genesis is desirable here. The chief and the
most disputed of those not already dealt with are
the notions of Substance and Accident, Causality, the
Infinite, Space and Time. We shall have to recur to
the cognition of Substance in Book II., but the nature
of our knowledge of Time, so much discussed at the
present day, we must examine at some length in the
present chapter. For an adequate defence of the trust-
worthiness of all these notions, we must refer the
reader to the volume on Metaphysics belonging to the
present series. The questions of genesis and validity,
though intimately connected, should here as elsewhere

368 RATIONAL LIFE.

be carefully distinguished. The former more properly
pertain to Empirical Psychology, the latter to Episte-
mology, Metaphysics, or Rational Psychology.

Substance and Accident. — Substance is defined as being
which exists per se, or, that which subsists in itself, whilst
Accident is that ivhich exists in another being, as in a subject of
inhesion. The most fundamental element, therefore, in the
notion of suhstance is subsistence, though it is the fact of
change with the accompanying permanence amid variation that
stimulates the mind to distinguish between substance and
accidents. Both correlative ideas are the product of intel-
lectual experience. Even very early in life I observe things
around me subsisting in themselves, and I am conscious that
I possess real independent existence. Further examination
causes me to notice greater or lesser changes taking place
both in external objects and in myself. As I begin to reflect,
however, I become assured that this change is not annihi-
lation, and that some constituent element must remain the
same amid the variations. Internal consciousness manifests
to me my own substantial sameness amid my transient
mental states, and reflexion on the evidence afforded by my
external senses enables me to perceive the necessity of such
an enduring identity underlying the transitory qualities of
material objects. The reflexion required is not of a very
dehberate or laborious character. It is a spontaneous
activity of the rational mind. The shape and temperature
of the piece of wax in the child's hands, the position and
colour of objects before his eyes vary from moment to
moment, but the substantiality of the object reveals itself to
his intellect. Although the ideas of accident and substance
were first wrought out very slowly, in mature life the appre-
hension of a necessarily enduring element amid the fluctuating
phenomena is so easy and rapid, that it may fairly be described
as an intellectual intuition.

Causality. — The notion of causality is connected with that
of substance, and can be attained only by rational free
beings. Sensuous perception acquaints us with successive
phenomena, but from this source alone we could not derive
the idea of causation any more than that of substantiality.
On the other hand, this concept is not an innate cognition,
nor a subjective form of the mind. It is the result of intellec-
tual experience, and it possesses real extra-mental validity.
We may distinguish several elements or factors which normally
co-operate in the formation of this idea.

(i) In our internal experience we are conscious of change
among our mental states. In some cases of variation the

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 369

order of succession seems casual ; or we at least are unaware
of the force which determines the course of our thoughts.
In others we are conscious that ive ourselves control and direct
the current. We fix our attention on particular feelings, we
combine or separate thoughts, we form complex ideas, judg-
ments, and reasonings. In all these processes we apprehend
ourselves as efficient agents, and we immediately cognize the
results as products of our personal energy. Causality is thus
concretely presented to the mind in the most intimate manner
in each individual deliberate act.

(2) This experience alone would be sufficient to originate
the conception of causation, but other factors assist in its
elaboration. Combined internal and external observation is
constantly revealing to us the fact that we control not only
our tJionglits but our movements, that our volitions liberate,
direct, and sustain the outflow of physical energy — that when
we will to move our limbs they are moved in proportion to
the degree and quality of the volitional effort. (3) Our senses
make known to us the action of material objects upon us.
We feel the latter as foreign and acti\'e, ourselves as passive
and recipient. Sensations of pressure and resistance, in a
special manner conduce to make us aware of force or energy
— notions essentially involving the idea of causal efficiency.
(4) Finally, we observe changes perpetually taking place in
the world around us : we notice frequent transitions from not-
being to being of various kinds. As our powers of reflexion
develop the intellect grows to apprehend more and more
clearly that there must be a sufficient reason for the rise of
these new modes of being. Repeated observation assures us
that this reason of the origin of particular forms of reality
must lie in particular antecedents which have been alwavs
followed by these results, and then the intellect cognizes the
changes as the effects of the agency of these antecedents. But
it should be remembered that our notion of causality rests
ultimately, not on the perception of the uniformity of changes
in the external world, but on our own subjective consciousness
of self-activity and our constant immediate experience that
the mind exerts real influence on bodily movement. For the
reader will find later that many modern philosophers, in the
name of this very notion and law of causation, actually deny
to the mind any causal influence whatever over bodily move-
ment, maintaining that only material agents can move
matter.''

Sensuous perception could never afford the notion of
anything more than succession, which is radically distinct

6 Cf. Balmez, op. cit. Bk. X. §§ 50—53.

370 RATIONAL LIFE.

from that of causality, efficiency, productiveness, or whatever
we Hke to call it. When an effort of attention combines
two ideas, when one billiard ball moves another, when a
steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid iron, when a blow
on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases there is
something more than, and essentially different from, the
mere sequence of two phenomena: there is effective force —
causal action of an agent endowed with real energy. But our
conception of the reciprocal causal action which obtains
between external beings is analogical, being derived in the
last resort from our immediate cognition of our own causalityJ
The Infinite. — The idea of the Infinite is the idea of the
plenitude of all being, of a Being who contains all perfections
without limit. This notion is in part positive, in part nega-
tive; and, as a matter of experience, it is conceived by us.
From both internal and external observation we can form the
concept of a limit; and then of limitation in general. We
can also form the idea of negation ; the recognition of the
principle of contradiction, the apprehension of the distinction
between being and non-being involves this conception.
Taking now the ideas of being, of negation, and of limit, we
can combine them so as to form the complex conception,
being without limit, that is, infinite being. The operation is,
therefore, effected by the intellectual activity of reflexion and
abstraction. The natural process will, however, be better
seen by taking a single attribute, for instance, that of power.
We are immediately conscious of effort put forth, and of
power exercised by ourselves. We can conceive this power
vastly increased, its boundaries pushed farther and farther
back. We can imagine an agent capable of whirling round
the earth or the solar system, just as we can swing a piece of
string round our finger ; yet we are fully aware that the power
of such an agent may be as rigidly limited as our own. But
we are not compelled to stop here ; we may think " greater
than that, and greater than that, and greater n'itliout any
limits or boundaries at all.'' Here we have the proper notion,
faint and inadequate, but still truly representing infinite energy.

"' Kant teaches, in harmony with the spirit of the rest of his
system, that causality and substantiality are a priori categories of the
understanding,— innate moulds or conditions which regulate our
thinking, but have no validity as applied to things-in-themselves.
Hume and his followers have sought to explain both ideas as
products of " custom " or association. If consistently followed out,
the Kantian and Sensist doctrines alike lead to absolute scepticism.
The real validity of the three notions, causality, substance, and
personal identity, must stand or fall together; and if the last is an
illusion, there can be no truth attainable by the mind of mar^.

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 37I

Wc can similarly form the notion of infinite intelligence,
holiness, and the rest ; and then combining tliese u-e can
conceive an omnipotent, infinitely intelligent, all-holy Being.
We have now reached as perfect a conception of God as is
possible to the finite mind. It is absurd to describe this as a
purely negative notion. We ascribe to the Reality which we
seek to realize to ourselves, every perfection we can conceive
in the intensest form or degree we can imagine, and then we
say : All that and more without any limit. Such a conception
wants clearness and distinctness, but it most certainly is not
purely negative. The thought of an attribute being increased
beyond the range of our fancy without any limit assuredly
does not thereby annihilate the positive content of the idea
already represented to ourselves.

The Idea of Space. — We have already more than once
touched on our cognition of Space, so that but little
additional treatment is necessary here. W^e have established
the fact of an immediate or intuitive perception of surface
extension through at least two of the senses — sight and touch.
We have also shown the part played by vwtor sensations in
experiences of solidity, or the third dimension of bodies; and
finally, we traced the growth and development of our know-
ledge of the m.aterial world. But the abstract conception of
Space is not the same thing as the perception of an extended
object, or a particular part of Space. It is an abstraction
founded on such individual acts, but rising above them ; and
the same active supra-sensuous power by which the ideas of
whiteness, truth, the infinite, &c., are formed, operates in the
present case. The mind observing a material object prescinds
from its other qualities, and thinks only of the co-existence of
its parts outside of each other : this is the notion of extension in
the abstract. Of course, however, as in the case of the ideas
of whiteness or being, long before the mind has elaborated this
reflex abstract notion, it has directly apprehended objects as
extended. Still, even the abstract notion of extension is not
strictly identical with that of Space. The extension of a body
is a property which belongs to the individual body itself, and
moves about with it, just as its other qualities. Space, on the
contrary, we look upon as something fixed, — that in which
bodies are contained, and through which they move. The space
of any particular object is the interval or voluminal distance
lying between its bounding superficies. Now, the human
mind having once cognized the trinal dimensions of material
bodies, and observed their motions, inevitably passes to the
conception of the successive intervals or spaces which they
occupy ; it distinguishes between the extended thing and the
room whicl the thing fills. Apprehending these separate

372

RATIONAL LIFE.

parts of space as immediately juxtaposed, it conceives the
continuity and the consequent oneness of space. Further
reflexion enables us to think of lines produced in all directions
beyond the boundaries of the existing universe, and we thus
reach the concept of ideal or possible space. Noting that
there is no limit to the possible production of such lines, we
conceive possible space as infinite ; not, however, as a positive
existence or reality, but as an inexhaustible potentiality. The
interval filled up by the entire physical universe is termed, in
opposition to the imaginary region beyond, actual or real
space.

Cognition of Time. — Whilst ancient materialistic
philosophers conceived Time as an objective real
entity, a substantial receptacle in which all events
happen, Kant makes it an a priori or innate form of
internal sensibility, a purely subjective condition of
all human experience which possesses no extra mental
validity. The true view is that Time is neither a real
independent being nor an innate form of conscious-
ness preceding all experience, but an idea which is a
genuine product of intellectual activity. It is like
other universal conceptions, an abstraction derived from
concrete cognitions of change, a generalization which
has a real foundation in the real changes going on in
the world, but is completed by the intellect.^

Still the psychological explanation of this notion
is attended with peculiar difficulties. All time is made
up of past, present, and future; but the past is for
ever extinct, and the future is non-existent, whilst the
present consists of one indivisible Now — a single instant
that perishes as soon as it is born. Again, since time,
unlike space, is presented to us, not by one or
other faculty, but as an integral part of all our experi-
ences, both internal and external, it is not easy to
isolate this cognition and trace it to its sources. Time
has been defined as "successive duration," and though

* Cf. St. Thomas: " Qua^dam sunt quae habent fundamentum
n re, extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum, quantum
ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae ut patet in
universali. . . . Et similiter est de tempore, quod habet funda-
mentum in wo/m, scilicet prius et posterius ; sed quantum ad id
quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeyatio completur per
operationem intellectus numerantis." (In I. Sent. Dist. 19, q. 5, a. i.)

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 373

faulty in some respects, this definition accentuates two
elements involved in the notion, change or successive
movement^ and persevering existence.

Development of the Notion. — The conscious life of the infant
is hardly more than a succession of changing states. There
is little looking forward or backward. The child is absorbed
in each experience as it occurs, vague and obscure though
these experiences are. Here we have a succession of conscious
states, but not the notion of time. We have a series of ideas,
but not an idea of a series. As memory grows stronger and
the powers of observation and comparison develop, the
child begins to notice that certain experiences recur in certain
conditions; particular sights, sounds, gustatory and tactual
feelings are repeated under similar circumstances, and the
judgment is elicited that the objects which cause these
conscious states endure, that they persevere in existence when
unobserved. The child at the same time begins to be
consciously aware of its own abiding identity and thus attains
the idea of sameness, and of persistent existence. To a being
unaware of its own continued identity the conception of time
would be impossible.

The perception of variation united with sameness is not,
however, the whole of the cognition of Time. For this the
mind must be able to combine in thought two different
movements or pulsations of consciousness, so as to represent
an interval between them. It must hold together two nows,
conceiving them, in succession, yet uniting them through that
intellectual synthetic activity by which we enumerate a collec-
tion of objects — a process or act which carries concomitantly
the consciousness of its own continuous unity. The conception
of two such points, with the intervening duration, gives us the
unit of time ; and in proportion as an interval is broken up
into periods of this kind by transitions of consciousness, the
representation of the time occupied expands. The transi-
tions of consciousness are not, however, discrete or detached
events. Nor is the course of mental life during waking houre
that ©fa continuous even-flowing river, but rather an eddying
undulating current with waves varying in depth and force.
We are thus led back to Aristotle's celebrated definition of
time as "the number of movement estimated according to its
before and after.''

The infant is probably first stimulated to this intellectual
operation by the regular recurrence of certain agreeable
experiences such as its food, the presence of its nurse, or the
use of its toys. Thus a certain series of incidents, A B C D
ending in X (the satisfaction of some desire), has happened

374 RATIONAL LIFE.

repeatedly in the past. As memory acquires strength, the
recurrence of A B, the first steps of the process, re-awakens
in a faint degree the recollections of C and D ; and much more
vividly the interesting event X. There is thus impressed
upon the child's mind along with the consciousness of the
present Nozv, the representation of a subsequent Noia, the
future enjoyment, together with a simultaneous notice of
interjacent events which force upon it the intervening
duration. The period is then measured by a subconscious
or implicit enumeration of the interposing incidents, and the
notion is complete.''

Subjective and Objective Time. — The child first measures
time by the number and variety of its own conscious states ;
but the estimate is of the vaguest and feeblest kind. Looking
drowsily backward and forward to a particular incident, it feels
the interval to be longer or shorter as it is dimly aware of
more or fewer intervening possible experiences. The irregular
character and varying duration of conscious states, however,
soon bring home to us the unfitness of these subjective
phenomena to serve as a standard measure of time. There
is indeed a certain rhythm in many of the processes of our

^ The above analysis coincides, we believe, with Aristotle's
doctrine which is thus developed by St. Thomas: " Manifestum
est, quod tunc esse tempus determinamus, cum accipimus in motu
aliud et aliud, et accipimus aliquid medium inter ea. Cum enim
intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii, et anima dicat, ilia
esse duo nunc, hoc prius, illud posterius in motu, tunc hoc dicimus
esse tempus. . . . Quando sentimus unmn nunc, et non discernimus
in motxi prius et posterhis, non videtur fieri tempus, quia neque est
motus ; sed cum accipimus prius et posterius et numeramus
ea, tunc dicimus fieri tempus, quia tempus nihil aliud est
quam numcrus motus secundum prius et posterius : tempus enim
percipimus, ut dictum est cum numeramus prius et posterius in
motu." [Comm. Physic. Lib. IV. lect. 17.) By "movement"
Aristotle, as well as St. Thomas, understands all forms of change,
whether subjective or objective — not merely external sensible move-
ment as many modern writers imagine. St. Thomas makes the
point quite clear, as well as the error of supposing that we can
immediately apprehend a "pure empty time : " " Contingit enim
quandoque quod percipimus fluxum temporis, quamvis nullum
motum particularem sensibilem sentiamus ; utpote si simus in
tenebris, et sic visu non sentimus motum alicujus corporis exle-
rioris, et, si nos non patiamur aliquam alterationem in corporibus
nostris ab aliquo exterior! agente, nullum motum corporis sentiemus;
et tamen si fiat aliquis motus in anima nostra, puta secundum succcs-
sionem cogitationum et imaginationuin, subito videtur nobis quod fiat
aliquod tempus ; et sic percipicndo quemcumqum motum percipi-
mus tempus ; et simiHter e contra, cum percipimus tempus simul
percipimus motum." (Ibid.)

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION.

373

organic life, such as respiration, circulation, and the recurrent
needs of food and sleep, which probably contribute much to
our power of estimating duration; but the natural objective
tendency of our minds, as well as our early perception of
the regularity of certain changes in the external universe
soon suggests to us a more easily observable objective scale
of measurement. Accordingly, the relatively uniform move-
ments of the heavenly bodies and the orderly changes of
day and night, of tides and of seasons, have come to con-
stitute the universal chronometer of the human race, and in
the popular mind to be identified with time itself.

Relativity of our appreciation of Time. — A period with
plenty of varied incident, such as a fortnight's travel, passes
ra.pid\y at the time. Whilst we are interested in each successive
experience, we have little spare attention to notice the dura-
tion of the series. There is almost complete lapse of the
" enumerating " activity. But in retrospect such a period
expands, because it is estimated by the number and variety
of the impressions which it presents to recollection. On the
other hand, a dull, monotonous, or unattractive occupation,
which leaves much of our mental energy free to advert to its
duration, is over-estimated whilst taking place. A couple of
hours spent impatiently waiting for a train, a few days in
idleness on board ship, a week confined to one's room, are
often declared to constitute an " age." But when they are
past such periods, being empty of incident, shrink up into
very small dimensions, unless their duration be over-estimated
on account of their accidental importance, or for some other
reason. An occurrence on which a weighty issue hangs seems
to move slowly on account of the microscopic attention
devoted to each successive moment of the event. In retro-
spect its gravity leads us to over-estimate the time required for
its accomplishment, and causes it to divide us by a seemingly
wide chasm from our previous life. Long periods are under-
estimated ; indeed our conception of a number of years is
purely S3mibolical. Very short periods — fractions of a second
— are generally over-estimated. Similarl}-, recent intervals
are exaggerated compared with equal periods more remote.
Whilst, as we grow older and new experiences become fewer
and less impressive, each year at its close seems shorter than
its predecessor.

Localization in Time. — Memory, or the knowledge that a
present mental state represents an experience which really
happened to us in the past, is an ultimate fact incapable of
explanation. But the process by which we refer the experi-
ence to a particular section of our past history is open to at
least partial analysis. The chief factors in the operation

376 RATIONAL LIFE.

seem to be the following : (i) Finding that the memory of an
impression wanes luith time, we tend to refer the more obscure
of two representations to the more distant date. Though an
element in the calculation, this, by itself, is obviously an
unsafe criterion. (2) The original order of the movement of
attention in any mental process leaves a disposition towards
its own reproduction, as, for instance, in repeating the
alphabet. Thus, there is a peculiar feeling attached to the
utterance of Y due to its formerly following X and preceding
Z in consciousness ; and this at least assists us in locating
that letter between the other two.^*^ This peculiar quality of
consciousness belonging to any mental state through its
having succeeded some particular state and preceded another
constitutes in fact a local "colouring" or sign, by virtue of
which its relative situation in the time-series of our past life
may be determined. The fact that the mind tends to repro-
duce events in their original serial order is indisputable, and
helps to explain — if explanation it can be called — how we
recognize which was prior of two reproduced events that
originally occurred in immediate succession. But the question
remains. How do we determine priority between two utterly
disconnected past experiences such as a toothache and a
particular interview ? (3) The answer given to this is that we
ascertain the time-relations of minor incidents by consciously
connecting them through contiguous association tvith more
important events which have themselves been associated with
public dates. Thus, I recollect that the toothache experience,
though more vividly remembered than the interview, occurred
when I was staying with certain people in the year 1890;
whilst the interview took place during a visit to London in
1897, the year of the Queen's Jubilee.

Expectation illustrates the same principles. For instance,
the mind having experienced the series of incidents A B C D,
on the recurrence of any one of them tends to revive in
imagination its successors, and the mere vivacity of the
images tends to generate an anticipation of their realization.
Apart from any reasoning process there can be awakened iu
the imagination a state of sensuous expectancy in the human
being as well as in the lower animals by the preliminary
stages of some familiar operation. But besides this species
of sensuous presentiment originating in previous association,
we are capable of a higher form of intellectual belief in future
events, which springs from inductions based on conscious
recognition of the uniformity of nature and the principle of
causality. This constitutes expectation in its most proper sense.

10 See Dr. Ward, " Psychology," Encycl. Brit. p. 66.

INTELLECTUAL COGNITION. 377

It involves memory, the notion of time, and inference from
cause to effect. In addition to its reference to the future,
expectation differs from memory by its active and emotional
character. The real interest of our lives lies in the experiences
which are to come, not in those which are gone. Consequently,
there is, especially in the keener forms of this state, a
stretching out of the mind towards the things that are before,
an eagerness to ascertain what is about to happen which
takes the form of hope in regard to what is in conformity with
desire, and fear or anxiety with respect to what is against our
wishes. Both emotions, by intensifying the vivacity of the
imagination, augment the force of belief, and so we are
inchned to over-estimate the probability of events which we
like or dislike much.

Readings.— On Reflexion and Self-Consciousness, St. Thomas,
Sum. I. q. 87, also De Veritate, q. 10, a. 8, 9; Kleutgen, op. cit.
§§ 102—120; Balmez, op. cit. Bk. IX. cc. vii. viii. ; Ladd, Philosophy
of Mind, pp. 105 — 112; Mivart, On Truth, c. ii. ; Piat, La Personne
humaine, c. i. On the Idea of Substance, cf. John Rickaby, Meta-
physics, Bk. II. c. i. ; Balmez, op. cit. Bk. IX. cc. i. iii. vii. ; Stockl's
Lehrbuch, § 31. On Causality, Rickaby, op. cit. pp. 304, seq. ;
Kleutgen, §§ 300—303 ; Balmez, Bk. X. cc. iv. v. viii. xi. xii, xvi. ;
Stockl, op. cit. § 45. On the Idea of the Infinite, Rickaby, Bk. I.
c. vi. ; Kleutgen, op. cit. Ft. V. cc. ii. iii.— especially §§ 412—419 ;
Balmez, Bk. VIII. cc. iii. iv. vi. viii. and xv. ; Stockl, § 27. On
Space and Time, Rickaby, op. cit. Bk. II. c. iv. ; Kleutgen, §§ 342—

3^9-

CHAPTER XVIII.

RATIONAL APPETENCY.

Rational Appetency. — We have sketched the
chief manifestations of Appetency or Conation exhi-
bited in the lower forms of life (c. x.), and we there
distinguished various kinds of action as automatic,
reflex, impulsive, and instinctive. We shall now
resume our treatment of this activity as exercised
in its higher grades. Amongst the most important
of these is Desire. This term is not confined
exclusively to inclinations of the super- sensuous
order, for many yearnings aroused by the imagi-
nation of sensuous pleasures are so called.

Desire defined and analyzed. — Desire may be
defined as a mental state of longing ov want aroused by the
representation of some absent good. It is a form of conscious-
ness superior to and more refined than that of appetite in
the modern sense. Unlike the latter, it is not a blind
organic craving limited to a single mode and definite
range of activit3\ In common with appetite, it involves
a species of discontent and longing, but its object is the
representation of some knonni good. The newly-born
infant is the subject of appetites and of reflex or
instinctive movements ; but it is incapable of forming
a desire. The first step in the development of the power
of desire is the awakening of the cognition. Some sense
is excited by its appropriate stinuilus, and the resulting
experience is felt to be agreeable. A bright colour

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 379

attracts the child's eye, its food tastes sweet, some
reflex or instinctive movement affords rehef or satis-
faction ; in a word, an experience is felt as good — as in
harmony with the agent's nature or some part of it —
and there is immediately evoked a tendency to prolong
that experience, or to secure a fuller possession of the
object. Should anything re-awaken the idea of such an
experience, there will be excited a tendency to realize
again the agreeable activity, and to reproduce the
movements by which it was previously obtained. Here
we have the fully developed state.

Analysis of Desire thus understood reveals to us
three elements: (1) the representation of some object
or experience not actually enjoyed, (2) the appreciation
of this object or experience as goody and (3) a resulting
tension or feeling of attraction towards the agreeable
object. The two former elements are rather the con-
ditions, the last the essence, of desire. Desire regards the
future, and so aims at the realization of the ideal. In
proportion as our acquaintance with various kinds of
goods extends, so the field of desire widens and longings
multiply. Whilst the physical appetites have their
birth in sensation, and are satiated, at least for the time,
by a definite quantity of appropriate exercise, desire
emerging from the activity of the imagination is practi-
cally of indefinite range; and in a rational creature who
can conceive boundless good it is incapable of being
fully satisfied by any finite object.

Is Pleasure the only object of Desire ? — It has been much
discussed in recent years whether all forms of appetency are
only towards pleasure and from pain. Mill, Dr. Bain, and
sensationists generally, maintain the affirmative. " Desiring
a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it, and thinking of
it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather
two parts of the same phenomenon ; in strictness of language
two different modes of naming the same psychological fact —
to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its
consequences), and to think of it as pleasant are one and the
same thing ; and to desire anything except in proportion as
the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impos-
sibility,'"'^ Seemingly unselfish impulses arc merely the effect

^ Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 57,

38o RATIONAL LIFE.

of association. Virtue, like money, originally desired solely
as a means to happiness, is later on pursued as an end in
itself. This doctrine has been effectively refuted by numerous
philosophers from Butler to Drs. Martineau and Sidgwick :
(i) Appetites proper are cravings whose primary object is the
exercise of an activity, not the pleasure thence proceeding —
e.g., the formal object of hunger is food, not the subjective
delight of eating; though of course by a reflex act this
pleasure may be made an end. (2) Many desires proper are
primarily extra-regarding, and not aiming at the agent's
own pleasure — e.g., the parental and social affections, sym-
pathy, compassion, gratitude, wonder, the desire of knowledge,
and the mental activities of pursuit. (3) The aim of rational
volition is certainly not always pleasure. We can choose
right for its own sake against the maximum pleasure. The
formal object of appetite is the good, not solely the pleasant ;
it includes bonuni honestum as well as boniim delectabile. We
may further urge (a) the hedonistic paradox, viz., that the
deliberate pursuit of pleasure — the only rational end of
egoistic ethics — is suicidal. Thus, the pleasures attached to
benevolence, self-sacrifice, pursuit of knowledge, field sports,
&c., are annihilated if consciously set as the end of our act.
(b) The assertion that all these now apparently disinterested
impulses are originally the creation of pleasant associations
is an appeal from consciousness to ignorance, and is by the
nature of the case incapable of proof, (c) The most careful
observation of children confirms the view that they are
subjects of many extra-regarding impulses.^

Motive. — With the multiplication of longings there
inevitably arises conflict of desires. The attainment of
an immediate gratification may clash with more remote
good, or duty with interest. The various objects which
thus excite desire are called motives. They include
whatever moves or influences in any degree the Will. The
apprehension of any object as desirable, whether it be
ultimately preferred or not, thus constitutes a motive.

2 On this subject see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. I. c. iv. ;
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Pt. II. Bk. I. c. v. and Bk. II.
c. i. § 3 ; James, op. cit. Vol. II. pp. 549, seq. ; Mark Baldwin, Hand-
book of Psychology, Vol. II. pp. 325, seq.

St. Thomas, insisting on the notion of good {conveniens naiura) as
wider and more ultimate than that of pleasure, considered and
rejected in advance the sensationist doctrine; commenting on
Aristotle, he urges that activity (operatio) is prior as an object of
appetency to pleasure, which is a consequence of the former. Thus :
" Non enim fit delectatio sine operatione neque rursus potest esse

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 381

Strictly speaking, the motive is not the physical being
possessed of objective existence, but this being as
apprehended by the mind, and represented as under some
aspect desirable. The force of a motive consequently
fluctuates, depending on the vividness with which it is
realized in consciousness. Its attractiveness will depend
partly on the quality of the object itself, partly on the
general character of the man ; but also more imme-
diately on the extent to which he permits or causes it
to absorb his attention at the time.

Spontaneous Action and Deliberation.— By far
the greater part of man's daily actions are determined
by his habits or usual modes of thought and voHtion.
UnrefleclTve' activity, thus issuing forth as the resultant
of character and present motives, may be termed sponta-
neous. Most of human conduct is accordingly the out-
come of the spontaneous tendency of the will. The
great majority of our actions are in themselves morally
indifferent; and even were a man consciously to analyze
his motives, he would find no sufficient reason foi
interfering with the normal direction of his inclination
formed by habitual action. Many of these acts, more-
over, escape consciousness altogether, as, for instance,
the separate movements in the operations of dressing,
eating, or walking ; but even in regard to those of the
performance of which man is aware, he is said to give
a virtual or implicit consent, rather than formally to will
their execution. If any of these actions have a moral
aspect, he is chiefly responsible for them indirectly,
in so far as they are voluntary in causa — that is, in so far
as he impUcitly intended or accepted them as effects or
as part of an entire operation freely initiated by him.

Occasions, however, occur when opposing motives
present themselves, and the agent has to exert more
exphcit volition. Some fresh consideration, running

perfecta operatio sine delectatione. Videtur autem principalius esse
operatio quam delectatio. Nam delectatio est quies appetitus in re
delectante qua quis per operationem potitur. Non autem aliquis
appetit quietem in aliquo, nisi in quantum aestimat (id) sibi con-
veniens. Et ideo ipsa operatio, quae delectat, sicut quoddam
conveniens, videtur per prius appetibilis quam delectatio." (Com. in
Ethica, Lib, X. 1. 6.)

3S2 RATIONAL LIFE.

counter to the natural tendency of his disposition,
emerges into distinct consciousness. The new motive
may be the clearer perception of some moral obligation,
of some enduring worldly advantage, or of the oppor-
tunity for proximate pleasure. When in such circum-
stances the agent adverts to the possibility of more than
one course of action, there arises deliberation; and the
course adopted is said to be deliberately chosen. The
word deliberation signifies a weighing or balancing. The
process implies active consideration of competing motives.
It is no longer a mere struggle of impulses. The agent
holds the alternatives together and compares them. He
dwells on each in succession, yet in some degree retains
both simidtaneonsly before consciousness. The operation
thus involves the tinity of consciousness possible only to
a rational Self. Hut we must not suppose that a
protracted pondering of motives is a necessar}'' con-
dition of every deliberate act. Two alternatives may
be consciously realized and one adopted in a moment.
If I advert to the moral quality of an impulse or an
action, and then acquiesce in its continuance, I thereby
make it my oivn. It is henceforth deliberately or • fully
consented to, and I am responsible for it.

Choice or Decision. — The acceptance of some
suggested course or its rejection constitutes the act of
choice. For this exercise of choice there must be the
self-conscious reflective cognizance of at least two
possible alternatives, though one may be mere absti-
nence from action. There is then a free practical
judgment by the intellect : "T/^/s is to be preferred ; " and
I embrace one side, or identify myself ivith it. I adopt
it, acquiesce in it, choose it. There is ajiat or a veto^ and
one side is elected.

Types of Election. — Different forms assumed by the act of
choice have been distinguished by psychologists as types of
election or decision.^ When the agent, after deliberately
weighing the various reasons, finds a clear balance on one
side, and then freely decides in favour of this, we have what
has been called the type of ^''reasonable decision." At other

3 Professor James gives an able and interesting analysis of some
of these types. (Op. cit. Vol. II. pp, 531—534-)

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 383

times, becoming impatient of suspense, we seek relief in
the adoption of one or other course in a somewhat reckless
manner. Here we have the impetuous decision.

Again, on other occasions the spontaneous bent of our
will — our present inclination as the resultant of our character
and actual motives — tends in a certain direction. Though
perhaps not in harmony either with our moral ideal or our
general interests, this way of acting offers itself as here and
now the pleasantest. It is for us the line of least resistance.
After some hesitation we consent or allow our will to issue
into the open channel. Our attitude is passive and permissive
rather than active and selective. This is an example of
acquiescent decision.

Finally, there are certain acts of choice, elicited at least
occasionally by all men, but far more frequently in the experi-
ence of those who are striving after a higher moral or
religious life, in which we set ourselves in opposition to the
spontaneous impulse of the will. There is a distinct feeling of
volitional effort, an unpleasant struggle against what is appre-
hended as the more agreeable suggestion. Some imagined self-
indulgence, or some angry or envious thought, emerges into
consciousness, and a. painful and prolonged endeavour is needed
to expel or suppress it. In cases like these, whilst keenly aware
of the greater intensity of the attractions on one side, and
whilst absolutely certain that the easiest course would be to
yield to the enticement, we often set ourselves to embrace
the less pleasant alternative. The general character of an
act of choice of this kind — the sense of effort, the conscious-
ness of painful struggle, and the final adoption of the less
agreeable course — distinguishes it from the previously men-
tioned types of decision.-^ Each of the other varieties of
choice reveals to us our moral liberty, for even in the acqui-
escent decision consciousness assures us that we freely ratify
or consent to the stronger impulse, but these experiences of
struggle against preponderating attraction bring it home to us
in an exceptionally vivid manner. This t3'pe may be called
anti-impulsive decision.'^

^ " The slow dead heave of the will that is felt in these instances
makes of them a class altogether different subjectively from all the
preceding classes. . . . Here both alternatives are steadily held in
view, and in the act of murdering the vanquished possibility the
chooser realizes how much in that instant he is making himself
lose. It is deliberately driving a thorn into one's own flesh." (James,
ibid. p. 534.)

^ The proof of free-will based on this experience of " anti-
impulsive effort," or of action against " the spontaneous impulse of
the will," is admirably treated in W, G. Ward's Philosophy of Theism,
Essays IX.— XI.

384 /RATIONAL LIFE.

Volition and Desire. — The processes of delibera-
tion and choice exemplify free or self-determined
volition in the strictest sense. This word is sometimes
employed to denote any act of the rational will, whether
spontaneous or reflective. Using it in the strict sense it
implies: (i) the conception of some object or end as
good or desirable, (2) advertence to the possibility of
alternative courses of action with respect to it, (3) a
judicial act of preference, and (4) the consequent active
tendency or inclination of myself to that side. Volition
is thus to be clearly distinguished from mere desire.
The latter state is necessarily awakened by the repre-
sentation of a possible gratification, but the volition
is originated by«the mind itself, and remains within its
control. In spite of feeling drawn towards a desired
object we can say. No. In the will's ratification or
rejection of desire our moral freedom is manifested.*^

Various Forms of Conative Activity distinguished. — Now
that we have analyzed the chief forms of conative activity, it
may be convenient here to call the student's attention to the
differences by which some of the more important of them are
distinguished. Instinct is described as unconsciously purposive,
impulse aimed towards an end not realized in consciousness.
Impulse is a state of feeling tending to issue into any action :
a striving towards any end or satisfaction obscurely felt.
Dr. Bain's definition of voluntary action as " feeling-prompted
movement " coincides with impulsive^ but not with strictly /n'^
action. Desire is a felt tension towards an end distinctly
realized in consciousness, a yearning, a mental state of
uneasiness awakened by the representation of an absent
known good. Motive is whatever attracts the will, the appre-
hension of a desirable end, an agreeable consequence of my
action viewed as moving me. Intention etymologically signifies
the act of tending towards something, and is commonly described

^ Henri Marion makes out an elaborate distinction between
Will and Desire, which, if not conclusive, is at least suggestive.
These are the headings: " Le desir est une double emotion; la
volonte est froide. (2) Le desir est trouble et agite ; la volonte est
calme. (3) Le desir est fatal ; la volonte est libre. (4) Le desir est
souvent vague, parfois inconscient, la volonte est precise, determinee.
(5) Le desir a pour objet des choses exterieures ; la volonte ne porta
que sur ce que depend de nous. (6) II y a des degres dans le desir ;
la volonte est une." {Lemons de Psychologic appliqnce a V Education,
pp. 92—95)

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 385

by the schoolmen as the tendency of the Will towards some end
through some means. It is thus opposed to choice, which refers
to the selection of intermediate means. If we wish to bring
out the distinction between Intention and Motive, perhaps
our best definition of the former will be: the Will's conscious
acceptance of or consent to a contemplated action or total
series of actions. The Motive is a represented good viewed as
attracting me ; the Intention is the Will's act of embracing a
represented future good. The intention is always /r^^, while
the desire or craving is not, unless consented to or ratified.^
Purpose or resolution is a deliberately formed intention with
regard to a future series of acts or a remote end. A wish is
the conception of an end as good, but without effort or
intention towards its realization.

Self-control. — The exercise of choice when the
agent makes an effort to resist the spontaneous tendency
of emotion or passion is an example of Self-control, on
the due cultivation of which depends in the highest
degree the happiness and well-being of each of us.
Under Self-control psychologists usually include the
power of restraining and directing thoughts, feelings,

'' Regnon's acute metaphysical analysis is so appropriate here
that I quote it at length: " La vie de la volonte presente deux
caracteres. Elle re^oit tine influence superieure . . . et mise en acte par
cette influence qu'on appelle une motion, elle exerce Vactiviie qui est
le propre de sa nature. A ces deux caracteres de passivite et
d'activite correspondent le motif et {'intention. Uintention est un
acte par lequel la volonte pose un terme, c'est-a-dire decide I'exist-
ence d'un effet, et j'ai prouve que I'intention ne modifie er\ rien son
principe et sa source. . . . Quant au motif, si on le considere, non
dans son objet qui est un bien a acquerir, non dans I'intelligence ou
il est la bonte pergue, mais dans la volonte qui est proprement son
siege, le motif est une influence qui incline physiquement la volonte,
ou mieux, \2i pousse vers un bien, de telle sort que la volonte est dans
deux etats physiques differents, lorsqu' elle subit ou lorsqu' elle ne
subit pas I'excitation du motif. Ainsi le motif meut la faculte qu'il
atteint ; I'intention pose un terme dont elle decide I'existence. Le
motif est subi par la volonte en tant qu'elle est un patient ; I'intention
est Vacte de la volonte en tant qu'elle est un agent. Le propre du
patient est d'etre determine par autrui, le propre de I'agent est de
determiner autrui. D'ou la conclusion suivante : La volonte est
modifiee d'une maniere ' determinee ' par le motif; mais la volonte
' determine ' elle-meme le terme de son intention; et cette distinction,
ce me semble, fait evanouir I'antinomie sujet de si grand debats. . . .
Le motif produit une motion dans la volonte — Vacte indelibere : mais
si I'intention se porte sur cet acte et decide qu'il soit, cet acte devient
{Ute delibe're' de volonte." [Mctaphysique des Causes, p. 741.)

386 RATIONAL LIFE.

and movements, whilst from another point of view, they
have distinguished different forms of Self-control as
physical, prudential, and moral.

Control of Expression. — (i) Since emotion is
intimately bound up with its external expression, the
suppression of the physical manifestation often speedily
extinguishes the feeling. Passion is in many cases
nourished and strengthened by the gestures and signs
which lend it utterance, as when a man gives way
to an outburst of rage. The actor by adopting the
gesticulations and frowns indicative of passion, works
himself temporarily into the frame of mind of the
character which he impersonates. The bodil}^ move-
ments apparently react on the feelings and intensify
them partly by suggestion, partly by augmenting the
general cerebral excitement. Consequently, energetic
and sustained effort to inhibit the external expression
will nearly always gradually extinguish the internal
feeling. "Control your temper" is, as a rule, merely
another way of sa3ang, *' Keep down the manifestation
of it." But sometimes the inhibition of external mani-
festation only turns the mind back on itself, and leaves
it to brood over the irritating cause of the emotion.
In such cases superficial suppression of symptoms is
by itself useless.^ An outburst of tears may relieve
the pent-up grief; and vigorous phj^sical exercise of a
neutral character may work off a fit of passion.

Control of Thought. — (2) In instances of this kind.
Control is best exerted by attacking the thought which
is the root of the impulse. This may be accomplished
indirectly, by withdrawing attention from the exciting
idea and fixing it upon some rival object. Thus, when
the recollection of a past insult awakens a feeling of anger
or a desire of revenge, it would generally be extremely
difficult to conquer the temptation by a direct veto
or a simple " I will not be angry." The most efficacious
means to restrain the malevolent impulse is to transfer
the attention to some other matter. And here we may

^ As when according to Thackeray, " to keep your temper "
means " to bottle it up, and cork it down, and preserve it carefully
for a more violent future explosion."

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 387

either simply endeavour to banish the irritating thought
and engross our mind in something else ; or we may
advance and attack the evil suggestion by concen-
trating our attention on an opposing motive, such as
the beauty of the virtue of forgiveness, the charity of
Christ, or some redeeming feature in our enemy's
character. When the temptation is of a seductive
character, or violent, or of frequent recurrence, the
former course is generally the safer. Dr. W. B. Carp-
enter has judiciously observed: "The Will may put
forth its utmost strength in the way of direct repression
and may entirely fail ; whilst by exerting the same
amount of force in changing the direction, complete success
may be attained. When the question is not of restrain-
ing some sudden impulse of excited passion, but of
keeping down an habitual tendency to evil thoughts of
some particular class, and of preventing them from
gaining a dominant influence, it does not answer
to be continually repeating to oneself, ' I will not
allow myself to think of this,' for the repetition, by
fixing the attention on the very thought or feeling from
which we desire to escape, gives it an additional and
even overpowering intensity, as many a poor misguided
but well-intentioned sufferer has found to his cost.
The real remedy is to be found in the determined effort to
think of something else, and to turn into a wholesome and
useful pursuit the energy which, wrongly directed, is
injurious to the individual and to society." ^

During the first years of childhood, the human being
is completely the creature of impulse, and only poten-
tially separated in respect of moral action from the
irrational animal. The simplest, and probably the
earhest, form of Self-control consists in the inhibition
of impulsive movement, in self-restraint freely put forth
at the recollection of a past prohibition or a painful
experience. The moral training which the child receives
has a most important influence in the rapid develop-
ment of this power of self-control. Judicious expres-
sions of approval or disapprobation when he has

9 Mental Physiology, p. 335; cf. Jules Payct, VEducation de la
Volonte (1899), Lib. II. c. iii.

3S8 RATIONAL LIFE.

resisted or yielded to temptation stimulate the child
to the use of his moral liberty ; and this faculty, like
his intellectual and physical aptitudes, is gradually
perfected b}^ exercise.

Order of development.— The precise date of the
first exercise of Free-will, like that of the awakening
of Self-consciousness, cannot be determined in any
individual ; but it implies considerable development
in the power of reflexion ; and is long subsequent to
our chief locomotive acquisitions. In the order of
development, then, physical appetites and instincts as
the guardians of animal existence and v^ell-being show
themselves earliest in life. Desire proper, which is
more complex, involving a representative element,
appears at a later stage. Its first manifestations
consist in ill-defined cravings, containing only the
vaguest representation of the means or end to be
attained. As the child grows older, unselfish impulses,
such as those of sympathy and gratitude, together with
the desire to renew remembered pleasures, arise. True
self-control and free volition manifest themselves last.

Habit. — The development of the power of voluntary
action proceeds concomitantly with the formation of
habits. By a habit is now commonly understood an
acquired aptitude for some particular mode of action. It is
thus opposed to instinct, which is an inherited tendency. ^'^
Modern writers usuall}^ include under habit uniform
modes of both bodily and mental activity. Habit has
its explanation in the great general fact that any
operation once performed by an agent tends to _ be
repeated with greater facility. Under whatever shape
we try to conceive the residual effect of a thought in
the mind, or of a motion in the nervous substance of
the organism, it is indisputable that the occurrence
of such an event leaves a facility for its reproduction,
and that the facility increases with each repetition.

1** The schoolmen signified by hahitiis innate as well as acquired
dispositions ; on the other hand, to the lower animals they denied
habits in the strict sense, maintaining that only rational free beings
can be subject of habits proper. (Cf. Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus,
Vol. I. p. 150.)

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 389

" Lines of least resistance " in the nervous tissue, or
" associations " between groups of mental states
become formed, and the reproduction of any part of
the operation tends to call up the remainder.

The physiological basis of habit was well expressed by
Carpenter in the principle that "///^ organism gvoius to the
mode in which it is cxevciscd.''^^ Although a constant
process of waste and reconstruction is ever going on in
the living being, yet, since 3^outh is the special period
of growth, it is then that the deeper and more per-
manent impressions and dispositions are wrought in
the organism. When maturity is reached, the flexibility
of the joints and muscles and the plasticity of all parts
of the system rapidly diminish, and the individual con-
stitution becomes set and fixed.

The psychological basis of habit lies in the law of
associatioii by contiguity. Au}^ group of mental states
whicH have^occurred together or in succession, tend to
be reproduced simultaneously or in the original order.
Conscious voluntary action, if reiterated, becomes auto-
matic or reflex. (See p. 218.) It lias been said that
''habit is second nature," and that "man is a bundle
of habits," but few recognize how much truth there is
in these sa3angs. All the ordinary operations per-
formed by mankind, such as walking, speaking, reading,
writing, are acquired habits. The various trades, arts,
professions, methods of business learned by men are
products of the same force. All the knowledge which
a man gathers, all the sciences of which he becomes
master, the modes of thought which he cultivates, the
feelings in which he indulges, are embodied as dis-
positions in his being. Every volitional act which he
exerts, be it good or ill, is registered in the cells of his
brain, and leaves a " bent " in his soul which proves its
reality by the increased inclination to repeat that act.^-^

^^ Mental Physiology, p. 340.

^- Cf. Payot : "Si c'est sous forme de souvenirs que se depose
dans la memoire de I'etudiant une partie du travail qu'il accomplit,
c'est sous la forme d'habittcdes actives que se depose en nous notre
activite. Rien ne se perd en notre vie psychologique ; la nature est un
comptable minutieux. Nos actes les plus insignifiants en appa-
rence, pour peu que nous les repetions, forment avec les semaines,

390 RATIONAL LIFE.

" To him that hath shall be given." The more strength
already acquired by a habit, whether physical, intel-
lectual, or moral, the easier to sustain it.

Practical Rules. — Hence the value of Professor Bain's
recommendations with respect to the acquisition of moral
habits — to start with as vigorous and decided an initiative as
possible, and to permit oneself no exceptions till the new habit
is firmly rooted. We must never lose a battle in the beginning
of the campaign. Many victories will be needed to com-
pensate for an early defeat ; and they will be more difficult to
win because of it. Of even greater value are the maxims
formulated by Professor James : " (i) Make your nervous
system your ally instead of your enemy : make automatic and
habitual as early as possible as many useful actions as you
can. (2) Seize the very first opportunity to act on every resolution
you make. (3) YimWy^ Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by
a little gratuitous exercise every day. Be systematically ascetic
or heroic in little unnecessary points, for no other reason than
that you would rather not do it, so that when the hour of dire
need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained
to stand the test." i^

Moral Discipline. — All ethical training consists in
the acquisition of moral habits ; but the worth of such
training lies not less in the disciplinary exercise of the
Will than in the particular habits acquired. The man
who, by persevering effort, conquers a bad temper or a
laz}^ disposition, has not merely acquired a valuable
disposition, such as other men possess by nature. He
has done much more. He has during the process
elicited a multitude of acts of fvee-will, he has put forth
voluntary effort, he has on innumerable occasions exerted
self-denial; and this exercise is the only means in his
possession of strengthening the highest and most
precious faculty with which he is endowed. Order

les mois, les annees un total enorme qui s'inscrit dans la memoire
organique sous forme d'habitudes inderaciuables." {L'Educaticn de la
Volonte, p. 135.)

^3 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. pp. 123 — 126. This admirable
vindication of Catholic teaching on Asceticism is specially welcome
from a writer of so very un-mediaeval a temper of mind as the
distinguished professor of Harvard. His treatment of volitional
activity contains some of the best pieces of psychology that he has
written.

RATIONAL APPETENCY. 391

and regulant}^ whether in work or recreation, are
amongst the most useful disciplinary agencies for
youth, since they accustom the young to act and decide
according to a yixed rule or plan, instead of vacillating
and changing with the impulse of the moment. One of
the greatest advantages of public school life is that of
the discipline and regularity which the organization
of a large body necessitates ; and perhaps amongst the
best parts of the discipline is that afforded by the
general games, such as cricket and football. Where
played with a good spirit, they make constant demands
on the virtues of obedience, self-restraint, unselfishness,
good-temper, patience, pluck, and perseverance ; and,
better still, this discipline is self-imposed.

Its importance. — The chief conclusion, then, which we
would draw from a consideration of this subject is the
transcendent importance of moral training in early life.
If the culture of the memory, of the imagination, and
of the understanding form integral parts of education,
more essential still is the training of the will. Even
confining our view to temporal interests, upon a man's
moral habits depend the happiness of himself and those
around him far more than upon his intellectual capabi-
lities. A mind possessed of due self-control may lead
a peaceful contented life amid many trials, whilst even
genius, if ill-regulated, will be miserable amidst the
most prosperous surroundings. But if moral training
is of importance to the individual, it is of still more
vital interest to society. In the private morals of its
citizens the robust and healthy life of the State has its
source. If the former are corrupt, diffusion of intel-
lectual culture may only increase the rapidity of national
decay. The need of insisting on the importance of the
moral element in education is especially grave at the
present day.

Character. — The total collection of a man's acquired
moral habits grafted into his natural temperament
make up his Character. Character is thus partly
inherited, partly formed by experience. That there is
given to each by nature a certain original disposition,
a certain fund of qualities, both intellectual and moral,

392 RATIONAL LIFE.

varying in different individuals, is evident from the
differences which in later life mark the personality of
members of the same family and of individuals reared
under very similar circumstances. On the other hand,
what we have just said regarding the growth of habits
shows how much of the formed character is acquired.
The formation of the character, however, is not merely
a process of moulding wrought into the original tempera-
ment by the impress of external agencies. Under the
same trials and temptations, one man by persevering
resistance becomes strong, self-reliant, and solidly
virtuous; whilst another by yielding becomes weak,
vacillating, and vicious. From the earliest acts of
free-volition there is constant reaction between personal
will on the one side, and the force of motives on the
other. Each solicitation conquered, each impulse to
immediate gratification resisted by building up habits
of self-control, goes to form a strong will, and the
stronger a man's will grows, the greater the facility
with which he can repress transitory impulses, and the
more firmly can he adhere to a course once selected
in spite of obstacles.

Types of Character. — If such a man is wont to
make his decisions on sound reason, we have the
highest type of strong character. When, however, this
firmness of adhesion attaches to decisions based not on
reason but on impulse, or when the mere fact of having
once made a decision closes the intellect to the appre-
hension of all opposing considerations, we have the
obstinate character.

Again, there are some men who quickly form
judgments on transient impulse or slight grounds, but
as readily change or reverse their choice. There are
others, too, who though slow and hesitating in coming
to a conclusion, even after they have made the election,
timidly shrink back into the previous state of doubt on
the appearance of a new motive. Both of these forms
are types of the K>eak or vacillating character. Accord-
ingly, narrowness and rigidity are the dangers for the
strong-willed, whilst excessive indecision and vacilla-
tion are liable to beset the large and liberal-minded.

NATIONAL APrRTENCY. 393

Temperaments. — IMan's character, then, is partly
inherited, partly acquired, — due, as recent writers say,
in part to nature, in part to nuriure. The original
element, in so far as it is determined by his bodily
constitution, was called his temperament by the ancients.
P^our great types of temperament w^ere recognized by
Aristotle and Galen, and ascribed to the quality of the
mixture of the chief humours of the bod3^ They are :
(i) The cliokric temperament, which typifies the
energetic disposition. INIen of this class were
held to be prompt and vigorous in action,
liable to strong passions, and inclined to
ambition and pride as well as anger.
^ (2) The sanguine, indicating the light-hearted, imagi-
native, vivacious. Persons of this class are
alleged to be brilliant rather than solid,
enthusiastic rather than persevering.

(3) The phlegmatic, or those of slow and somnolent

disposition, tardy in judgment, of tranquil
mind, devoid of strong passions and incapable
of great actions, whether good or evil.

(4) The melancholy, signifying those prone to sadness,

env}^ and suspicion ; of a brooding intro-
spective disposition ; of obstinate will, and of
persevering dislikes. ^^ The ancient physio-
logical explanation is long since abandoned,
but the classification has been generally
retained, especially in Germany, where Kant
insisted strongly on the fourfold division.

^^ See Pesch, Insiitnfiones Psychologicce, §§ 1078, 1079; Hoft'ding,
Outlines of Psychology, pp. 349, 350 ; . Herbart, Text-Booh of Psychology
(Eng. Trans.), pp. 100 — 102; Kant, Anthropologic, pp. 318—324.

CHAPTER XIX.

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM.

Free-will and Philosophy. — We have now
reached one of the most important theses in the
present volume — the Freedom of the Will. This
doctrine ramifies into all departments of Meta-
physics, and the view adopted on the question must
logically determine the theory of life and morality
which is the practical outcome of rational specu-
lation. Ethics, Natural Theology, Ontology, and
Cosmolog}^ all meet the phenomenon of the human
Will in one connexion or another ; and all these
sciences are compelled to harmonize their general
conclusions with their creed upon this point.

Free-will and Psychology. — Many writers on
Psychology maintain that the discussion of Free-will
should be excluded altogether from this science, and
relegated to Ethics or some other branch of Philosophy.
Provided the subject be adequately treated, it seems to
us of minor interest where this shall be done. Still the
claims, na}' the obligations, of the psychologist to face
this problem are obvious. The facts of volition, choice,
self-control, character, the feeling of remorse and of
responsibility, are all important mental phenomena
which can hardly be ignored \nXhe Science of the Mind.
Indeed no adequate treatment of voluntar}- activity is
possible v/ithout assuming some view on the question of

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM, ; 395

moral freedom ; and those English psychologists who
profess the most rigid doctrine as to the purely positive
or phenomenal character of the science of Psychology,
invariably adopt one side — usually that of determinism
— in their account of volition. As we take a larger view
of the subject, and conceive Psychology to be a philo-
sophical science, it is our duty not to shirk the question.

Free-will defined.— Will, or Rational Appetency Ij
in general, may be described as the faculty of inclining |j
towards or striving after some object intellectually apprehended
as good ; but viewed strictly as a free power, it may be
defined as the capability of self-determination. By self is ^^i
meant not the series of my mental states, nor the conception '
of that series, but the abiding real being which is subject of
these states. By Free-will or Moral Freedom, then, we >
understand that property in virtue of which a rational
agent, when all the conditions required to elicit a voli-
tion are present, can either put forth or abstain from
that volition.

Scholastic Terminology. — The schoolmen here, as usual,
distinguished terms with more accuracy and precision than
their successors. They defined spontaneous acts, as all those
which have their source ivithin the agent, e.g., the movements of
the roots of a plant, as well as the impulsive or the fully
deliberate actions of men. Such acts merely exclude coaction.
The schoolmen further distinguished two forms of voluntary
action. Voluntary acts in a wider sense they defined as
"those proceeding from an internal principle {i.e., spon-
taneous) with the apprehension of an end."" Only voluntary
acts in the strict sense were held to be free, or deliberate. These
latter imply not only an apprehension of the object sought,
but a self-conscious advertence to the fact that we are seeking
it, or acquiescing in the desire of it. The spontaneous or
impulsive acts of man which are the outcome of his nature
are voluntary in the lax sense, but non-voluntary in the
stricter signification. The term actus hunianus — human action
— was confined to free or deliberate acts : actus hominis desig-
nated all indeliberate actions of man. Further, the term
liberty was carefully distinguished. Physical liberty means
imm.unity from physical compulsion or restraint {necessitas ''''^" ^
coactionis). The unbridled horse is in this sense free, whilst
the prisoner in a cell is not. Moral Liberty, or Freedom of
Will {libertas arbitvii) signifies immunity from necessitation

3o6 RATIONAL LIFE.

by the agent's nature {necessitas natiircr). In this latter sense
the prisoner is free, but the horse is not. When Locke
defines free-will as the power to do what I choose, he confounds
moral and ph3^sical liberty. The latter in the case of human
beings is also cdXled personal fveedoni.

\jj\i^ Problem stated. — Now the question at issue is not

"^ ' whether man can choose or will without any motive
r \ whatsoever. Such a choice would be irrational and

' impossible, because volition implies the embracing of

an object intcUednally apprcJiended as a good. But an}'
object of thought apprehended as good or desirable is
thereby a motive soliciting the will — whether it be ulti-
mately preferred or not. Attacks of determinists
on " the theory of motiveless volition " are therefore
completely irrelevant. No accredited defender of Free-
will teaches that man can choose or will without any
motive. St. Thomas would have described such a view
as self-contradictory and absurd. A^/7/// eligitur nisi sub
specie boni — " Nothing is willed except under the appear-
ance of good," was a universally received axiom in the
schools. Free-will implies not choice luithont motive,
but choice betiveen motives. If there be but one motive
within the range of intellectual vision, the volition in
such circumstances is not free, but necessary. Equally
unjustifiable is it to represent the doctrine of Indeter-
minism as a theory of causeless volition. The mind or the
self is the cause. Again, the question is not whether all
actions of man are free, but whether any action is so.
In the words of Dr. H. Sidgwick : ** Is my voluntary
action at any (every) moment determined by (i) my
character (a) partly inherited, (b) partly formed by past
feelings and actions, and (2) my circumstances or the
external influences acting on me at the moment ? or
not?" Or, in those of Dr. Martineau : "In exercises
of the will {i.e., in cases of choice) is the mind wholly
determined by phenomenal antecedents and external
conditions ; or does itself also, as active subject of these
objective experiences, play the part of determining
Cause?" Or to put it otherwise: Given all the pre-
requisites for a volition except that act itself, does it
necessarily follow ? Or finally, in the language of

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 397

Professor James : " Do those parts of the universe
already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what
the other parts shall be ? ^ Dcterminists or Necessarians
answer in the affirmative ; Liheytarians, or Anti-deter-
minists or Indeterminists say, No.

We allow most readily, first, that a very large part
of man's daily action is indeliberate, and therefore merely
the resultant of the forces playing upon him : secondly,
that even where he acts deliberately, and exerts his
power of free choice, he is influenced by the weight of
the motives attracting him to either side ; and finally, as
a consequence of this, we grant that a being possessed ) ^\j^^
of a perfect knowledge of all the forces operating on a ] ^
man would be able to prophesy with the greatest pro- \ ^ ^
bability what course that man will take. But on they ». p«,H
other hand, we hold that there are many acts of man
which are not simpl}^ the resultant of the influences
working upon him : that he can, and sometimes does
set himself against the aggregate balance of motive,
natural disposition, and acquired habit ; and that,
consequently, prediction with absolute certainty con-
cerning his future free conduct would be impossible
from even perfect knowledge of his character and
motives. Such is the thesis we defend. Whether it
be called the doctrine of free-will, of moral liberty, oi
indetcrniinism , or of contingent choice, seems to us of little
moment. But it is of the utmost importance that the
precise point of the dispute should be understood, and
the gravity of the issue realized. For this reason we
have formulated the question in so many ways.

Fatalism and Determinism. — There is a marked tendency
among recent opponents of Free-will to shrink from the use
of such " hard " terms as necessity, fatality, and the like,
adopted by their more courageous and more logical prede-
cessors. We have now-a-days, as James says, " a soft deter-
minism which says that its real name is freedom." (Op. cit.
p. 149.) These efforts to change the meaning of the terms
employed in the controversy can only confuse the student
by obscuring the fundamental difference between the rival
doctrines, which involve profoundly opposed conceptions of

1 Cf. Sidgwick, op. cit. p. 46; Martineau, op. cit. p. 188 ; James,

The Will to Believe (i8y8), p. 150.

398 RATIONAL LIFE.

the universe. Mill (Logic, Bk. VI. c. ii. § 3, n. 3) sought to
make a distinction between Determinism and Fatalism. The
latter doctrine holds, he teaches, that all our acts are deter-
mined by fate or external circumstances, independently of our
feelings and volitions. Determinism, on the contrary, main-
tains that action is determined by feeling. In practice, then,
they will certainly differ. The determinist may seek to arouse
good desires in himself or others : the fatalist will abandon
the attempt as useless. But logically fatalism flows from
determinism. In connexion with this point Mill falls into
one of his frequent inconsistencies, teaching that " our
character is in part amenable to our will." {Exam. p. 511.)
Our character is, of course, merely the result of inherited
tf" constitution and personal acts. The former is obviously
beyond our control, and according to Mill the latter have
all been inevitably predetermined by antecedent character
and external influences, until we reach infancy, where of
course there was no freedom at all. The desire to " alter
my character" or to improve myself must in the determinist
theory have ever been as independent of me, as completely given
to me, as the shape of my nose.

The arguments usually adduced to establish the
Freedom of the Will are threefold. They have been
called the psychological, the ethical, and the meta-
physical proofs respectively. The first of these appeals
to the direct testimony of consciousness. The second
is indirect in character, being based on the analysis of
certain mental states — ethical concepts. The third is
a more complex deduction from the nature of higher
mental activity. We shall begin with the second as
its demonstrative force is to some minds clearest.

Argument from Ethical Notions : Obligation. —
" Thou canst for thou oughtst." The inference which
Kant thus draws is perfectly just; though he erroneously
interprets it, and confines liberty to the noumenal world,
whilst conceding the "empirical self" and the pheno-
mena of experience to the rule of a rigid determinism.
If I am reall}^ bound hie et nunc to abstain from an evil
deed, then it must at some moment be really possible
for me that this deed shall not occur. The existence
of moral obligation is at least as certain as the uniformity
of nature — the assumption or postulate on which all the
propositions of physical science rest. The conviction

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 399

that I am bound to abstain from evil is not a generaliza-
tion from an imperfect and limited experience, but an
immediate and universal judgment of mankind. The
moral law lies at the foundation of practical social life.
Right conduct is not merely a beautiful ideal which attracts me.
It commands me with an absolute authority. It obliges me
unconditionally.^ Whatever be my own feelings or
desires, I remain in each act categorically bound to do
right and to avoid wrong. At the same time it is a
patent fact that the moral law is not always observed.
But if the moral law obliges me at all times it must be
really within my power on those occasions when I
disobey it. To suppose that I can be really and uncon-
ditionally bound to perform an act which is now, and
has ever been, for me absolutely impossible, is utterly
irrational. For instance, a dishonest director or pro-
moter of a bubble company, is elaborating a plan to
amass a fortune by the plunder of several hundred poor
people. Suppose his moral sensibility is not as yet
altogether obliterated, and that he adverts to the fact
that his evil scheme is a piece of cruel and nefarious
swindling. He feels that it is wicked and wrong — that he
ought not to proceed with it. Involved in this conscious-
ness of the present obligation is the conviction that he
can abstain from his evil course. Are both the persuasion
that he ought and that he can an illusion ? In the deter-
minist theory no other volition or choice than those
actually elicited were really possible to that man
throughout his entire past life, and the present criminal
choice is inexorably determined by the equally inevitable
choices that have gone before.

" Leon Noel states this argument well : " Si nous n'etions pas
libres, le bien nous apparaitrait comma un ideal nous manifestant sa
beaute et sollicitant notre amour. II serait le terme d'une tendance
analogue a I'admiration esthetique. . . . Ce n'est pas ainsi que Ic
bien s'offre a nous. Il ne nous presente pas un ideal, attendant, pour
nous entrainer a Taction, qu'il lui reponde un attrait assez puissant.
II nous apparait sous la forme austere du devoir, nous imposant una
loi a accomplir toujoiirs, quelles que soient nos dispositions et nos
tendances. Pour qu'un sentiment pareil ne soit pas absurde, il faut
que nous soyons libres. L'imperatif absolu du devoir suppose una
puissance superieura a toutes les circomstances, n'ayant besoin que
d'elle-meme pour lui obeir." {La Conscience du Libre Arbitre, p. 165.)

400 RATIONAL LIFE.

Remorse and Repentance. — Let us now examine the
character of another mental state : If I have voluntarily
yielded to some evil temptation, or knowingly done a wrong
act; if I have been deliberately unjust, unkind, or dishonest,
especially if I believe my act to have been grievously sinful ;
when I reflect upon it I am keenly conscious that my conduct
was blameuorthy. I condemn myself for it, I feel remorse for it,
I judge thati I ought to regret it, that I am bound to repent it.
But for acts that have not been thus deliberately performed
I do not in this way blame myself, even though they may
have resulted in far more serious injury to others or to
myself. Of course I wish that even involuntary actions of
mine which may have occasioned harm had not happened ;
but I do not deem them culpable/ and I judge that I am not
bound to repent them. The sentence of self-condemnation
and the pain of remorse present in the former and absent
from the latter cases are due to the assurance that the former
were mine in the strictest sense, that I freely did them — that,
unlike the latter, they were not the inevitable outcome of my
nature and circumstances, that I could have done otherwise.
Furthermore, this clear distinction is confirmed by the
universal judgment of mankind, which asserts that it is right
to have remorse and to blame myself for the evil deliberately
done zc'hich I could have avoided, but not for those acts which
were not deliberate, and therefore not in my power. But if
determinism be true, both classes of acts were equally the inevit-
able outcome of my nature and circumstances. If the reader
will think out the strictly logical consequences of deter-
minism he will see that, according to that theory, it is just as
rational to indulge in remorse and self-condemnation for an
attack of heart-disease or for being caught in a railway
accident as for having committed an act of perjury.

The determinist — who invariably claims exclusive mono-
poly of the scientific attitude of mind — refuses to think; and
instead vehemently insists that injustice is done his theory,
that there is a profound difference between the two cases,
that feelings of sorrow, desires, and purposes of amendment,
are useful to prevent future perjuries, but not for the avoid-
ance of railway collisions. This is very true, but equally
irrelevant to the point at issue — the rationality of remorse and
self-condemnation for our past voluntary acts. If all my past
acts, whether deliberate or indehberate, alike inevitably
resulted from my nature and circumstances, it is not virtue
but irrational folly to indulge in remorse for sin, and it is
mendacious to teach that it is right and reasonable to repent
of a crime which we believe to have been as unavoidable as
an earthquake. Professor James writes on this topic with his

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 401

wonted vigour. " Some regnts are pretty obstinate and hard
to stifle, — regrets for acts of wanton cruelty or treachery, for
example, whether performed by others or by ourselves.
Hardly any one can remain entirely optimistic after reading
the confession of the murderer at Brockton the other day ;
how, to get rid of the wife whose continued existence
bored him, he cnveigled her into a desert spot, shot her
four times, and then as she lay on the ground and said
to him, ' You didn't do it on purpose, did you, dear ? '
replied, ' No, I didn't do it on purpose,' as he raised
a rock and smashed her skull. Such an occurrence with
the mild sentence and self-satisfaction of the prisoner,
is a field for a crop of regrets, which one need not
take up in detail. We feel that though a perfect mechanical
fit for the rest of the universe, it is a bad moral fit, and
that something else would have been really better in its place.
But for the deterministic philosophy the murder, the sentence,
and the prisoner's optimism were all necessary from eternity;
and nothing else for a moment had a ghost of a chance of
being put into their place. To admit such a choice, the
determinists tell us, would be to make a suicide of reason ;^ so
we must steel our hearts against the thought. . . . (Yet)
Determinism in denying that anything else can be instead
of the murder, virtually defines the universe as a place in
which what ought to be is impossible:' (Op. cit. p. 61.) But it
is in the name of reason — in order to conceive the universe as
a rational whole— to satisfy the postulate of uniformity of
causation, that determinists deny free volition !

Merit and Desert— Closely related to the mental
states just discussed are the conceptions of merit smd
desert — notions embodied in all languages, and engrained
in the moral consciousness of mankind. When I have
struggled perseveringly against a difticult temptation,
or made some deliberate sacrifice in the cause of virtue,
I feel that my act is mentorioiis, that I have deserved a
reward. I may see no prospect throughout my life of
receiving the recompense. But I am none the less
assured that 1 have established a right to it, that such
a recompense is just. iVnd this I judge to be so because
I believe the act to have been free. For if not, even
though the ar '; had been far more painful to myself, and
far more useful to mankind, I deem that I have not
this claim. The good accomplished unwittingly or
involuntarily, however useful, is not meritorious on the

402 RATIONAL LIFE.

part of the agent; praise or esteem which I may receive
for it I recognize in my heart to be undeserved.''^ Now
this judgment is primarily inward. It is a retrospective
sentence pronounced by my reason on my deliberate
actions — or rather on myself as exerting them. I do
not, as some determinists seem to imply, esteem these
acts because they are evidence to me of the valuable
character which I possess. The very reverse is often
conspicuously the case, as when the drunkard, striving
to reform, measures the merit of his painful resistance
by the very badness of that formed character which the
violence of his temptation reveals. Still less is the
sense of merit due to the experience that good actions
have been rewarded and evil acts punished in the past.
From a very early age the child shows, in its feeble
way, that it can clearly distinguish between deserved and
undeserved punishment. " I could not help it," is the
invariable excuse ; and when the child really believes that
this was the case, he is convinced that the punishment
is unjust. This same retrospective judgment as to the
merit or demerit of free action, and their absence from
actions similar in effects but involuntary in origin, is
confirmed by the general sense of mankind both cultured
and uncultured.

Retribution. — The truth is, the idea of moral retribution
is incompatible with Determinism. That theory is
compelled to maintain that the notion of the restitution
of violated fight order through expiatory suffering is a childish
delusion. Punishment is purely preventive. Praise
and blame are not Just awards for self-sacrifice in the
past, hut judicious incentives for anticipated /?/i'«f^ services.
Gratitude is, not in jest but in earnest, " a delicate
sense of favours to come." _

Responsibility. — For acts done by me with

3 Cf. G. L. Fonsegrive : " Quand on dit, en effet, qu'on a merite
une recompense ou une punition, on veut dire non pas seulement
que necessairement il resultera de I'acte accompli un plaisir ou une
douleur, mais qu'on s'est cree des droits soi-meme a ce plaisir ou a
cette douleur. Cela est si vrai que nous regarderions tons comma
injustes une recompense ou une punition qui seraient les conse-
quences d'une action accomplie par nous sans notre assentiment
int^rieur." {Essai sur U Libre Arbitre, p. 509.)

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 403

advertence to the fact that I was doin<:^ them, and
with a consciousness of their moral qiiahty, I judge
myself accountable. Their goodness or badness I consider
to be rightly imputed to me. If good the pyaise, if evil
the blame is mine. But actions performed by me
inadvertently, or without cognizance of their moral
quality, I pronounce with equal certainty not to be
justly imputable to me. They are not truly mine ; and
it is not right that I should have to answer for them.
The meaning and ground of this distinction is that I am
convinced the former acts viere free in the strict sense ;
that I had real power to have chosen the other course ;
whilst the latter were there and then ine\itable — the
necessary resultant of my character and the forces
playing on me. This ethical conception is so important
that it is desirable to scrutinize it closely :

Notion of Responsibility analyzed. — Responsibility in the
fullest sense pre-supposes : (i) A justly binding authority.
(2) Knowledge in the agent of the just will of this authority —
of the Tightness or wrongness of the act. (3) Power either to
perform or abstain from the act. If any of these be absent,
responsibihtv in the full sense no longer exists. Be it noted
that the rea'lity of my responsibility or of my duty does not
rest ultimately on the mere fact that the badness or goodness
of the deed actually moves my will. Even were my will hard-
ened by crime so as to become insensible to the charms of
virtue or the foulness of vice, both obligation and responsi-
bility would remain real, so long as I intellectually apprehended
the act to be my duty. But most important of all, the act
must be really mine — really within my power to perform or to
omit. If not, my reason affirms, I cannot be answerable for
it. Imperfect knowledge, fear, sudden passion — in so far as
these conditions were themselves outside of my control —
all diminish responsibility, precisely in proportion as they
diminish freedom. I may have communicated the plague to
an entire city, or poisoned my father and mother, and though
plunged in grief over the terrible misfortune, I may retain
the clearest conviction that I am not responsible for the
calamity, that I am not morally guilty of the act, that I
cannot be justly punished for it, because I know it was not my
free act, because I am sure that / could not have helped it.
I apply this same criterion to the conduct of other men, and
I am quite certain that mankind at large would endorse my
judgment. I may of course have been guilty of voluntary

404 RATIONAL LIFE.

carelessness, or imprudence which resulted in the act. If so,
I am accountable just in so far as this final act was voluntary
or free in causa — in its original cause. That is, my responsi-
bility is measured by the distinctness with which the final
disastrous act could have been foreseen by me as likely to
result from my earlier faults, and the facility with which
these could have been avoided. It is because the maniac
and the somnambulist are inevitably determined by their nature
and the forces acting on them, that we judge them unac-
countable for any harm which they may have caused. We
take measures to prevent their innocently doing further
evil ; and we may even apply painful remedies to deter them
in the future ; but we do not judge them deserving of hlame or
moral censure. We deem them irresponsible agents. Respon-
sibility is therefore not the " consciousness of the solidarity of
our mental life," that is, the conviction that certain acts, as a
wfl//^;' c»//ac^ physically entail certain painful consequences;
nor the knowledge that the laiv visits certain transgressions
with particular penalties. It implies that I SiiTi justly punish-
able for a past/r^^ act, and only for Sifree act.^

Justice. — Finally, the idea ot Justice involved in
nearly all other ethical conceptions is completely sub-
verted. Justice is volition and action according to Law.
But if determinism be true, all volitions are equally
predetermined according to the laws of the universe.
Each human choice is as inflexibly fore-ordained as the
daily ebbing tide. Of course it still remains true that
we can infancy picture other imaginar}^ conditions, and

* Professor Alexander, who attacks the doctrine of Free-will in
his Chapter on Responsibility, writes : " Responsibility depends on
two things. First that a man is capable of being influenced by
what is right, that he can feel the force of goodness ; and second
that whatever he does is determined by his character.'" (Moral Order and
Progress, p. 335) Now if every human act is thus absolutely deter-
mined by character, how can I justly pronounce the Brockton
murderer, mentioned above, to be worthy of reprobation rather than
pity ; or the man who perseveringly struggles against temptation to
be meritorious ? The character and every volition of each throughout
his life were alike inexorably predetermined for him by his inherited
organism and environment. Neither of these men have ever had
for a second in their lives the real poiver of making a different choice
than that which they have made. Again, Mill's statement that
responsibility means "the knowledge that if we do wrong we shall
deserve punishment," is plausible only because it explains one free-
ivill term by another. With the latter we have already dealt.

P REE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 405

construci; moral ideals fairer to contemplate than the
actual facts of human life. But these conceptions
themselves are merel}' particular manifestations of the
same universal iron necessity. Moral law is identical
with physical law, and wliatcvcr is is rigJit.

Determinism distorts Moral Conceptions. — In
brief, then, the notions and sentiments which constitute
the moral consciousness of mankind, and are embodied
in the laws and literatures of all nations, and in the
ethical terms of all languages, imply the freedom of the
Will. *' On the Determinist theory," as Dr. Sidgwick
justly remarks, " ought, responsibility, desert, and similar
terms, should be used, if at all, in new significations."
The universal illusion was indeed profitable to society
in the past, but its day is over. Dr. Maudsley frankly
tells us : " The doctrine of free-will, like some other
doctrines that have done their work and then, being no
longer of any use, have undergone decay, . . . was
necessary to promote the evolution of mankind up to a
certain stage." ^ It is scarcely necessary to point out
that a psychological or metaphysical hypothesis which
is contradicted by the actual moral consciousness of the
human race is not in a very satisfactory condition. The
determinist does not save his position by asserting that
he can provide intelligible or useful meanings for our
ethical terms. The problem for him is to harmonize
his theory with the actual character and genuine significance
of our leading moral emotions and sentiments. The
business of science is to accept facts as thy are and to
examine them, not to manufacture them — to interpret, not to
transform them.

Free-will and Ethics. — It has been argued by Dr. Sidgwick
that the question of Free-will has little or no bearing on
Systematic Ethics. (Op. cit. c. v. §§ 4, 5.) The whole con-
troversy comes to this : If we mean by the Science of Ethics
merely the exposition of a code of judicious rules of indi-
vidual conduct, a psychological account of the formation of
habits, and a scheme of useful social sanctions; then, perhaps,
the problem of Free-will might be ignored in such a " syste-
matic " treatise. But if by the Science of Ethics we mean,
not a body of precepts to attain an end somehow or other

5 Sidgwick, op. cit. Bk. I. c. v. § 2; Maudsley, op. cit. p. 415,

4c6 RATIONAL LIFE.

assumed, but a Moral PhilusopJiy, i.e., a philosophical deter-
mination of the right end of human action, an analysis of the
grounds of Duty or Moral Obligation, a rational account
of the moral convictions of man universally embodied in
the leading ethical terms and ideas — responsibility, merit,
approval, remorse, &c., and an adequate treatment of the
most wide-i caching of all ethical virtues — Justice ; then — and
such is of course the only study worthy of the name of the
Science of Ethics — the Freedom of the Will is not merely not
a side issue ; it is a most vital and all-important question
penetrating to the very foundations of Moral Philosophy.
The fact that leading determinists such as Mr. Spencer and
Dr. Maudsley, as a logical consequence of their doctrine
reduce morality to natural action makes the significance of the
problem clear. (Cf. Martineau, op. cit. Vol. 11. pp. 311 — 324.)

Argument from Consciousness. — We now return

to a more strictly psychological argument — the intro-
spective anal3/sis of volition. We shall study different
phases of this activity ; and we invite the reader to
make experiments and observe for himself.

Attention. — We have already indicated the con-
nexion of volnntavy attention with the present question ;
but it will be well to notice some special aspects of this
mental function here. If I study by introspection any
process of voluntary attention, such as that involved in
recalling a forgotten incident, or in guessing a riddle,
I observe that / myself deliberatel}^ guide the course of
my thoughts. I am conscious that I do this by
fostering the strength of some ideas, and starving
others. I am conscious too that those which I select
and detain are often among the feeblest and least
attractive; and that by my preferential diiienX.\on I cause
them to prevail. I determine not only what repre-
sentations, but what aspects of these representations shall
occupy my consciousness. In such cases I am conscious
of exerting free volition. Further, throughout this process
I apprehend myself as causing my mental activity — I am
immediately conscious of my attention as the exercise
of free causal energy put forth by nte.

It is this power of the mind to modify through
selective attention the relative strength of rival motives
that renders so futile all comparison of the will with a

FREE-IVILL AND DETERMINISM. 407

balance Inevitably drawn in the direction of the heaviest
weight : " Pull a body," says Professor Alexander, "to
the right with a force of twelve pounds, and to the left
with a force of eight ; it moves to the right. Imagine
that body a mind aware of the forces which act upon
it ; it will move in the direction of that which, for what-
ever reason, appeals to it most ; and in doing so it will,
just because it is conscious, act of itself, and will have
the consciousness of freedom. A true explanation of
this consciousness turns the flank of indeterminism."
(Op. cit. p. 340.) " Flanking " movements are some-
times perilous to the flanking party. Imagine that
body not merely aware of the forces acting upon it, but
also self-conscious of the active po-wev of selective attention b}^
which it increases the force of the eight pounds or
diminishes that of the twelve, and the example will
accurately represent what introspection assures us
takes place in our minds when we exert our free-will
to overcome the strongest motive. The illustration
thus merely makes clear the radical misconception of
the actual character of our mental life required by the
determinist theory.^

Or, the argument may be put in the converse form :
Suppose that I was free, could consciousness affirm that fact
more clearly than it does now ? "Let us ask what the effort
to attend would effect if it were an original force. It
would deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of
innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly
away. The delay thus gained might not be more than
a second in duration — but that second might be critical;
for, in the constant rising and falling of considerations
in the mind, where two associated systems of them are
nearly in equilibrium it is often but. a matter of a
second more or less of attention at the outset, whether

^ Cf. Leon Noel: "La predominance de Vidce qui triomphe
s'obtient precisement par le fait de ractivite voHtive qui la soutenait
et commandait le jeu des representations. Cette meme activite,
maintenant, se tourne definitivement vers elle, de tout son poids, et
c'est ce qui constitute la volition. Elle ne surgit pas soudainement,
par Taction de I'idee et des motifs; depuis longtemps elle se trouvait
preparee dans la conscience, par une force maitresse de I'idee et des
motifs." (Op. cit. p. 194.)

4o8 RATIONAL LIFE.

one system shall gain force to occupy the field and
develop itself, and exclude the other, or be excluded
itself by the other. When developed, it may make us
act ; and that act may seal our doom. . . . The whole
drama of the voluntary life hinges on the amount of
attention, slightly more or slightl}^ less, which rival
motor ideas may receive. But the whole feeling of
realit3% the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary
life, depends on our sense that in it things are really
being decided from one moment to another, and that it is
not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged
innumerable ages ago." •"

Deliberation. — Let us take another experience. Suppose
two alternative courses are suggested to me in regard to some
projected action, as for instance the investment of a sum of
money ; or the selection of a servant. I set myself to reflect
on the merits of two claimants. I question each of them
about their capabilities. I examine their testimonials, and
make what inquiries I can about them. I then ponder on the
motives against and in favour of each. I consider the matter on
different occasions ; and finally at the end of a week select
one of the candidates. Now what is to be noticed here is that
the process of deliberation itself is, on the testimony of internal
consciousness, an exercise of free volition. I have freely
reflected, inquired, and examined the reasons for each side.
As I dwelt on the arguments for one of the candidates, I felt
drawn to decide in his favour, but I freely deferred decision.
I voluntarily abstained from what I there and then felt to be
the easier and more agreeable cor.rse. It is of no avail to
assert that I had some motive for these acts of reflecting",
comparing, refraining, and finally electing. In order that the
process may have been intelligent and not blindly impulsive,
there must have been some reason present to the mind — and
so far forth a motive. What determinism has to show is that
that reason so inexorably pre-determined mc there and then to
reflect, to compare, and to abstain, that any other act was
impossible to me. But this is what no man — even the deter-
minist — in the act of deliberating can believe. The conviction
irresistibly borne in on me by introspective consciousness is
just the opposite — that it is / — the indivisible abiding subject I —
who freely recall and detain that reason or motive before
my consciousness, and confer upon it Avhatevcr strength it
possesses.

' James, Viiniiplcs of rsycholo^y^ Vol. I. p. 45J,

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM, 409

Finally, this conviction oi my freedom throughout the
process was founded not on ignorance of what was determining
my action, but on the immediate and positive knowledge that
/ myself was causally determining my action. For I have had
plenty of experience of action of the opposite kind — of oscil-
lating passively under the pressure of rival impulses, of the
intrusion of uninvited motives, of unvvelcomed ideas forced
upon the mind, and even of agreeable spontaneous activity
that was indeliberate. This important fact is constantly over-
looked in attacks on the argument from introspection. Were
I free in nil my actions perhaps my knowledge of moral
freedom would not be so clear. Were a man always hungry
his conception of hunger would be imperfect. I have learned
what/rtv, self-determined, conative activity is by having been
repeatedly the subject of conative activity that was not free
or determined by myself, but the spontaneous and necessary
outcome of my character and the motives playing upon me.^

Decision or Choice. — Deliberation is free, but
the act of choice is the culmination of the exercise of
freedom. Let us take an ethical choice. A temptation
to an immoral act suggests itself — to excuse a fault by
a lie, to commit some small dishonesty, to reveal some-
thing to my neighbour's discredit. The evil thought
may have been present for some time before I awake to
its immoral quality. So far it has been non-voluntar3s
and I am not responsible for it. Now, however, I
advert to its sinfulness, and there is at once forced
upon me a deliberate choice — to resist or to consent to
the temptation. Suppose that I now deliberately decide
either to consent or resist. I am irresistibly con-
vinced duving that act of decision that the election is freely
made by me — that 1 am not inevitably determined by
habit and present motive to this course — that the
opposite alternative is really in my power. This con-
viction that I have chosen freely — that the situation

^ " II y a entre rhesitation et la deliberation una difierence
importante. lUsitcr, c'est proprement subir passivement des impul-
sions motrices, osciller tantot dans un sens, tantot dans I'autre ;
deliherer c'est ne subir aucune impulsion, mais les soumettre toutes
au jugement actif de I'esprit, aiin de juger de la valeur de leurs
resultats. ... Or les seuls actes vraiment volontaires, les seuls
qu'on appelle libres, sent ceux qui sont precedes d'une deliberation;
et ils sont d'autant plus volontaires que la deliberation a cte plus
attentive." (Fonsegrive, op. cit. p. 423.)

410 RATIONAL LIFE.

being precisely the same I might have freely elected the
opposite — remains afterwards, and is the ground for my
sense of remorse or self -approval. Professor Sidgwick
assuredly does not exaggerate the testimony of con-
sciousness, yet even he writes : " Certainly, in the case
of actions in which I have a distinct consciousness of
choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which
I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible
not to think that I can now choose to do what I so
conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act
unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have
yielded to such inclinations in the past."^

Or, take an instance of prudential decision. Whilst
reading for an examination, I receive an invitation to some
pleasant entertainment. The spontaneous impulse of my
will is to consent at once : but I freely resist this inclination.
I reflect on the pros and cons ; and then I deliberately choose.
Here again the conviction, both during and after the election,
that my election is free is irresistible. Consciousness affirms
that it is I who freely initiated the act of reflexion. It is
the same abiding indivisible I — not alternating groups of
feelings — who have deliberated, who have actively considered
each motive in turn, who have decided which shall prevail.
This Ego, introspection also assures me, is not a mere
conscious arena wherein rival propensities conflict : it is not
a mere mass of ideas and desires with the more frequent of
the latter personified into a character; it is not a mere abstract
notion of my life, past, present, and future. It is, on the
contrary, the real being who has this notion, the permanent
subject of my states, the true cause of my deliberations and
vohtions. To the suggestion that this Self which thus seems
to decide is perhaps merely my formed character, it has been
effectively replied : " Besides the motives felt, and besides
the formed habits or past self, is there not a present self that
has a part to perform in reference to both ? Is there not a
causal self, over and above the caused self, or rather the caused
state and contents of the self (the character) left as a deposit
from previous behaviour ? Is there not a judging self that
knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above the

'•* Methods of Ethics, p. 64. What we are directly and positively
conscious of is not that we are able to move our limbs— that we
know by past experience — nor yet that kt 5//^// be able to choose in
the next second ; this also is an inference and may be falsified by
death, &c. The affirmation of consciousness is that iiotu in the
iioment of consent or refusal I freely elect.

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 411

agitated self that feels them ? The impulses are but phenomena
of your experience ; the formed habits are but a condition and
attitude of your consciousness, in virtue of which you feel
this more and that less ; both are predicates of yourself as
subject, but are not yourself, and cannot be identified with
your personal agency. On the contrary, they are objects of
your contemplation ; they lie before you to be known, com-
pared, estimated; they are your data ; and you have not to
let them alone to work together as they may, but to deal
with them as arbiter among their tendencies. In all cases
of self-consciousness and self-action there is necessarily this
duplication of the Ego into the objective, that contains the
felt and predicated phenomena at which we look or may look,
and the subjective that apprehends and uses them. It is with
the latter that the preferential power and personal causality
resides ; it is this that we mean when we say that ' it rests
with us to decide,' that our impulses are not to be our
masters, that guilty habit cannot be pleaded in excuse for
guilty act." i"

Adhesion to resolution under temptation. — Let

us now take the case of a moral choice freely sustained
in the face of severe pressure. Suppose an angry
impulse, a feeling of envy, or an impure image presents
itself to me. As soon as I advert to its sinfulness, I
deliberately reject the evil thought and endeavour to
direct my attention to something else. But the tempta-
tion recurs again and again in spite of my efforts to
banish or suppress it ; and the victory is only finally
secured after a long and painful struggle. ^^ Now the
most careful introspective observation of my mental
processes assures me here that I am exerting and
sustaining volitional activity against the preponderant
impulse. Further, it forces upon me at each instant the
absolutely overwhelming conviction that the alternative
choice is hie et nunc in my power — that I can, alas !
only too easily surrender. It is only by painful,
constantly renewed, energetic volition that I can inhibit
the sinful inclination. The alternative choice would require
no positive act. Mere cessation from this sustained

^" Martinean, A Study of Religion, pp. 214, 215.

^' The Volitional effort should be carefully distinguished from
Muscular effort. James does this well, Principles of Psychology,
Vol. II. p. 562 ; cf. also Noel, op. cit. pp. 229 — 234.

412

RATIONAL LIFE.

volitional effort would permit the evil impulse to take
possession of my consciousness — would involve acquie-
scence or consent. The motive of doing right undoubtedly
attracts me ; but the assertion that the cognition of
the rightness of resistance converts such resistance into
the pleasantest course, or constitutes a motive of such
force as to draw me inevitably to the side of virtue, is
extravagantly untrue. It is / myself who, by continuous
painful effort of volitional attention, keep this evane-
scent idea of duty before my mind and give it what
power it possesses. Moral conduct of this kind is, as
Professor James truly says, action in the line of greatest
resistance. It is not merely one original momentary act
of choice against what seemed to be the strongest
motive ; it is a series of volitions in opposition to what
consciousness continuously assures me is the strongest
motive. But according to the determinist, not only the
original decision, but each subsequent volition was
inexorably determined by the preponderant attraction,
and no other alternative was ever possible to me.^'^

An objection. — To these various arguments one general
objection is urged : "The conviction of freedom is an illusion."
" Men," says Spinoza, " deceive themselves in thinking that
they arc free. On what is this opinion based ? On this
alone, that they are conscious of their acts, but ignorant of
the causes which determine them. The idea which men form
of their liberty arises then from this, that they do not know
the causes of their actions/' i'' '• Which motive is chosen,"

1- Cf. M. Piat : "II existe une profonde difference entre mes
representations et mes volitions morales. Mes representations viennent
de je ne sais quelle region de men etre et s'imposent a ma conscience.
Elles se font en moi sans moi. Je ne les produis pas ; Je les subis.
II en va tout autrement des actes que j'accomplis pour me con-
former a la loi morale. Ces actes ne se passent pas en moi sans
mon concours ; je ne suis seulement spectateur de leur evolution ;
je les tire de mon propre fond et par un effort qui ne depend que de
moi. Quand je lutte centre une passion, je sens bien la sollicitation
de I'idt-al et le charme du bien qui m'appellent en haut ; rnais ce
que je sens avec non moins de nettete, c'est que cette sollicitation
et ce charme n'ont rien d'analogue a une force, si subtile et delicate
fju'on la suppose, qui me tire et m'entraine a sa suite. C'est par
un effort qui m'est propre, par une tension de mon energie, que
j'opine pour lui centre la passion." {La Liberie, Vol. II. p. 94)

^^ Cited by Maudsley, op. cit. p. 409.

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 413

says Professor Alexander, '' is perfectly fixed and dependent
upon the character, which cannot choose otherwise than it
does." The mistaken notion that " I was free to do other-
wise " is due simply to the fact that : " Given any act, a
different act is conceivable, there is a logical alternative to
everything. But so far as the agent believes that he, with his
character and under his circumstances, could have acted
otherwise, he confuses the feeling that he chooses with this
mere logical possibility."^* The reply is already furnished in
the analysis of the examples of conative activity just given.
My assurance of freedom in voluntary attention, deliberation,
and effort against temptation is founded, not on ignorance of
the causes which have determined my volition, but on the
knowledge that / am that cause — the certainty that it is /
who have originated, developed, guided, and sustained my
volitional activity. I can clearly distinguish certain free
volitions from conative activity which is not free. I can
recognize with not less clearness the wide difference between
the conception of some abstractly possible action and the
conviction that an alternative course is or was really in my
power. And the assertion that whilst I was painfully struggling
against a violent and protracted temptation consent was
there and then never really possible to me, is simply
incredible. If ugly facts are to be got rid of by calling them
" illusions," no psychological or metaphysical hypothesis,
however absurd, could be effectually disproved.

Metaphysical Argument. — The third form of
proof used in establishing the Freedom of the Will is
sometimes called the Metaphysical Argument. The
distaste for metaphysical speculation, which has held
such complete sway in this country during the last two
centuries, has virtuall}?' ostracized this argument from
English philosophical literature. It is indeed of very
little use for the purpose of converting a man who is
not convinced of the existence of Free-will by the
preceding lines of reasoning. But, on the other hand,
it has the advantage, which they do not possess, of
showing the cause of our freedom, and the natural con-
tinuity of that freedom, as long as reason remains to us
in this life. We do not of course mean by this, that
there is moral liberty involved in every use of reason.
We have already pointed out that freedom is limited to

i-* Op. cit. p. 340.

414 RATIONAL LIFE.

those states of mind in which we advert to thoughts
and desires that have occurred to us, and in which we
are thus in a reflex manner concomitantly aware of the
character of these thoughts — of their real or apparent
worth, of their value estimated from a moral, a pru-
dential, or a hedonistic standpoint. As often as the
mind is in such a condition — and ever}^ man's experience
assures him of its frequency — we are free to indulge or
resist the thought, to foster or struggle against the
desire.

The cause of this lies in the fact that the Will is a
rational appetite : an appetite which embraces nothing
of necessity, except what is apprehended as desirable in
every respect. The Rational Will can be irresistibly
drawn only by that which reason proposes as so univer-
sally attractive that it contains no dissatisfactory
feature. As long as the thought of an object reveals
any disagreeable aspect, the Will has not that which it
is naturally longing for — perfect happiness — and it is
able to reject this object. The Will is moved to desire
an object only in so far as that object is good. Appe-
tency is in truth merely tendency towards good,
whatever form that good may take ; and an object
which contains any deficiency is the reverse of desirable
so far as that feature is concerned. If, then, attention
is concentrated on this undesirable feature, and with-
drawn from those which are attractive, the object loses
its enticing force. But during this present life no object
presents itself to the intellect as attractive under all
aspects when ive advert to its vahie, — that is, in the mental
situation for which liberty is claimed. As regards /zw^Y*?
goods it is obvious that, either in the difficulty of their
acquisition, or in the uncertainty of their possession, or
in their possible incompatibility with our highest good,
there is always something on account of which they are
undesirable, and for which man may turn away from
them to seek the infinite good — God Himself. At the
same time it is equally clear that man is not at present
drawn inevitably in this latter direction. The inade-
quate and obscure notion of God possessed in this life,
the difficulty of duty, the conflict of man's pride and

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM 415

sensLialit}' with virtue, all make the pursuit of our true
good disagreeable in many respects to human nature,
so that we can only too easily and freely abandon it.
The clear apprehension of an Infinite Good, such as is
given in the Beatific Vision of the blessed in Heaven,
would, theologians teach, remove this freedom. The
blessed cannot help loving God above all things ; we,
however, though necessitated to seek after good in some
shape or other, are at libert}' to reject any particular
form of it presented to us. Our Freedom, accordingly,
lies in our power of choosing between the manifold kinds
of good which are ever conceivable by the Intellect ; it
is, in fact, a free acceptance of intellectual judgments
concerning the desirability of thoughts and external
actions. Free-will is, therefore, a result of man's
possession of a spiritual faculty of cognition whose
object is the universal, and which can conceive
unlimited and unalloyed good. Consequently, where
such a power does not exist, as in the case of brute
animals, moral liberty is absent.

The establishment of Free-will by the two former
arguments demonstrates that independently of the
intellect we are endowed with a spiritual faculty, an
activity superior to matter, and not completely con-
trolled in its operations by the physical organism. This
in truth is the rock of offence. If the Will is free, then
there is more in man than an organized frame.

Objections against Free-will. — We shall now handle briefly
the leading objections urged against Free-will. Since many
of these claim to be the outcome of modern science, we shall
treat them under the heads of the several branches of know-
ledge to which they belong. We shall start with those which
are asserted to proceed from the study of the mind itself.

Psychological Difficulties. — i. Many determinists devote a
considerable quantity of abuse to the doctrine of Free-will,
as a fitting exordium to prepare the reader's mind to make
proper estimate of the pros and cons. Thus, Dr. Bain
characterizes his opponent's view as incomprehensible and
unintelligible. Free-will, he tells us, is " a power that comes
from nothing, has no beginning, follows no rule, respects no
time or occasion, operates without impartiality;" and reason-
ably enough he looks on such a conception of voluntary

4i6 RATIONAL LIFE,

action as "repugnant alike to our intelligence and to our
moral sentiment." ^^ In the same strain Dr. Maudsley : "A
self-determining will is an unmeaning contradiction in terms
and an inconceivability in fact."^« Such rhetorical devices
are to be met by simple denial. That the mind possesses
at times the power of free choice, of freely yielding to or
resisting the most agreeable attractions, that it is not always
inevitably determined in the direction of the greatest
pleasure 'is at least as intelligible a proposition as its contra-
dictory. Moreover, since it expresses what is practically the
universal conviction of mankind, it cannot be self-evidently

absurd.

Similarly, when Professor Stout compares free volition in
the libertarian view to "a Jack-in-the-box," and says that
"contingent choice" in that theory " springs into being of
itself as if it were fired out of a pistol," ^' the anti-determinist
can, of course, at once retort the illustration and reply that,
on the contrary, it is in Professor Stout's theory human choice
resembles the pistol-bullet— is just as free, meritorious, or
blameworthy, and that the Brockton murderer is just as
responsible and worthy of reprobation as the revolver with
which he shot his wife !

2. It is affirmed that our own internal experience is in
favour of the necessarian view. Introspection tells us that
we are always determined by motives ; and it is denied " that
we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the
strongest present desire or aversion." ^^ By " strongest," is
meant strongest estimated in quantity of pleasure or pain.
Now, here we come to the point of assertion and denial about
an ultimate fact of consciousness which is incapable of
demonstration, and which each must examine for himself.
We hold that each man's own internal experience reveals
the fact that he can at times resist the strongest desire or
aversion, and we believe that most men, at least occasionally,
do so. In involuntary acts we admit also that we are inevit-
ably necessitated by our character and the motives operating
upon us. Even in deliberate choice we are influenced by the
greater weight of motive on one side, but we are not inexorably
determined thereby.

3. "The strongest motive always prevails." This is
either a tautological statement, or it is untrue. If strength
of motive is to be determined by its final prevalence, then it
is an identical proposition affirming the undeniable truth that
the motive which prevails, does prevail. This seems to be

15 Emotions and Will (3rd Edit.), pp. 483, 492, 500.

w Op. cit. p. 412. 1^ Manual of Psychology, pp. 590, 614.

^8 Mill, Exam. (2nd Edit.), p. 505.

P REE- WILL AND DETERMINISM. 417

Bain's viewJ^ Mill, however, says, by strongest is meant
most pleasurable.-'^ In this sense the statement must be
denied, and appeal made to the illustrations given above.

4. Some determinists find misrepresentation the most
convenient method of demolishing the case for Free-will.
" That every one is at liberty to desire, or Jiot to desire, which
is the real proposition involved in the dogma of Free-will, is
negatived as much by the analysis of consciousness as by the
contents of the preceding chapters." ^^ The question is not
whether desire be free, or whether action in opposition to wish
be possible. G. H. Lewes is here less unfair towards his
opponents. "No one," he says, " supposes that our desires
are free."-- Desire is an ambiguous term. Primarily, as we
have already indicated, it means a consciousness of want or
insufficiency to be satisfied by some represented object.
Such a state is, of course, not a volition or free act of the
will. The latter consists in the rejection of, or consent to,
this feeling — in the act of permitting or resisting the spon-
taneous movement of the appetite towards the desired object.
We certainly can at times put forth an act of will to restrain
this spontaneous desire. The word desire is, however, also
used to designate the movement of the appetite, when this
motion has been accepted or adopted by the will, and of
course in this sense it is impossible not to will or desire what
we freely desire.

5. One of the difficulties most frequently urged is, that
experience of our neighbour's actions shows that they are
ever determined by character and motives. " We always
explain the voluntary action of all men except ourselves on
the principle of causation by character and circumstances.
Indeed, otherwise social life would be impossible, for the life
of man in society involves daily a mass of minute forecasts
of the actions of other men founded on experience." ^^ "All
the massive evidence to be derived from human conduct,
and from our interpretation of such conduct, pomts to the
conclusion that actions, sensations, emotions, and thoughts,
are subject to causal determination no less rigorous than the
movements of the planets." 2* ,,

This objection, however, really proves nothing against -^ - -s/t^
our doctrine. For, (a) such predictions and judgments deal f*^ «^^^^**^^
mainly with external acts of which a large part are inde- ^^*^
liberate, and so necessitated by nature and circumstances.

^9 Emotions and Will (2nd Edit.), p. 409. ^o Exam. p. 519.

21 H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, § 219.

22 The Study of Psychology, p. 109.

23 Sidgwick, op. cit. Bk. I. c. v. n. 2. '^^ Lewes, op. cit. p. 102.

4i8

RATIONAL LIFE.

{b) Even in deliberate actions, unless their moral quality be
very marked, men follow freely the spontaneous impulse of
the will, which is the resultant of character plus motives.
The most thorough-going libertarian allows that man's will
is influenced, though not inexorably constrained, by these forces;
and hence Christian teachers of all times have laid the
greatest stress on the formation of virtuous habits, (c) Even
where the morality of an act becomes prominent, it is only
men aiming at a virtuous life who frequently resist the solici-
tations of pleasure, (d) That in an unreflective mood we
should thus seem to consider other men's acts to be com-
pletely determined by character and motives, is quite
explicable on the principles of mental association. Character
and motives have admittedly great influence, and they are
the only factors of the case which come within our cognizance.
Accordingly, the unknown element of the will being always
neglected, the observed agents impress themselves vividly on
our mind, especially in connexion with successful predictions,
and so cause the existence of the unseen element to be for-
gotten, {e) Finally, when we reflect upon the deliberate
moral acts of others, we most certainly do not believe them
to be the inevitable outcome of their circumstances, as is
shown by our allotment of praise and blame.

6. The fiction of Free-will, it is said, has its root in the
illusion, that the mind is at any moment not merely the
aggregate of conscious states then present, but something
persisting amid these changing phases. " The collective ' I,'
or ' self,' can be nothing different from the feelings, actions,
and intelligence of the individual." ^^ " Considered as an
internal perception, the illusion consists in supposing that at
each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate

and fundamental
ego is merely an

of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists."
Here, of course, we again reach ultimate
differences of view. We deny that the
aggregate or a series of states. The unity of consciousness
refutes such a doctrine. If there were not a permanent
abiding principle or subject, underlying our transient con-
scious states, then memory, reflexion, deliberation, and
reasoning would be impossible.

7. Herbert Spencer urges : " Either the

Ego

which is

supposed to determine or will the action is present in con-
sciousness, or it is not. If it is something which is not present
in consciousness, it is something of which we are unconscious
— something therefore of whose existence we neither have nor

25 Dr. Bain, Mental Science, p. 402.
^'^ Spencer, Principles of Psychology, § 219.

Pn£E-wiLL And determlvis.v. 4i<^

can have any evidence. If iL is present, then, as it is ever
present, it can be at each moment nothing else than the
state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that
moment."-^

From neither of the alternatives does the alleged con-
clusion follow, and the legitimate inference from the second
is actually the direct contradictory of that conclusion.
Although the Ego were not presented in the consciousness
of successive states, yet the possibility of memory and reflexion
would afford irresistible evidence of such a permanent
subject. But if the Ego were continually present in con- \

sciousness, if amid the transient mental states which form J^
the current of our psychical life we were conscious of the ■ ^
Self as ever present, then assuredly it could not be any mere '
passing state, simple or compound. Surely the fact of being
conscious of a permanent self cannot demonstrate that it is
merely transitory. Yet this is literally Mr. Spencer's con-
clusion. The syllogism, however, involves other fallacies.
Suppose the Self to determine our volitions, it does not
necessarily follow that the Ego must be always distinctly
realized in consciousness. At most this need only be on the
occasions of the exercise of free or deliberate volition. As
a matter of fact, the vividness with which the Ego is appre-
hended varies in different mental attitudes ; but the mere
possibility that any past act can be recalled and identified,
that we can by any reflex act cognize a mental state as a
state of Self, demonstrates that the Ego is something over and
above the "passing" states.

Metaphysical Objections.— i. " Nothing can begin without
a cause; but a free volition has no cause; therefore it is
impossible." We grant the major premiss, but deny the
minor. The Ego, or Self, is the cause, and a free cause.
I can choose which motive is to prevail. Though I follow the
weaker attraction, my voUtion is neither motiveless nor
causeless.

2. Free-will is asserted to be in conflict with the Lazv
of Causation. The law of causation is thus expressed by
Dr. Bain : " Every event is uniformly preceded by another
event ; or, To every event there is some antecedent which
happening it happens." ^8

27 Ibidem, § 2ig.

28 Dr. Bain's Logic, Vol. I. p. 27. Cf. also p. 226, and Mill's
Logic, Bk. III. c. V. § 2. Mill endeavoured, and as is now admitted
unsuccessfully, to prove this law. Dr. Bain abandoned the attempt
as hopeless. On the confusion of the principle of causality with
the uniformity of nature, cf. Fowler's Liductive Logic, pp. 24—26;
also Knight's Hume, pp. 161— 163.

420 UATtONAL UrU.

In the phenomenalist account of tliis law there is a
lamentable confusion of two distinct truths of quite different
orders. The one is the principle of causality — " nothing can
begin to exist without a cause;" the other is the law of the
iinifovuiily of nature — "the same causes produce the same
effects," or, "the laws of nature are constant." The former
is a necessary metaphysical principle ; and we have explained
its bearing on free volitions in the previous answer. The
latter generalization is a contingent truth which we can easily
conceive subject to exceptions. Suppose now that uniformity
was proved from experience in the region of physical science
• — a task which the Empirical Philosophy is utterly unable to
accomplish. There would yet not have been made any
advance towards the demonstration of uniformity within the
sphere of mind, where the phenomena are of an utterly
opposite character. Again, if within the total assemblage of
mental states we find the law to pTeva.il generally, the inference
as to its universality may be more or less probable, until our
internal experience brings before us a distinct exception.
As soon as this occurs — and our illustrations we consider
have established the fact — a priori probability becomes
worthless, and our induciio per enumerationeni simplicem falls
to the ground. The student should always remember that
physical science simply assumes the law of uniform causation ;
that its universality is merely a postulate to be justified only
in metaphysics ; and that the metaphysician, who recognizes
moral convictions to be not less real nor less weighty facts
than those of physical science, is bound to qualify, limit, or
interpret the law when applied to moral actions in accordance
with his wider and more comprehensive view of experience.
The truth is, that though the law of uniformity is fulfilled in
the subsequent series of events proceeding from an originat-
ing cause, it does not apply in an absolute unqualified manner
to the primary originating cause itself. '^^

Objections from Physiology, Physics, and Statistics. —
Physiology. — According to certain physiologists, e.g., Dr.
Maudsley, G. H. Lewes, and Luys, Physiology has disproved
the freedom of the Will. This science, it is asserted, has
established that the connexion between bodily and mental
states is so intimate and continuous that each modification
of the mind is inexorably conditioned by some definite mole-
cular change in the substance of the organism. But since
the uniformity is rigid among the corporeal changes^ it must
be equally so among the mental correlates. To this we may

-3 See an admirable article by Father H. Lucas in The Month,
February, 1S77, pp. 248, seq.

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 421

reply, that equally distinguished authorities on physiological
science deny any such conflict as is alleged between Free-
will and that science.^^ As regards the facts asserted, we
admit, ot course, a very close dependence of mind on body, —
the scholastic doctrine that the soul is the form of the body
always laid stress on this truth, — but we emphatically deny
that anything approaching to the shadow of a proof that
every act of the former is conditioned and determined by the
latter has been made out.

Physics. — The establishment of the Law of the Conser-
vation of Energy is asserted to have disproved Free-will.
This argument applies not merely to free-volition, but to all
conscious states, and would prove, if valid, that no bodily
movement has ever been influenced by any mental act in the
history of the world 1 We shall examine the difficulty later.

Statistics. — It is alleged that Free-will is disproved by the
existence of the Moral sciences. Buckle, who used to be
the classical author on this line oi attack, maintains that the
actions of men " vary in obedience to the changes in the
surrounding society, . . . that such variations are the result
of large and general causes which, working upon the aggre-
gate of society, must produce certain consequences without
regard to the volition of those particular men of whom the
society is composed." He concludes that "suicide is merely
the product of the general conditions of society, and the
individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary
consequence of preceding circumstances." This is proved by
the evidence of statistics, " a branch of knowledge which,
though still in its infancy, has already thrown more light
on the study of human nature than all the sciences put
together." 31 fhe same objection adopted by Mill, Bain, and

^^ See the writings of Beale, Carpenter, and Ladd. Carpenter's
Mental Physiology is replete with excellent observations on this
subject. Ladd writes: "Nothing of scientific value which Physio-
logical Psychology has to offer, throws any clear light on the
problem of the 'freedom of the will.' . . . When M. Luys, for
example, maintains that to imagine ' we think of an object by a
spontaneous eftbrt of the mind is an illusion,'' and that, in fact, the
. object is only forced on us by the cunning conjurer, the brain,
'because the cell-territory where that object resides has been
previously set vibrating in the brain,' he is controverting a plain
and universal dictum of consciousness by his private and unveri-
fiable hypothesis on a question of cerebral Physiology where
experts and novices are alike ignorant. Physiology neither dis-
proves nor verifies the postulate of free-will ; accordingly this
postulate must be raised and discussed on other grounds." {Physio-
logical Psychology, p. 544.)

31 History of Civilization in England, pp 24, 30.

422 RATIONAL LIFE.

most other determinists, is evidently considered by them to
be one of their most irresistible arguments. Let us first recall
the precise point at issue. The defenders of moral freedom
maintain that within a certain limited sphere man's volition,
and consequently his action, is not inevitably predetermined
by his character and surroundings. They admit : (a) that his
spontaneous or indeliberate acts are merely the outcome of
motive and disposition ; (b) that he can never act without
some motive — the most common forms of which being im-
mediate pleasure, permanent self-interest, and duty ; (c) that
even in deliberate or free actions he is largely influenced,
though not inevitably determined, by superior force of attrac-
tion. Thus, a man accustomed to give way to a particular
temptation, will very probably yield again — though freely —
when it recurs. It is now at once evident how easily general
uniformity, even in individual conduct, is reconcilable with
the libertarian view. Furthermore, statistics deal with
societies of men, not with the particular human being, and
there is no contradiction in the existence of regularity among
actions of the community taken as a whole, while the
members freely vary. " It is precisely because individual
actions are not reducible to any fixed law, or capable of
representation by any numerical calculation, that statistical
averages acquire their value as substitutes." -^^

32 Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 343. The inefficiency of the
statistic objection is well shown from two widely opposed views of
Causation by Dr. Venn and Dr. Martineau. Dr. Venn points out :
(i) That there is a certain illegitimate gain in the apparent force of
the difficulty by the selection of sensational cases, such as the
regularity of suicides, misdirected letters, and the like. The
emotional shock of surprise aroused by such discoveries makes us
mistake their logical value, which does not exceed that of regularity
in meals, or in wearing clothes. (2) Mere uniformity of an average
proves nothing as to invariable determination of the individual
action. Were there a purely random or chance factor among the
agencies at work, this would not affect deductions from the theory
of Probability. If a sufficiently large number of observations were
taken we would be justified in expecting that the random occurrences
on the positive and negative sides would be approximately equal.
Thus in tossing a collection of pennies, whether they were com-
pletely necessitated or partly free we should expect a uniform
average of heads and tails in the long run. (3) "The antecedents
and consequents in the case of our volitions must clearly be
supposed to be very nearly immediately in succession, if anything
approaching to causation is to be established." But nothing of the
kind is or can be attempted in statistical averages. It is probable
that no two of the three hundred suicides in London last year were
precisely alike in antecedents; and very few, if any, of this year

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM. 423

Theological Objection : Divine Prescience and Free-will. —
It is argued that God could not foresee with certainty our
actions were they free. This is properly a theological
difficulty ; and for an adequate answer we refer to the volume
of this series on Natural Theology. We may, however, point
out that it is not strictly accurate to speak of Godi foreseeing
events to come. With Him it is a question of actual insight,
of intuitive vision. The past and future are both alike ever
present to His infinite changeless intelligence. Not only all
that has been and all that will be, but even all events that
would occur under any conceivable circumstances lie unfolded
before His omniscient mind. It is true that we cannot imagine
the nature of such an eternal intelligence, any more than the
snail which takes a week to cross a field, can conceive the
human vision that simultaneously apprehends in the flash of
a single glance leagues of a landscape ; but this does not
disprove the fact. Logical dependence in the order of knoidedge
is not the same thing as causal dependence in the ontological
order, that of being. Our certainty regarding past or present
volitions of ourselves or of others does not affect their
freedom ; neither does God's vision of our future free actions.
He sees them because they will occur ; but their occurrence
is not necessitated by the certainty of His knowledge.

Finally, it is asserted that if volition is not as rigidly
ruled by the law of Uniform Causation as other events,
then a science of Psychology is impossible. The objec-
tion possesses about equal force with that which alleges
that if some miracles are admitted to have occurred in the
life of our Lord, or of His Saints, all physical science is
thereby annihilated. Mr. Spencer sums up the whole case
thus : " To reduce the general question to its simplest form :
Psychical changes either conform to law, or they do not.
If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all
works on the subject, is sheer nonsense : no science of
Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there

resembled in all details these of last year. If it could, for instance,
be shown that three hundred individuals of last year, and again of
this year, under the action of three hundred precisely similar sheaves
of motives put an end to their lives, then the determinist would have
made some progress. The statistician does not attempt to show such
similarity. " In fact, instead of having secured our A and B (motive
and volition) here in closest intimacy of succession to one another,
we find them separated by a considerable interval, often indeed we
merely have an A or a B by itself." (Venn, Logic of Chance, c. ix.
§§ 16 — 21.) Cf. Martineau, op. cit. pp. 255 — 272. We need scarcely
say that with his theological explanation later on of the relation of
God's foreknowledge to our free volitions, we do not agree.

424 RATIONAL LIFE.

cannot be any such thing as Free-will." ^^ Xhe alternative J
is, of course, especially as regards Mr. Spencer's portly |
volumes, awful to contemplate. Such a calamity is not, !
however, inevitable. It is a misconception of the doctrine to
afiirm that the reality of Free-will can seriously affect the
scientific character of Empirical Ps3'chology. The inter-
ference of free volition, though ethically momentous, may be |
psychologically very small. There still may remain sensibility,
imagination, memory, intellectual cognition, sensuous appetite,
automatic or involuntary movement, habit, and the emotions,
as law-abiding as ever. With such wide dominions under
the sway of uniformity, and with the Free-will itself subject
to the conditions we have enumerated, all anxiety as regards
the reconciliation of Freedom with Psychological science
disappears.

Readings on the IF///.— St. Thomas, Sum. i. qq. 82. 83.; W. G.
Ward, Philosophy of Theism, Essays 6, 7, 10, 11, 17; Martineau,
A Study of Religion, Vol. II. pp. 195 — 328 ; Carpenter, Mental
Physiology, Introduction to 4th Edit, and c. ix. ; Father Lucas,
Essays in The Month, 1877; Ladd, Physiological Psychology, pp. 524 —
544. French literature is much richer on this subject. A good
compact work is Leon Noel's La Conscience du Libre Arbitre (Louvain,
1899); G. Fonsegrive's exhaustive £55^/ sur le Libre Arbitre (2nd
Edit. Paris, 1896), contains much valuable matter; Abbe Piat's
La Liberie (Paris, 1895), Vol. I. contains useful historical matter;
Vol. II. has a good chapter on the argument from consciousness.
J. Gardair, Les Passions et la Volonte (1892), pp. 300 — 440, expounds
the scholastic doctrine well. See also T. de Regnon's able work,
Metaphysique des Causes. The German reader will find a good treat-
ment of the whole subject in Dr. Gutberlet's D/t WiUensfreiheit und
ihre Gegner (Fulda, 1893).

33 Principles of Psych. I. § 220.

t
.1.

CHAPTER XX.

THE EMOTIONS. EMOTIONAL AND RATIONAL

LANGUAGE.

Feeling and Emotion. — We have already (c.xi.)
investigated the nature and conditions of Feehng,
understood as the agreeable or disagreeable tone
of mental activity — what recent writers call the
phenomenon of pleasiire-pain. We shall now briefly
treat of Feeling as synonymous with the Emotions.
This latter term, which literally means a movement
or perturbation of the soul, is commonly employed
to denote certain complex forms of cognitive and
appetitive consciousness in which the latter element
is predominant. This is especially observable in the
connotation of the term passion which, although the
usage is not rigidly fixed, generally signifies in
English either a violent actual emotion or a deep-
seated permanent tendency to some particular species
of emotion. The latter sense is exemplified in the
principle that passion is sharpened and intensified,
whilst emotion is dulled and enfeebled by re-iterated
or prolonged stimulation.^

1 Cf. Hoffding : "By Emotion {Ajfekt) is understood a sudden
boiling up of feeling which for a time overwhelms the mind and
prevents the free and natural combination of the cognitive elements.
Passion, sentiment, or disposition {Leidenschajt), on the other hand,
is the movement of feeling become second nature, deeply rooted by

426 RATIONAL LIFE.

Scholastic View of Emotion. — The schoolmen, who were
interested in the emotions on ethical rather than psycho-
logical grounds, discussed these states, in so far as they
handled them at all, in their treatment of the Passions. These
latter they defined as intense excitations of the appetitive
faculty. The passiones seusibiles vel animales, which they
especially studied, are acts of sensitive appetency. They
recognized eleven chief forms, which they divided into two
great classes, called the passiones concupiscibiles and the
passiones irascibiles. In the former class the object of the
mental state acts directly on the faculty as agreeable or
repugnant in itself; whilst the object of the irascible appetite
is apprehended subject to some condition of difficulty or
danger. In scholastic phraseology the object of the appetitus
or passio concupiscihilis is boniun vel malum simpliciter : that
of the appetitus irascibilis is bomim vel malum arduum. Six
passiones concupiscibiles were enumerated, — joy or delight and
sadness, desire and aversion or abhorrence, love and hatred.
These are the affections of the appetitive faculty viewed as
present, future, and absolute, or without any reference to
time. The five passiones irascibiles are hope and despair,
courage and fear, and anger. The first pair of emotions are
the acts elicited by the appetitive side of the mind in presence
of arduous good, according as the difficulty of attainment is
apprehended as slight or insuperable. Courage and fear are
the feelings awakened by threatening evil viewed as more or
less avoidable ; whilst anger is aroused by present evil.

Whatever view be taken in regard to this scheme as
a scientific classification, but little reflexion is required to see
that the several emotions mentioned are really phenomena of
the appetitive faculty of the mind emerging out of cognition.
Appetency embraces the conscious tendency /row evil, as well
as towards good ; for these two inclinations are only negative
and positive phases of the same energy. But this faculty
must also be the root of the mental states arising in the
actual presence of good or ill. The words desii e and appetite,
indeed, bring more prominently before us the notion of an
absent good, since it is in striving after such an object this
power most impressively manifests itself. Still, it cannot be
maintained that it is by a diffeirent faculty we stretch after, or
yearn for a distant joy, and take complacency in its actual

custom. . . . ' Emotion,' says Kant, ' takes effect as a flood which
bursts its dam ; passion as a stream which wears for itself an ever-
deepening channel ; emotion is like a fit of intoxication which is
slept off ; passion as a madness brooding over one idea, which sinks
in ever deeper.' . . . Feeling begins as emotion, and passes — if it
finds sufficient food— into passion." (Outlines, p. 283.)

THE EMOTIONS. 427

possession. It is not by three separate powers, but by one
and tlie same, that we dishke evil in general, shrink from its
approach, and are sad in its presence. Hope is similarly a
desire to attain an arduous good, unsteadied by a cognitive
element of doubt ; whilst despair is a painful prostration
resulting from a negative phase of the same activity. The
affinity of courage ^ndfear to the two former states, and their
like derivation from the positive and negative forms of
appetitive activity, are obvious. Both involve intellectual
appreciation of the threatening danger, but whilst in the one
case the will is strong and determined, in the other it shrinks
back in feeble irresolution. Anger implies at once dislike and
desire of revenge.

Chief forms of Emotion. — Amongst the feelings
which have attracted most psychological interest are
the following: (i) Self-regarding emotions. (2) Those
of an altruistic character. (3) Feelings attached to
intellectual activity. (4) ^Esthetic feelings. (5) Moral
sentiment. These classes are not mutually exclusive.

Self-regarding Emotions. — Emotions with respect
to Self take a variety of shapes. Though sometimes
termed Egoistic, they may be ethically either good or
bad. The pleasurable forms appear as self-esteem, self-
complacency, self-commiseration, and the like ; whilst
among painful feelings are remorse, self-condemnation,
and shame. They are all different phases of self-love ;
and so products of the Appetitive Faculty. There is
in man an instinctive desire of his own happiness ; and
consequently satisfaction in contemplating the possession
of whatever increases it. Every excellence possessed,
every good attained, every praiseworthy action done,
forms agreeable food for self- reflexion.

Pride and Vanity. — The special form of self-love
exhibited in an inordinate desire of our own excellence
is termed pride. This vice is not self-confidence, nor
the consciousness of any virtue we may happen to
possess, nor even the confession to others that we do
possess such virtues. These may indeed be symptoms ;
but the essence of the vice lies in the craving for undue
superiority. Closely related to pride is vanity, or vain-
glory. The primary meaning of this term is inordinate
desire for glory, that is, for fame or esteem among men.

428 RATIONAL LIFE.

In ordinary language vanity usually signifies either the
seeking of praise on account of some trifling or paltry
performance not really worthy of honour, or the act of
setting an exaggerated value on the varying standard
of human approbation. Vanity is thus incompatible
with true greatness, which must be capable of rightly
estimating both personal gifts and the fickle judgments
of other men. In self-commisevation we indulge in a
sweet feeling of pity over the injustice of our position,
or the unfortunate circumstances in which we have
been placed. There is a peculiar joy in the possession
of a grievance which often causes its removal to leave
an " aching void." But the trial must, in such cases,
have been of a nature to be easily appreciated by our
neighbours. The explanation of the state would seem
to be, that the satisfaction derived from the imagined
interest or importance our particular trouble gives us
in the eyes of others, with the agreeable and inexhaus-
tible fund of conversation it supplies, more than counter-
balance the inconvenience.

Remorse and Shame. — In remorse and sliame we
have painful species of self-reflexion. In the former
there is both sovroiv and self-condemnation for our past
action. It may, or may not, be mingled with shame.
The most important element in this latter state is the
pain caused by the representation of the disapproval
or contempt of others. As their admiration is agree-
able, their dis-esteem is mortifying. It should be
noticed that shame is in itself essentially different from
moral self-condemnation. Our contrition for sinful
action may indeed be mingled with shame at the
appearance our conduct presents in the eyes of our
fellow-men; but those writers who would resolve the
moral sentiment into mere shame ignore most important
facts. A man ma}' experience the keenest self-con-
demnation on account of an action such as a duel, in
v/hich social approval was completely with him, whilst
he suffers a torturing consciousness in consequence of
some involuntary act or some trifling piece of ill-
manners, which he knows has not the faintest shadow
of moral taint about it.

The emotions. 429

The Sense of Power. — Among the self-regarding emotions
may be also classed a feeling concerning which much has been
written by modern psychologists — the sense of power. The
term " sense " is of course not here used in the strict signifi-
cation of cognitive faculty, but as equivalent to an emotional
form of consciousness of an abstract character. We must
distinguish two elements or grades in this sentiment, — the
desire of power, and the complacent pleasure in its actual pos-
session. It is in this latter stage that we have the complete
emotion ; and the luxury of the state consists in the conscious
satisfaction of a desire of wide range.

The longing for power first exhibits itself in the simple
shape of the impulse towards the exercise of our physical
faculties. We have already shown it to be a universal law of
our being that appropriate action of our various energies is
agreeable. Consequentl}-, although the original instinct is of
the nature of a spontaneous impulse towards activity without
the representation of any pleasure to be attained, yet, after-
wards, the memory and idea of this resulting gratification
come to reinforce the impulse. The child shows this active
instinct in the constant and vigorous exercise of its limbs and
voice. It evidently rejoices in its power of exerting its
members and creating surprising effects in the world around.

Every advance in the efficiency of our command over our
faculties means enlarged potentialities of satisfaction, and
the consciousness of such increased efficiency is agreeable.
As the bat, gun, or horse become parts of our personality, its
special perfections curiously afford a joy similar to that
generated by the knowledge of our own physical or intellec-
tual superiority over our neighbours. Even the fact that our
tailor has cut our coat in a particular way, that a pet rabbit
winks one of his eyes in an eccentric manner, or that a pig
which we have purchased surpasses in fatness those of our
less fortunate acquaintances, carries with it in our imagi-
nation an undefinable dignity, which, blending with our
other excellences, helps to swell this grateful emotion of self-
importance. When, instead of material implements, other
men become the instruments of our will, the range of our
power is at once indefinitely extended. It is too in the desire
to gain sway over our fellow-creatures, whether by intellectual
labour, by eloquence, by literary work, or by military force,
that the passion is seen in its most striking forms ; and it is
in success in these directions that the emotion assumes its
most luxuriant and its most dangerous character.

Fear and Anger are ordinarily classed as self-
regavding emotions ; but may be aroused in behalf of

430 RATIONAL LIFE

other beings. Both are manifested throughout the
entire animal kingdom. Both seem to be instinctive,
at least in a vague form, in the infant; and both exhibit
themselves at a very early age. Their general utility
for the protection of the individual is obvious ; but
when excessive they are directly injurious. Fear is
purely painful. It may be defined as the pain of anti-
cipated pain. Anger may be in part pleasant. It includes
both the pain of felt injury and the agreeable con-
sciousness of reacting against the cause of our pain.
The intensity and power of the evil pleasure of revenge
are only too well known. Physically, fear, apart from
the exertion of flight, which it may excite, causes
depression, lowering of vitality, derangement of the
digestive organs. If the fear be great the imagination
is excited, impressions are exaggerated, the faculty of
judgment and reasoning is disordered, and control ot
attention is impaired. Consequently, from an educa-
tionalist standpoint, fear, though at times a necessary
instrument, is always an imperfect motive. Its efficiency
is deterrent from evil rather than promotive of genuinely
good effort ; and especially in the very young it may
conflict with the very self-composure and steady con-
centrated energy needed for study.

Anger is amongst the most exciting of the emotions.
It stirs up activity and arouses to energetic action.
It seeks relief by injuring the cause of its pain. Like
fear, though in a different way, it heightens the
sensibility of the imagination and obscures the power
of judgment and reflexion. Wlien combined with fear,
anger if fostered rapidly passes into hatred. In the
form of virtuous indignation it may be an elevated
moral force ; but it is always a dangerous impulse, and
needs watchful control from the earliest stages.

Altruistic Emotions: Sympathy. — The most
marked form oi unseljish or benevolent emotion is that of
sympathy. Sympathy literally mea.ns feeling luith others ;
benevolence wishing ivcll to others. That there are
naturally in man non-selfish impulses is shown especi-
ally by his possession of benevolent and sympathetic
instincts. liobbcs, indeed, who defines///^ as, grief for

THE EMOTIONS. 43 ^

the calamity of another, arising from the imagination of the
like calamity befalling one's self attempted to reduce even
these to far-sighted selfishness ; but the general tendency
of the present representatives of his school is to admit
naturally altruistic inchnations. That sympathy is an
innate unselfish impulse, or rather a native disposition,
is shown by the prompt manner in which the feeling
arises on the contemplation of another's suffering ; by
the entire absence of any prospect of gain to ourselves
in return for our compassion ; by the real self-sacrifice
to which it often successfully urges ; and by the univer-
sality of its range, — moving us to compassionate the
pains of brute animals, the sorrows of strangers and
historical personages, and even the imaginary woes of
the creations of the dramatist and novelist.

Analysis. — The two chief features of the state of
Sympathy are a lively representation and an active
appropriation of the feelings of others. There is both
a projection of self into the situation of the sufferer,
and a voluntary acceptance of his grief. In compassion
there is a free affectionate adoption of the pain as our
own, not a shrinking dislike for it through fear of its
infliction on us. We can sympathize with the trials
and joys of those differing from us in age, sex, or condi-
tion, which it is absolutely impossible should occur to
ourselves. At the same time, since sympathy involves
the realization of the feelings of another being, some
experience of a kindred nature is presupposed. And
herein lies the cognitive factor in the emotion. The
intensity of our sympathy will thus be conditioned both
by the range of our actual knowledge, and by our
capacity of imagination. Consequently, its force dimi-
nishes when the feeling is of a kind remote from our
experience. We can all commiserate physical pain ;
but the keen sufferings of refined or scrupulous minds
are often incomprehensible to ruder natures.

Equally important with the element of cognition
involved in the act of compassion is that of affection.
The accepted signification of the term antipathy, as
equivalent to dislike, shows this. Anger and hatred
suspend for the time our power of pity. The intensity

43i RATIONAL LIFJl.

of sympathy is, ceteris paribus, in proportion to our love
for the object of the emotion. This fine susceptibility
of human nature would also seem to be less in unison
with the energetic than with the reflective or contem-
plative character ; though the former disposition is
more fertile in the practical fruits of benevolence.
Since the Christian era, the faculty has grown both
in range and depth along with the mental and moral
development of the race. The increase in the exercise
of the imagination arising from the universal habit of
reading, so new in the history of mankind, must have
an important effect in enlarging the normal power of
the fancy. To this cause, perhaps, ought to be traced
the present popular indignation against various forms
of cruelty towards which men seemed almost insensible
a few centuries ago. Sympathy in the full sense com-
prehends fellow-feeling in the joy of another, as well
as compassion over his pain. The former is a more
completely disinterested state, and far harder to attain,
as the neutralizing action of jealousy and envy,
even in a faint form, is able to destroy this truly
unselfish feeling. This does not occur in the case of
pity.

Feelings attached to Intellectual Activity. —
The mental states of novelty, surprise, and wonder, called
by Dr. Bain,^ feelings of relativity , also play an important
part in this department of the mind. The agreeable
feeling of novelty is a particular instance of the pleasure
due to exercise of the mental energies in general. The
enjoyment of any activity is highest whilst fresh, and
gradually tones down as the faculty becomes habituated
to the action of the stimulus. According^, transition
from the exertion of one power to that of another ;
or even variation in the quality of a mental state must,
ceteris paribus, be agreeable. Since the number of pos-
sible experiences is limited and the list of absolute
novelties soon exhausted, the advantage of change in
employments is obvious. The recurrence of a former
mental state after an interval of time may be attended
with almost as much pleasure as that of its first appear-

2 Bain's description of some of the Emotions is among the best.

THE EMOTIONS. 433

ance ; and occasionally, as in the case of old familiar
tunes, previous acquaintance enriches the emotion.

Suvprise contains something in addition to novelty.
In the latter state there is change : in the former there
is besides a certain shock of unexpectedness. Prac-
tically, of course, the two feelings shade into each
other— marked novelties producing surprise; but the r^^
characteristic feature of the latter state is the temporary \ — ^
perturbation of the movement of thought, owing to the
sudden appearance of an unlooked-for idea which does
not at once coalesce with the existing current. In itself
such a dislocation would be disagreeable rather than
the reverse, but the pleasure springing from ^ a fresh
energy prevents surprise being classed as a universally
painful state. Dr. Bain allots it to his group of so-called
" neutral " feelings.

Wonder (which Aristotle deems to be the beginning
of Philosophy) is a more complex emotion than surprise.
It requires a certain magnitude or greatness as well as
strangeness in the new event, which causes a failure of
the effort to understand or classify that event with our
past experiences. When the novel object is of such a
completely unfamiliar kind as to convince us that it
is beyond our comprehension, the mind is thrown into
a condition of conscious stupefaction, which is the
purest form of astonishment. The soul, however, cannot
long persist in such an attitude, and the natural incli-
nation of the intellect impels it to try and bring this
occurrence into harmony with others which we have
observed. The native tendency of the mind to exert
its powers when thus stimulated by the enigmatic, is
the essentially rational attribute of curiosity. It is
scarcely too much to say that this impulse holds a
similarly important position in the domain of knowledge
with that possessed by the instinct of self-preservation
in the kingdom of physical life.

The Logical Feelings of consistency and contradiction
are closely related to the emotions just described.
These states are essentially cognitional ; but pleasure
or pain forms such a very important ingredient, that
the term feeling is frequently applied to them. They
CC

434 RATIONAL LIFE,

afford the best example of strictly intellectual senti-
ments, and are of a spiritual or supra-sensuous char-
acter. The consciousness of the irreconcilability of
apparently independent cognitions is distinctl}^ dis-
agreeable. We are dimly aware of an internal state
of strain or contention ; and we cannot rest till we
effect agreement between the discordant forces. The
discovery of new truth, the bringing of fresh facts
under old generalizations, at once satiates the intel-
lectual yearning for unity and gratifies our sense of
power. There is a very real joy in detecting hitherto
unperceived relations of similarity, whether it be in
the solution of a mathematical problem, the discovery
of a law of physics, the invention of a happ)^ metaphor,
or the guessing of a riddle.

This kind of enjoyment is one of the main elements
in the higher species of those pleasures which constitute
the Emotions of Pursuit. This term has been employed
to denote the agreeable excitement attendant on certain
kinds of out-door sport, games of chance, and interest
in the plot of a novel. There is in such exercises
novelty, the satisfaction due to the play of our faculties,
and a pleasing interest aroused by the uncertainty of
the result, which gives much food to imagination and
intellect. If the stake is very heavy the agreeable
character of the excitement disappears, and the state
of doubt, resulting in anxiety and fear, may become
extremely painful.^

^ Rivalry or Emulation. — Closely connected with the emotions of
pursuit and the sense of power is the passion of emulation — one of the
most important psychological forces both for good and evil in the
economy of human life. Amongst the ordinary constituents of this
feeling are: (i) The pleasure of activity — though sometimes,
especially when excessive, the activity may not be pleasant ; (2) the
agreeable interest of the chance element — the excitement of hope
and expectancy ; (3) the sense of power ; (4) the anticipated gratifi-
cation of triumph ; (5) the pleasure of the imagined admiration of
the spectator; (6) the pleasure of conflict itself, in so far as it is
distinct from the factors just mentioned. That the excitement of
contest, when not counterbalanced by some positive pain, such as
fear or fatigue, is per se agreeable, seems to be established by the
enjoyment which mimic combat in so many forms affords both to
man and to the young of all animals. It is an essential element in

THE EMOTIONS.

435

iEsthetiC Emotions. — Another interesting class
of feelings are the esthetic emotions. The chief of these
are the sentiments awakened by the contemplation oi
the Beautiful and the Sublime. Ontology is the branch
of Philosophy to which the problem of the nature and
objective conditions of Beauty properly belongs. But
since the middle of last century discussion on this
subject has been so continuous, that there has grown
up a portentous body of speculation claiming the title
of the Science of Esthetics. '^ Here we can only analyze
briefly the feelings aroused by the perception of the
Beautiful, the Sublime, and the Ludicrous, and point
out the chief features in these realities themselves.

The Beautiful. — The epithet beautiful is applied to
such widely different things as a sunset, a human face,
a flower, a landscape, a musical symphony, a grey-
hound, a poem, a piece of architecture ; and there may
be awakened pleasing emotions by the consideration of
any of these objects. The first and essential property,
then, of beauty is that it pleases. In most cases the
satisfaction aroused involves two elements — the one
sensuous, the other intellectual. The lower is the result
partly of the harmonious action of an external organic
faculty, such as sight or hearing, partly of that of the
imagination. Thus, we describe particular hues as
beautiful, certain sounds as charming, and in many
of the examples just mentioned, the important part
played by the quality of the organic stimulus is evident.

most of our field sports. The above analysis shows that this spring
of action which has done so much for social progress contains both
useful and dangerous elements — that like all other passions it may
be productive of both good and evil. The aim of the Teacher must
be to extract from its use the maximum of good, with the minimum
of evil. The pleasure of activity, interest, increased power of
faculty, and even the desire of esteem, may be all neutral or good.
But the desire to triumph over another, if it includes the wi§h to inflict
pain, or if it be so intense that failure invokes envy or hatred of the
successful rival, is obviously bad. But that emulation, when limited
and safeguarded under normally wholesome conditions, does not
necessarily result in these evil effects, seems to be abundantly
established by the innumerable forms of competition which have
been sanctioned by moralists of all ages.

^ Cf. ^sthetik, by J. Jungmann, S.J. (Freiburg).

436 RATIONAL LIFE.

Along with this satisfaction due to sensation, there
is also usually an element of gratification depen-
dent on the exercise of the imagination. We have
alread}' shown in our chapter on the development of
sensuous perception, what a large part the reproduc-
tive activity of consciousness plays even in seemingly
simple cognitions, such as those of a house or of a tree.
Consequently, the pleasure of the effect must be attri-
buted to the agreeable operation of both the presenta-
tive and the representative faculties of the lower order.
The combined energies of the external and internal
senses are thus of themselves capable of accounting
for much of the delight aroused by the contemplation
of beautiful objects ; and we think those writers in error
who would deny or minimize the realit}^ of sensible
beauty. Visual, auditory, and motor sensations, both
actual and ideal, conspire according to their quality,
their intensity, and their harmonious combinations to
enrich the pleasurable sentiment of admiration.

Unity amid Variety. — Nevertheless, human appreciation
of Beauty is essentially rational ; and the importance of
intellect in this department of cognition is shown by the
absence of aesthetic tastes in irrational animals. The
most universal feature in the various kinds of beautiful
or pleasing objects, the generality of philosophers have
held to consist oi 7inity amid variety; and the apprehen-
sion of this perfection is an intellectual act. Symmetr3^
order, fitness, harmon}'-, and the like, are but special
forms of this unit3\ The suitable proportions of the
lineaments of the face, of the limbs of an animal, and
of the constituent portions of a building ; the admirable
co-ordination of the several parts of a flower ; and the
unity of idea which should run through a musical air,
a poem or a drama, are all only varying expressions of
the one amid the manifold. Monotony is painful ; same-
ness wearies the faculties. On the other hand, chaotic
multiplicity, disorderl}^ change overpowers and prevents
us from getting a coherent grasp of the confused mass
before us. When, however, our energies are wakened
into life by a rich variety of stimulus, whilst, at the
same time, the presence of some central unity enables

THE EMOTIONS. 437

us to hold the several parts together with ease, there
is produced in the mind a luxurious feeling of delight.^

Utility. — A particular manifestation of this unity of
thought in a work of art is utility. The mind is gratified
by seeing how an object is adapted to the purpose for
which it is intended. The structure of the greyhound
thus embodies the idea of speed : the English dray-
horse that of strength. The charm of a pillar in a piece
of architecture depends as much on its obvious utility
and fitness, as on its own beauty ; and the fundamental
rule of Gothic art, that no ornament is to appear for the sake
of ornament, is but a practical application of this psycho-
logical law. Objects which please indirectly as in this
way subservient to some ulterior end are said to exhibit
relative or dependent beaut}^ ; those which charm of them-
selves exemplify absolute, intrinsic, or independent beauty. A
flower, taken as a whole, may be described as absolutely
beautiful, whilst the delight awakened by contemplating
the fitness of its parts is an effect of dependent beauty.

Association. —The extent and importance of this
second kind of beauty gave occasion at the end of last
century to the advocates of Associationism to attempt
the explanation of all forms of beauty by that principle.
A plain of ripe waving corn is beautiful in this view
because it suggests peace and plenty; a ruined castle
because it recalls deeds of chivalry and prowess in past
times. The influence of Association in awakening
agreeable emotions, and in giving an accidental charm
to indifferent objects is undoubtedly very great. The
scenes of our childhood, familiar tunes, the rise and fall
of fashions, and the rules of etiquette, all exhibit the
beautifying force of this agency. Still, it is a mistake
to push the principle too far, and a sea-shell, a feather,
or a landscape must often win the approval of the
severest iesthetic judgment, apart from any extrinsic
relation which it may possess. *5

^ The picturesque wants the unity of beauty proper, but the dis-
agreeable effect of mere disorder is prevented by the beauty of the
separate elements ; certain harmonies, too, usually pervade the
irregularities.

^ Ruskin thus concisely states the flaw in the case of the advo-
cates of Associationism : "Their arguments invariably involve one

438 RATIONAL LIFE.

Sight and bearing are the principal senses in the
appreciation of beauty ; but the experiences of the
other faculties when represented in imagination can
contribute much to the general effect, as is especially
seen in poetic description. A consequence of beauty
being mainly apprehended by the two higher senses
is the disinterested character of the emotions aroused,
and the communistic or shareable nature of aesthetic
pleasures in general. The delight of admiration,
though it may stimulate the desire of personal appro-
priation as a means to ulterior advantage, is not itself
an egoistic affection. The joy awakened by the con-
templation of a picture or a landscape, by a poem or a
concert, is not diminished but increased by the partner-
ship of other minds.

The Sublime. — The emotion of the Sublime, though an
agreeable consciousness, differs from that of the Beautiful.
The object of the former feeling is some kind or other of
grandeur. Physical magnitude, immensity in force, space,
or time, moral excellence displayed in searching trial, may
all be characterized as sublime, and awaken the corres-
ponding sentiment. The emotion involves admiration, fear,
or awe, and a certain sympathy with the power manifested.
Mere size is usually not sufficient to constitute sublimity.
There must be a certain degree of perfection of form to give
contemplation an agreeably stimulating character ; and in
this respect the emotion aroused is related to our enjoyment
of the beautiful. But yet it is in the grandeur of the object
that the chief element of sublimity consists, and this feature
is so essential that even ugliness and wickedness of trans-
cendent magnitude may sometimes generate a feeling of an
almost admiring awe. The mind becomes aware of its
feebleness and incapacity in the presence of immensity, whilst
at the same time it is stimulated to endeavour to comprehend
the object. Sublimity, like Beauty, is a revelation of the
Divine attributes, but in the former the infinite incompre-
hensibility of God is brought more home to us. In our
admiration of the sublime in human action little introspection
is required to discover a thrill of sympathy with the agent.

of these two syllogisms: Either Association gives pleasure, and
Beauty gives pleasure, therefore Association is Beauty ; or, the
power of Association is stronger than the power of Beauty, there-
fore the power of Association is the power of Beauty." {Modern
Painters, Vol. II. 31.)

TitE AMOTIONS. 43^

Although in the sentiment aroused by the contemplation of
a piece of wild scenery, or of a storm at sea, this ingredient
of feUow-feehng is not so easily detected, yet if we carehilly
reflect on the fact that what properly impresses us in these
phenomena is the manifestation of a Power, we shall find that
in the effort to realize to ourself such an energy we experience
a faint vibration of sympathetic consciousness.''

The Ludicrous. — The mental state aroused by contem-
plation of the Liuiicroiis is in striking contrast to that of the
Sublime. In place of admiring awe and fear, we have
joyous elation ; instead of a shrinking consciousness of our
own diminutiveness we explode in a burst of exuberant mirtli.
Though the emotion is eminently rational, the fit of
laughter, is, of course, only a physical movement which may
be excited by purely physical stimuli, just as well as by the
intellectual perception of the ridiculous.

There has been much discussion as to what are the
essential features of the ludicrous. According to Aristotle,
the laughable is to be found in what is deformed or mean,
yet incapable of producing pity, fear, anger, or any otiier
strong emotion ; and Herbert Spencer has not advanced the
psychological analysis of this state much further. Incon-
gruity, the latter writer teaches, is a prime constituent of the
ridiculous, but this incongruity must not give rise to other
powerful feelings. To see a fop tumble into the mud may
cause us to laugh, whilst the fall of an old man whom we
love arouses quite a different emotion. Hobbes defined
laughter as " a sudden glory arising from the conception of
some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity
of others and with our own formerly." This view would
place the essence of the ludicrous in a degradation of the
object. It is true that the point of wit often consists in
making others seem contemptible, and there is awakened a
pleasurable consciousness of elation in ourselves by the
contrast; but such a theory is very one-sided, and does not
account for good-natured laughter, or for many forms of
humour. Release from restraint is undoubtedly a very
general condition of mirth, and the facility with which

' Hamilton thus distinguishes the character of these emotions :
" The Beautiful awakens the mind to a soothing contemplation ;
the Sublime arouses it to strong emotion. The Beautiful attracts
without repelling, whereas the Sublime at once does both ; the
Beautiful aftords us a feeling of unmingled pleasure in the full and
unimpeded activity of our cognitive powers, whereas our feeling of
sublimity is a mingled one of pleasure and pain — of pleasure in the
consciousness of strong energy, of pain in the consciousness that
this energy is vain." {Metaph, Vol. II. pp. 512, 513.)

440 NATIONAL LIFS.

laughter can be excited by any unusual event when we have
been for a time sustaining a dignified or solemn demeanour
has often been noted. The cheapness of the wit directed
against holy things which have been long held in reverence
by mankind is thus obvious.

The Moral Sentiments.— Under this term are
included the feelings of moral obligation, responsibility,
approbation, disapproval, remorse, and self-commen-
dation. As we have already dwelt at length on
Conscience, we must be brief here. We have seen
that conscience is not a special faculty or sense, but
the ordinary judicial activity of the intellect which
discerns zvhat actions are right and zvrong. The cognition
of Tightness or wrongness includes or results in the
consciousness of obligation — the feeling of ought. It is
this latter frame of mind which is more especially
termed the moral sentiment. As a mental state it is sui
generis, and though capable of rational explanation, it
cannot be analyzed into mere sensations. It manifesto
itself as a certain consciousness of pressure or constraint
on the will differing in kind alike from the motive force
of pleasure or pain and the compulsion of known truth.
We feel impelled towards duty though it be disagreeable :
we can refuse to embrace it though it be evident. It
involves a sense of subjection to an authority with which
we are brought into immediate contact. It presents
to the mind a categorical imperative which binds absolutely ;
and from which there is felt to be no appeal. It
contains the germ of the notion of holiness.

The objects to which the moral sentiment attaches
are not, like those of the aesthetic feeling, lifeless things,
but voluntary actions, and primarily my own ; secondarily
those of others. It essentially implies the notion oi free
choice, becoming meaningless if human volitions are
reduced to the category of natural events uniformly
determined by necessary law. This consciousness of
obligation is, moreover, universal throughout mankind,
although the influences of education and the social
environment may alter considerably the classes of
action to which it is affixed. The intellect may doubt
or even err in determining what particular conduct is

THE EMOTIONS. 44 1

right ; but that which he judges to be right each man
feels bound to do. Further, the perception of the obli-
gatoriness or wrongness of contemplated conduct
carries in its train all the other forms of the moral
sentiment. The action apprehended to be wrong
evokes the feeling of disapprobation. This is judged to
be rightly transferred to the agent. The action I know
to be mine: its moral quality I feel to be justly ascribed
to me. I am conscious of responsibility for it. When
after its accomplishment the act is considered retros-
pectively, the combined feelings of violated obligation,
disapprobation, and responsibility result in the painful
consciousness of remorse.

These various phases of ethical feeling all contain
a distinctly moral element as original and as incapable
of analysis as that of the feehng of ought. Finally, there
is in the background present in them all a common
feature oi reverential fear — well insisted upon by Newman :
*' Conscience leads us to reverence and awe, hope and
fear, especially fear. . . . No fear is felt by any one
who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful,
though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he
has thereby forfeited some advantage ; but if he has
been betrayed into any kind of immorality, he has a
lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act
be no offence against society, — of distress and appre-
hension, even though it may be of present service to
him, — of compunction and regret, though in itself it
be most pleasurable, — of confusion of face, though it
may have no witnesses. These various perturbations
of mind, — self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting
remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future —
and their contraries, . . . these emotions constitute a
specific difference between conscience and other intel-
lectual senses."^ These moral sentiments, however,
be it remembered, are developed, refined, strengthened,
and perfected, in proportion as man acts up to the
dictates of conscience : they can be weakened, perverted,
all but extinguished by continuous violation and abuse.

I
I

^ Granunar of Assent, p. io8.

442 RATIONAL LIFE.

No distinct Faculty of Feeling. — Having now treated o.
the chief emotions, we would recall once more the truth on
which we have often insisted, that these states are not acts
of a third radically distinct faculty, but complex products
of appetency varying in character with the quality of the
cognitive consciousness out of which they emerge. No satis-
factory attempt has been made to show that such states as
anger, hope, shame, curiosity, pride, are all reducible to a
third ultimate mental aptitude, distinct alike from conation
and cognition. Yet if such a third faculty is to be assumed,
or if it is to be identified with the mere capacity for pleasure
or pain, reason should be assigned why the various emotions
are to be grouped under it rather than under the other two.
But the more carefully these states are analyzed, the clearer
will it become that they are only complex forms of appetitive
and cognitive consciousness. Desire and aversion are princi-
ples of wide range, and when they have been carefully
applied to the explanation of every feeling, very little that
is not an act of a cognitive power will remain. We may
appropriately complete our treatment of these states with a
citation jFrom the work of Jungmann, devoted to the special
subject of Feeling : " Modern Psychology is accustomed to
treat of several species of Feeling and Feelings in its theory
of the third Faculty. We accordingly have discussions
regarding the sympathetic, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and
rehgious emotions ; and also of the feeling or sense of right,
of the beautiful, of the noble, and of moral good, or of sesthetic,
moral, and religious feeling. If we admit no special Feeling-
power, besides the faculties of Cognition and Conation,
where shall we dispose of these states ? It is not very
difficult to find the right place for them, if we only get a
clear notion of what is meant by these names. The sympa-
thetic emotions are, in general, joy or sorrow over the weal
or woe of others. Those feelings are styled ' ^Esthetic '
which are awakened in the soul in the presence of the
sesthetic excellence of the creations of human genius. Under
the phrase ' Intellectual FeeHngs ' are signified those agree-
able or disagreeable affections the cause and object of which
is an activity of our inteUigence in harmony or conflict with
that intelligence. Finally, Moral and Rehgious Feelings are
the appetencies of the soul in the presence of ethical good
and ill with reference to the supernatural order. . . . The
sense of the Beautiful and the Good, or yEsthetic and Moral
sentiment, is not a (special) energy, not a faculty of the
soul, but simply the first attribute of every created spirit —
rationality. Rationality embraces a two-fold element. Our
soul is rational on the one hand because its understanding

THE EMOTIONS. 443

is necessarily determined by Eternal Wisdom's laws of know-
ledge ; on the other, because there is impressed upon its
appetency a natural bent towards what agrees with these
laws of knowledge and with Uncreated Goodness, that is,
towards the physically perfect and the ethically good ; and
therefore towards the Beautiful. This rationality, for reasons
assigned elsewhere, does not manifest itself in all rnen in
equal perfection, but in its essence it is present in all.
Accordingly, in so far as no other agencies interfere, every
man naturally knows and recognizes the Good, the Right,
the Noble, the Beautiful, and the Great; towards these he
is impelled, these he embraces, these he loves, these he
enjoys. On the other hand. Wickedness, Meanness, Ugliness,
are for every man the object of aversion and displeasure."^

Genesis of Feelings. — What is the proximate cause of
Emotion ? — Professor James writes : " Our natural way of
thinking about the ' coarser ' emotions is that the mental per-
ception of some fact excites the mental affection called the
emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the
bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the
bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the Emotion.
Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep ;
we meet a bear, are frightened and run. The hypothesis
here to be defended says that this order of sequence is
incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately
induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must
be interposed between them, and that the more rational
statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because
we strike, afraid because we tremble and not that we cry,
strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as
the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the
perception the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale,
colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then
see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult, and
deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid
or angry." (Op. cit. p. 450.) Although James makes a distinc-
tion between the "coarser" and "subtler" emotions, he
accounts for both classes in practically the same way. The
theory seems to be accepted in substance by Lange, Lloyd
Morgan, and others. The chief evidence urged in its favour
are the following alleged facts: (i) Particular perceptions do
excite diffused bodily effects antecedent to emotions. (2) Many
pathological cases in which the emotion is " objectless " are
thus easily explained. The numerous instances of unmotived
fear, melancholy, anger, and the like, which are frequently met

" Das Gemiith tuid das Gejiihlsvermogen, § 99.

444 RATIONAL LIFE.

with in asylums, are thus easily accounted for as due to a
morbid condition of those parts of the nervous mechanism
by which the emotion in question is usually expressed. Thus
an organic malady which occasions trembling is felt as fear.
(3) " The vital point : If we fancy some strong emotion, and
then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the
feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left
behind; no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be
constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual
perception is all that remains." (Op. cit. p. 451.)

Criticism.— Although its chief thesis is erroneous, this
theory seems to us to contain grains of truth frequently over-
looked by its opponents, i. An emotion is not a momentary,
atomic conscious state of pure quality ; but a complex form of
mental excitement always lasting for some time, and generally
constituted of sundry elements both cognitive and appetitive,
sensuous and spiritual. The class of " coarser" emotions—
which roughly correspond to the passiones sensibiles vel animales
of the schoolmen— more especially include as an essential
component the consciousness of motor nervous activity and
general bodily disturbance. What we understand by an
emotion of anger or fear, is thus not a simple act of an
ultimsite feeling-faculty, but a process of consciousness com-
prising a cognition of some object, a resulting appetitive or
impulsive state, and a feeling of organic excitement.^'^ This
latter ingredient is probably the incoming perception of the
reverberation of neural discharges diffused throughout the
system. Consequently, if we abstract the feeling of bodily
symptoms, a very substantial constituent of the coarser
emotions is thereby ehminated. Still the remnant is not
merely a neutral " state of perception." There will remain
also an element of appetency or conation. Of course the
latter factor may Hkewise be abstracted; but surely this is
deliberately das kind mit deni Bade auszuschiitten — " to empty
out the baby along with the bath." In the subtler emotions
—passiones spirituales — the rational appetitive element of com-
placency or dissatisfaction is at least as important as the act

^^ The organic commotion — tvansmutatio coyporalis — is made an
essential part of the "coarser" emotions by St. Thomas. Thus:
" Passio propria invenitur ubi est tvansmutatio coyporalis, quK quidem
invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi." {Sum. 1-2. q. 22. a. 3.) "Ad
actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur hujusmodi transmutatio :
unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis materialiter ponitur
aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi, sicut dicitur, quod ira est accensio
sanguinis circa cor, unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur
in actu sensitive virtutis appetitive quam in actu sensitivae virtutis
apprehensiva." {Ibid. a. 2. ad 3.)

THE EMOTIONS. 445

of intellectual appreciation ; but it is quite true that if we
abstract all the sensible effects, the passional element of the
emotion disappears.^^

2. Nevertheless, the impulsive or appetitive element in
emotion — whether " coarse" or " subtle," is not merely the
apprehension of the reverberation of the neural disturbance.
This disturbance is the effect either of the impulse or of the
physical correlate of the latter. The fact that mankind at
large — including psychologists — have hitherto so interpreted
the conscious process affords at least a strong presumption
in its favour. Furthermore, there are many experiences
which cannot otherwise be rationally explained. For example,
an officer at the mess-table hears the word "liar" or
"coward" incidentally pronounced, and remains unaffected.
But let him understand that the term is addressed to himself,
and the state of consciousness immediately awakened is
totally different. The sound, the physical impression is sub-
stantially the same in both cases ; and it is not easy to see on
the physiological theory why the motor reverberation should
be so enormously different. The common sense theory, on
the other hand, answers intelhgibly that though the act of
perception may be almost the same in both cases — or even
more intense in the former — yet the rational meaning is
completely different. This difference of meaning can account
for the enormous difference in the subsequent mental state —
the violent impulsive feeling which has as its physical corre-
late an outgoing nervous process. This expresses itself in the
bodily commotion which is felt as organic sensation. The
same holds true of the feeling of fear, moral approval,
aesthetic admiration and the sentiment of the sublime or the
ludicrous, which are awakened not by the impressions of
particular stimuli, but by intellectual appreciation of relations
which give its meaning and worth to the object. The closing
words of Lotze in another connexion are to the point here :
" The shudder in presence of the sublime, and the laughter
over comical incidents are unquestionably both produced
not by a transference of the physical excitations of our eyes
to the nerves of the skin or the diaphragm, but by what is
seen being taken up into a world of thought and estimated at
the value belonging to it in the rational connexion of things.
The mechanism of our life has annexed this corporeal expres-
sion to the mood of mind thence evolved, but the bodily expression

^1 " Amor, et gaudium, et alia hujusmodi, cum attribuuntur Deo
vel angelis, aut hominibus secundum appetitum intellectivum, signi-
ficant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus absque
passione." [Ibid. a. 3. ad 3.)

446 RATIONAL LIFE.

would never of itself without the understanding of ivhat it presents
give rise to the mood." (Microcosmus, Vol. I. Bk. III. c. 3, § 4.)
The physical act of tickling may excite laughter similar in
kind to that awakened by a humorous story, yet the frame of
mind evoked is totally different ; and on the other hand,
what is substantially the same strong emotion may manifest
itself in quite unlike motor effects. Thus intense sorrow may
result in violent outbursts or tearless silence.

3. The various facts cited in favour of the physiological
theory can be accounted for just as well on the psychological
or common-sense view. Emotion and emotional movements,
whatever was the original order of their occurrence when
connected by association reciprocally suggest each other.
The awaking of emotion in the actor by counterfeit expression
is thus easily explained. The pathological cases of objectless
emotion can be similarly accounted for. The recurrence of
any part of a total emotional mood tends according to the
ordinary law of mental association to reinstate the remainder;
even though the recurring element be organic sensation
abnormally excited by the morbid instability of the nervous
mechanism of expression. But it is at least as probable that
these pathological cases are due to disordered cerebral idea-
tional centres which pervert the emotion at its source. ^^

Classification of the Emotions. — We have ab-
stained in the present chapter from all attempt at a
systematic classification of the emotions. We believe
such an undertaking to be impossible; and we think that
a scheme falsely pretending to effect a scientific division
of these mental states will do more harm than good.
Most of the emotions are extremely complex states.
Few of them are of well-defined character ; and the
Quality even of these is rarely pure. Feelings are in-
variably mingled or tinged with others of a different

^2 The constitution of a total emotional process, e.g., a fit of
anger, seems to us to include these psychical and physical elements:
(i) Cognitive state (a), with its physical correlate, a nervous change in
cerebral centres (a) ; (2) a conscious appetency or impulse [b], excited by
(fl), and having as physical correlate a diffused otitgoing process along
motor nerves ()8) ; (3) expressive bodily commotion {transmiitatio
corporalis) {7), caused by (i)(/3), and presenting itself to consciousness
through organic sensation (c). Psychically the emotion is composed
of (fl) (b) (c) ; the physical counter-part consists of (a) (&) (7). On the
general question cf. also Mark Baldwin, Feeling and Will, pp. 252 —
257; and Stout, Manual, pp. 287 — 297.

THE EMOTIONS. 447

nature. They also shade into each other by impercep-
tible transitions. Moreover, they continually change in
tone with the varying age, circumstances, and dispo-
sitions of man. As a consequence of all these
properties, no sa.tisia.ctory fundanientum divisionis can be
selected ; no table of memhva excludentia, no arrangement
exhibiting degrees of intrinsic affinity — in a word, no
scheme embodying the rules or attaining the ends of
logical classification, can be drawn up.

Certain writers, starting from some very unimportant
extrinsic feature have elaborated plans possessing a
degree of external S3mimetry, but lending no real assist-
ance to the analytical study of the emotions. Others,
on the contrary, adopting some hypothetical principle,
which claims to penetrate to the root of mental life,
have subjected many mental states to the most violent
handling in order to squeeze them into the prescribed
compartments. We thus find feelings which are closely
akin in nature widely separated, and vice versa; because
the particular principle chosen, however suitable in the
division of other states, is utterly inappropriate when
applied to these. In such a situation it seems to us
decidedly the best course frankly to accept the facts ;
and so we have merely taken up the chief feelings and
pointed out their most prominent characteristics. But
in order to establish completely the justice of our
method, we shall indicate a few of the schemes which
have been advocated :

Spinoza recognizes as the three great primary types of
passion : Desire, Joy, and Sadness. They form the three first
on the ordinary scholastic list, which we have already given,
and did he but add the fourth — aversion or abhorrence — the
scheme of the Dutch philosopher would have been at least
as good as that of any of his successors. If he marks off joy
from desire, he ought to separate aversion from sadness.
Desire aims at future or absent good, the fruition of which is
joy; the object of abhorrence or aversion is absent evil, and
its presence creates sadness.

Thomas Brown's classification of emotions runs thus :

I. Immediate — cheerfulness, melancholy, wonder, moral
feeling, love, etc.

II. Retrospective — anger, gratitude, regret, gladness.

448 RATIONAL LIFE.

III. Prospective — the desires of knowledge, power, fame,
etc. ; also hopes and fears.

The principle of division here — that of time, is of very
little importance from a psychological point of view. What
is fundamentally the same feeling — e.g., the moral sentiment
— may be evoked by the contemplation of an object as future,
present, or past. It is obviously unwise to separate these
phases of the same emotion from each other, and to group
them with feelings to which they have no affinity.

Herbert Spencer, assuming the theory of Evolution, seeks
to classify the emotions according to degree of development
and complexity. This he considers to be determined by the
order of their manifestation in the ascending grades of the
animal kingdom, in different stages of human civilization,
and in different periods of the individual's life. He accord-
ingly divides all feelings into four great classes :

I. Presentative feelings. — Sensations considered as pleasur-
able or painful.

II. Presentative-Representative. — The majority of emotions
so called. They are due to inherited experience : our
sensations arouse vague representations of pleasurable or
pai nful sensations experienced by our ancestors, e.g. terror.

III. Representative. — Ideas of feeling of the previous class,
excited in the imagination apart from external stimulus, e.g.,
the pleasures of poetry.

IV. Re-Representative. — The most abstract, complex, and
refined sentient states. Representations of representations
of sensuous impressions. The sentiments of justice, of
property, and the moral sentiment are illustrations.

Criticism. — In the first place the assumption on which his
scheme is based — that all our emotions are evolved out of
sensuous impressions — may be simpl}^ denied. Proof of such
a thesis would be a very big undertaking indeed, and
Mr. Spencer does not seriously attempt it. The emotions
of curiosity, surprise, the ludicrous, shame, logical consis-
tency, and moral approval, are certainly not reducible to
sensuous elements. Again : stage of development, though
possibly a consideration of much use for educational purposes,
is not an appropriate ground of division from the standpoint
of psychological analysis. What is needed is a systematic
grouping of the several distinct species of emotion, such as
love, wonder, hope, anger, fear, and the like, according to
their mutual affinities, and as far as possible in their purest
forms in the hope of discovering some underlying general
principle which rationally connects them. If we wish to
study the characteristics of the various human races, we
class them as Caucasian, Mongolian, American Indian, and

THE EMOTIONS. 449

the other large divisions, and then subdivide these groups
into smaller famihes, the Indo-Germanic, the Semitic, and
the rest. We do not take as our divisions : man up to the
age of three ; from three to ten ; from ten to twenty. A
fatal defect of this development method of classification is
that it distracts our attention from most of the very affinities
and differences which it is our primary object to discover.
The characteristic features of the elementary distinct types
of emotion are ignored, and widely opposed qualities of
consciousness are grouped together, whilst what is funda-
mentally the same activity in successive stages of growth is
split up and assigned to different categories. Thus curiosity,
indignation, and admiration for the beautiful should appear
in nearly all the four compartments. The error of this
classification is, in a word, the substitution of differences of
decree for differences of kind.

^ii'

The Expression of the Emotions. — In the final
analysis we always have to be satisfied with the state-
ment that a definite neural movement is de facto the
immediate antecedent or consequent of a given psy-
chical act. The one cannot be deduced from the other ;
and why God created mind and body thus cannot be
explained. But, though a vast region of mystery will
ever surround the small field of human knowledge, it is
the duty of the scientist to seek to push back the
circumference of his circle as far as he can. At this
object theories of emotional expression aim ; and,
although the subject lies on the border-land of both
Physiology and the Science of Mind, it seems here
appropriate to give a short account of what has been
done with a view to explaining why particular actions
are connected with certain emotions.

Sir Charles Bell, the distinguished physiologist, in his
essays on the Anatomy and Pliilosophy of Expression (1806 —
1844), was practically the first to attempt an accurate scientific
treatment of emotional expression. He devoted himself
solely, however, to describing in detail the muscular move-
ments engaged in the manifestations of the various feelings ;
and he makes no pretence to explain why the particular
gestures are connected with the corresponding mental state.

Bain seeks to go a step further in the line of explanation
in attempting to formulate a principle which will account for
the difference in character of the movements accompanying
DD

450 RATIONAL LIFE.

broadly different kinds of feeling. This he does in his " Law
of Self-conservation:" States of pleasure are concomitant with
an increase, and states of pain with an abatement of some or all of
the vital functions. Pleasurable feelings — ^joy, laughter, hope
— express themselves in augmented vigour of the vegetative
functions, and also in the stimulation of various muscles, facial,
respiratory, and the like. On the contrary, painful feelings
— sadness, fear, sorrow, result in depression of organic life,
.and in the general diminution of motor activity. This
generalization embraces a considerable number of facts, but
it is subject to so many limitations that its claims to be styled
a law are very doubtful. As a principle, too, it is so vague
that it helps us very little in accounting for particular forms
of emotional expression.

Evolutionist theory. — Attempts have been made by Darwin
and Herbert Spencer to account for emotional expression on
the hypothesis of Evolution. Darwin's theory is embodied in
three laws :

1. The principle of the preservation of serviceable associated
habits. — Movements which at an earlier period in the history
of the race were instrumental in the relief or gratification of
particular mental states, tend to survive when no longer of
use. The phenomena of frowning and weeping are thus
explained as being effects on the eyebrows and lachrymal
glands of the contraction of certain ocular muscles. This
contraction was the result of prolonged fits of screaming,
very frequent during infancy in the early history of the race.
At present though the scream be voluntarily suppressed, and
the cause removed, painful mental states will still produce
the frown or the tears. Scratching the head was serviceable
for the relief of cutaneous irritation during long years of
pre-human existence, and still persists as a gesture aroused
by intellectual distress. Similarly, grinding the teeth and
clenching the fists, formerly useful actions in conflict, now
accompany angry feelings when apparently purposeless.

2. The principle of antithesis. — Opposite impulses of will
tend to urge us in opposite directions. In the same wa}',
given certain states of mind leading to habitual actions under
the previous principle, opposite states of mind will tend to
set up movements of a directly contrary nature, though they
be of no particular use. The fJexuons movements of a joyful
affectionate dog are thus accounted for as the antithesis of
the rigid attitude of angry dislike.

3. The principle of actions due to the constitution of the
nervous system independently from the first of the zcill, and
independently to a certain extent of habit. — To this class are
assigned all expressive movements not accounted for by the

THE EMOTIONS. 451

other two laws. Such are the trembHng of the muscles,
modifications of the secretions, and other changes effected
by particular emotions.

Criticism. — As regards the first law, if the doctrine of
descent were already established, the explanation thus given
of a few instinctive gestures, such as clenching the fists and
grinding the teeth, would certainly be plausible. Still, the
application of the law in a large majority of cases would be,
to say the least of it, very improbable. To take the example
of weeping, cited by Darwin, there is no real evidence to
show that screaming of itself is productive of tears, for the
screams of both infants and adults are often strongest when
tearless ; and, on the other hand, tears may flow from joy
or pity, although these states cannot have been associated
with infantile screaming. Similarly the connexion between
irritation of the scalp and intellectual anxiety is very faint.

A most important point, however, usually overlooked by
advocates of Evolution, is the fact that emotional expression
must have often been disadvantageous, not beneficial, to the
individual. If Talleyrand's saying, " Speech is given man to
conceal his thoughts," possesses an element of truth in any
condition of human society, assuredly the manifestation of
his feelings and desires must have been detrimental to the
agent in the earlier stages of animal existence. The pre-
monitory disclosure of hatred or fear, for instance, would
have been invariably unprofitable. It would in fact seem
that many instinctive modes of expression ought, as a rule,
to have been extinguished almost as soon as they appeared.

Darwin's second principle has met with but little accept-
ance even amongst his disciples. When we endeavour to
realize precisely what is meant by contrary feelings tending
to produce movements of an opposite nature, we discover that
the conception of contrariety involved s extremely vague.
" What is meant, it may be asked, by opposition between the
impulses of the will to turn to the right and to the left, over
and above the contrariety of direction in the resulting move-
ment ? And even supposing there were such mysterious
contrast in our volitions, with which contrariety of move-
ment had become instinctively associated, one might still
inquire how we should be able to determine the proper
antithesis in the case of any given emotion. Why, for
example, should the movements of a dog during an outburst
of affection be regarded as the antithesis of movements
which accompany anger, rather than of those which charac-
terize terror ? As states of feeling, one suspects terror
before a threatening look and the pleasurable elation at
friendly symptoms, have quite as many elements of contrast

452

RATIONAL LIFE.

as the feelings said to be in antithesis by Mr. Darwin ; and
so far from the movements of these opposite feeUngs being
unhke, they very closely resemble one another in many
respects, as may be seen in the fawning and crouching
attitudes." ^^

Darwin's third principle is sufBciently comprehensive, but
it suffers from the disadvantage of explaining virtually
nothing. It merely tells us that the character of certain
expressive movements resulting from the excessive generation
of nerve force by strong feeling is determined by the consti-
tution of the nervous system. This is undoubtedly the case,
and Darwin's whole theory would, we believe, have approxi-
mated more to actual truth, though thereby losing the charm
of ingenuity and originality, if it had assigned a considerably
larger share of the phenomena to this cause.

Herbert Spencer accounts for emotional expression thus :
Nervous energy is aroused by feeling, and tends to express
itself in the discharge of motor activity. This discharge
exhibits itself partly in a general effect diffused throughout
the entire system y partly in special excitement within a restricted
field. An attack of coughing exempHfies both. The disturb-
ance produced will be directly as the intensity of the
feeling, and inversely as the size of the muscles acted upon.
Thus, a faintly pleasurable feeling may excite a slight lateral
oscillation in a dog's tail, whilst stronger em.otion sets him
barking and capering around. Movement first takes hold
of the smaller and more easily moved muscles, afterwards of
the heavier parts, and finally of the whole body. This may
be seen by tracing the external manifestations of a fit of
anger or merriment. In the incipient stages slight feelings
act upon the lips and eyebrows, but as the passion grows in
strength, the lungs, head, limbs, and finally the entire organism
may be set in violent motion. The particular movements
within the restricted field, however, are those which specifi-
cally express the several qualities of emotion. These
movements are, in Mr. Spencer's view, inherited ancestral
actions by which feehngs similar in kind to those now aroused
were formerly satisfied.^*

Spencer's law of restricted discharges is substantially
identical with Darwin's principle of associated serviceable
actions ; and the remarks we have made above are again
applicable here. Spencer, too, illustrates his law by an

^^ Sully, Sensation and Intuition, p. 29.

14 Darwin's theory is expounded in his book, The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals, 1872. Spencer's treatment of the
subject is given in his Essay on the Physiology of Laughter, and in
his Principles of Psychology, Ft. VIII. c iv.

THE EMOTIONS. 45J

account of the genesis of that important emotional expression
— the frown ; and the divergence between his explanation
and that of Darwin, affords an instructive comment on the
worth of the doctrine common to both. The corrugation ol
the eyebrows, Spencer tells us, is useful in protecting the
eyes from the rays of the vertical sun. This act would there-
fore have afforded an advantage in tropical regions during
the combats of the animals from whom we are more imme-
diately descended. Accordingly, those individuals in whom
the nervous discharge accompanying the excitement of
combat chanced to cause an unusual contraction of the
corrugating muscles of the forehead " would be more likely
to conquer and leave posterity — survival of the fittest
tending in their posterity to establish and increase this
peculiarity."^^ The recurrence of angry feelings or non-
pleasurable states of any kind would, therefore, after a time,
by association tend to excite the frown, where its utility as
a sunshade has ceased. Darwin, as we have already men-
tioned, showed in an equally conclusive manner that frowning
is an inheritance from the distortion of the facial muscles
during long ages of infantile screaming. Both hypotheses
exhibit the fertile imagination possessed alike by the philo-
sopher and the naturalist, but the conflict in their conclusions
ought to warn us of the exceedingly precarious character of
their theory. ^'^

Spencer's law of general diffusion corresponds to Darwin's
third principle, but is a far more definite and satisfactory
description of the course of neural disturbance. It appears
to us to contain much truth. It gives a natural account of
the gradual development ot the external manifestation of
feeling, and embraces many curious facts. Unfortunately,
however, the author at times does not seem to distinguish

15 Principles oj Psychology, % 498. For Darwin's account of the
gesture, cf. op. cit. pp. 225, 226.

1^ The distension of the nostrils by indignation, Mr. Spencer
similarly traces to the accidental advantage gained by those of our
ancestors in whom the diffused discharge chanced to dilate the
nostrils during conflict, especially when influenced by non-pleasur-
able feelings their mouths were occupied in holding on to part of an
antagonist's body! The force of this ingenious explanation is some-
what seriously shaken by the fact, that the nostrils are also dilated
in certain pleasant states ; and we find Wundt classing this gesture
under the general tendency to extend the mouth, eyes, nostrils, &c.,
in order to increase agreeable sensations. The act of blushing and
several other phenomena are also differently accounted for by these
three writers. The simple truth is that once we get into the regions
of pare imagination, there is no limit to fanciful hypotheses.

454 RATIONAL LIFE.

clearly between the mental state and its physical concomitant.
He frequently appears, especially in his article on Laughter^
to speak as if the emotion were itself identical with, or trans-
formable into, the accompanying discharge of nervous energy;
although he elsewhere recognizes the transcendent difference
which separates them.

Wundt also formulates a theory in three general laws:
I. The principle of the direct alteration of innervation. This
signifies that intense emotions generate their external expres-
sion by exerting an immediate reaction on centres of motor
innervation, paralyzing or stimulating the action of many
groups of muscles — e.g., in the trembling of limbs and con-
traction or enlargement of blood-vessels, 2. The principle
of the association of analogous sensations. This means that
different species of sensations in which there is a certain
community of tone or quality tend more easily to combine
and strengthen each other. The muscles of the jaws thus
assume an attitude of tension under energetic feelings ; ol
agreeable ease in quiet satisfaction ; and of unpleasant dis-
tortion under contrary emotions. The movements of the
mouth and tongue under the action of sweet, bitter, sour, or
disgusting tastes, are also excited by the idea of such sensa-
tions, and then transferred to analogous feelings or emotions.
3. The principle of the relation of movement to the perceptions of
sense. This law embraces all gestures and expressive motions
not included under the other two. Movements of the eyes,
head, and limbs accompany our thoughts and words. As our
language or feelings become excited we point towards distant
objects, clench our fists, raise our arms, erect our head, and
the like. We smilingly nod assent, or deprecatingly draw
back our head from the imagined object. This theory, though
less imaginative than either of those just mentioned, deter-
mines more accurately the relations between many classes ol
feelings and their expression.^''

The Origin of Language. — Rational language
may be described as, a system of conventional signs vepve-
sentative of thought: or we may define oval language in
more precise fashion as, a system of articulated ivords repve-
sentative of thought. The primary object of language is
the communication of ideas ; but it serves in addition
as a record or register of past intellectual acquisitions,
and also as a mechanical aid to thinking. (See p. 302.)
The origin of language thus understood, has formed a

" For a synopsis of Wundt's theory, of. Ladd, op. cit. p. 531.

THE EMOTIONS. 455

prolific subject of speculation. It is the function of
Theology, not Philosophy, to interpret the passages of
Scripture bearing on this matter, and to explain in
what manner and to what extent this gift was communi-
cated to the first human beings. Apart, however, from
the decision of these points there remains for Philosophy
the question : Could language have been invented by
man, and, if so, by what agencies and laws would its
development be governed ? The latter investigation,
moreover, is not purely hypothetical in character.
Whatever interpretation of Scripture be adopted, the
subsequent history of language will, in accordance with
God's usual providence, have been governed by natural
laws. Abstracting then from Revelation, could language
have arisen in a natural manner ? and, however origi-
nated, what are the principles which have determined
its evolution ?

Its Nature. — For rational speech the name must be used
consciously with a meaning ; that is, as a sign of an object of
thought. The parrot articulates words, and the dog un-
mistakably manifests feelings of joy or anger ; but neither of
these animals is capable of language in the proper sense of
the term. Even the most pronounced advocates of Material-
ism are constrained to admit that no other creature but man
has ever attached a name to an object.^^ For such an
operation, a supra-sensuous power of abstraction and reflexion
is absolutely necessary. Accordingly, language could not
have preceded the existence of intellect or reason. Manifesting
thought, if must be subsequent to thought. It presupposes the
formation of general concepts, and in its simplest employment
of a word as a sign, language involves that apprehension of
universal relations which is the characteristic feature of
supra-sensuous intelligence. Still, the invention of language
does not require a previous fund of elaborate notions.
Looking on human nature as we find it at present, the
accumulation of a considerable collection of intellectual
products, and any but the most meagre cultivation of the
rational faculties seems naturally impossible without the
assistance of words. But given men created with both
the reflexive activity of thought and the physical power of
making signs, and they will inevitably soon learn to com-
municate their ideas to each other.

^8 Cf. Maudsley, op. cit. p. 502. On the other hand, no tribe of
men has yet been discovered devoid of the attribute of speech.

456 RATIONAL LIFE.

Development. — Starting with the social mbtinct, men tend
to congregate together. In the next place, their nature is
such that lively emotions are expressed not merely in facial
changes, but in cries and movements. There is also exhi-
bited in man, especially in early life, a curious mimetic
impulse, which leads him to reproduce in his actions and
utterance the phenomena of external nature, whether animate
or inanimate, that most interest him. Cries thus elicited in
sympathy or fright, having been both felt and heard by the
individual in the presence of the external object, will be
associated with it, and tend to be reproduced on other
occasions, according to the laws of suggestion. Moreover,
living in community and being of like nature and disposition,
men would be impelled to similar manifestations, and would
soon grow to associate their neighbour's utterances as well
as their own with the appropriate external event. We have
not, how'ever, yet reached rational language ; we are still in
the plane of sense and instinct. These are preliminary
steps ; still, gregarious brutes would get thus far. But in
addition to these aptitudes, man is endowed with the faculty
of abstraction and reflexion, and this power would now
inevitably lead him to conceive and employ these expressions
as signs of the corresponding objects — to mean things by
words ; and at once we have rational speech.

Agencies. — To the iirst query, then, we must answer : Yes.
Apart from any special Divine intervention, man, with his
present nature, by use of the faculties which God has given
him, would have invented a language. The materials
employed for signs will be in part the exclamations emitted
as interjections, in part mimetic utterances by which he seeks
to suggest to the hearer the object imitated. ^'-^ The indirect
action of the onomatopoeic tendency is, however, probably
far more influential than its immediate results. Not only
are analogies observed between the sensuous impressions
and the sounds or feelings of efl"ort put forth in the responsive
vocal expression, but kindred utterances involving a like

^9 The hypotheses which lay chief stress on the interjectional
and onomatopoeic impulses have been respectively styled by Max
Miiller the ''Pooh-pooh and Bow-ivow theories." {Lectures on the
Science of Language, First Series, p. 344.) He holds that the
efficiency of these principles is extremely limited, many apparent
instances of onomatopoeia not being really so, e.g., thunder from the
same root as the Latin tenuis, tender and thin. Squirrel not from the
rustling whirling of the little animal, but from the Greek Skioiiros=
shade, tail ; the French siicre from the Indian sarkhara, &c. He does
not however seem to have considered sufficiently the mediate or
indirect agency of onomatopoeia.

THE EMOTIONS. 457

tone of consciousness are used to designate analogous,
though very unlike experiences. Still, by far the most
impo'rtant part of all languages, it has been forcibly argued,
is reducible by the science of Comparative Philology to a
small collection of generic roots representative of universal
ideas though applied to particular objects. These root-
sounds, it is asserted, cannot be onomatopoeic; they are
indicative of characteristic actions or attributes of the object,
and so are expressive not of particular impressions, but of
general notions. For this reason they are fruitful and capable
of forming part of the names of many things possessing this
feature in common. These four hundred or five hundred
ultimate roots, which remain as the generic constituent
elements in the different families of languages, are neither
interjectional nor mimetic sounds, but phonetic types produced
by a power inherent in human nature. There is, in fact, a
species of natural harmony between the rudimentary oral
expression and the corresponding thought, just as there is
between the latter and the external reality.^'-

Very little original capital would have been required, and
however this was obtained, whether in the form of casual
sounds accompanying appropriate gestures, or as a spon-
taneous product of human nature, or as a collection of
suitable utterances elicited by Divine intervention, the start
once effected, progress was comparatively easy. New sur-
roundings, new wants, the inventive energy of intellect, the

20 Cf. Max Miiller, op. cit. Lect. ix. Apart from the question of
the original fund of root-sounds — which is equally a difficulty to all
purely rational theories— Miiller's general doctrine seems plausible.
The fierce conflict, however, which still prevails on most funda-
mental questions of the science of Comparative Philology makes
one feel that beyond the limited region of common agreement even
the most attractive hypotheses are extremely hazardous. Schleicher,
for instance, the leading Darwinian in this field, whose confidence
in his views is always in direct proportion to the obscurity of the
subject-matter, asserts that language is a natural organism, the
growth and decay of which is governed by fixed and immutable
laws. Language is as independent of the will of the individual as
the song of the nightingale. Opposed equally to both Max Miiller
and Schleicher is the chief American philologist. Professor Whitney.
With him language, which separates man from the brute, is
essentially a voluntary invention, an " institution " hke government,
and "is in all its parts arbitrary and conventional." {Life and Groivth
of Langxiage, p. 282.) Steinthal's teaching increases the novelty ;
and Heyse, who stands to Hegel as Schleicher to Darwin, evolved
a mystical creed on the subject, in unison with the spirit of his
master's philosophy. An account of the various theories is given
in Sayce's Introduction to the Science of Language, Vol. I. c. i.

458 RATIONAL LIFE.

force of analogy, multiplied and perfected the materials in
use. Diversities of climate, food, and exercise, acting on the
organism, modify the vocal machinery. Special occupations
develop particular groups of words earlier in one district
than in another. Variety of classes, trades, and professions
within the same nation fosters the simultaneous growth of a
multiplicity of terms. The onomatopoeic and interjectional
tendencies continue to make small contributions from time to
time, but the great force which enriches our vocabulary is
analogy. The old roots representing generic attributes merely
require recombination to express a novel object. Growth of
language and intellectual power will proceed concomitantly,
for they act and react upon each other.

Readings. — On Emotional Activity, see Das Gemidh tend das Gefuhls-
vermogen der neuren Psychologie, von J. Jungmann, S.J. Dr. Gutberlet
handles the matter from a different point of view, op. cit. pp. igg —
229; On Language and Emotional Expression, ibid. 116 — 128;
J. Gardair's, Les Passions et la Volonte, pp. 6 — 250, contains a good
exposition of the scholastic doctrine. Portions of Dr. M'Cosh's
Emotions are useful.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Book II.
Rational Psychology.

CHAPTER XXI.

SUBSTANTIALITY, IDENTITY, SIMPLICITY, AND
SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

Scope of Rational Psychology. — We have
hitherto been chiefly studying the character of our
several mental activities, and the modes of their
exercise ; we now pass on to inquire into the nature
of the principle from which they proceed. The
aim of Rational, Metaphysical, or Philosophical
Psychology, is to penetrate to the source of the
phenomena of consciousness. It endeavours to
ascertain the inner constitution of the subject ot
our psychical states, and to discover the relations
subsisting between this subject and the body. In
a word, Philosophical Psychology seeks to learn
what may be gathered by the light of reason
regarding the nature, origin, and destiny of the
human soul.

46o RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Its Importance. — The importance of such a study
is evident. What are we ? Whence come we ? How
ought we to hve ? What is there to hope for ? These
have ever been questions of transcendent interest to man-
kind ; and never more so than at the present day. Beside
these problems, unless in so far as they may throw
light on them, the discussions of Empirical Ps3^chology
sink into comparative insignificance. Yet the great
majority of recent English text-books on Psychology
affect to ignore these matters altogether. Or, if they
allude to them, the}^ do so \vith a shame-faced profuse-
ness of apology which is not a little amusing. The
naturalist, the physiologist, the ph3^sicist, ma}^ speculate
at length about the nature and future destiny of man's
soul ; but if a writer on the Science of the Human
Mind ventures to touch on topics so alien to his subject
and so unbecoming his character, unless, indeed, in
order to show that there is no soul and no future, his
reputation as a psychologist is at once ruined, and he is
stigmatized as a " metaphysician"! The unsatisfactori-
ness of such a course ought now to be plain to our
readers. The first part of this work, whatever be its
positive value, ought to have at least proved that it is
impossible to separate the investigation of our mental
activities from Philosophy — that an unphilosophical psy-
chology is necessarily an inconsistent, and therefore an
unscientific psychology. Our views concerning the exist-
ence of an external world, the nature of the higher
faculties of the soul, human responsibility, causalit}',
and the final question of materialism or spiritualism,
must inevitably be determined by the view of the
character of mental life adopted in the empirical portion
of Psychology. Once more we are forced to choose,
not between a metaphysical psychology and psychology
without any metaphysics ; but between a psycholog}^
annexed to an inconsistent, half-concealed, clandestine
metaphysics, and one that forms part of a philosophical
system which, whatever be its difficulties, is at any rate
openly professed and frankly declared.

Method. — Our method of procedure here will be
both inductive and deductive, both analytic and

THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL. 461

synthetic. We start from truths and facts already
possessed to reach others not yet known. We argue
from the effect to the cause. From the character of
those mental activities, which we have analyzed with
so much care, we shall now be able to perfect our con-
ception of the subject to which they belong. We
believe that no doctrine concerning the nature of the
soul can be satisfactorily established in the face of
modern criticism, based, as it now is, on most acute
and elaborate analyses of our conscious states, unless
that doctrine rest upon an analysis of these states not
less thorough and painstaking. And it is for this reason,
we have begun this work by so laborious and detailed
an investigation into the character of our mental
activities, especially those of thought and volition.
From what the mind does, we shall now seek to learn
what it is. From the spiritual nature of our rational
and voluntary operations, we shall show that the soul
is endowed with the attributes of simplicity and
spirituality ; or rather, that in its nature it is a simple
spiritual substantial being. When this all-important
truth has been firmly established, we shall deduce
certain other conclusions regarding the soul's origin
and destiny. It will, however, be most convenient
to begin by proving the soul to be a substantial prin-
ciple. We shall then establish its persisting indivisible
identity through life ; next its simple nature ; and after-
wards its spirituality. Each of these propositions, taken
by itself, may afford but little positive information ; and
even when they have been all combined, the synthetic
concept of the nature of the soul thus reached will still
necessarily be very imperfect and inadequate ; never-
theless, it will constitute knowledge real and valid, so
far as it goes.

Substantiality of the Human Mind or Soul. —
By the word Mind or Soid, we here understand the
siibject of our mental life, the ultimate principle by which we
feel, think, and will. A principle is that from which some-
thing proceeds, and by ultimate principle is here meant
the last ground or source of the mental activit}^ within
us. Our immediate task, therefore, is to prove that

462 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

this ultimate principle of our individual conscious life
is of a substantial nature. The notion of Substance has
been so violently attacked in modern philosophy that it
is desirable in entering upon the present question to
add some further remarks to the account already given
of this idea when deaUng with its genesis. (See p. 368.)
But for a detailed discussion of the subject we must
refer to the volume of this series on Metaphysics,

Validity of Notion of Substance. — AH being is
divided into substance and accidents. Substance is that
which exists per se — that which subsists in itself ; as
contrasted with accident, that which of its nature
inheres in another as in a subject of inhesion. The
primary element therefore in the concept of Substance
is not permanence amid change, although in the develop-
ment of the notion this feature plays an important part.
Still less is the essential note of substance the idea of
a secret substratum, concealed like ''the core of an onion "
beneath a rind of changing accidents really distinct
from itself. The Divine Being, though devoid of all
accidents and immutable from all eternity, is a perfect
Substance ; and on the other hand, an atom or an
angel created to be destroyed the next instant, would
have been a genuine substance, even if it underwent
no change during its brief existence. The assault of
modern philosophy upon the conception of substance
has been almost entirely directed against this secret
substratum or noumenon which is supposed never to reveal
itself to cognition. Accordingly, when we recall and
insist upon the old definition — id quod per se stat, — the
most plausible objections which have been raised against
this notion lose their force. ^

^ "The chief attack on substance is made precisely on the
misconception, that the inmost essence of the notion is a substratum,
hidden away under quaHties really distinct from itself, a fixed
unchangeable thing clothed in attributes, some variable, some
constant, but all, as was just said, really distinct. Such is the
interpretation of the scholastic theory by most opponents ; while
the schoolmen themselves have held up existence per sc as the
fundamental notion of substance. For, first it is clear that they
could apply no other definition to God. Moreover, even with
regard to created substance, they were aware of the enormous

THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL. 463

The Mind is a Substantial Principle. — Every
form of reality must in the last resort either subsist in
itself, that is, exist per se, or inhere in another being.
Sphericity, colour, pain, for instance, cannot subsist in
themselves ; neither can there be an infinite series of
such accidents, each being only a mode or attribute
of another; there must ultimately be something which
exists per se. Furthermore, substances really act, and
by their action make themselves known to us. Now
the last ground of our mental life, the ultimate basis
of our psychical activities must be a substantial principle.
States of consciousness, mental modifications, necessarily
presuppose a subject to which they belong. Even
assuming that they ma}' turn out to be functions of
the nervous system, or phases or aspects of cerebral
processes, they must still have their origin in a substantial
principle. Motion is unthinkable without something
that is moved. A feeling necessarily implies a being
which feels. Cognitions and passions cannot inhere in
nothing. Desires cannot proceed from nothing ; they
must have a source or a subject from which they flow.
So far even the materialist must agree with us.

Internal Experience. — Or we may appeal directly to the
testimony of internal consciousness. That I am a real being,
subsisting in myself; that I am immediately aware of myself
as the subject of sensations, feelings, and thoughts, but not
any one of them, or all of them ; that I am the cause of my
own volitions ; that I am distinct from other beings ; that
there is in me a Self — that I am an Ego which is the centre
and source of my acts and states, the ultimate ground and
subject of my thoughts and affections, is forced upon me by
constant, intimate, immediate self-experience, with the most
irresistible evidence. If it be an illusion, there is no beUef,
no cognition, however clear and certain, that can claim assent.

philosophic difficulty in the proof of what are sometimes called
'absolute accidents that are more than merely modal,' for the
demonstration of which they relied not on arguments from reason,
but upon consequences which they thought to be involved in the
Church's doctrine about the Holy Eucharist." (John Rickaby,
Metaphysics, p. 254.) "Permanence is not of the essence of substance,
any more than non-permanence or succession of accidents is of
their essence ; Kant, therefore, and Green are wrong in the leading
position which they assign to permanence." [Ihid. p. 259.)

464 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Notwithstanding his own erroneous view as to the nature
of Substance, Lotze rightly insists that the cognition of a
substantial self, is a fact of immediate experience : " It has
been required of any theory which starts without presupposi-
tions and from the basis of experience, that in the beginning
it should speak only of sensations and ideas, without mention-
ing the soul to which, it is said, we hasten without justi-
fication to ascribe them. I should maintain, on the contrary,
that such a mode of setting out involves a wilful departure
from that ivhich is actually given in experience. A mere sensation
without a subject is nowhere to be met with as a fact. It
is impossible to speak of a bare movement without thinking
of the mass whose movement it is ; and it is just as impossible
to conceive a sensation existing without the accompanying
of that which has it, — or rather, of that which feels it, for
this also is included in the given fact of experience that the
relation of the feeling subject to its feeling, whatever its other
characteristics may be, is in any case something different
from the relation of the moved element to its movement.
It is thus and thus only, that the sensation is a given fact ;
and we have no right to abstract from its relations to its
subject because this relation is puzzling, and because we
wish to obtain a starting-point which looks more convenient,
but is utterly unwarranted by experience." (Metaphysic, § 241.)

Abiding Identity of the Mind. — Having insisted
on the truth that the primary note in the concept of
substance is not the idea of a permanent secret immu-
table substratum; we now proceed to prove that, as a
matter of fact, the substantial being of the human mind
does endure throughout our mental life — that the soul is a
real unitary being ivhich abides the same during all the varying
modes of consciousness. And, although permanence amid
changing accidents is not necessarily implied in the
notion of substance, the establishment of the present
proposition will undoubtedly tend to render still more
evident the substantial nature of the Mind. The proof
rests on the evidence of internal consciousness, under-
standing this term in a broad sense, so as to include
reflective-cognition and self-conscious memory.

Reflexion and Memory. — Any process of reflec-
tive observation of our experiences brings into the most
vivid contrast the distinction between the mind as an
abiding subject and its transitory modifications, whilst it
forces upon us the real sameness of that subject with an

THE ID ENTITY OF THE SOUL. 465

evidence that is irresistible. The simplest act of jiidg-
nient, the briefest process of conscious reasoning is
possible only to a being that persists unchanged during
the interval required to pass from subject to predicate,
from premisses to conclusions. But the necessary con-
tinuity of the agent becomes more obvious in the
exercise of deliberate recollection. Memory, in a certain
sense, is involved in every retrospective operation ;
indeed, it is an essential condition of every act of
knowledge which extends beyond the mere present
sensation ; but the assurance it affords concerning some
past experiences is not less than that which we possess
in regard to present events. I am indubitably certain
that I rose from bed this morning, that I breakfasted,
that I have written the first words of the sentence
which I am now continuing, that I was in Liverpool
last winter, and the like. When I now turn to analyze
introspectively these remembrances, I perceive that
they all imph'citly involve the identification of my
present self with the self of these past experiences.
But this would be impossible were the mind merely
a succession of states, or were the material organism
the substantial principle in which these states inhere.
The constituent elements of the latter, it is a well-
established physiological fact, are completely changed
in a comparatively short time ; and fleeting mental acts
which did not inhere in a permanent subject, could as
little result in this self-conscious recollection, as could
the disconnected cognitions of successive generations of
men. The unity of consciousness establishes an essential unity
of being. It is only a real unitary being, persisting the
same amid transitory states, that can afford an adequate
basis for the fact of remembrance. Margerie, therefore,
rightly maintains : " The condition necessar}^ for the
act of recollection, is the identity of the being who
remembers, with that being whose former states are
recalled by memory. To remember experiences of
another would be to remember having been somebody else :
in other words, to simultaneously affirm and deny one's
own identity, a pure and absurd contradiction."^

'^ Philosophie Contemporaine, p. 140.
EE

466 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Apart, however, from memory, self-consciousness, strictly
understood, discloses to me only the present existence of the
Ego in my various operations. It does not reveal my past
history, nor assure me of the identity of the man sitting here
with the boy who was at a certain school many years ago.
Mistake is therefore possible with respect to some past events
owing to accidental aberrations of memory. But this in no
way invalidates our argument. A single certain recollection
would be siijficient to prove the persisting identity of the mind as a
real being. Lotze has written well : " We come to understand
the connexion of our inner life only by referrmg all its events
to the one Ego lying unchanged alike beneath its simultaneous
variety and its temporal succession. Every retrospect of the
past brings with it this image of the Ego as the combining
centre ; our ideas, our feelings, our efforts are comprehensible
to us only as its states or energies, not as events floating
unattached in a void. And yet we are not incessantly making
this reference of the internal manifold to the unity of the
Ego. It becomes distinct only in the backward look which we
cast over our life with a certain concentration of collective
attention. ... It is not necessary and imperative that at
every moment and in respect to all its states a Being should
exercise the unifying efficiency put within its power by the
unity of its nature. ... If the soul, even if but rarely, but
to a limited extent, nay, but once be capable of bringing
together variety into the unity of consciousness, this slender
fact is sufficient to render imperative an inference to the
indivisibility of the Being by which it can be performed." **

Simplicity of the Soul. — In establishing the per-
manent identity of the mind we have proved that it is
not composed of a series of successive events or states.
By affirming its simplicity we mean to affirm that it is
not composed of separate parts or diverse principles of
any kind ; consequently that it is not extended.* The

3 Microcosnms, Bk. II. c. i. § 4. The student must be careful not
to conceive the tuiity of consciousness in this sense as opposed to the
doctrine of the ultimate duality of consciousness in External Percep-
tion. (Cf. p. 106.)

^ The schoolmen expressed this attribute — absence of extension
or composition of integrant parts — by the term quantitative simplicity.
The fact that the soul is not the result of a plurality of principles
coalescing to form a single nature (as e.g., in their view the formal
and material principles of all corporeal objects) they signified by
asserting that it is essentially simple — simplex quoad essentiam. Our
proof equally excludes all forms of composition, that of extended

THE SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL. 467

method of proof is the same — from the indivisible unity
of consciousness ; and the present proposition is really
demonstrated by the last argument. But the impossi-
bility of the ultimate source of our conscious life being
a composite substance will become clearer if we con-
sider the character of some particular mental acts, and
try to realize what is involved in the supposition that
they proceed from such a substance.

(i) The Simplicity of Intellectual Ideas. — Our experience
teaches us that we can form various abstract ideas,
such as those of Being, Unity, Truth, Virtue, and the
like, which are of their nature simple indivisible acts.
Now, acts of this sort cannot proceed from an extended
or composite substance, such as, for instance, the hvain.
This will be seen by a little reflexion. In order that
the indivisible idea of, say, Truth, be the result of the
activity of this extended substance, either different
parts of the idea must belong to different parts of the
brain, or each part of the brain must be subject of an
entire idea, or the whole idea must pertain to a single
part of the brain. The first alternative is clearly
absurd. The act by which the intellect apprehends
virtue, being, and the like, is an indivisible thought. It
is directly incompatible with its nature to be allotted
or distributed over an aggregate of separate atoms.
But the second alternative is equally impossible. If
different parts of the composite substance were each
the basis of a complete idea, we should have at the
same time not one, but several ideas of the object.
Our consciousness, however, tells us this is not the case.
Lastly, if the whole idea were located in one part or
element of the composite substance, this part should
itself be composite or simple. If the latter, then our
thesis — that the ultimate subject of thought is indi-
visible— is estabhshed at once. If the former, then the
old series of impossible alternatives will recur again
until we are finally forced to the same conclusion.

parts as well as that of separate unextended principles, whether
homogeneous or heterogeneous. The unity of consciousness is in-
compatible with a multiplicity of. component elements, of whatever
kind.

468 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

(2) The Simplicity of the Intellectual Acts of Judgment ami
Inference. — A similar line of reasoning applies here. The
simplest judgment supposes the comparison of two distinct
ideas, which must be simultaneously apprehended by one
indivisible agent. Suppose the judgment, " Science is useful,"
to be elicited. If the Subject which apprehends the two
concepts " science " and " useful " is not indivisible, then we
must assume that one of these terms is apprehended by one
part and the other by a second ; or else that separate
elements of the divisible Subject are each the seat of both
ideas. In the former case, however, we cannot have any
judgment at all. The part a apprehends " science, "_ the
different part h conceives the notion " useful," but the indi-
visible act of comparison requiring a single agent who
combines the two ideas is wanting, and we can no more have
the affirmative predication than if one man thinks " science,"
and another forms the concept " useful." In the second
alternative, if a and h each simultaneously apprehended both
"science" and " useful," then we should have not one but
a multiplicity of judgments. The simplicity of the inferential
act by which we seize the logical sequence of a conclusion,
is still more irreconcilable with the hypothesis of a composite
Subject. The three judgments — Every y isz ; every x is y ;
therefore, every x is z — could no more constitute a syllogism
if they proceeded from a composite substance than if each
proposition was apprehended alone by a separate man.

This good old argument has also been adopted by Lotze :
" Any comparison of two ideas, which ends by our finding
their" contents like or unlike, presupposes the absolutely
indivisible unity of that which compares them ; it must be
one and the same thing which first forms the idea of «, and
then that of h, and which at the same time is conscious of the
nature and extent of the difference between them. Then
again the various acts of comparing ideas and referring them
to one another are themselves in turn reciprocally related ;
and this relation brings a new activity of comparison to
consciousness. And so our whole inner world of thoughts
is built up, not as a mere collection of manifold ideas existing
with or after one another, but as a work in which these
individual members are held together and arranged by the
relating activity of this single pervading principle. This is
what we mean by the Unity of Consciousness. It is this we
regard as sufficient ground for assuming an indivisible soul."^
' (3) TJie Indivisibility of Volition. — The same line of argument

5 Metaphysics, § 241. Cf. Balmez. op. cit. Bk, XI. c. ii. ; also our
:itation, pp. 245—247.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL. 469

as in the case of judgment establishes the simplicity of the
soul from the unity of consciousness presented in acts of
will. An indivisible act of choice cannot be elicited by an
assemblage of distinct parts or principles.^ But we may
leave the development of the proof to the reader.

We have thus shown that the soul cannot be formally
extended, tliat it cannot have parts outside of parts after the
manner of a material substance. But this does not exclude
the possibility of what is sometimes termed virtual extension —
that attribute in virtue of which an energy indivisible in itself
may yet exert its influence throughout an extended sphere.

The Spirituality of the Soul. — We now pass on
to demonstrate that the soul is spiritual or immaterial.
The attribute of spirituality is sometimes confounded
with that of simplicity, but they ought to be carefully
distinguished. By saying that a substance is simple we
mean that it is not a resultant or product of separate
factors or parts. By affirming that it is spiritual or
immaterial^ we signify that in its existence, and to some
extent in regard to its operations, it is independent of
matter. The principle of life in the lower animals was
held by the schoolmen to be in this sense an example of
a simple principle which is nevertheless not spiritual,
since it is altogether dependent upon the organism, or,
as they saXd, completely immersed in the body. St. Thomas,
accordingly, speaks of the corporeal souls of brutes.

The Human Soul is a Spiritual Substance. —
The proof may be stated briefly thus : The human soul
is the subject or source of various spiritual activities ;
but the subject or source of spiritual activities must
be itself a spiritual being ; therefore the soul must be
a spiritual being. The minor premiss is merely a
particular application of the axiom, that the operation
of an agent follows its nature — actio sequituv esse. As the
being is, so must it act. The establishment of the
general truth of this principle is a problem for Meta-
physics ; but all that is necessary for our purpose
becomes evident on a little careful consideration of the
axiom. An effect cannot transcend its cause : no action
can contain more perfection or a higher order of reality

*> Cf. Margerie, pp. 15, seq. ; and Balmez, op. cit. Bk. IX. § 76.

470 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

than is possessed by the being which is the entire
source of that action. If. then, a mental activity can
be shown not to be exerted by a material organ, or to
be in any degree independent of a material organ, the
principle from which that activity proceeds must be
similarly independent. It is positively unthinkable that
whilst the soul depended as regards its whole being on
the organism, it should still in some of its exercises be
in any way independent of the organism. If, accord-
ingly, any activities of the soul are spiritual, then the
soul itself is spiritual." For the proof of the propo-
sition that we are endowed with activities of a spiritual
or immaterial kind we have only to refer to the results
established in chapters xii. and xix. where we showed
both Intellect and Will to be intrinsically independent
of the body. We shall, however, here recall some of
the facts which manifest the truth of our thesis :

I. The Spirituality of TJionght. — We are capable of
apprehending and representing to ourselves abstract
and universal ideas, such as justice, unity, man,
triangle ; we can form notions of spiritual being, e.g.,

"' Cf. Coconnier : " U operation suit I'etre et liii est proportionnee
. . . M. Biichner reconnait formellement la valeur de cette formule,
quand il ecrit : ' La theorie positiviste est forcee de convenir que
/ 'ejfet doit repondre a la cause, et qu'ainsi des effets compliques doivent
supposer, a un certain degre, des combinaisons de matieres com-
pliquees.' M. Karl Vogt . . . quand il dit : ' Kncore faut il pourtant
que la fonction soit proportionclle a Vorganisation et mesuree par clle.'
M. Wundt . . . quand il dit : ' Nous ne pouvons mesurer directe-
ment ni les causes productrices des phenomenes, ni les forces
productrices des mouvements, ?;/a?s nous pouvons les mesurer par leurs
effets.' C'est a dire qu'aujourd'hui comme autrefois tout le monde
reconnait qu'on peut juger de la nature d'un etre par son operation.
Telle operation, telle nature ; tel effet, telle cause ; telle fonction
tel organe ; tel mouvement, telle force; telle maniere d'agir, telle
maniere d'etre. Ainsi parlent, dans tons les siecles et par tout pays,
la raison et la science. Done, si un etre a une operation a laquelle
seul il s'eleve, a laquelle seul il puisse atteindre, qu'il accomplisse
comme agent isole, degage libre, transcendant, cet etre doit avoir
une existence transcendante libre degagee et qui appartienne en
propre a sa nature. Or, en regardant I'ame humaine, je lui trouve
une semblable operation ; je lui vois, a un moment, cette maniere
d'agir libre, transcendante degagee de la matiere. . . . C'est quand
I'ame humaine pense, et quand elle prend conscience d'elle-meme et
de sa pensee." (L'Aiue humaine, Existence et Nature, pp. 123 — 125.)

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL. 471

of God ; we can understand necessary truths ; we can
comprehend possibilities as such ; and we can perceive
the rational relations between ideas, and the logical
sequence of conclusion from premisses. But we have
shown that such operations as these are spiritual
phenomena, which must accordingly proceed from a
spiritual faculty. They could not be states of a faculty
exerted through, or intrinsically dependent on, a bodily
organ. A power of this kind can only react in response
to physical impressions, and can only form representa-
tions of a concrete character, depicting contingent
individual facts. But universality, possibility, logical
sequence, general relations, do not constitute such a
physical stimulus, and consequently could not be appre-
hended by an organic faculty. Accordingly, these
higher mental functions must be admitted to be of a
spiritual character ; they thus transcend the sphere of
all actions depending intrinsically or essentially by their
nature on a material instrument.

This same argument is recently adopted by as competent an
authority on cerebral physiology as Professor Ladd. He thus
writes : " The existence which we call ' the mind ' is never
known — even when observed in its most exalted states and in
the exercise of its most spiritual activities — as released
wholly from bodily functions. ... At the same time, in all
forms of knowledge, and especially in self-knowledge, with
its equipment of realized aesthetical and ethical sentiments,
and of self-conscious choices, the mind manifests and knows
itself as manifesting an existence in some sort independent of
the bodily organism. With no mere figure of speech we are
compelled to say, every mind thus transcends completely, not
only the powers of the cerebral mechanism by springing into
another order of phenomena, but also the very existence, as
it were, of that mechanism by passing into regions of space,
time, causality, and ideality, of various kinds, uiieie the terms
that apply to the existence and activity of the cere[)ral
centres have absolutely no meaning whatever. For example,
the human mind anticipates the future and predicts, on a
basis of experience in the past, the occurrences which lanll
be but are not now. Into this future, which is itself the
product of its own imagining and thinking, it projects its own
continued and yet characteristically altered existence, as well
as the continued similar existence of things. But the existence
of the brain, and of its particular forms of nerve commotion,

472

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

is never other than a purel}^ here-and-now existence. This
physical existence is, therefore, transcended in an absolnte
way by every such activity of the mind. Moreover, all supra-
sensuous knowledge, as such, enforces the same conviction as
to a potential independency of the mind, inferred upon the
basis of an actual experience with mental activities in the
way of transcending the sphere of the correlated being and
activities of the brain. For all (supra-sensuous ?) knowledge is
of the universaL In knowing, the mind moves in the sphere
of so-called ' law,' of ' genera,' and ' species,' of ' relations
common ' to many individuals, of the ' categories,' of the true
for all spaces and all times and all circumstances. But the
existence of the brain is never more than concrete and
individual ; its being is at every instant precisely such and
no other — so many countless atoms of oxygen, hydrogen,
nitrogen, &c., combined in precisely such proportions."^

2. Self-Consciousness. — The reflex operation exhibited in
the act of self-consciousness, is also of a spiritual or supra-
organic order, and cannot be the activity of a faculty
essentially dependent on a corporeal agent. The peculiar
nature of this aptitude, so fundamentally opposed in kind to
all the properties of matter, has been already gone into at
such length (pp. 23S — 242), that we can afford but little space
for the subject here. We shall, however, call attention to
that aspect of this familiar phenomenon which has often been
recognized by thoughtful minds to be the most wonderful fact
in the universe. In the act of self-consciousness there occurs
an instance of the complete or perfect reflexion of an indi-
visible agent back on itself. I recognize an absolute identitj'
between myself thinking about something, and myself
reflecting on that thinking Self. The Ego reflecting and the
Ego reflected upon is the same : it is at once subject and object.
An action of this sort is not merely nnlike the known qualities
of bodies : it stands in direct and open conflict with all the
most fundamental characteristics of matter. It is in absolute
contradiction with the essential nature of matter. One part
of a material substance may be made to act upon another,
one atom may attract, repel, or in various ways influence
another, but the assumption that one atom can act upon itself
— that precisely the same portion of matter can be agent and
patient in its own case — is repugnant to all that either
common experience or physical science teaches us. If then
this unity of agent and patient, of subject and object, is so
contrary to the nature of matter, assuredly an activity every
element of which is intrinsically dependent on a corporeal
organ cannot be capable of self-reflexion.

8 Philosopliy of Mind, pp. 400, 401.

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL. 473

_ . . . _ _^

3. The Will. — The interest attached to the discussion
of the freedom of the will is chiefly due to the bearin.i^
of that doctrine on the nature of the human mind. If
any of man's vohtions are free, if tlie}' are not the out-
come of the forces playing upon him, then there must
be within him an inner centre of causahty, an internal
agent, a nucleus of energy, enjoying at least a limited
independence of the organism. The argument based
on voluntary action may, however, start from two dis-
tinct points of view :

(a) A merely sentient agent — one whose whole
being is immersed in material conditions — can onl}'"
desire sensible goods. It can only seek what is pro-
portioned to its nature, and this is always reducible to
organic pleasure or avoidance of pain. On the other
hand, to a spiritual creature which is endowed also
with inferior faculties, both sensuous and supra-
sensuous good is adapted. Therefore, the aspirations
of the latter are unlimited, while those of the former
are confined within the sphere of material well-being.
But our own consciousness, history, biography, and the
existence of poetry and romance, all overwhelm us with
evidence of the fact that man is moved by supra-
sensible good. Love of justice, truth, virtue, and right
for its own sake, are motives and impulses which
have inspired some of the greatest and noblest works
chronicled in the narrative of the human race. Con-
sequently, there must be in man a principle not
completely subject to material conditions.

(/;) Again : we are free ; we are capable of self-
determination ; but no organic faculty can determine
itself. Such an action, as we have already insisted,
is repugnant to the essential nature of matter. On the
other hand, were our volitions not spiritual, were they,
as our opponents allege, merely subjective phases or
mental states inseparably bound up with organic pro-
cesses ; did they not proceed from a principle in some
degree independent of matter, their moral freedom would
be impossible ; and man would be devoid of responsi-
bility and incapable of moralit}'.

CHAPTER XXII.

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO.

Since the unity of consciousness exhibited in the
mind's reflex cognition of itself as a real abiding
indivisible being plays so important a part in the
theses which we have just estabhshed concerning
the nature of the soul, this seems to be the most
appropriate place to examine some of the chief
attacks which have been made in modern times
upon the doctrine which we defend.

Kant's Theory of the Ego.— We have already (pp. 267—
269) indicated and criticized the nature of Kant's attack on
rational psychology — his attempted distinction between a
noumenal and phenomenal Ego, his doctrine that we have
no knowledge of the mind as a thing-in-itself, that we are
merely aware of the formal unity of consciousness, and that
this phenomenal Ego is not a real subject, certainly not a
substance subsisting in itself. Here we have space to make
but one or two additional observations. The appUcation to
the mind's perception of itself of the hypothesis of an illusory
subjective formal element in cognition, and the attempt to
distinguish the empirical Ego of conscious experience from a
supposed unknowable noumenal Ego, are untenable. Even
were the Kantian distinction between noumenon 2ind phenomenon
valid with respect to objects of the extra-mental world, it is
only by misconceiving the character of the knowledge derived
from self-consciousness that this distinction can be extended
to the mind's cognition of itself or of its states. The external
thing, which is different in kind from the mind, is known
by the latter through a mental modification which might
conceivably mislead as to the nature of its cause. But con-

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO 475

scionsness affords at all events an immediate knowledge both
of my states and of myself in those states. There is no room
for appearances or phenomena here ; the mind, the object
of knowledge, is really immediately /'r^s^n^ to itself. I do not
merely apprehend transitory mental states which I am led
to ascribe to an unknown substance or cause. I am conscious
that I originate, direct, and inhibit my mental activity.
I am immediately cognizant of my own causality — of my
concrete self as energizing or suffering in my thought. More-
over, although I never can have an intuition of a naked
" pure Ego " stripped of all particular forms of behaviour,
yet by careful repeated internal observation of how the
concrete self behaves, combined with rational deduction from
evident principles, I can establish certain truths concerning
the nature of this self of which I am directly cognizant in
the concrete. I can, for instance, prove — under the sanction
of scepticism — that it must be a real, abiding, indivisible
being, not wholly evanescent ; that some of its activities
cannot have their ultimate source in an extended material
thing, and the like. I do not pretend to demonstrate any-
thing, nor do I feel much concern, about any unknowable
noumenon which never reveals itself in my consciousness.
If there be in existence an inscrutable " transcendental Ego "
eternally screened from my ken by this self-asserting
" empirical Ego," I confess I feel very little interest either in
the nature or the welfare of the former. The only soul about
which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its acts,
which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and hopes.^

Empiricist Theory. — The chief assault, however, on
the conscious unity of the mind, as a real abiding being,
especially in English philosophical literature, is that of
Hume and the Associationist school. Moreover, since
the doctrine of these writers in a slightly modified form
has been recently adopted by Professor James, at least,
as an adequate psychological account of the facts,
and then converted into a metaphysical basis of opera-
tions whence to attack the traditional belief in a sub-
stantial spiritual soul, it is incumbent on us to examine
these views at some length.

Hume, having reduced all known reality to a
succession of transitory feelings, was logically forced to
deny the presence of any real abiding mind, persisting

1 For some useful criticism of Kant's theory, of. Balmez, op. cit.
Book IX. CO. 9 — 12 ; and Lotze, Metaphysic, § 244.

476 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

the same amid varying states. The idea of a permanent
self, he argues, is not derived from any sensuous
impression, therefore it is a "fiction" of the imagi-
nation ; for, on Sensist principles, the only ideas which
can pretend to any validity are those derived from
impressions : '* I venture to affirm of the rest of mankind
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection ot
different perceptions which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and
movement. The mind is a kind of theatre where
several perceptions successively make their appearance.
. . . There is properly no simplicity in it at one time,
nor identity in different ; whatever natural propension
we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.
The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us,
they are the successive perceptions only that constitute
the mind."- Hume is the frankest as well as the
ablest representative of sensationalist phenomenism ;
but Mill, Bain, Ribot, Taine, and the rest of the school
accept this conclusion, and are unanimously agreed
that the mind is nothing more than a succession of
conscious states.

Criticism. — That this dissolution of the Ego into
a procession or series of phenomena constitutes a
nductio ad ahsnrdiim of Sensism, will, we trust, be evident
to the reader who has followed our reasoning in the
last chapter. The argument may be summarized in
a few words. If the mind were but a succession of
evanescent states, judgment, reasoning, self-conscious
reflexion would be absolutely impossible. The judicial
act requires the indivisible unity of the agent who
juxtaposes the terms; reasoning is not possible unless
the premisses successively apprehended be combined
by one and the same simple energy ; and lastly, self-
conscious reflexion and rational memory impl}- the
persistence of a real abiding subject which can compare
the past state with the present. (See pp. 464 — 466.)

Mill felt this difficulty. He saw that in rejecting
the doctrine that the Ego is something more than a
succession of states he was forced to accept "the

- Treatise op Human Nature, Part IV. § 6.

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 477

paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series
of feehngs is aware of itself as a series.'''^ He, however,
abandons the hopeless attempt to remove the "■ paradox,"
naively counselling us that " by far the wisest thing we
can do is to accept the fact."

Criticism. — The term " paradox " is here abused,
''paroxysmal unintelligibility " — the phrase in which
Professor James so energetically describes another
theor}^ — is scarcely too strong for the doctrine that
the mind is merely a series of feelings which are aware
of themselves as a series. We must not deceive our-
selves with words. What is a series ? It is a succession
of distinct events, or several separate events succeeding
each other. The terms, a " thread of consciousness,"
and a " series " of mental states, seem to indicate a
unity of some sort to which, loose though it be, the
self of the Empiricist Psychology has no claim. The
moment we attempt to conceive accurately what is
meant by a mere succession of conscious states, we
perceive that a conviction of personal identity, and a
memory of past actions, such as each man's own
experience assures him he is possessed of, is absolutely
impossible to it.-^ On the other hand. Mill is again
wrong in representing his opponents as teaching that
" the mind or Ego is something different from any
series of feelings or possibilities of them," if by
" different " is meant that the Ego is something
separate, standing out of all relation to its states.
The states are nothing but modifications of the Ego ;
and the true mind is the subject plus its states ; or the
subject present in its states. It is " an abiding exist-
ence with a series of feelings."^

W. James's Theory. — Though characterizing
Mill's treatment of the subject as "the definitive bank-

'^ Exam, cxxii. ad fin.

■* As Mr. Courtney urges, "Such a series could never be summed."
{Metaphysics of Mill, p. 70.) Similarly Professor Knight, " A succes-
sion of states of mind has no meaning except in relation to the
substrate of self that underlies the succession, giving it coherence,
identity, and intelligibility. The states are different, but the self —
whose states they are — is the same." {Hume, p. 177.)

^ Cf. M'Cosh's Exam, of Mill, c. v.

478 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

ruptcy of the associationist description of the con-
sciousness of self," "^ Professor James advocates the same
doctrine in but sHghtly modified shape. He disapproves
of the associationist account, which represents personal
identity, as formed " by successive thoughts and feelings
in some inscrutable way ' integrating ' or gumming
themselves together on their own account."" Instead,
he teaches that the Self consists of " a stream of con-
sciousness," in which each " section " knows the pre-
vious section, and in it all which went before. He
summarily discards the notion of an abiding indivisible
substantial soul connecting past states with present, as
needless and useless to the Psychologist.^ For him
" The passing Thought is itself the thinker, and
psychology need not look beyond." " The I or Self
is a Thought at each moment different from the last
moment, but appvopviative of the latter, together with all
the latter, called its own."^ It is true, that " common
sense insists there must be a real proprietor in the case
of these selves (successive thoughts), or else their actual
accretion in a personal consciousness would never take
place. . . . This proprietor is the present, remembering
'judging thought' or the identifying 'section' of the
stream. . . . This is what collects and owns some
of the facts which it surveys and disowns the rest."
To help us to understand how this interesting " appro-
priation " of the past self or total collection of thoughts
by the present Thought is effected in the absence of any
real connecting being, he continues : " We can imagine
a long succession of herdsmen coming rapidl}' into pos-
session of the same cattle by transmission of an original
title by bequest. May not the ' title ' of a collective
self be transmitted from one Thought to another in
some analogous way ? It is a patent fact of conscious-
ness that a transmission like this actually occurs. . . .
Each Thought dies away and is replaced by another.
The other knows its own predecessor. Each later
Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts
which went before, is the final receptacle — and appro-
priating them is the final owner — of all they contain and
« Principles, vol. i. p. 359. ' P. 338. ^ pp ^j^._^^,^^ y p ^qi.

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 479

own. Eacli Thought is thus born an owner and dies
owned, transmitting whatever it reahzed as its Self to
its later proprietor." ^^

Criticism. — The suggested emendations on the associ-
ationist " gumming " hypothesis are : (i) The likening of
conscious life to a " stream " rather than to " a series of
states;" (2) the substitution of the statement that "the last
section of consciousness cognizes its predecessor, and in that
predecessor every previous cognition," instead of the state-
ment that the " series is aware of itself as a series ; " (3) the
suggested method of " inheritance " or " appropriation " of
past selves or states by the present state, instead of their
gumming themselves by association.

As regards (i), it may be fairly objected from the stand-
point of experience, on which Mr. James himself insists so
much, that the representation of conscious life as " a series of
states " is, in one important respect, more accurate than the
conception of it as a " stream." It is not continuous, but
interrupted by periods of unconsciousness. (See p. 366.) This
objection is not merely verbal : its force will become more
evident as we proceed. But we maintain that actual psycho-
logical experience presents to us more than thoughts or states of
consciousness, whether as a series or as a stream — that we
have an immediate apprehension of a real self in some
thoughts and states which is not those thoughts or states.
(See pp. 463, 464.)

(2) The assertion that "the present Thought knows and
appropriates its predecessor," is more plausible at first sight
than the proposition that " the series knows itself as a series."
For a series evidently has not the unity needful to a Knower
or an Owner ; whilst the Thought possesses the unity of a
single act by which an agent ma}^ cognize a previous thought.
(a) Still, even supposing that the present thought could,
without a connecting subject or agent, cognize in some degree
its predecessor, it is not true that that predecessor really
knew and included all that went before. It can hardly be
maintained — especially by Mr. James, who is so emphatically
opposed to the admission of any unconscious state of mind —
that every mental state can really know a vast multitude of
things of which it is absolutely unconscious. In what
intelligible sense can it be alleged that the section of the
" stream " of my consciousness extending back over the last
half-minute really contained The Charge of the Six Hundred,
which I possibly could now repeat, though I have not recited

Pp- 3^8. 339.

48o RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

it for ten years past ? Were my present passing Thought the
only thinker within me, even if it could apprehend and
appropriate all contained " in the pulses of my cognitive
consciousness " for the last three months, the Greek and
Mathematics I learned in early life would be lost for ever.

(b) But the statement that the mere " present Thought "
is the Thinker, the Owner who recognizes identity between
the present state of consciousness and its ininiediate but
extinct predecessor is also exposed to all the main difficulties
which have proved fatal to Hume and Mill. " Pulses of
cognitive consciousness " as like as successive images of a
man in a lookmg-glass might follow one after another in the
same brain without one state being able to identify itself
with the antecedent state. Whether they succeed each other
immediately like passengers in an omnibus, or at intervals like
lodgers in the same bed of a hotel, makes no difference. In
order that any one " pulsation '' be recognized as like or
unlike even its immediate predecessor, the two pulsations
must be apprehended by one indivisible agent, who abiding
the same, cognizes both, and assimilates or dissociates them.
The necessity of this permanent subject for even the simplest
acts of intellectual judgment has been shown already (p. 465). ^^

(c) The insufficiency of this theory which claims to " find
place for all the experiential facts unencumbered by any
hypothesis save that of passing states of mind," becomes
still clearer when brought face to face with the " experiential
fact " of periods of sleep, swooning, epileptic attacks, and
the like. When I av/oke this morning, the last previous
" pulse of my cognitive consciousness " in possession of
Mr. James's doctrine had been extinct, dead, and buried for
over six hours, yet I speedily became aware that the TJiinker
who had laboured on the subject was still present and alive
within me. It would be interesting to learn by what " verifiable
experience " it can be shown that there was, during my sleep,
a continuous stream of "judging Thoughts " or " pulsations
of cognitive consciousness," each before it died handing over
to its successor the contents of Mr. James's hundred pages.
This difficulty is still further increased by the phenomena of
" double consciousness " to which we shall return.

(3) It is scarcely necessary to criticize the analog}^ sug-
gested with respect to the " inheritance " or " appropriation "

^1 James admits that his theory " must beg memory." (p. 539.)
But this is precisely what it has no right to beg ; especially when, as
we shall see presently, this psychologist attacks the pcymaiient soul as
needless, on the ground that his own theory gives a suffieient account of
the facts ! The truth is, consistent phenomenism is just as impossible in
empirical psychology as it certainly is in physical science.

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 4S1

of past " selves " by the present Thought. The reader can
easily think out for himself the impossibilities involved. The
transmission of " ownership " of a herd of cattle through a
succession of herdsmen is possible, because the cattle are
permanent objects which exist during the transmission,
because they are distinct and separable from their dying
owners, and because the ownership in virtue of which a man
can legally buy and sell his cows is different in kind from his
" ownership " of his own past existence.

(4) Finally to compare the theories of Mill and James :
In a psychological analysis of the cognition of our personal
identity an account has to be given of two things — the
knowing agent and the object known. Mill's proposition that
the knowing agent is " a series of states," James easily shows
to be absurd ; whilst his own statement that each single act
of knowledge is the knowing agent, possesses, as we have
observed, a certain superficial plausibility. But when we turn
to the account of the object known — the entire past experi-
ence of the agent — the situation is completely reversed.
That the whole collective existence of a person is reahzed
and known by, or rather in the course of, his entire series of
conscious states is, it might be urged, "verified by experience."
But the doctrine that each "pulse of cognitive conscious-
ness," whether waking or sleeping, appropriates, contains,
and possesses the life history of the individual, Mill could
fairly retort, is one of those hypotheses which its own author
elsewhere describes as " paroxysmal unintelligibilities." _

Conclusion. — After reflecting on these two empiricist
theories of personal identity, the reader will probably con-
clude that the vulgar " common-sense" account of the matter
is not to be so summarily disposed of as Professor James
implies. That account, which has survived the attacks of
many centuries, maintains that the same real, abiding, indi-
visible being, the " soul " which was the subject of my past
experiences, still exists within me; and that owing to the
modifications it underwent in those experiences, it possesses
the power to reproduce many of them — not all simultaneously,
but in succession — and to recognize them along with its own
identity in successive thoughts.

James's attack on the Soul.— Having examined
the adequacy of the Harvard professor's account of
our mental experience, it will now be easier to estimate
the worth of his objections against the vulgar "common
sense" doctrine. For it must not be forgotten that
the force of these difficulties depends mainly on the
FF

482 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

sufficiency of the rival explanation of the unity of
consciousness. The psychologist — even the scientific
psychologist — must choose some coherent theory of con-
scious life. The question to be decided is : Which is
the most rational interpretation of the facts ?

1. In the first place, then, James argues, the
hypothesis of a substantial soul is quite unnecessary in
Psychology. " /^ is needless for expressing the actual subfeciive
phenomena of consciousness as they appear. We have formu-
lated them all without its aid by the supposition
of a stream of thoughts, each substantially different
from the rest, but, cognitive of the rest and appro-
priative of each other's content. . . . The unity, the
identity, the individuality, and the immateriality that
appear in the psychic life are thus accounted for as
phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with
no need of reference to any more simple or substantial
agent than the present Thought or * section ' of the
stream." (Op. cit. p. 344.)

Assuredly if " the unity, individuality, and identity "
of our mental life are all adequately expressed and
satisfactorily accounted for by James's theory, the
doctrine of a Soul may be dismissed as gratuitous.
If concepts, judgments, reasonings, emotions, and
recollections can be intelligibly conceived and described
without the implication of their inhering in or pertain-
ing to anything more permanent or substantial than
themselves, whether material or immaterial, then the
psychologist has no need of the hypothesis of a Soul.
But we trust we have advanced sufficient reasons to
show that this is not the case, and that neither the
''unity, individuality, nor identity" of a man's mental
life can be conceived or expressed without the impli-
cation of some more permanent unitary being within
him which is its root and source.

2. Further, he urges, even if a metaphysical hypothesis be
needed by the psychologist, that of a substantial spiritual
soul is worthless. It affords no help in rendering intelligible
anything which needs accounting for. "The bald fact is
that when the brain acts, a thought occurs. . . . What
positive meaning has the Soul when scrutinized, but the

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 483

ground oj the possibility of thought. . . . And what is the
meaning' of this ( — the statement that brain action excites
or determines this possibihty to actuahty) . . . but giving
a concrete form to one's behef that the coming of the thought
when brain-processes occur, has some sort of ground in the
nature of things? If the word Soul be understood merely
to express that claim, it is a good word to use. But if it be
held to do more, to gratify the claim,— for instance, to connect
rationally the thought which comes, with the (cerebral)
processes which occur, and to mediate intelligibly between
their two disparate natures, — then it is an illusory term."
It may be used as a provisional term like that of Substance
to express the belief that there is more in reality than a mere
phenomenon, " more than the bare fact of co-existence of a
passing thought with a passing brain-state. But we do not
answer the question ' What is that more ? ' when we say
that it is a ' Soul ' which the brain-state affects. This kind
of more explains nothing." (P. 346.)

To this objection we would reply that the formulation of
the problem needing solution, given in the proposition " the
bald fact is that when the brain acts, a thought occurs,"
ignores the very nodus of the difficulty which the Soul — or at
all events, the Soul viewed as an abiding substantial being
— is invoked to account for. That nodus is the unity of con-
sciousness throughout the whole series of thoughts zvhich go to make
up our psychic existence. The soul is not invented as a sort
of plastic medium to explain the connection between a
transitory thought and the concomitant brain-change. Belief
in a permanent substantial Mind existed long before men
knew of the existence of such cerebral processes. It is m
order to give a rational account of the connexion of thought
with thought, of the past thought which has perished with
the present which is living and the future unborn thought ;
it is to render the consciousness of our persisting identity
intelHgible that spiritualist philosophers have insisted on
the fact of an abiding substantial soul. And the permanence
of such a real individual immaterial being as basis of our
consciousness, does provide at any rate a coherent account
of each man's internal experience. On the other hand, we
venture to assert, first, that the notion of thoughts and
feehngs inhering in nothing is absurd and unthinkable ; and
secondly, that even were a succession of such psychological
monsters possible, they could never constitute that enduring
self-conscious personality which each of us calls " I."

Furthermore, we readily admit that the proposition,
" Thought is an activity of the Soul," like any other merely
verbal statement, " explains nothing," unless its terms have

484 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

been defined or are already understood. But when, after a
careful examination of all the relevant data furnished by
experience, the Soul is defined by the psychologist as A real
being, immaterial and indivisible in its nature, abiding in duration,
individual in character, the agent and source of sensation and
vital activity as well as of thought and volition, the word Soul
is assuredly not an " illusory term " vaguely expressive of the
belief that there is more in reality than the mere phenomenon.
And when the psychologist has shown that the application
of these predicates to the agent and subject of our mental
activities is justified and necessitated by the analysis of these
activities, he has provided us not with " an explanation which
explains nothing," but with the proof of the objective validity
of that conception which alone renders " the unity, the
identity, the individuality, and the immateriality, that appear
in our psychic life" intelhgible.

3. The argument for a spiritual soul deduced from the
Freedom of the Will, Professor James disposes of in summary
fashion. At best "it can only convince those who believe
in free-will ; and even they will have to admit that spontaneity
is just as possible, to say the least, in a temporary spiritual
agent like our Thought, as in a permanent one like the
supposed Soul." {Ibid. p. 346.)

The first statement is quite true, and the second partially
so. The rejection of Free-Will undoubtedly involves the
repudiation of one of the chief arguments for the spirituality
of the soul; whilst by subverting the notions of personal
merit and responsibility as universally accepted, it destroys
the principal rational ground for belief in a future life ; and
deprives of their meaning, as we have seen, many of the
chief ethical notions of mankind. Moreover, since presum-
ably God could create and then immediately destroy a
spiritual being endowed with free-will, it does not seem
impossible that " a temporary spiritual agent " might enjoy
" spontaneity." We may also speak of a volition or voluntary
election as being "free." Nevertheless the argument from
free-will retains all its force. A volition, or an act of choice, is
not " an agent," but ''the act of an agent,'' and its own freedom
consists in its being freely exerted by that agent. Now,
because an action without an agent is unthinkable, spiritualist
philosophers may postulate the soul as the cause of the action.
Further, the doctrine of Free-will teaches that our conscious-
ness reveals to us something more than "Thoughts" endowed
with " spontaneity." It dwells on the reality of deliberation,
reflexion, sustained resistance to temptation, on responsibihty
for past conduct — and especially on the rationality of remorse.
But these experiences — on some of which James himself

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 485

elsewhere so admirably insists (see p. 401) — are just the facts
for which there is no room in the theory that makes each
passing Thought the " Self." If the Soul of each man be a
real individual being persisting throughout life, which has
freely acted and formed good or bad habits in the past, there
is an intelligible foundation for the moral convictions of
mankind. But if " the only verifiable Thinker " be the passing
Thought, it is somewhat difficult to see the justice of chas-
tising the present " pulsation of consciousness " in the
Brockton murderer, for a malevolent " pulsation " long since
extinct ; nor why the present " pulsation " ought to repent for
its wicked predecessor from which it is " substantially
different." 1=^

4. Fortunately, Professor James has indicated his
own metaphysical creed as to the constitution of that
something *' more " which lies behind our mental states.
This helps us better to compare the value of the doctrine
of a spiritual substantial soul with other final explana-
tions of the basis of our mental life. " For my own
part," he tells us, *' I confess that the moment I become
metaphysical and try to define the more, I find the notion
of some sort of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to
be a more promising hypothesis, in spite of all its
difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual
souls." (Ibid. p. 346.)

Amongst the " difficulties " of this " more promising
hypothesis " we would suggest the following : [a) The
complete absence of all evidence whatsoever of the
existence of such an anima mimdi or world-soul. Con-
sciousness assures us of the reality of some sort of
anima or mind within ourselves ; and, arguing from
analogy, we ascribe a similar anima to other organisms
like our own. But obviously in the case of the material
world the parity totally fails. Nothing more unlike a
human brain or a living organism than the physical
universe could well be conceived, {b) Again, the notion
of such an anima mtmdi is incoherent in itself and in

^2 James's use of the term "verifiable," seems at times to imply
that nothing is to be admitted as real by the psychologist which is
not apprehended and "verified" by some particular sense. This
was Hume's doctrine, and leads to absolute scepticism alike in
physics, psychology, and metaphysics.

486 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

conflict with all that we actually know of the nature of
mind. This anima mundi is vaguely described as a
universal consciousness thinking in each one of us. Of
a personal consciousness we know something ; of a
universal or impersonal consciousness which is unaware
of itself, or of the various persons whom it may
constitute, we can frame no conception. The most
essential features of the mind, at least as gathered from
experience, are its tmity and individualistic character. It
reveals itself to us as ens indivisum in se sed divisum ab omni
alio — a being undivided in itself but separated off from
all other beings. What kind of a mind or soul then is
that which, unconscious of itself, is split up into a
number of other selves each unconscious of the rest ?
{c) The h3^pothesis which interprets our conscious
existence as merely a fragment of a universal mind,
would seem to be a formal acceptance of Pantheism.
It implies that our individuality is only apparent. It
would logically be forced to transfer to this universal
soul the responsibility for all our thoughts and volitions.
Indeed, in this theory we would seem to have little
more reality or personality of our own than the modes
of the Divine Substance of Spinoza. But we must not
be unjust to Professor James. We feel sure from his
other writings that he would repudiate these conclusions.
He believes in the freedom of the will ; and in his essay
on Human Immortality, he seeks to find place for a future
life; though we fanc}^ few will be satisfied with the meta-
physical speculations by which it is supported. ^^

^^ His view, as expressed in that work, seems to be that there
exists throughout the universe, or rather behind the veil of matter,
a reservoir of universal consciousness, which trickles or streams
through the brain into living beings, somewhat as water through a
tap, or light through a half-transparent lens. Each tap, or lens,
shapes or colours the incoming flow of thought with its various
individualistic peculiarities, "and when finally a brain stops acting
altogether, or decays, that special stream of consciousness which it
subserved will ^'anish entirely from this natural world. But the
sphere of being that supplied the consciousness would still be
intact ; and in that more real world with which even whilst here it
was continuous, the consciousness might, in ways unknown to us,
continue still." [Ibid. pp. 37, 38.) In addition to the difficulties

PALSE THEORIES OF THE PGO. 487

^H 11 M.i. ■-■ - ■ - ■■ ■— — ■ ■ ■■-■.■■■■ ■ » ■ ■■-■I- . .,. „- _ .1..— -— , . -,.

Double Consciousness. — Mental pathology, fre-
quently styled Psychiatry, has recently brought into
prominence certain abnormal phenomena of memory
and self-consciousness, which from their connection
with the philosophical problem of personal identity have
attracted much interest. In these cases of so-called
"double-consciousness" or "altered personality," the
unity of psychic life is ruptured and two or more
seemingly dissociated mental existences present them-
selves, sometimes in alternating sections, sometimes — it
is alleged — simultaneously in the same individual.

The celebrated case of Felida X., methodically observed
during several years by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux, will illustrate
the general character of the phenomena.^^ Born in 1843, of
hysterical tendency, she enjoyed normal health until 1857.
During that 3^ear she fell into a swoon which lasted only a
few minutes ; on recovering consciousness, however, her
whole character seemed changed. The original Felida is
described as serious, of somewhat morose and obstinate
disposition, unobservant, and of mediocre abilities, but excep-
tionally industrious. Felida 2, on the contrary, was gay and
boisterous, very sensitive and pliant, idle yet observant, and
of seemingly more than average talents. In her secondary
state Felida could remember the experiences of her previous
life, and otherwise appeared quite normal. After some months
in this condition, another attack restored her to her original
state. The dulness, sullenness, and habits of work all
suddenly returned ; but there was complete forgetfulness of
every incident which had occurred since her former fit. For
over thirty years she has now passed her life in alternate
periods of her primary and secondary states. In the " second "
condition she retains the memory of both states ; but during

above indicated in regard to the absence of evidence, and the inco-
herence of the notion of such a universal consciousness, it is
sufficient here to repeat Mr. James's complaint against the doctrine
of his opponents that " it guarantees no immortahty of a sort we
care for." It is in the perpetuity of our own personal individual
consciousness that each of us is primarily interested, not in that of
" the sphere of being " which originally provided the supply.

^^ See Revue Scientifique, May, 1876. Felida's history down to
1887 is also given by Binet, Alterations of Personality (1892), pp. 6 —
21. For other cases see also Pierre Janet, L'Automatisme psycholo-
gique (Edit. 1899), pp. 70—130, 300—350; and James, op. cit,

PP- 375—400-

4^8 kATIO^^AL PSYCHOLOGY.

-- ■ — — - - - ■ - -

the "primary" epochs there is complete amnesia respecting
the "second." Thus Fehda i was quite unaware of even
such events as the First Communion of her children and the
death of her sister-in-law, which occurred during the "reign"
of Felida 2. The " primary " periods are consequently
inconvenient and disagreeable to her, and as time has gone
on the duration of the " secondary " intervals has come
gradually to predominate. They now form her normal con-
dition. Felida has thus been endowed with hvo consciousnesses,
one of which is "split off" from the other. ]\I. Binet's
argument runs thus: "Two fundamental elements constitute
personality — memory and character," but in Felida there is
a change of character and memory, therefore " Felida is
really two moral persons ; she has really two Egos." ^^

In hypnotism a similar phenomenon is produced when a
"personality" is artificially created by suggesting to the
subject that he or she is some other personage. Occasionally
the part is remembered and consistently maintained through-
out successive hypnoses, although the experiences of the
suggested character are, it is alleged, often completely
forgotten during the waking state. In fact, the deeper forms
of the hypnotic trance constitute such a "secondary" psychic
existence " split off" from the main current. Natural or
spontaneous somnambulism gives us illustrations of the same
phenomenon.

Besides this dnaMty of successive consciousnesses the theory
of the Doppel Ich advocated by Max Dessoir and others,
insists upon the reality of at least two simultaneous conscious-
nesses, each held together by its own chain of memories, but
" split off " from each other. Various actions usually styled
automatic or reflex are maintained to be the outcome of the
" secondary consciousness." The power of distractedly
following a consecutive train of thought whilst reading aloud,
or playing an instrument, or performing other complex opera-
tions, the working of the involuntary inspiration of the poet,
abnormal " automatic writing," the struggle between reason
and appetite, the " higher " and " lower " self, as well as all
forms of sub-conscious mental activities have been claimed as
evidence of the reality of a genuine current of consciousness
"split off" from the main stream and lost to normal memory.
It is argued from these various groups of facts that the old
philosophic conception of a single unchanging Self in man
must be abandoned, that self-consciousness instead of being
a unity is really multiple, or at least double in its ultimate con-
stitution, and that our seemingly indivisible personal identity is

i^ Cf. Binet, op. cit, p. So and p, 20.

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 489

merely Si fusion of diverse factors. As M. Binet urges : " What
is capable of division must be made up of parts. If a
personality becomes double or triple it is a grouping or
resultant of many elements. "^^

Criticism. — We would first observe that the more
remarkable cases like that of Felida are extremely rare,
and that theories built on such abnormal and obscure
phenomena are necessarily very frail. At the same
time we allow that the difficulty is not solved by merely
calling such cases " abnormal ; " and, whilst admitting
the obscurity of the problem, it seems to us that the
psychologist is bound to indicate what explanation his
principles offer for such facts, when these are duly
authenticated. Unfortunately the temptation to make
such histories startling by exaggerating their abnormal
aspect betrays itself even in " scientific " reports.
Thus it is often asserted that all the events of one state
are completely forgotten in the other, yet further
inquiry discloses that a mass of common experience
such as knowledge of the meaning of language,
familiarity with persons, objects, localities, and the like,
are retained in both. On the whole, increased care in
the observation of these cases goes to connect the most
extraordinary with the normal, and also seems to prove
that in at least one of the psychic existences portion
of the experiences of the other are remembered._ This
fact alone would prove real identity of the person in both
conditions.!'^

2. With respect to the alleged alterations of the
" self," we must recall the important distinction between
the abstract notion of my personality and the perception
of my concrete self already dwelt upon. (P. 365.) We
there pointed out that besides the immediate appre-
hension of self as present in our mental activities, each
of us possesses a habitual representation of hiniself in the
form of a complex conception elaborated by intellectual

i6 Op. cit. pp. 348, 349. Similarly Ribot : "The unity of the
Ego is the cohesion of the states of consciousness." {Les Maladies de
la Personalite, ad fin.)

17 Cf. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 164—168.

490 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

abstraction. This idea presents to me a quasi objective
view of m3^self, emphasizing the states, experience, and
character by which the total Ego is externally dis-
tinguished from other persons rather than the subject
as distinguished from these states themselves. This
objective concept of self as an individual history is
based on memory. Consequently a dislocation of
memory will mutilate the conception. If, then, owing
to some cerebral malady a considerable section of my
past life is lost to remembrance, or if the present vivid
pictures of the imagination are confounded with recol-
lections, the habitual representation of my personality
will naturally be perverted. This truth is abundantly
illustrated in patients subject to "fixed ideas," and in
incipient stages of insanity. In such cases the invalid
interweaves part of his own history into that of an
imaginary character, yet is quite sane on other points,
or even realizes the erroneous character of his delusion.

3. Variations in the representation of our personality would
thus be mainly occasioned by perturbations of memory ; and
the mind's power of remembrance depends on the state of the
organism. The recurrence, in fact, of a particular set of
cerebral conditions may either re-instate or exclude a par-
ticular group of recollections. The mental changes observed
in Feiida and hypnotized subjects may therefore be accounted
for as due to alterations in the functioning of the brain
occasioned during the transition. Concerning the nature of
this change in the brain's action nothing is known. Forty
years ago it was conjectured that the two cerebral hemi-
spheres may work independently, and it has been held that
the functioning of one side corresponds to the normal Ego,
whilst that of the other is correlated with the " secondary "
self. This hypothesis has been especially urged with respect
to the curious phenomenon of intelligent unconscious " auto-
matic " writing. This rare " gift " has been ascribed to a
" subliminal " or sub-conscious Ego ; but seems to us to be
more scientifically explained as the product of semi-conscious
and reflex action. Post-mortem examinations have undoubt-
edly proved that one half of the brain has sometimes sufficed
for normal mental life ; and it has also been suggested that
other particular areas of the brain may be alternately isolated
or inhibited ; or that the blood supply is somehow varied, and
so sets the nervous mechanism in different gear. Though

FALSE THEORIES OF THE EGO. 491

destitute of proof, these hypotheses have a certain plausibiUty.
Something of the kind probably happens in falHng asleep ;
and the stories of dreams and somnambulistic performances
resumed and continued during successive nights, fit in with
the same explanation. In fact, several of the chief difficulties
of "double-consciousness" have been always familiar to
mankind in our dream experienced^

4. Changes of character are of various degrees, and often
seemingly sudden. They are simply variations in the abiding
frame of mind ; and are consequently much influenced by
bodily conditions. The complete alteration of mental tone
by bad news, by a bilious attack, or by a couple of glasses of
champagne, are well known. In cases of sudden insanity the
change in moral disposition is often extraordinary ; and that
the alternate set of cerebral conditions which presumably
succeed each other in FeUda should occasion a different
emotional and volitional tone seems natural enough. If then
it is the duty of the psychologist to seek to harmonize irregular
phenomena with normal facts, these rare specimens of mental
Hfe afford no justification for departing from the old universal
conception of a single continuous personality in man.

5. Professor James devotes much space to these " muta-
tions " of the Ego, yet overlooks the fact that they are
peculiarly fatal, not to his adversaries, but to his own theory
that "the present thought is the only thinker," and that

18 Hypotheses of locally separated brain processes— attractive
because easy to the imagination — seem to us too simple and crude
for the facts. The physiological concomitants of all higher mental
operations must be extremely complex; those of any total mental
mood must be both complex and widely diffused. Organic sensations
are important factors in all emotional moods ; and these are certainly
conditioned by widely diffused neural processes. Further, these
alleged multiple "psychic existences" in the same individual in-
variably overlap and fade into each other. According to Janet,
Leonie and Lucie have three "personalities" and Rose "at least
four." These assuredly cannot be all isolated and distinct. Conse-
quently they cannot be dependent on nervous functionings in
anatomically separate regions of the brain. The established psycho-
logical principle that a total frame of viiiid fosters recollections and
feelings related to it by contiguity or congniity inhibiting those not so
related may explain much if we conceive these alternating " person-
alities " as cases of extremely marked "frames of mind" exerting
exceptionally despotic selective power. Such abnormally distinct
and enduring mental moods would involve sets of neural conditions
of unusually distinct character ; but we think their mutations are
determined by alteration in the quality rather than in the locality of
nervous processes, — that the basis is physiological not anatomical.

492 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought
" appropriating"'' and "inheriting" the contents of its pre-
decessor. The difficulties presented to this process of
inheritance by such facts as sleep and swooning have been
already dwelt upon ; but here they are if possible increased.
The last conscious thought of, say, Felida 2 has to transmit
its gathered experience not to its proximate conscious
successor, which is Felida i, but across seven months of
vacuum until on the extinction of Felida i the next conscious
thought which constitutes FeHda 2 is born into existence. If
single personality is hard for Mr. James to explain, " double-
personality " at least doubles his difficulties.

6. As regards the asserted duality of simultaneous conscious-
nesses ; morahsts from St. Paul downward have insisted upon
the reality of the struggle between opposing conscious
activities within us — between the " higher " and the " lower "
self. The statements that " reason ought to rule in man,"
that " will can resist appetite," that " man is in great part an
automaton," emphasize the two-fold factor in conscious life.
Still they do not justify or make intelligible the conception of
a " secondary unconscious consciousness " or of a state of
consciousness " split off from consciousness." A rivulet
detached from the main current of a river remains still a
stream of water ; but a " thread of consciousness" excluded
from consciousness is no longer a "thread of conscious-
ness ; " a.nd such phrases if intended to be more than
a loose figurative expression are misleading and unjusti-
fiable. The various operations ascribed to this " secondary
consciousness " are best accounted for as either faintly
conscious activities or reflex and automatic processes of the
animated organism.

Readings.— On chapters xxi. xxii., cf. St. Thomas, Sim. i. q. 75.
On scope and method, cf. Coconnier, L'Anie hiimaine, c. i. ; Ladd,
Philosophy of Mind, cc. i. ii. On substantiality of soul, Rickaby,
Metaphysics, pp. 245—260; Balmez, Bk. IX. cc. 11, 12; Kleutgen,
op. cit. §§ 791 — 807. On simplicity and spirituality, Coconnier,
ibid. c. iii. ; Mercier, Psychologic, Pt. III. Art. 2, sect, i ; Farges,
Le Cerveau et VAme, pp. 57 — 108. On double-consciousness, Piat,
La Personne humaine, cc. 2, 3, Farges, op. cit. pp. luS — 136; Ladd,
op. cit. c. v.

CHAPTER XXIII.

MONISTIC THEORIES.

Dualism and Monism. — Psychological theories
concerning the nature of man and the relations of
body and mind are classed as Dualistic and Monistic.
Dualism teaches that Mind and Body are two really
distinct principles; whilst Monism maintains that
both mental and corporeal phenomena are merely
different manifestations of what is really one and
the same Reality. According to the character of the
opposition and mutual independence ascribed to the
two principles by different thinkers of the former
school, we have Ultra-Dualism and Moderate
Duahsm. To the previous class belong Plato and
Descartes; to the latter Aristotle and the leading
Scholastics. As both forms of dualism agree in
teaching the spirituality of the soul, we shall defer
further comparison of them for the present.

Monism. — Of Monistic theories there are three
chief types: Monistic Spintitalism ox Idealism; Materialism;
and a third doctrine which has been variously described
as the Double-aspect Theory, the Identity -Hypothesis, the
New Spinozism, and also simply Monism, There is rooted
in the intellectual nature of man a craving for the
unification of knowledge, for the reduction of facts and
truths to the fewest and most general principles. And
we ourselves maintain that the only truly satisfactory
account of the Universe as a whole is Monistic — that

494

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

philosophical system which derives the multiplicity of
the world from a single indivisible spiritual principle,
God. But the present question is not the origin of the
Universe, but the inney constitution of the individual
human being ; and the attempts to ignore the essentially
disparate character of mind and matter, and to reduce
either to the other, or to identify them both in some
inconceivable tertium quid seem to us among the most
lamentable perversions of a rational instinct which the
history of philosophy has to show.

Spiritualist Monism or Idealism.— This theory
overcomes all difficulties as to the relations between
body and mind or the possibility of inter-action between
them by boldly denying the reality of any material
substance existing in itself without the mind. It holds
that our consciousness of mental states is immediate and
primary, whilst our assurance as to the reality of matter
is at best mediate and secondary. It insists on the fact
that our notions of substance, cause, energy, and the like,
are all in the first place derived from the consciousness
of our own mental activities, and that in the final
analysis we can never know anything about the nature
of matter except what is given in our psychical states.
It assumes that matter could not act upon mind ; and
finally concludes that the most philosophical course is
to deny all extra-mental reality to matter, and to look
upon the seemingly independent material world as an
illusory creation or emanation of mind itself. But the
Monist does not stop here. In his desire for unity he
does not merely deny real being to matter, he asserts
that all minds are in realit}^ one — all individual conscious
existences being but w^avelets surging on the one
ocean of Universal Consciousness.

Criticism. — As opposed to the Materialist tlie
Idealist seems to us impregnable. Our reasons for the
rejection of Idealism, which are not available by the
Materialist, we have already stated (pp. loo, 113 — 117) ;
so we can merely refer the reader back to them
here. Against the Monistic aspect of the theory, which
denies the real plurality of minds, we would urge in
addition : (i) The complete absence of proof — nay, of

MONISTIC THEORIES. 495

the possibility oi proof. (2) Its direct conflict with our
immediate internal experience. My own individuality,
my real oneness, the complete insulation, the thorough
exclusiveness of my personality are the best attested
and the most fundamental convictions of my life. If I
admit the existence of other men in any form, I must
accept their testimony to the same experience in their
own case. To reject this clear evidence of universal
experience for the sake of some obscure a priori postulate
of unity is irrational. (3) It is inconsistent with freedom
and responsibility. If all finite minds are but phases
or moments of the Absolute Spirit, possessing no
substantial reality of their own, it seems impossible that
such finite spirits can be guilty or the Infinite Spirit
innocent of sin. Some idealistic monists — Lotze, for
instance, if we do not misunderstand him — believe they
can adopt Monism yet evade these consequences. Such
a course seems to us impossible. It is only by changing
the meaning of words and inconsistently allowing real
plurahty of beings that they can reconcile their systems
with the ethical convictions of mankind.

Materialism.— Conveniently assuming that experi-
ence establishes the existence of the brain as a
permanent extended substance, but affords no evidence
respecting the abiding reality of the mind, the materialist
seeks to show that the cerebral substance is the sole
and ultimate cause or ground of all our conscious states.
Consciousness, he teaches, is a property of matter,
or the resultant of sundry properties of material
elements combined in a complex manner. The pro-
gress of physiological science proves, he alleges, more
and more clearly every day the dependence of intel-
lectual processes on neural functions. Moreover, it
is impossible to imagine how conscious states can act
upon matter or cause bodily movements ; whilst the
doctrine of the conservation of energy and the law of inertia
are incompatible with the view that the mind is an
immaterial being exerting a real agency in the niaterial
universe. Such is the general argument of materialism ;
but it will conduce to clearness, if we examine its chief
tenets in detail.

496 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Thought is not a Secretion of the Brain. — In expositions of
the coarser forms of materialism such assertions as the follow-
ing have been boldly put forth: " Lrt pensee est une secretion
du cerveau:' (Cabanis.) " There subsists the same relation
between thought and the brain, as between bile and the
liver." (Vogt.) Moleschott describes thought as " a motion
in matter," and also as a "phosphorescence" of the brain.i
Other philosophers of like metaphysical acumen have been
found to proclaim the existence of the soul to be disproved,
because anatomy has not revealed it — the "dissecting knife "
having never yet laid it bare.

Writers of this calibre scarcely deserve serious refutation.
To speak of thought as a "secretion" or "movement" of
cerebral matter is to talk deliberate nonsense. Thought is
essentially unextended. The idea of virtue, the judgment that
two and two must equal four, the emotion of admiration, are
by their nature devoid of all spatial relations. The various
secretive organs effect movements and material products. Their
operations occupy space; and the resulting substance is
possessed of resistance, weight, and other material properties.
The process and the product can be apprehended by the
external senses ; and they continue to exist when un-
perceived. Conscious states are the exact reverse in all
these features. The microscope has never detected them.
They cannot be weighed, measured, or bottled, \yhen not
perceived they are non-existent; their only esse is percipi.
Even Herbert Spencer is forced to admit, "That a feeling
has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more
than ever manifest when we bring them into juxtaposition." ^
Tyndall acknowledged the same truth in a paragraph often
cited: "The passage from the physics of the brain to the
corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted
that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the
brain occur simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual
organ, nor apparently any rudiments of the organ, which
would enable us to pass by a process of reasoning from one
to the other. They appear together, but we do not know
why. Were our minds and senses so expanded as to enable
us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain, were
we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings
and electric discharges, if such there be, and were we
intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of

1 For an account of modern German Materialism, cf. Janet,
Materialism of the Present Day, c. i. ; also Margerie, Philosophie Con-
temporaine, pp. 191 — 226.

'' Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. § 62.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 497

thought and feeHiig, we should be as far as ever from the
sohition of the problem — ' How are these physical processes
connected with the facts of consciousness ? ' The chasm
between the two classes remains still intellectually impas-
sable." ^

Thought is a not a Function of the Brain. — In a scarcely less
crude way consciousness is sometimes described as a. function
of the brain: "There is every reason to believe that conscious-
ness is a function of nervous matter, when that matter has
attained a certain degree of organization, just as we know the
other actions to which the nervous system ministers, such
as reflex action, and the like, to be." * " Thought is as much
a function of matter as motion is." ^ The use of the term
"function," however, does not better the materiahst's position
with any reader not contented with payment in obscure words.
What is a " function of matter " ? The only " functions " of
matter of which physical science is cognizant consist of
movements or changes in matter. Now, thought, as we have
just pointed out, is nothing of this sort. If we employ this
word at all, we must speak of intellectual activity as a function
of something utterly opposed in nature to all known subjects
of material force. When mental processes are at work,
movements indeed take place in the nervous substance of
the cerebrum, and it is accordingly true that the brain
"functions" and expends energy whilst we think. But
neither this functioning nor the energy expended constitutes
thought. As Tyndfll says, the "chasm" between the two
classes of facts still remains " intellectually impassable."

Thought is not a Resultant of material forces. — Biichner,
by comparing the organism with the steam-engine, seeks to
prove that mental life is merely the result of the complexity
and variety of the material forces and properties at work in
the former. "Thought, spirit, soul, are not material, not a
substance, but the effect of the conjoined action of many
materials endowed with forces or qualities. . . . In the same
manner as the steam-engine produces motion, so does the
organic comphcation of force-endowed materials produce in
the animal body effects so interwoven as to become a unit,
which is then by us called spirit, soul, thought. The sum

3 Address to the British Association at Norwich. Professor Huxley
has, in one of his better moments, endorsed this doctrine. (Cf.
" INIr. Darwin and his critics," Contcmp. Rev. Nov. 1871.) But the
passage tells equally against the "function" view of the ne.\t
objection, advocated at times by Mr. Huxley himself.

■* Prof. ll\i\\ey,Cont£mp. Rev. Nov. 1871.

^ Huxley, Macmillan's Magazine, J^.Iay, 1S70.

49S NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

of these effects is nothing material ; it can be perceived by
our senses as Uttle as any other simple force, such as magnet-
ism, electricity, etc., merely by its manifestations.'"^

This is a fair example of the random methods of reasoning
employed by materialists. What is the resultant of the
aggregate of forces accumulated in the steam-engine ? It is
nothing more nor less than movements of portions of matter,
all perceptible by the external senses. If the engine drags a
train, we may speak of the motion of the latter as being a
single effect, but the occurrence has only a moral or meta-
phorical unity. It is really a series of events, a vast
assemblage of parts of matter moving other parts. When
we turn to the living organism, we find, indeed, a similar set
of movements and displacements of matter, but we find also
in addition to these physical occurrences, and differing from
them, as Mr. Spencer says, " by a difference transcending all
other differences," the very phenomenon to be explained,
" spirit, soul, thought." Granting, then, for the sake of argu-
ment, similarity between the material forces collected in the
steam-engine and in the human body, at most the legitimate
inference would be that the various movements and organic
changes observable in the body were the outcom.e of its
material energy ; but there is not a shadow of a reason for
attributing the distinctly new phenomenon of consciousness
to that energy. In the final sentence another piece of con-
fused and inconsistent thinking is introduced. Thought is
there likened to the *^ simple forces, magnetism and electricity."
But the only known manifestations of electricity and magnet-
ism consist in the production of movement. Consciousness,
however, is revealed in a different way. Of the nature of
electricity or magnetism as a simple force we know nothing.
The word is merely an abstract term to denote the unknown
cause of a certain species of movements coming under
external observation. On the other hand, of mental states
we have immediate internal experience; and that experience
discloses conscious life as centred in one single being, in a
peculiar indivisible unity utterly repugnant to the composite
nature of a material subject.^

♦* Kraft iind Stojf (Trans.), pp. 135, 136.

'' " Fifty million molecules, even when they are highly complex
and unstable phosphorized compounds, gyrating in the most
wonderful fashion with inconceivable rapidity, certainly do not
constitute one thing. They do not, then, by molecular constitution
and activities, constitute a physical basis conceivable as a represen-
tative or correlate of one thing." (Ladd, Phys. Psychology, p. 595.)

MONISTIC THEORIES. 499

Unknown Properties of Matter.— Against the

spirituality of the principle of thought, it was objected
by Locke that matter has a great variety of wonderful
and unlike properties, that our knowledge of these is
still very limited, and, consequently, that we are not
justified in asserting that matter could not be the
subject of intellectual activity. He also says this state-
ment is derogatory to the Divine power, implying that
God Himself could not endow matter with the faculty
of thought. We most readily admit our knowledge of
matter to be still very inadequate ; and we allow that
matter possesses many unlike qualities. But it is not
from mere dissimilarity in character subsisting between
mental and material phenomena — although this dis-
similarity " transcends all other differences" — that we
infer a distinct principle. It is from the absolute
contrariety in nature which sets them in opposition.
In spite of the imperfect condition of our acquaintance
with matter, we can affirm with absolute certainty that
some new properties, e.g., self-motion, can never be dis-
covered in it. It is, too, no reflexion on the power of
God to say that He cannot effect a metaphysical im-
possibility, such as the endowment of an extended
substance with the indivisible spiritual activity of self-
consciousness would be.

Dependence of Mind on Body. — The spirituality
of the soul, it is said, is disproved by the absolute
dependence of mental life on bodily conditions — a
dependence more effectively established by Physiology
and Pathology each succeeding year. We find, it is
asserted, that intellectual abihty varies in proportion to
the size of the brain, its weight, the complexity of its
convolutions, and the intensity of its phosphorescent
activity. Mental powers develop concomitantly with
the growth of the brain, and similarly deteriorate with
its decay or disease : " The doctrine of two substances,
a material united with an immaterial, . . . which has
prevailed from the time of Thomas Aquinas to the
present day, is now in course of being modified at the
instance of modern Physiology. The dependence of
purel}^ intellectual operations such as nicinory upon

500 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

material processes has been reluctantly admitted by the
partisans of an immaterial principle, an admission in-
compatible with the isolation of the intellect in Aristotle
and Aquinas. . . . Of the mind apart from the body we
have no direct experience and absolutely no knowledge.
... In the second place, we have every reason to
believe that there is in company with all our mental
processes an nnhvoken material succession.'"^ This argu-
ment in behalf of Materialism gains much of its weight
with many minds from the belief that those who
formerly defended the spirituality of the soul conceived
it as an independent entity standing out of all relations
to the body. The allusion to St. Thomas in the passage
just quoted is an expression of this belief. Recent
advances in physiological knowledge, it is imagined,
have disproved this supposed mutual isolation of the
two substances, consequently the inference is that
modern science has rendered untenable the spirituality
of the soul.

Criticism. — Now, in the first place, this historical theory is
utterly false. It is mainly since the rebellion against Scholas-
ticism, inaugurated by Descartes, that this exaggerated
antagonism between soul and body has been advocated by
anti-materialist thinkers. The central idea of the Peripatetic
Psychology, as expounded by every leading writer, from
Albert the Great to Suarez, is the conception of the soul as
substantial form of the body — a view which implies tlie most
intimate union and interdependence between these two co-
efficient principles of man.

Consequently, so far from ignoring or admitting " with
reluctance" the influence of bodily conditions on mental
operations, the greatest emphasis is laid upon the fact, as
any one possessed of an elementary acquaintance with
the writings of St. Thomas or any other scholastic, on the
appetites, imagination, sense-perception, memory, and the
passions, must know. Mediseval philosophers were just as
well aware as our wise men of to-day that age, bodily fatigue,
the processes of digestion, disease, stimulants, and the like,
affect our mental operations ; and in taking these into account
they had to meet by anticipation every difficulty that has or
can be raised from the physiological quarter. Pliysiology ha&
brought to light no facts of essentially novel significance in

^ Bain, Mmd and Body, p, 130 ; cf. ISIaudsley, op. cit. c. ii.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 501

their bearing on this problem. It has, indeed, given us a
better knowledge of the material structure of the brain and
nervous system, and of the occurrence of special processes
there in conjunction with mental states; but the general
principle of interdependence between mind and bod}', illus-
trated in such facts, was forced on the human intellect in its
very earliest attempts at psychological speculation. Moreover,
it ill becomes Cerebral Physiology, which is still in a very
backward state, to dogmatize in this fashion.'-^

In the next place, assuming for the moment that all the
assertions regarding the intimate relations between neural
conditions and mental life were accurately true, and in no
way exaggerated, how would this prove more than an extrinsic
dependence of the soul on the body which it enlivens ? " For,
suppose for an instant that human thought was of such a
nature that it could not exist without sensations, without
images and signs (I do not mean to say that no kind of
thought other than this is possible) ; suppose, I repeat, that
such were the conditions of human thought, is it not evident
that a nervous system would be then required to render
sensation possible, and a nervous centre to render possible
the concentration of sensations, the formation of signs and of
images ? According to that hypothesis, the brain would be
the organ of imagination and of language, without which
there would be no thought for the human mind."^*^ In such a
case — and this is precisely the theory of St. Thomas — what-
ever affects the organ or instrument of the mind will naturall}'
modify mental operations. Now we have shown (c.xiv) how

^ Of the theory of certain scientists, "that all mental pheno-
mena, whatever their varied characteristic shading, have exact
equivalents, as it were, in specific forms of the nerve-commotion of
the living brain," Professor Ladd remarks: " Our first impression
on considering the foregoing way of accounting for mental pheno-
mena is that of a certain surprising audacity. The theory, standing
on a slender basis of real fact, makes a leap into the dark which
carries it centuries in advance of where the light of modern research
is now clearly shining." He shows that even in such comparatively
simple problems as the determination of the physiological con-
ditions of variations in the quantity, quality, and time-rate of
sensation, " almost everything needed for an exact science of the
relations of the molecular changes in the substance of the brain
and the changes in the states of consciousness is lamentably
deficient ; " whilst as regards the neural conditions of spiritual acts,
such as the conviction of the principle of causality, or the idea of
substance, he shows that science must remain in absolute ignorance.
(Cf. Physiological Psychology, pp. 592 — 597.)

^^ Janet, Materialism of the Present Day, p. 134.

502 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

intellect requires as an essential condition the operations of
sense and imagination, and is therefore extrinsically dependent
for its materials on these organic faculties. But, on the other
hand, study of the character of its activity (c. xii.) has also
proved to us that the spiritual power transcends the material
order, and that this power is in its nature essentially and
intrinsically independent of matter. The continuity of the
organic process, if proved, would be accounted for by the
exercise of the imaginative faculty, which the intellect requires
as a condition of its operation. That neither imagination nor
organic memory are, as Bain implies, intellectual activities,
must have been evident frorri the earlier part of this work.

In answer to the sage observation that we never find mind
apart from the body, it is sufficient to reply that concomitance
does not prove identity, and that at all events we often find
body without mind. Whenever we meet with a new group of
properties or effects incapable of being accounted for by
previously known causes, we are bound, according to the
universally recognized canons of physical science, to assume
a new cause for these phenomena. As regards the part of the
difficulty which lays stress on the relations between the
character of the brain as a whole and intellectual ability,
whilst we readily admit that the vastly superior mental
faculties of man would lead us to anticipate in his case a
more perfect instrument than is to be found in the brute
kingdom, it is worthy of notice that science has as yet
completely failed to assign any distinct property of man's
brain by which his intellectual superiority is marked. ^^

11 " Since evidently the absolute weight of the brain cannot be the
measure of intelligence, because if so the elephant and the whale
ought to excel the greatest human genius, therefore refuge has been
taken in greater relative weight. . . . Since again in this respect man
is surpassed by several of the smaller birds {e.g., the titmouse), and
the adult by the child, the multiplicity, complexity, and thickness
of the convolutions on the surface of the brain are to afford the
solution. But since on this principle the ox ought to distinguish
itself by mental capacity, appeal is made to the chemical constitution
of the cerebral substance, and the excellence of man's intellect
attributed to the richress of his brain in phosphorus ; but here again
the superiority of the human cerebrum is disputed by two pro-
verbially stupid animals, the sheep and the goose." (Gutberlet,
Psychologie, p. 255.) On the relative weight, size, etc., of brains,
cf Ladd, op. cit. Pt. II. c. i. ; also Surbled, Le Cerveau, cc. iv. — xii.
The latter writer gives some very interesting statistics on this point.
Thus, the average cubic capacity of Parisian skulls — which are
larger than those of most European nations — is estimated to-day
at about i,559ec, whilst six skulls of "Cave-men," assigned to the

MONISTIC THEORIES. 503

Man not a Conscious Automaton. — All Material-
ists necessaril)^ teach that conscious states can never
condition or determine bodily movements, but Dr. Shad-
ivorth Hodgson was, we believe, the first frankly to
admit the still more incredible consequence that states
of consciousness never condition, determine, or modify
£ach other. " There is real action and reaction between
organs and parts of organs in a nervous system, as well
as between nerve and other parts of the organism and
between nerve and external stimuli ; but there is no real
reaction of consciousness upon nerve, and no real action and
reaction of states of consciousness npon each othev.''^- Again,
^' Process-contents of consciousness do not stand in any
relation of real conditioning to one another. It is not
pleasure or pain^ for instance, which conditions desire or
aversion ; nor is it desire which conditions volition or
reasoning ; but the neural or cerebral actions which condition
the antecedents condition in their continuation the con-
sequents also."^^ To make his meaning quite clear,
Mr. Hodgson takes the example of a man turning aside
to avoid a wheelbarrow. The old-fashioned view is
•*' that the state of consciousness is a really operative
link in the chain of events." This is a delusion. The
true positive explanation is that the physical impression
on the retina determines the nervous processes which
result in the appropriate movement. The mental state
is a mere epiphenonienon. " Throughout the process con-

Pala2olithic period, average i,6o5cc, and a collection of skulls of
ancient Gauls reach i,592cc- This does not seem very favourable
to Evolution. Again, as regards the weight of the brain : Cuvier
used to be triumphantly cited by materialists, as an example of
great intellect, due to a very heavy brain — 1,830 grammes (about
4 lbs.). The average British brain is about 1,400 grammes (3 lbs.).
But in recent times cases of brains exceeding that of Cuvier have
been found combined with very moderate abilities. A still more
surprising fact is that Gambetta, whose mental gifts French mate-
rialists, at all events, will be the last to deny, was possessed of
actually only 1,160 grammes (aj^ lbs.) of cerebral material, an
endowment inferior to that of the lowest tribes of savages. Un-
doubtedly, great intellectual power is, as a rule, accompanied by
a large brain, but there are very serious exceptions to the law.

J2 Cf. The Metaphysic of Experience (189S), Vol. II. p. 283.

13 Op. cit. Vol. I. p. 446.

504 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

sciousness is initiated by and depends on nerve-motion
and not vice versa. . . . (The opposite view) would
involve the assumption that at some point or other of
the process, either consciousness began to act as a real
condition (having previously been a conditionate onl}'),.
or an immaterial agent, which had previously been
dormant, was roused to activity. But neither alterna-
tive is positively conceivable ; neither of them has any
observed facts in its favour. On the other hand, we can
render all the phenomena positively intelligible on the
hypothesis of neural action above set forth. "^^

Dr. Hodgson is the ablest and most consistent exponent
of psychological materialism at the present day ; but his
candid acceptance of the consequences of that theory seems
to us to provide as perfect a reductio ad absiirdtim as we need
desire. Were the avoiding of present visible obstacles the
only operations to be accounted for, the comparatively
simple psychical and physical processes involved mighty
perhaps, as in the case of reflex action, be thus mechanically
explained. But a little reflexion suggests problems which it
will require considerable courage to solve in this fashion.
Thus : When the novelist is thinking out his plot, or the
detective is striving to piece together the fragmentary clues
of a hidden crime, does no idea, feeling, or desire which wakes
up within him exert any influence on his subsequent mental
states ? Do his thoughts never " stand in any relation of real
conditioning to one another ? " When we say that the con-
sciousness of having received a deliberate insult has excited
anger and hatred which generated an implacable desire of
revenge, and that this motive instigated the plotting and com-
mitting of a cunningly contrived murder, is our language
throughout purely mythological ? Is it possible to believe that
the feeling of the insult has itself contributed nothing towards
arousing the hatred, nor this passion towards planning of the
revenge ? Does the apprehension of the premisses of a
syllogism play no real part in eliciting the inference ? If
materialism be true, Dr. Hodgson's conclusion is inevitable;
the neural antecedents and they alone condition the neural
consequents, the incidental phenomena of a conscious state
which happened to accompany the former have no influence
upon the incidental phenomena accompanying the latter.
Unless we accept this conclusion, we are told we must admit
that consciousness is really active or that " an immaterial

1^ Vol. II. pp. 315—318.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 505

agent which had previously been dormant was roused to
activity." We are glad to see the inevitable alternative so
clearly and so candidly stated. The doctrine of an immaterial
soul is surrounded with obscurities and difficulties which it
would be foolish to ignore or to seek to conceal. We
certainly cannot picture a soul by the imagination ; still less
can we imagine Jioii' it acts on the body, or Jww mental acts
and nervous processes influence each other. But it is
indifferent logic to deny the reality of an event because we
cannot imagine the mode of its occurrence ; and the inability
of our imagination to conceive the nature of immaterial
agency is a frail reason, indeed, upon which to reject the
doctrine of a spiritual soul and embrace a system of
materialism that makes such astounding demands upon our
powers of faith.

Monism. — The most serious assault, however,
which at present is being directed against the doctrine
of a spiritual soul and luture life is that of Monism
proper. In its best known forms this metaphysical
h3'pothesis, for it is essentially a metaphysical conception,
has been styled the Double- A sped Theory and the Identity-
hypothesis, because of its maintainmg that mental states
and the concomitant nerve-changes are simply different
" aspects " of one and the same being. It has been
called the Ne7£> Spinozism from its affinity to the meta-
physical theory of the father of Modern Pantheism ;
and it has also been termed the doctrine of Psycho-
physical parallelism from its denial of all interaction
between the psychical and the physical processes which
take place in the living being. This doctrine of
pavallelisvi might, of course, be united with a meta-
physical theory of Dualism, as in the systems of Descartes
and Leibnitz ; indeed, it is to Dualism it naturally
points, but now-a-days it is generally employed in the
interests of Monism for the purpose of describing the
supposed relations of bodily and mental states. Marked
by important differences in the hands of its various
exponents, Monism, in all its forms, adheres to the
cardinal tenet that Mind and Body are not two distinct
realities hut merely two ''aspects,'" ''sides," or " phases" of
one being, and that there is no real interaction betivcen mental
cind bodily states. W. K. Clifford, A. Bain, Herbert

5o6 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Spencer, Huxley, and among recent psychologisls, Pro-
fessor Hoffding, are among the best known advocates ot
this theory ; so we shall sketch and briefly examine
their views.

The term Mind-stuff was invented by Clifford to
denote the material out of which he asserts that human
minds are formed. According to him there is attached
to every particle of matter in the universe a bit of
rudimentary feeling or intelligence. When the molecules
of matter come together in certain forms and propor-
tions, the attached atoms of mental life fuse into a
complete self-conscious mind.^^ Neither the molecules
of matter, however, nor the appended morsels of mind
can have any influence on the other. At least, this is
Clifford's doctrine at times: "The physical facts go
along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by
themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but
there is no interference of one with the other." ^"^

The only arguments suggested in defence of these
doctrines are the assertions: (i) that Physiology has
established an absolute and complete parallclisni between
psychical and physical facts ; (2) that physics has proved
the impossibility of any mutual interaction between them ;
and (3) lastly, the fact that Clifford's view is essential
to the theory, that all of us, both mind and body, have
been developed out of inferior organic forms and
ultimately out of inorganic matter. Thus in his own
words: "The only thing that we can come to, if we
accept the doctrine of Evolution at all, is that, even in
the very lowest organisms, even in the amoeba w^hich
swims in our own blood, there is something or other

15 .. When molecules are so combined as to form the film on
the under-side of a jelly-fish, the elements of mind-stuff which go
along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of
sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the
brain and nervous system of a vertebi-ate, the corresponding
elements of mind-stuff are so combined as to form some kind of
consciousness. . . . When matter takes the complex form of the
living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of
human consciousness, having intelligence and volition." [Lectures
and Essays, 2nd Edit. p. 284 ; also Mind, Vol. III. pp 64, 65.)

^8 Op. cit. p. 262.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 507

inconceivably simple to us, which is of the same nature
with our consciousness, although not of the same com-
plexity, that is to say (for we cannot stop at organic
matter, hnoivins^ as we do that it must have arisen by
continuous physical processes out of inorganic matter),
we are obliged to assume, in order to save continuity in
our belief, that along with every motion of matter,
whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which
corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves." (Op. cit.
p. 266.)

Defenders of a spiritual philosophy are not necessarily
opposed to Evolution, when that hypothesis is properly
limited and defined : but Clifford's statement that -we
know all living beings " must have arisen by continuous
physical processes out of inorganic matter," is almost
amusing for its audacity. It is, of course, simply the
reverse of the truth. An overwhelming weight of
scientific evidence and authority establishes the fact
that life is never evolved from inorganic matter. Even
scientists as unlikely to be prejudiced against the
doctrine of abiogenesis as Huxley and Tyndall are
forced to confess that evidence of a single case of
spontaneous generation has never yet been adduced.
As regards the other arguments, we may for the present
merely call attention to the truth that even were com-
plete parallelism, in the sense of reciprocal correspond-
ence between every form of mental state and definite
neural processes, fully demonstrated — hopeless though
the prospect of this result be — nothing would have yet
been effected towards the reduction of mental activity
to a mere appendage of such nervous changes. As for
the statement, that science has proved the non-inter-
ference of the two sets of phenomena, it is both false in
itself and in conflict with Clifford's own teaching on
other occasions, and with that of the school to which he
belongs. The majority of that school teach that bodily
processes, at all events, determine changes in our
mental states.

Dr. Bain does not appear to go quite so far as Clifford.
Mental life in man he considers to be a " subjective aspect "
of bodily changes ; but that there are *' subjective aspects"

5o» RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

attached to all movements of every kind of matter he has not
the courage to assert. This position, of course, leaves on
liis hands the awkward difficult}- — why should this very curious
" vSubjective aspect," of which there is no trace in the rest of
the material world, suddenly manifest itself in the case of
those portions of the universe which we call living beings ?
To atone, however, for the deficiency just mentioned, he is
vigorous enough in insisting that mental life is but an
"aspect" or "side" or "face" or "phase" of neural
changes, and that therefore it has no reahty independent of
such changes, and no power of affecting their course. He
strongly objects to the phrase, " Mind and body act upon
each other." There is merely a continuous series of physical
events with inactive subjective "aspects." "We have," he
assures us, "every reason for believing that there is in
company with all our mental processes, an unbroken material
succession. From the ingress of a sensation, to the out-going
responses in action the mental succession is not for an instant
dissevered from a physical succession." ^'' The neural
changes are determined solely by neural antecedents : the
niaterial sequence carries with it the mental sequence, but
cannot in the slighest degree be modified by the latter.
Nevertheless : " The only tenable supposition is, that mental
and physical proceed together as tcndivided twins. When
therefore we speak of a mental cause, a mental agency, we
have always a two-sided cause; the effect produced is not the
effect of mind alone, but of mind in company with body.
That mind should have operated on the body is as much as
to say, that a two-sided phenomenon, one side being bodily,
can influence the body ; it is after all body acting^ upon body.
. . . The line of mental sequence is thus, not mind causing
body, and body causing mind, but mind-body giving birth to
mind-body : a much more intelligible position." ^^

Herbert Spencer seems to hold approximately the same
view as Dr. Bain, though his general system of Evolution
would appear to lead on to Clifford's doctrine of mind-stuff.
Mental states, he allows, cannot be identified with nervous
processes. The two sets of facts are separated by " a
difference which transcends all other differences." All forms
of consciousness are, he teaches, resolvable into elementary
units of feeling akin to electric shocks. These correspond to
pulses of molecular motion transmitted through the sentient
nerves. But the sensation of shock made known through our
inner consciousness can never be analyzed into the physical
movements observable, if at all, by our external senses. These

17 Mind and Body, p. 131. ^^ Op. cit. pp. 131, 132.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 509

are his words : " When the two modes of Being which we
distinguish as subject and object have been severally reduced
to their lowest terms, any further comprehension must be an
assimilation of these lowest terms to one another : and, as
we have already seen, this is negatived by the very distinction
of subject and object, which is itself the consciousness of a
difference transcending all other differences. So far from helping
us to think of them as of one kind, analysis serves but to
render more manifest the impossibility of finding for them a
common concept — a thought under which they can be united.
Let it be granted that all existence distinguished as objective
may be resolved into the existence of units of one kind
(material), . . . and let it be further granted, that all existence
distinguished as subjective is resolvable into units of con-
sciousness, similar in nature to those which we know as
nervous shocks, . . . can we think of the subjective and
objective activities as the same ? Can the oscillation of a
molecule be represented in consciousness side by side with
a nervous shock and the two be recognized as one ? No
effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has
nothing in common witli a unit of motion becomes more than ever
manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.''' ^^ In spite,
however, of the incompatible character of physical and
mental processes, Spencer finally concludes that both are
but '' faces " or " aspects " of one and the same substratum :
" Mind (i.e., conscious-states) and nervous action are
subjective and objective faces of the same thing." ^° The
ground for this unification of mental and physical pheno-
mena is the same as that urged by Clifford and Dr. Bain
—the intimate correspondence between the two series. As
to the nature of this one ultimate reality, of which mental and
bodily activities are but diverse aspects, Spencer assures us
that it is unknoivable.

Criticism of Monism. — Each form in which the Double-
Aspect theory has been advocated, stands exposed to number-
less special difficulties, but here we have room to touch only
on a few of the most general objections, which tell universally
against every representation of the doctrine.

I. Dilemma. — The advocate of the new system must accept
either of two alternatives. He must, with Clifford, look upon
this "double-aspectedness" as a universal property of matter;
or he must, with Dr. Bain, limit it to living beings. In the
first case he has to make an absolutely incredible assumption
without a scrap of evidence in its favour. In order to do
away with the souls of a few living beings, who do not

^ Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. § 62. ''^ Op. cit, p. 140.

5IO RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

constitute the one-hundred-millionth part of the mass of the
physical world, he has to assign a mental hfe to every grain
of sand and drop of water on the earth. He has to ascribe
to every molecule of matter in the universe something the
nature of which cannot be imagined, and of the existence of
which neither the experiments of science nor the observation
of mankind has ever discovered the shghtest trace. Such is
the modest demand on our powers of faith made by scientists
— who can, when it suits them, be so exacting in their
demands for proof. Even Tyndall, sympathetic though he be
with such views, is forced to declare :" It is no explanation
to say that objective and subjective are two sides of one and
the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have
two sides ? There are plenty of molecular motions which do
not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel
when it rises into frost ferns upon a window-pane ? If not,
why should the molecular motions of the brain be yoked to
this mysterious companion consciousness ?"^i

Should he adopt the second alternative, the defender of
this double-faced theory has to explain the unaccountable
appearance of the subjective aspect where it presents itself
in conscious beings. It is a new phenomenon, differing from
all previously existing phenomena by " a difference that
transcends all other differences." Whence does it come ?
Physicists will not admit creations out of nothing, and neither
will they allow that consciousness is merely a new form of
the material energy of the universe, even were such a trans-
formation conceivable. If material force is transmuted into
mental states, then, unless the law of the conservation of
energy be abandoned, the reverse operation must alsohold,
and mental states must be capable of issuing forth in the
form of physical action. Conscious mental states would thus
be capable of acting upon matter : but this is precisely what
advocates of Monism declare to be impossible. That mental
acts cannot affect material processes is the most fundamental
article of their creed. Accordingly, whichever of the two
necessary alternatives he accepts, the anti-spirituahst finds
himself in an equally unsatisfactory position.^"-^

2. Mental States not Composite.— If we inquire more closely
into the nature of this hypothetical " stuff," out of which
intelligence, emotion, and volition are alleged to be manu-
factured, the absurdity of the doctrine is brought still more
closely home to us. What is this material ? Is it conscious ?

21 Cf. Mallock, Is Life ivorth Living? p. 180.

2- Cf. Herbert, Modern Realism Examined, p. 71. Sects. 7—12
contain some very good criticism of this theory.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 511

Most supporters of the theory, we beheve, would answer, No.
How then is it Uke our mental life ? Does a multiplicity of
unconscious acts constitute an act of conscious intelligence ?
If, on the other hand, we ascribe real but incipient conscious-
ness to the molecules of matter, and if mental life is the
outcome of their combination, it would seem that a mental
existence ought to belong to all material objects with which
experience presents us. Have plants, or their leaves, or the
various parts of the human body minds of their own ? Is a
new steam-tug a thing of joy to itself? What are the
emotions of a deserted coal-mine? Or is it only very s;;/a//
lumps of coal that have minds ? Is the soul of carbon different
in kind from that of nitrogen or oxygen ?

But even were it granted that such allotments of subjective-
aspect were attached to all molecules of matter, they would
not solve the problem. We have already demonstrated the
spirituality of man's intellect and will, and we have shown
the peculiar, indivisible character of supra-sensuous acts,
such as conception, judgment, reasoning, and self-conscious-
ness ; but in doing so we have disproved the double-aspect
theory. The unity of consciousness cannot be an amalgam
of morsels of subjective-aspect essentially dependent on
extended molecules. Simple abstract ideas, judicial acts and
free volitions, cannot be a mere compound of electric shocks
or of unconscious units. They are indivisible acts, and they
must pertain to an indivisible agent other than matter. As
Lotze argues, analogical inferences from the combinations
of physical forces to the fusion of mental states mislead, not
only from the dissimilarity of the two classes of events, but
from inaccuracy in describing the operations of the former.
In nature two abstract ' forces ' or ' motions ' never coalesce
to form a resultant. What really happens is that two bodies,
moving or at rest, produce a motion of a body or bodies. Now
movements or forces existing in this concrete way are not
simple, but divisible into parts seated in the various molecules
of the body. But in thought, especially in the unity of con-
sciousness involved in judgment and self-knowledge, we have
a real concrete, indivisible activity, which accordingly must
pertain, not to an assemblage of separate molecules, but to a
single simple agent.^^ Somewhat similarly James writes :

"The theory of mental units 'compounding with them-
selves,' or ' integrating ' is logically uninteUigible. It leaves
out the essential feature of all the * combinations ' we
actually know. All the combinations which we actually know
are effects wrought by the units said to be combined upon some

Cf. Mctaphysic, § 241, and Microcosmns, Bk, II. c. i. §§ 5, 6.

512 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

ENTITY other than themselves. Without this feature of a medium
or vehicle, the notion of combination has no sense. In other
words, no possible number of entities (call them as you like,
whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can
sum themselves together. Each remains in the sum what it
was ; and the sum itself exists only for a bystander who
happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as
such ; or else it exists in the shape of some other effect on an
entity external to the sum itself. . . . ' A statue is an aggregation
of particles of marble; hut as such it has no unity. For the
spectator it is one ; in itself it is an aggregate ; just as to
the consciousness of an ant crawling over it, it may again
appear a mere aggregate.' (Royce.) . . . Musical sounds do not
combine per se into concords or discords. Concord and
discord are names for their combined effects on that external
medium the ear. Where the elemental units are supposed
to be feelings the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred
of them, shuffle and pack them as close together as you can
(whatever that may mean), still each remains the same feeling
it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of
what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a
hundred-and-first feeUng there, if when a group or series of
such feelings were set up a consciousness belonging to the group
as such should emerge. And this hundred-and-first feeling
would be a totally new fact; the hundred original feelings
might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation,
when they came together ; but they would have no sub-
stantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could
never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible
sense) say that they evolved it. Take a sentence of a dozen
words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then
stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each
think of his word as intently as he vvill ; nowhere will there
be a consciousness of the whole sentence. We talk of the
' spirit of the age ' and the ' sentiment of the people,' and
hypostatize public ' opinion.' But we know this to be
symbohc speech, and never dream that the ' spirit,' ' senti-
ment,' etc., constitute a consciousness other than and
additional to that of the several individuals whom the words
' age,' or ' people,' or ' public ' denote. The private minds
do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has
always been the invincible contention of the spiritualists
against the associationists in Psychology." ^'^

2i Op. cit. pp. 158—60. The italics and capitals are those of
Professor James himself. His argument here is, it seems to us,
perfectly sound, but, notwithstanding his disclaimer (p. 162), fatal
to his own ihjory. How can " the present section of conscious-

MONISTIC THEORIES. 513

Absurd consequences. — Advocates of psycho-
physical parallelism as well as of all forms of materialism
agree at least in this, that mental states cannot act on
the body. The main object in describing conscious
activity as parallel to, or as an aspect, or phase of a
nervous process, is to emphasize its incapacity for the
production of any physical change. If it be once
admitted that mental agency is really operative ad
extra, that conscious states do really originate bodily
movements, then the one great excellence claimed for
the monistic theories v^ith which we are here engaged is
abandoned. 25 The existence of an efficient energy
distinct from material force is admitted, and the chief
tenet of the spiritualist philosopher is granted. It is
to guard against such a contingency that Bain and
Hoffding insist '' that there is no rupture of nervous
continuity;" and Clifford that "the physical facts go
along by themselves," and "the mental facts go along
by themselves." The admission of a second real
agent capable of interfering with or modifying in the
most infinitesimal degree the course of material events
is absolutely fatal to all monistic anti-spiritualist
systems. But we venture to doubt whether the
astonishing consequences in regard to most of our
beliefs — scientific as well as vulgar — which inevitably
proceed from the denial of mental efficiency have been
adequately realized by these writers.

Mind's efficacy in Evolution. — The theory of Evolution, for
instance, will have to wear a somewhat altered appearance as
a rational explanation of facts, if it be true that conscious
states never influence bodily movement. The doctrine of

ness," the merely " passing thought" act as "bystander" to sum
up the series of long past states into the unity of a Self ? Or if
James chooses the other alternative and says that the present
thought in which I cognize the unity of my past states, is "an
cj^ect on an entity external to the sum itself" (of these states) ; is not
this "entity" after all very like the vulgar common-sense soul
contemptuously discarded because it "explains nothing and
guarantees nothing." On this question see also pp. 47, 48, above.

2' The idealist may maintain the real efficiency of mind, but he
does so by denying the independent reality of matter — with the
disastrous results already indicated, (pp. 113 — 116.)

nil

514 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

natural selection in the animal kingdom is built on the
assumption of serviceablencss of pleasure and pain in the
struggle for life. Herbert Spencer never wearies of expatiat-
ing on the utility of both the agreeable and the disagreeable
qualities of action in the contest for existence. Pleasure and
pain are according to him not merely the foundations of
morality, but the prime agents in the development and
perfecting of all sentient life.^'' Darwin is still more copious
in showing how accidental actions, qualities, and experiences
which afford satisfaction, in consequence of that satisfaction,
emerge triumphant from among innumerable variations, and
thus secure their own preservation. The beautiful colours
and songs of several species of birds, for example, are held
to be the result of long gradual evolution under the constant
action of sexual selection — individuals inheriting richer
attractions more easily securing mates. But what " utility "
or " serviceablencss" can fine colours or pleasant or painful
feelings possess in the struggle for life if they never determine
or modify bodily activity ? If conscious states and cerebral
processes are merely parallel series of events which never act
on each other, how can the preference for agreeable feelings
favour the production of the movements to which the feelings
are attached ? How can pleasure or pain exert a selective
influence in favour of certain kinds of physical action ?

Other Minds non-existent? — Again, if thought never really
influences action, what proof have we that other minds than
our own exist ? We at present infer other minds because we
look on certain actions and expressions of our fellow-men as
effects of certain feelings and volitions akin to our own, and
deem them incapable of happening except in consequence of
such mental states. But according to tiie new theory these
actions are nothing of the sort. They are merely the effects
of previous neural groupings ; and might have taken place
just the same whether the mental states accompanied them
or not. The latter are merely appended inactive " phases,"
or " epiphenomena," which can occasion " no rupture oi
nervous continuity." We may still, perhaps, infer the exist-
ence of other brains, but logically the gestures, words, and

2** " Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-
giving acts are life sustaining acts." [Data of Ethics, p. 83.) " During
the evolution of life pleasures and pains have necessarily been the
incentives to, and deterrents from, actions which the conditions of
existence demanded and negatived. . . . The pleasures of sympathy
exceeding its pains lead to an exercise of it which strengthens it,"
(Ilnti. p. 245.)

MONISTIC THEORIES. 515

actions of our neighbours might have been precisely the
same \i consciousness had no existence. 2''

But reflexion discovers consequences still more surprising.
The whole past history of the world, the building of cities,
the invention of machinery, the commerce of nations, the
emigrations of peoples, the rise and fall of civilizations, all
that has been done on this planet by human beings, might
have happened in precisely the same way if there had never
awoke to consciousness a single human mind ! All the pain
and sorrow, all the joy and gladness, all the love and anger
that we suppose to have governed the world's history might
never have been, and that history might have run exactly the
same course ! The neural groupings, the cerebral movements,
which were the true, ultimate, and only causes of the various
actions of human beings, have never once been interrupted,
modified, or interfered with by those " aspects " or " phases "
which constitute the "parallel" series of conscious states,
since the first man appeared on the earth. Given the original
collocation of the material atoms from which the present
cosmos has been evolved, and every event, down to the least
incident of our daily life, was therein rigidly and sufficiently
determined, even though no single act of intelligence or
volition had ever wakened into life ! ^^

-^ " It is admitted that the feelings of others cannot themseh^es
be perceived by any sense ; certain bodily movements only are
perceived, which are supposed to indicate feelings. It is admitted,
further, that these movements proceed with the strictest physical
sequence ; in other words, that in the absence of feelings they would
take place just as they do. It follows that mind leaves no trace of
its presence in the movements by which alone it is revealed. What is
this but to say it is a pure supposition, without a single vestige of
evidence ? The only evidence science can have of anything is that
it is, or effects some change, some movement. Whatever effects no
change, makes no sign in the material world, is to physical science
non-existent." (Herbert, op. cit. p. 113.)

28 This argument is stated with much force by Herbert. {Ibid.
p. 133.) It should be borne in mind that the present argument does not
involve any particular metaphysical theory of causality. Accepting
even Mill's definition of causation as invariable succession, our con-
tention would still retain its force. The defender of the double-
aspect doctrine may of course instinctively attribute minds to other
human bodies, but he has no rational grounds for believing in such
minds ; consequently he cannot maintain mental states to be
constant concomitants or conditions of physical actions. The latter, he
asserts, are unaffected by the former, and so might have occurred
precisely as well without them. If the mind cannot modify or
influence bodily movements, then, clearly, it contributes nothing to

5i6 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

4. Meaningless Terms. — Finally, the entire vocabulary used
in the exposition of the theory, is a veritable museum of non-
sensical and sophistical terms. Hyphens, ambiguous epithets,
and cloudy metaphorical language are profusely employed in
pretended explanations of facts of which no real account is
given. What idea is really conveyed to the mind by such
words as " double-aspect," " mind-stuff," " two-sided cause,"
" subjective and objective sides of the same fact," " undivided
twins," " double-faced unity" ? We know what is meant by
" stuff" when we talk of the materials out of which a table or
a suit of clothes is made, but the word becomes absolutely
unmeaning when spoken of an intellectual idea, like that of
Being, or of the simple cognitive act of self-consciousness.
" Double-aspect " signifies, or ought to signify, two views or
points of viewing what is known to be one and the same
thing; but here we have two sets of facts or things " differing
by a difference that transcends all other differences." Surely,
then, to speak of the unextended mind and the material brain
as " aspects " of the same fact, is merely a childish attempt
to deceive ourselves with half-understood words.

Similarly, the terms, " objective side of a feeling " and
*' subjective side of a nervous current," when intended to be
taken as a philosophical explanation, and not as mere
metaphorical phrases expressive of ignorance, are a perversion
of language. " The expression, ' a two-sided cause,' is one of
those figures of speech which are the crutches of Metaphysics,
and enable halting theories to make progress. We find the
same difficulty in realizing in our mind the conception of a
two-sided cause as we have in realizing a blue-sound or a three-
sided motion." -9 A Cause is defined in Dr. Bain's own Logic,
as " the entire aggregate of conditions or circumstances
requisite to the production of the effect." But if mental
states form part of the aggregate of conditions required to
effect a given movement, then mind is no longer a mere
"aspect" of physical processes: it is a really efficient agent
which occasionally "ruptures the nervous continuity," and
Mr, Bain's doctrine, in company with all other forms of
materialistic monism, at once falls to the ground. If mental
states do not co-operate in the production of physical changes,
then they must not be described as past-causes, or the " side "
of a cause, without self-contradiction.

the wonderful works of civilization, and, so far as these latter are
concerned, might never have been. This is one of those curious
but strictly logical consequences of this theory, which its supporters
do not care to obtrude on public attention.

-9 Cf. M. Guthrie, On Mr. Spencer's Unification o/Knozvlcdge, p. 248.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 517

Monism: Conservation of Energy and Law of
Inertia. — To many minds the most serious attack in
recent years on the spirituahty of the Soul is that based
on the doctrine of the conservation of etiergy. Though
sometimes specially directed agSiinst free-will, the objec-
tion, if valid at all, disproves the possibility of any
influence of mind upon body. Physical energy, defined
as capacity for doing ivork, may be either kinetic, e.g., that
of the flying bullet, or potential, e.g., that of an elevated
weight. Numerous experiments in chemistry and physics
go to show that in the transmutations of energy from
one form to another none is lost or gained ; and the
results have been formulated in the statement : The sum
of the kinetic and potential energies of any isolated system of
bodies remains constant. This conclusion has been still
further generalized in the form of the Law : The sum
total of energy in the universe always remains the same. From
this generalization the positivist psychologist passes to
a further inference, the doctrine of "psychophysical,
parallelism " — mental and bodily changes never affect each
other ; and then by one more logical leap to Monism —
mind and body are mere diverse phenomenal manifesta-
tions of one substratum.

It has also been maintained that this final con-
clusion is confirmed, if not independently proved by
the principle of inertia, Newton's first law of motion:
" Every body continues in its state of rest or uniform
motion in a straight line except in so far as it may be
compelled by impressed forces to change its state."

Harald Hoffding is perhaps the ablest exponent of this
argument, so we shall cite from his Outlines of Psychology.
The italics are ours :

" Materialphenomenaappearin the form of space. . . . This
characteristic distinguishes them from states of consciousness,
yet does not contain anything by which the material is
sharply defined and closed off as a world in tself. Fur we
might conceive these spatial movements as brought about by some-
thing non-spatial. The material world would in that case lie
open to influences from without. But scientific research
makes such a possibility always more inadmissible. It now
applies in all departments the principle that every tnaterial
movement must be explained by another material movement. The

5i8 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

very first principle (the law of inei'tia) on which natural
science is based, is that the state of a material point (rest or
movement in a straight line) can be altered only through the
influence of another material point ^^^. . . This principle cannot
from its nature admit of rigid proof. It is the fundamental
assumption with which natural science comes into existence.
. . . The like holds true of a more special principle, namely,
of the conservation of matter and energy. Modern chemistry is
based on the assumption confirmed by numerous experiments
that in all changes of matter the sum of the material atoms
remains the same." (pp. 30, 31.) Living beings, Hoffding
assures us, are in no way an exception to this law. The old
notion of a " vital force " governing the growth and reproduc-
tion of the living organism is illusory. " This doctrine is really
only a mythological way of expressing the amazement which
the unique character of organic phenomena excited." (p. 34.)^^
Still less does the mind act upon the body or vice-versa.
"There is no justification for maintaining as a fact that a
bodily process causes a menial process or the reverse. . . . The
supposition that a causal relation may exist between the
mental and the material is contrary to the doctrine of the conserva-
tion of energy, for at the point where the material nerve process
should be converted (sic) into a mental activity a sum of
physical energy would disappear without being made good by
a corresponding sum of physical energy." (p. 55.) " It will be
easily seen that it avails nothing to say that the mind may not
be able to increase the sum of physical energy, but that
it can alter the direction of the applied energy. A physical
movement does not change its direction except under the
influence of a physical force of a certain strength. So that this
subterfuge also of necessity makes the energv of consciousness a
physical energy.'" (p. 56.)"'^ As there is a perfect correspondence

"<^ The laii) of inertia is here mis-stated. As given above (p. 517) in
Newton's words, it does not assert that the movement of a body can
be affected only by the influence of another material agent. Newton
himself would never have admitted such a principle. Yet it may be
conceded that physical science prescinds from all but material
agencies.

^1 Were Ilotfding not committed to this view we doubt if he
would write thus to-day. The best authorities in biological science
now admit that the attempt to explain life mechanically — so much
in vogue twenty-five years ago — has failed all along the line ; and
that the present tendency is universally back towards vitalism. Cf.
Prof. Haldane, "Vitalism," Nineteenth Century (Sept. 1S98).

=*- Here is a truly naive petitio principii. After copiously proving
universally admitted facts, the writer slurs over the crucial question,
and devotes just tivo lines, plus an abusive epithet, to establish

MONISTIC THEORIES. S^O

between mental and neural processes, whilst the hi2i.' of the
conservation of energy precludes real interaction between them,
the only satisfactory scientific conception of their relations is
that " Mind and body, consciousness and brain are evolved
as different forms of expression of one and the same being."
(54.) " Both the parallelism and the proportionality between
the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an
identity at bottom. . . . We have no right to take mind and
body for two beings or substances in reciprocal interaction."
(64.)^^ In fine, " the Identity-hypothesis regards the mental and
material worlds as two manifestations of one and the same
being both given in experience." (66.) Still, lest the reader
might begin to suspect that the scientiiic psychologist has
after all lapsed into Metaphysics, he is reassured and com-
forted by the statement : " Concerning the inner relation

the fundamental thesis on which his attack upon dualism rests !
The two lines are either a puerile and irrelevant truism, or a formal
begging of the whole question in dispute. The assumption that a
physical movement is modified only by a physical force is a truism for the
astronomer, chemist, physicist, &c., who abstract from all but physical
forces ; but it is the precise point to be proved in regard to the vioral
sciences, ethics, economics, aesthetics, psychology, which all assume,
and find the same sort of verification for the assumption, that 7ion-physical
forces — motives and volitions — direct physical movements. What
the Mofiist has to prove is, e.g., that the ideas of " Independence" or
" British supremacy " have had no real influence in originating or
in directing that special commotion of material particles and trans-
mutation of physical energy called "the Boer war." For this, neither
a question-begging epithet, nor an irrelevant truism will suffice.
Assuredly the fact that the physical scientist may justly assume this
law of inertia with only approximate proof in regard to lifeless matter
does not compel the moral scientist to admit it without any proof,
rigid or approximate, regarding living conscious beings.

'^'■^ Surely the parallelism of two activities would point not to one
but to two distinct substrata. Again : are they parallel in space, or in
time ? Or how ? Are both continuous ? Experience affirms mental
states accompany only a fraction of neural processes ; and present
science professes profound ignorance of the character of the cerebral
correlate of the higher rational activities. What, then, is the
precise signification of this "parallelism" of the activities, except
their incapacity to meet — which is scarcely a reason for their identifica-
tion ? Does the "proportionality" — e.g., of a reasoning process to
its concomitant nerve-commotion — refer to variation in intensity,
or spatial area, or rapidity, or duration ? Or has this half-conceived
metaphor — on which the whole weight of the monistic inference here
rests — any consistent intelligible meaning whatsoever ? This is a
specimen of the clearness and accuracy of thought of that
" scientific " psychology which contemns the "metaphysician."

520 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

between mind and matter, we teach nothing ; we suppose only
that one being works in both. But what kind of being is this ?
Why has it a double form of manifestation, why does not one
suffice ? These are questions which lie beyond the region of
our knowledge." (Op. cit. p. 67.)

Criticism: Metaphysics inevitable.— It niay be
justly urged that any positivistic attempt to disprove
the interaction or the real duality of mind and body
based on the Conservation of Energy, viewed as a generali-
zation of physical science and prescinding from all
metaphysics, is necessarily illegitimate and worthless.
Every interpretation of this Law involves some meta-
physical theory. The doctrine can certainly not be
invoked as an established truth of positive science
incompatible with real interaction between mind and
body, whilst its own philosophical significance is
altogether ignored. The notions of causality, action,
energy, and the like, are derived, in the first instance,
from the mind's own real activity and its immediate
experience of exerting real influence over thoughts and
bodily movements, (pp. 368, seq.) All our conceptions of
energy, causality, interaction between material agents pre-
suppose the experience of personal causality — of the
real influence of mind on body. If it be an illusion to
think that the mind really influences the body, it must be
equally erroneous to suppose that any one body really
influences another. What then, is the precise meaning
of the " first principle of exact science " that " the state
of a material point can be altered only through the
influence oi another material point?" It will not avail
the positivist to turn round now, and say that by
" causal action" or "influence" of material agents on
each other, he only means constant succession or concomitance.
For such constant succession or concomitance cannot
be denied to obtain with respect to the mental and
bodily processes. The truth is, the positivist Psycho-
logist, by professing to abjure all metaphysics, evades
the obligation of defining those metaphysical concep-
tions with which all real science is saturated, and then
employs them alternately in the sense ascribed to them

MONISTIC THEORIES. 521

by Hume or by Reid, by phenomenism or by common
sense, as he finds convenient for his argument.^^

2. Constancy of Energy not a Necessary Truth.-— The law is
not a necessary a priori axiom, but a generalization from
experience. Now many writers urge that the law is not
demonstrated to hold accurately for any living organism;
and that there is no possibility of its ever being rigidly proved
respecting the universe as a whole. The experiments establish-
ing the exactness of the law, from the nature of the case, have
been fully satisfactory only in reference to portions of
inanimate matter; whilst the very point in dispute is its
applicability to living sentient beings. The animal structure is
an extremely delicate machine, in which the action of a
relatively small force may liberate or transform a very large
quantity of latent energy, pretty much as the faintest pressure
of a hair-trigger pistol may explode a powder-magazine.^-^
In such a case the pouvoir decrochant — the force which frees the
stored-up energy — is so infinitesimally small as to be quite
inappreciable when incorporated in the total result. In this
view the law is admitted to possess approximate but not
absolute accuracy in regard to sentient or rational beings.^^
Consequently there always remains room for the interaction
of mind and body, though the total quantity of energy in the
universe should thereby undergo infinitesimal variations.

3. Mathematical Solutions. — Distinguished mathemati-
cians, however, have professed to reconcile the modification
of bodily movement by the mind with the most rigid fulfil-
ment of the law. One of the simplest solutions advanced is
thus stated : " It is a principle of mechanics that a force
acting at right angles to the direction in which a body is
moving does no work, although it may continually alter the
direction in which the body moves. No power, no energy, is
required to deflect a bullet from its path, provided the deflect-
ing force acts always at right angles to that path. ... If
Mind or Will simply deflect matter as it moves, it may produce
all the consequences claimed by the Wilful School, and yet it
will neither add energy nor matter to the universe."^^

3-» Cf. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 209—219.

3* "As far as we can j udge, life is always associated with machinery
of a certain kind, in virtue of which an extremely delicate directive
touch is magnified ultimately into a very considerable transmutation
of energy." (Balfour Stewart, On the Conservation of Energy, p. 163.)

36 G. Fonsegrive, Le Libre Arbitre (1896), pp. 315 — 326.

37 Cited by Tait and Stewart, The Unseen Universe, p. 180. These
eminent physicists, however, prefer a different solution. [Ibid. §§
III, 112.) M.M. Cournot, de Saint-Venant, Boussinesque, and

522 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

4. True Solution. — The notion underlying most of the
answers suggested — that the Mind or Will merely directs,
applies, or disposes of the energy stored in the organism-
contains, at least, part of the explanation ; but their advocates
seem to us frequently to err in representing the Mind as in a
condition of excessive isolation from or independence of the
body. Indeed, much of the strength of this difficulty is due
to the erroneous conception of the mutual relations of soul
and body prevalent among spiritualist writers since Descartes.
In his theory (see above, p. 257), if the soul initiated or modified
a series of bodily movements, it would do so after the manner
of Si foreign agent, and would therefore seem inevitably to alter
the quantum of energy possessed by the alien material system
with which it is supposed to interfere. But if, rejecting this
ultra-dualism, we return to the Aristotelian conception
according to which soul and body constitute one complete
substantial living being of which the soul is the animating,
actuating, or determining principle— the formal cause, whilst
the body is the determinable, material, quantitative principle,
the difficulty at once loses more than half its force. The
question is now no longer whether a spiritual agent can excite
or modify the movements of a foreign material system without
augmenting or diminishing the energy of that system, but
whether the conscious states of a sentient being can determine
the actualization and direction of the latent physical energy
of that being without changing its amount. For, in this view,
the material energy manifested in movement was previously
stored in the living organic tissues; feelings and volitions
merely determine the form it shall assume. Mental acts thus
modify not the quantity, but the quality of the energy contained
in the system. The distinction between quality and quantity
in all forms of energy is the key to the solution of the difficulty.

This is admirablyinsisted upon by P. Couailhac in his recent
able monograph on the problem.^^ Quantity and movement
are the special object of the exact sciences ; but they do not
exhaust the content of the universe. In every transition from
potential to actual energy, the qualitative element, he rightly
urges, is as real and influential as the quantity. Direction, which
is the qualitative element of movement, is as real and important

others, have also invented various ingenious solutions based on
more or less abstruse mathematics. To our mind, however, the
chief value of these attempts is that they make prominent the com-
plexity, obscurity, and uncertainty of the assumptions involved in
applying the doctrine of Conservation to the living organism, and
prove the groundlessness of the dogmatism of Monism.

»8 La LibertJ ct la Conservation dc VEncrgie (Paris, 1897), Livre IV.

MONISTIC THEORIES. 523

as velocity and duration. In order that a material particle may
move, it must take a definite path in space. But the quantity
of energy— the velocity and the mass— being given, an in-
definite variety of such paths conceivably lie open to it. It
does not dispose of quality to say that the direction of the moving
body is due to the intensity of "the forces playing on it. This
merely pushes the question back. The effect of these forces
is due as much to their quality as to their quantity, and so the
qualitative element must ultimately be traced back to a directive
principle distinct from quantity. Passing to the more complex
movements of Uving organisms which start from a germ cell
and develop into an animal of a particular species, the
qualitative efficiency of the energy which determines the lines
along which the embryo is to evolve becomes still more promi-
nent. Whilst the quantity of the energy of the Uving organism
at any time is the resultant of the material elements borrowed
from external nature, the form of this energy is determined by
the organizing force of the germinal principle; though the
action of the latter is again conditioned by the nutriment
absorbed. Finally, in the living conscious being this qualitative
determining factor takes a still higher form, its range of activity
is wider, its power of applying, directing, and disposing of the
energy stored in the organism is more varied and more flexible,
but it cannot alter the quantity of the capital funded in the
self-moving machine. If, then, it be the quality of the forces
distributed in the nervous system which the directive power of
the soul inmiediately determines, the liberation and control of
a man's physical activity by his thoughts and volitions need
not necessarily conflict with even the most rigid fulfilment of
the Law of the constancy of the quantity of energy.^'-^

The Law of Inertia, however, cannot be admitted
to apply to conscious movements. Amongst the reasons
for denying its validity, are these: (i) It is admittedly
not self-evident. (2) It cannot be proved. (3) It at

39 "La volonte pent eveiller et tirer de leur torpeur les forces
disponibles de rorganisme, auquel elle est unie. Ella ne peut les
accroitre. Ces forces ont une limite, quand elle est atteinte, elles
s'arretent ou flechissent. Et il n'y a pas de tension de la volonte
qui puisse les porter en avant ou les soutenir. ... La fonction de
la vie est de placer les forces physico-chimiques dans les conditions
ou peuvent se produire les combinaisons d'ou resulte le tourbillon
vital, La vie est directrice. Majs elle ne peut ni alterer ni per-
fectionner les elements qui sont mis a sa disposition par la nature."
(Couailhac, op. cit. p. 226.)

524 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

least seems to be directly contradicted by the internal
experience of all men. (4) It would involve the in-
credible absurdities already dwelt upon, (pp.513 — 516.)
It is the unwarrantable application of this principle — not
that of the constancy of energy — which is incompatible
with dualism and the efficacy of mental action.

Agnosticism. — The final outcome of Monism is
Agnosticism. As in establishing our own doctrine, we
have indirectly refuted this creed — for since it profes-
sedly reposes not on reason but on faith, creed it is — we
cannot dwell on the subject further here. Indeed, since
the Unknowable declines to recognize the laws of logic,
rational criticism would be obviously futile. In its dark
continent the identification of thought and matter may
be peacefully accomplished without the disturbing
interference of either the profane scientist or the imper-
tinent philosopher. Screened off from the inconveniences
of public discussion, rebellious facts, and repugnant
principles can there be silently suppressed. The
freedom, responsibility, abiding identity and indi-
viduality to which conscious experience testifies can
be rejected as irrelevant evidence — because, of course,
no evidence is accepted within the jurisdiction of the
Unknowable. The difficulties of the theory which main-
tains that human thought has never influenced human
civilization, are easily overcome — the resources of the
Unknowable being equal to all emergencies. Enjoying
the hospitality of its ample territory, the most violent
contradictions and implacable inconsistencies can rest
in tranquil repose. Its frontiers once crossed, the
Monist has reached a hallowed asylum, into which
even the most relentless persecution of logic or common
sense cannot follow him. There, at last, all objections
are answered, all difficulties are solved, all doubts are
assuaged by the one great axiom so well — if not wisely —
expressed by Dr. Hodgson: " Whatever you are totally
ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."

Additional Readings. — Coconnier, ib. c. ii.; Farges, ib. pp. 136 — 106;
Ladd, ib. cc. 9, 10.

CHAPTER XXIV.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

Immortality and Psychology. — We have now
proved that the soul is a simple, spiritual, sub-
stantial principle ; and we have criticized at some-
length the chief counter theories. The truths thus
far established, though interesting in themselves,
derive their main importance from their bearing on
the question of a future life. This topic, however,
cannot be isolated and kept strictly within the
boundaries of psychology proper, for it is inseparably
bound up with problems of other branches of
philosophy. Immortality of the human soul pre-
supposes the existence of God ; and the most con-
vincing arguments of a future life are deduced from
ethics. But this fact merely evinces the solidarity
of the great metaphysical questions, whilst the
philosophical science of the human mind seems
clearly to be the place where the discussion of its
destiny ought to be undertaken.

Immortality and Theism.— Moreover, although
rigid demonstration of a future life presupposes the
existence of a Divine Ruler, — for were there no God,
the present question would be idle and meaningless, —
still it is worthy of note that some of the proofs of
Immortality are amongst the most forcible arguments

^26 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

for the existence of the Deity. Anyhow, the considera-
tions to be advanced here are of a purely rational
•character, and prescind altogether from the assured
certaint}^ of an everlasting life which we have guaranteed
by Revealed Religion.

Teleological Argument. — Our first proof will be
that deduced from the nature of the faculties, aspira-
tions, and yearnings of the human mind, and the
manner in which they point to another sphere of exist-
ence in which they are designed to enjoy their appro-
priate objects. Notwithstanding the seeming success
which temporarily marked the first assault of the theory
of natural selection on the doctrine of final causes, it is
now becoming more and more evident every day that
the attempt to explain the universe and all it contains
in a purely mechanical fashion, as the fortuitous out-
come of the collision of blind forces, has completely
failed ; and that the theory of Evolution is hopelessly
incompetent to solve even the simplest biological
problems without ultimately falling back on a teleo-
logical conception of the world. At all events, evolu-
tionists themselves are fully as insistent as pre-Darwin
ph3'siologists on the axiom that there is no organ ivithout
its function, that no activity or faculty is to be found in
the kingdom of organic life which has not its fitting
object, its appropriate end to serve. The e^'c would
never have been developed unless there were in exist-
ence light and material objects to be seen. The
mechanism of the ear would never have been evolved
save to operate in a universe of sound. The senses of
smell and taste exist only because there are real stimuli
to exercise them. And each instinct discovered in the
animal kingdom points infallibly to some real object by
which it is to be gratified. " Everywhere in nature
there is evident the law of correlation, of finality of
harmonious reciprocity, of appeasement of real needs,
and satisfaction of natural tendencies." ^ Even the
rudimentary organ is held to establish conclusively the
reality of the past or future occupation for which the

^ Cf. J. Knabenbauer, S.J., Das Zcugniss des Menschengeschlechtes
juY die Unsterblickkcit der Seek, p. 5.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 527

member was made. In fact, all the evidence gathered
in behalf of Evolution, when impartially viewed from
a larger and higher standpoint, merely confirms the
main thesis of Natural Theology that the Author of
the world is a Being of infinite wisdom who governs it
in harmony with reason and according to law. If we
now turn to Psychology for an accurate account of our
mental aptitudes and tendencies, we shall learn that
the Mind is the subject of activities and powers rising
altogether above the needs of the present life ; and that
it exhibits talents and aspirations which find not their
proper satisfaction here, but stretch out beyond the
present existence, demanding a future state in which
they may attain adequate realization.

Aspirations of the Intellect. — Man alone, of all creatures
upon earth, has the power of looking back into the past and
forward into the future. His mind, by the indwelling energy
of its peculiar nature, strains and gazes out across distant
epochs of time. Unlike that of the mere animal, its interest
is not confined to the present Now. It naturally rises to the
concept oi endless duration. The mystery which surrounds this
notion has ever been a stimulus to thought and speculation.
It lies at the source of man's most universal and deep-seated
intellectual cravings ; whilst the most ardent admirers of the
sagacity of the lower animals do not venture to suggest that
the idea of a never-ending future exercises their intelligence
or troubles their peace of mind. There is a similar attraction
for the intellect in the notion of space. Thought is conscious
of the power and the impulse to transcend the physical
boundaries and impediments which fetter the bodily frame.
It feels that, unlike material energies, it can in an instant
reach out and soar beyond the utmost frontiers of the created
universe. The conception of the possible, the necessary, the
universal, as the schoolmen insisted, is the special fruit of man's
intellect. The more the human mind is developed and per-
fected, the more it feels its affinity with realities which lie'
behind and beyond sensible experience. (See pp. 471, 472.)'

2 Cf. Piat : " Notre pensee n'est pas close, comme celle des
betes, dans una portion determinee du temps et de I'espace ; son
elan natif remporte plus loin : de quelque maniere qu'elle s'exercc,
de quelque cote qu'elle se tourne, c'est toujours de I'Eternel qu'elle
a en perspective. Or il y a quelque chose de significatif dans cette
excellence de notre esprit. En face de I'eternite le temps ne compte
pour rien. Si longtemps que nous ayons vecu, tout nous a encore

528 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Higher rational activity, in fact, proclaims that the true and
sufficient object of the yearnings of the soul must lie beyond
the confines of this life circumscribed by corporeal conditions.
If every organ has its fitting function, and every instinct its
appropriate object, it is incredible that the highest aspirations
of reason should be aimless, and the noblest energies of man
should be ever emptying themselves into a void.

This same line of reasoning is accepted by as thorough-
going an evolutionist as A. R. Wallace. He has written thus:
"Those faculties which enable us to transcend time and space,
and to realize the wonderful conceptions of mathematics and
philosophy, or which give us an intense yearning for abstract
truth (all of which were occasionally manifested at such an
early period of human history as to be far in advance of any
of the few practical applications which have since grown
out of them), are evidently essential to the perfect develop-
ment of man as a spiritual being, but are utterly inconceivable
as having been produced through the action of that law (of
Natural Selection) which looks only, and can look only, to the
immediate material welfare of the individual or the race.
The inference I would draw from this class of phenomena, is
that a superior intelligence has guided the development of
man in a definite direction and for a special purpose." {On
Natural Selection, p. 359.)

Yearning of the Will : Insatiate desire of Happiness. — But
the intellect is not the only faculty which speaks to us of
another life ; the conative side of man's being insists not less
urgently on the same truth. In each living creature the
collective tendencies which issue from its internal constitution
form the complete expression of its nature or essence, and
manifest the end which it is designed to realize. The specific
tendency of the human being is rational appetency. This is
the characteristic outpouring of man's being ; through it, his
true self-reaHzation is to be accomplished. But since rational
appetency follows upon intellectual cognition, and since this
latter activity tends towards the universal and the infinite,
ever insatiably conceiving better and more perfect objects
than those presented by experience, so rational desire can
never rest content with the goods and pleasures of this
life.

manque lorsque nous venons a mourir, si nous mourons tout
entiers. Quand nous sortons de la vie, Tadaptation de notre pensee
a son milieu connaturel n'a pas commence ; il reste entre notre
ideal et nous une disproportion radicale. II faut done, pour que la
finalite soit satisfaite, que notre existence se prolonge a I'indefini."
{Destinee de I'Homme, p. 159. Paris, 1898.)

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 529

We are not dependent, however, on abstract reasoning for
the establishment of this fact. Our own consciousness, along
with the sages, poets, and philosophers of every age, all
iterate the same truth. There is implanted in our nature a
yearning for happiness which can never be satisfied in our
present sphere. This rational instinct exhibits itself in the
lowest and hardest conditions of human existence ; but the
wealth, the comforts, the luxuries, the art and the science
which civilization brings, are impotent to appease it. The
power of conception ever exceeds the present reality. With
each successive stage of mental development the craving
becomes more and more conscious of itself, and it grows and
expands, proclaiming ever more clamorously that it is not to
be satiated with any finite creature. The brute animal lives
normally in a state of content. Its faculties and instincts find
their proper nutriment, and it is satisfied. But for man "the
eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing."
Though master of the rest of creation, he is condemned
throughout this life by the very constitution of his rational
nature to be ««-satisfied with his lot ! Is it possible, that of
all living beings on earth, man alone — and in his highest
powers — is to be aimlessly dis-proportioned and mis-adapted
to his environment ? Is this highest of rational instincts
destined to be universally frustrated ? Are the loftiest and
best yearnings of the noblest and best work in this rational
universe to be for ever vain and illusory ? and more vain and
dissLppointing precisely in proportion as by moral and intellectual
culture he developes and perfects his highest faculties ?^

Ethical Argument. — It is, however, from the
department oi Ethics that reason puts forth the most

* " II faut done ou que rhomme soit dans la nature un monstre
incomprehensible ou qu'il y ait pour lui quelque chose de plus que
la nature. II faut ou que la vie de I'homme n'ait aucun sens et n'en
puisse jamais avoir . . . qu'elle devienne de plus en plus intolerable
au fur et a mesure, que se deployant davantage, elle enferme plus de
raison ; il faut que la vie de I'homme soit impossible en droit ou v

qu'on la con9oive comme la premiere etape d'une evolution com-
mencee qui doit s'achever ailleurs. Si tout finit avec le dernier
soupir, rhomme est un etre manqu^ ; il est tel par nature ; il Test
d'autant plus qu'il touche de plus pres a son point de maturity. Or
il n'est pas rationnel de croire a une antinomic aussi profonde :
on ne peut admettre que cette meme finality qui s'accuse si visible-
ment dans toutes les especes inferieures, s'arrete brusquement au
plus haut degre de la vie et y fasse a jamais defaut." (Piat, op. cit.
pp. 192, 193. Cf. Martineau, A Study of Religion, Bk. IV.)

530 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

irresistible demand for a future life.^ Morality is an
essentially rational phenomenon. The reality of right
and wrong, of duty and virtue, of merit and responsi-
bility, are amongst the most certain convictions of our
rational nature. That what is seen to be clearly
wrong nmst not be done, notwithstanding the temporal
disadvantages which may ensue, is an axiom to which
the intellect gives complete assent, however feeble the
will, may be in actual practice. But in the judgment
that conduct entailing a sacrifice ought to be pursued,
there is implied the further judgment that it cannot be
ultimately worse for the agent himself to do that which is
right. Our intellect, in fact, affirms that right conduct
is always reasonable. The supposition that virtue can
finally result in a maximum of misery for the agent ; or
that wickedness may effect an increase in the total
quantity of his personal happiness is seen to be in
conflict with reason, and to be destructive of all
morality. It is impossible that perfect and fully
enlightened reason can recommend us to do that which
conscience categorically /?y^/(is. But if so, our perma-
nent real interests cannot be injured by right conduct.
Duty cannot be in irreconcilable war with rational self-love.

In the concrete. — The issue becomes clearer when
we face the question in the concrete. Can it be
equally well in the end for the successful swindler who
amasses a fortune by the plunder of his clients, and for
the upright man who honestly struggles through a life
of poverty, and resisting temptation, dies in want ?
Can it be ultimately the same for the forger or slanderer
and the innocent man, whose life he has ruined ? Is
there to be no difference, when the last breath is
breathed, between the murderer and his victim, the
adulterer and the chaste, the martyr or the saint and
his malicious persecutor ? History affords plent}' of
examples of bad men, with hardened conscience,
prosperous to the end of their lives, and of virtuous
men who, owing to their honesty, have died with the
stamp of failure on their earthly career. Our whole

* The ethical proof, resting on divine purpose in the world, is
itself teleological, but is conveniently separated from the former proof.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 531

rational moral nature affirms that this cannot be the
final outcome of things : that it cannot in the last
resort be as well or better for those who violate the
principles of justice, and those who faithfully observe
the moral law seeking to conform their conduct to the
ideal of right and holiness. The first postulate of physical
science is that the universe is rational. Its most fundamental
axiom, the law of uniformity , is based on this assumption.
Would it he a rational universe if vice is to be rewarded and
virtue to he punished in the end ? Is it a rational universe
if the moral life of mankind be founded on an illusion ?
Can the holiness of the world's saints, the virtues of its
best heroes, the moral life of the mass of mankind have
had their source and origin, their never-failing food
and support in one huge hallucination ?

Professor Sidgwick merely expressed this truth in
the most moderate terms when, after all decorous
hesitations and qualifications and sub-qualifications,
he conceded that "the existence of a Supreme Being
who will adequately reward me for obeying this rule of
duty or punish me for violating it," is " a matter of life
and death to the Practical (Moral) Reason," and finally
concluded with the truest philosophical statement in
his work. " The whole system of our beliefs as to the
intrinsic reasonableness of conduct must fall, . . .
without a belief in some form or other that the Moral
Order which we see imperfectly realized in the actual
world is yet actually perfect. If we reject this belief,
we may, perhaps, still find in the non-moral universe
an adequate object for the Speculative Reason capable
of being in some sense ultimately understood. But the
Cosmos of Duty is reduced to a Chaos, and the pro-
longed effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect
ideal of rational conduct is seen to be foredoomed to
inevitable failure."^

Immortality makes Morality always reasonable.
— On the other hand, if the present life be, as the
Schoolmen taught, only the antechamber to eternity ; if

5 Methods of Ethics (Edit. 1874), Bk. IV. c. vi. ; cf. also Balfour,
Foundations of Belief, pp. 339 — 354 ; and Mallock, /5 Life ivorth
Living ? c. ix.

532 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

the happiness of Heaven means the perfection of man's
highest powers and the satisfaction of his highest
aspirations in a bHssful union with the infinite source of
all beauty and all good by contemplation and love ; and
if a life of virtue here consists in the perfecting of our
nature and the preparation of it for that union with God,
then we have an adequate foundation for all our ethical
notions. And we are provided with an ideal of moral life
and a conception of man's end, which explain and
harmonize our ethical conceptions among themselves,
and their relations with the facts of our temporal life.

Actual sanctions imperfect. — It is true, of course, that the
present life is not devoid of moral sanctions, that extreme
courses of vice generally meet with retribution, and that, as a
rule, honesty is the best policy — at least where the police
system is efficient. But it cannot be seriously pretended that
this is always the case ; and still less that each individual act
of virtue, and every noble sacrifice for the sake of duty gains
its just recompense. It is indisputable that in the lives of the
great majority of men a certain judicious mixture of unscrupu-
lousness would secure to the agent an increase in the dividend
of the sources of happiness. It is urged also that the
sanctions of conscience and of public opinion, compensate for
all other deficiencies. We should be very sorry to unduly
depreciate the value of a good conscience : but the assertion
cannot stand the test of experience. It is generally only in
the virtuous that conscience is sensitive ; and good men
probably suffer sharper pangs for smaller faults than the
wicked do for grievous crimes. Indeed, the more abandoned
the criminal, the fainter the internal moral chiding becomes ;
whilst agreeable elation or complacent self-satisfaction over
his meritorious performances is not a kind of pleasure in
which the truly virtuous man is wont to indulge. Finally, if
belief in a future retribution be recognized as illusory, both
the menace and the promise which make up the chief part of
the sanction of conscience are annihilated. The claim put
forward on behalf of public opinion as an adequate sup-
plementary sanction is equally invalid. For, firstly, the
censure of society cannot reach secret sins and a very large
part of man's moral life ; whilst it is extremely likely to err
regarding motives on which the goodness or badness of conduct
essentially depends. Secondly, the only public opinion for
which the individual cares is that of his own class or neigh-
bourhood ; and this not infrequently is opposed rather than
favourable to virtuous actions.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 533

Formal Theistic Proof. — Formally assuming the
existence of God as independently established in
Natural Theology, the argument for a future life may
now be thus enunciated : An infinitely wise and
benevolent God could not have implanted in all men
a yearning for happiness whilst intending this natural
desire to be necessaril}^ finally, and universally frus-
trated. Nor could He as a just and holy legislator
have imposed upon mankind His Moral Law whilst
leaving it incomplete and imperfect through defective
sanction. But if there be no future life for man, God
has done this : hence v/e are bound to conclude that
God has designed to continue the soul's conscious
existence after death.

Argument from Universal Belief. — Another argu-
ment upon which much stress has always been laid is
the practical universality of the belief in a future life.
Such a conviction in opposition to all sensible appear-
ances must spring, it was urged, from man's ritional
nature, and must be allowed to be true unless we are
prepared to hold that man's rational nature inevitably
leads him into error in a matter of fundamental import-
ance to his moral life. To admit this, it was argued,
logically leads to scepticism. Adequate treatment of
this argument would require considerable space.

Scholastic Metaphysical or Ontological Arg-ument. — In

addition to the arguments just given, the schoolmen deduced
a proof of the soul's future preservation from its nature as a
simple spiritual being. This ontological demonstration, it must
be admitted, has not the persuasiveness with the modern mind
which it possessed in the schools. Nevertheless, when properly
understood, its defensive value is considerable. It enables
the spiritualist to meet all materialistic attacks by showing
that the subject of our conscious life is constructed to resist
the destructive agencies which corrupt material beings ; and
it furnishes a conception by which a future life becomes more
intelligible. We shall briefly state it in its scholastic shape.

By death is understood cessation of life in living beings.
Such cessation of life might conceivably be brought about by
either of two causes : annihilation of the living being, or
corruption of its vital principle. Anniliilation means the
reduction of the object into absolute nothingness. A creature

534 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

is, strictl}' speaking, annihilated only when it so ceases to be
that no element of it remains. A being is said to be incor-
ruptible when it is incapable of perishing either by dissolution
into the constituent parts or elements which may compose it,
or by destruction of the subject in which it inheres or upon
which it depends for its existence. Corruption from the
philosophical point of view may thus in scholastic language
be of either of two kinds, corriiptio per se, essential corruption,
or corriiptio per accidens, accidental corruption.^ In corruption
per se there is a dissolution of the being into its component
principles, as in the death of a man and the combustion
of firewood. A being was said to suffer corruption per
accidens when put an end to indirectly by the destruction of
the subject on which it depends. An accident perishes in this
way when the subject in which it inheres is broken up or
changed in such a manner as to be no longer a fit support for
it, as in the case of the disappearance of the shape and
colour from a ball of melting snow or butter. According to
the opinion most commonly received among the schoolmen,
the extinction of the vital activity of brute animals and plants
is an instance of corriiptio per accidens.

Now the Ontological argument claims to prove three
propositions : (A) that the human soul is both per accidens and
per se incorruptible ; (B) that it can be annihilated neither by
itself nor by any other creature ; (C) that no sufficient reason
can be assigned for supposing that God will ever annihilate it.
It should be clearly understood that Almighty God could by
an exercise of His absolute power'' annihilate the human
soul or any other creature. For every creature continues to
exist and act only in virtue of the constant conservation and
concurrence of God. But the argument proves that the soul

^ " A Being is incorruptible if it does not contain within itself a
principle of dissolution ; it is indestructible if it can resist every
external power tending to destroy or annihilate it. If the indestruc-
tible and incorruptible Being is endowed with life, it is called
immortal." (Kleutgen, op. cit. § 844.) The signification of these
terms varies slightly with different writers. Kleutgen points out
that annihilation is always possible to God by the mere withdrawal
of His conserving act.

"^ The phrase potentia absoluta denotes the range of the Divine
Power abstracting from all self-imposed degrees. Within its sphere
is included the production of anything not involving a contradiction,
such as would be, e.g., a square circle. Potentia ordinata signifies the
range of God's power as conditioned by His free decrees. Thus, if
God has once promised a particular reward on the fulfilment of a
certain condition, He cannot henceforward retract.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, 535

is fitted in its nature to survive, and that God is the only
Agent by whom its destruction could be accomplished.

(A) The Soul is incorruptible. — It has been already demon-
strated (i) that the soul is a substantial bein^, (2) that
it is simple or indivisible, (3) that it is spiritual or not
intrinsically dependent on the body for its action or existence,
(c. xxi.) But a simple substantial being is incapable of
corruption per se, for it is not composed of distinct parts or
principles into which it might be resolved ; and a spiritual
substance is exempt from corruption /^^r accidens, since it does
not intrinsically depend on the body for its existence.
Therefore the human soul is incapable of corruption in either
of these alternative ways. Incorruptibility is thus a conse-
quence of immateriality. If the mind were a function of the
brain, or an aspect of nervous processes, then dissolution of
the organism would necessarily involve destruction of the
soul. The refutation of these hypotheses in our first three
chapters has, consequently, removed the chief argument
against the possibility of a future life.

(B) The Soul cannot be annihilated either (i) by itself or (2) by
any creature. — Annihilation is the reduction of something to
nothing. But this result cannot be the effect of any positive
action ; for every positive action must terminate in a positive
reality. A positive act, other than that of creation, can only
change the state of the materials upon which it operates. It
cannot make them disappear altogether. Any action accord-
ingly, whether of the soul itself or of another creature, could
at most effect merely a change or modification in the soul.
Annihilation is possible only by the withdrawal of the con-
serving or creative power which has sustained the being in
existence. Now, as creation and conservation in existence
pertain to God alone. He only can cease to preserve; and,
therefore, He alone can annihilate. The argument has been
thus concisely stated : " Inasmuch as it is a simple spiritual
substance, the soul can come into existence only through the
creative act of God ; and, therefore, only through annihilation
by God can it perish. Annihilation consists in the refusal
of any further creative conservation : accordingly, He alone
who preserves and sustains a being can let it sink back into
nothing. In fact, no created force can subdue Omnipotence
exercising creative conservation, so as to reduce into nothing-
ness that which God preserves in existence. Divine creation
and conservation consists merely in the effective volition that
something be. Now, either God wills that the soul exists
longer, or He does not will it. If He wills it, then His will
can be overcome by no finite power. If He does not will it,
then it ceases of itself to exist without any other agency beine

536 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

cause of its cessation. Consequently, the soul can in no way
be destroyed by any finite power." ^

(C) There is no reason to suppose that the Soul will ever
perish. — It has been now proved by the ethical and teleological
arguments that the soul will not perish at death, and by
this ontological argument that it is of its own nature
incorruptible, and that it can be destroyed neither by itself
nor by any created being ; it only remains to be shown that
there is no ground for supposing that God will ever annihilate
it. The ultimate end and purpose for which the Almighty
conserves the soul in existence is His own extrinsic glory,
both objective and formal.'' But this end remains for ever;
therefore the act of conservation ought to be everlasting.

The only conceivable grounds which can be suggested for
the cessation of God's preserving action are, (a) the incapacity
of the soul to act when separate from the body, with its
consequent inability to apprehend, to praise, or to love God,
and (b) the unworthiness of the souls of the wicked to exist.
As regards (a), the ethical argument proves that the soul must
live at least for a time after death, and be capable of experi-
encing reward or punishment. It must, therefore, be endowed
with intelligence and will, and so be capable of contributing
to the formal glory of God. The mode, however, of its action,
following the mode of its existence, must be different from
that of its present state, (b) As for the wicked, it is at
least possible that they may be preserved for ever to vindicate
by their punishment the justice and offended majesty of God ;
though that this is a fact cannot be proved by philosophy alone.
For, absolute certainty of eternal punishment, as of everlast-
ing reward, is afforded us only by the infallible testimony of
Holy Writ. The congruity of such unending punishment was
deduced by scholastic theologians from consideration of the
infinite majesty of the Person offended, and the infinite claims
which He possesses over His creatures. The rebellion and
ingratitude of the creature constituting an offence under a
certain aspect infinite was held to be — even in the light of
pure reason — not unfittingly punished by a penalty finite in

^ Gutberlet, Die Psychologie, pp. 314, 315.

'-^ The extrinsic or external glory of God is that given to Him by
His creatures ; intrinsic or internal, is that aftbrded by Himself The
former is finite, the latter infinite. Both kinds may be either
objective or formal. The objective glory of God is that conferred by
the mere existence of His perfections, whether manifested in Him-
self or in His works. The latter is compared to that reflected on
the painter by his pictures. The formal glory of God consists in
the recognition and acknowledgment of the Divine excellences,
whether by Himself or by created intelligences.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 537

intensity but unlimited in duration. The adequate treatment,
however, of this difficulty would lead us into the territory of
dogmatic theology.

Objections against the doctrine of a Future
Life. — As the proofs of Immortality are nowadays
attacked from various standpoints, it is most desirable
to define accurately how much each can reall}^ estab-
lish. A want of clearness and precision on this point
is not infrequently exhibited by defenders of a future
life ; and they sometimes forget that the use of an
unsound argument, or the misuse of a sound one, has
often seriously damaged a good cause. To us it seems
best to admit frankly that whilst each of the ordinary
proofs has some special merit, it is also subject to
some particular defect or limitation ; and that it is only
by their collective combination that the complete
doctrine can be satisfactorily established.

(i) The ethical argument demonstrates that there must
be a. future co7iscioiis existence ; but it hardly proves that
this must last for ever. For it would be difficult to show
that God could not adequately reward and punish
virtue and vice in a finite period. (2) The teleological
argument also proves a future conscious existence in
which the higher aspirations of Intellect and Will can
be satisfied. And although it may not rigidly demon-
strate that the future life must be endless^ it points to
that conclusion, at least in the case of the good. But it
is more complex than the previous argument : it pre-
supposes the formal establishment of the law of finality
by Natural Theology or Science ; and so its persuasive
power is less. Further, respecting the future existence
of the wicked, its logical force is distinctly weaker.
(3) The argument from universal belief is subject to these
same limitations. All three proofs merely establish the
fact of a future existence. None of them suggest how
this is to be reconciled with the tendency to decay
witnessed in all living organisms. They simply leave
us with the antinomy or seeming conflict between experi-
ence and reason unsolved. (4) Here the ontological
argument comes to our aid. It removes the conflict by
showing that the objections based on the corruption of

538 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

material beings lose their force when directed against
the subject of thought and self-consciousness. It also
shows that continuity of existence is natural to the soul ;
that is, that the soul is apt to endure, and that it is not
liable to destruction by any created agency. But since
this continuity of existence is a contingent fact, depend-
ing on the free-will of God, the simplicity or spirituality
alone cannot prove that this continuity will be certainly
realized. To secure this recourse must be had to some
form of the teleological argument. Further, since in our
experience consciousness is liable to interruptions ; and
since, as far as our knowledge goes, mental states are
always accompanied by cerebral changes, the ontologi-
cal argument, without still further help from teleology,
would be unable to prove that the soul will be capable
of eliciting conscious acts when separate from the body.

I. The answer to sundry difficulties will now be
comparatively easy. Thus, for example, Professor
James writes : " The substance (of the soul) must give
rise to a stream of consciousness continuous with the
present stream, in order to arouse our hope, but of this
the mere persistence of the substance pev se offers no
guarantee. Moreover, in the general advance of our
moral ideas, there has come to be something ridiculous
in the way our forefathers had of grounding their hopes
of immortality on the simplicity of their substance.
The demand for immortality is nowadays essentially
ideological. We believe ourselves immortal because we
believe ourselves _^2^ for immortality." (Op. cit. p. 348.)

It may be replied that the demand for immortality
was teleological eight centuries ago in the time of
Aquinas, and long before in that of Plato. The
philosophers of the middle ages insisted much upon the
contmgent character of all created things. Not one ot
them would have put forward the simplicit}^ of the soul
as an argument for continuity of existence except on
teleological gronnds — as indicative of the intention of a
wise and good God. It is an essential tenet of the
scholastic philosophy (i) that the continuous existence
of every creature depends on its free conservation by Gotl
and (2) that all its operations require the free efficient

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 539

concurrence of the Divine Being. But all inferences as to
the future free actions of God must necessarily be based on the
doctrine of finality. For the persistence, then, both of
" the stream of consciousness " and of the substance of
the soul, the schoolmen had to argue from the " provi-
dentia divina " or the "consilium Dei," which is
merely the Latin for theistic teleology. But in proving
the soul to be a simple immaterial being, and thus
exempt from corrupting agencies, they believed they
showed its conservation to be natural or in harmony
with reason ; whilst to them it would be evidently
incompatible with Divine Wisdom to preserve in exist-
ence an inert soul devoid of action and consciousness.^^

2. The same answer destroys the force of Kant's famous
objection based on what he calls " the intensive quality " of the
soul, which he thus stated : " The supposed substance (of the
soul) if not by decomposition may be changed into nothing
by gradual loss {remissio) of its powers, consequently by
elanguescence. For consciousness itself has always a degree
which may be lessened, consequently the faculty of being
conscious may be diminished, and so with all the other
faculties." 11

1" As an "encyclopaedic ignorance" of scholastic philosophy
widely prevails in English psychological literature of the present
day, a few citations may be useful to show that the teleological
argument was appreciated by St. Thomas. That all creatures are
contingent he proves thus : " Hoc, igitur, quod Deus creaturae esse
communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet ; nee aliter res in esse
ccnservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit (infundit) esse, ut dictum
est ; sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare
esse, et sic eas non facere; ita postquam jam factae sunt, potest eis
non influere esse ; et sic esse desinerent, quod est, eas in nihilum
redigere." {Sum. i. q. 104. a. 3.) But the soul is designed to exist
for ever : " Unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat ;
desideriura autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem ;
sensus autem non cognoscit esse, nisi sub hie et nunc : sed intel-
lectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus ; unde
omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper ; naturale
autem desiderium non potest esse inane; omnis igitur intellectualis
substantia est incorruptibilis." {lb. q. 75. a. 6.) Again : " Impossibile
est naturale desiderium esse inane ; natura nihil facit frustra. Sed
quodhbet intelligens naturaliter desiderat esse perpetuum, non
solum ut perpetuetur secundum speciem, sed etiam individuum."
{Cont, Gent. Lib. II. c. 55. Cf. Ibid. c. 79. ad 4.)

^1 Critique of Pure Reason (Meiklejohn's Translation), p. 246.

540 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Undoubtedly if God ceased to conserve the soul it would
at once cease to exist; and whether this happened suddenly
or after a gradual waning of its activity, matters not a whit.
But it would be in conflict with the wisdom of God to suppose
that He could conserve the soul in an inert, unconscious
condition, devoid of all activity. Further, the argument from
Ethics, and the desire of happiness, in so far as they establish
anything, prove that the future existence must be conscious.
Kant seems to suppose that continuous conscious existence
is deduced by the ontological argument as a necessary result
of the simplicity of the soul, apart from and independently of the
divine conservation and concurrence. The argument may have
been employed in this illegitimate way by deists — certainly
not by the schoolmen. For them the aspirations of the intel-
lect, the desire of happiness and the simple immaterial
constitution of the soul, which secures its immunity from
corruptive agencies, were all so much teleological evidence of
God's design to continue the soul's existence and to supply His
efficacious concurrence requisite for its conscious activity in
the future.

3. A disembodied spirit, it is affirmed, cannot be pictured
by the imagination. " A spirit without a body," Biichner
assures us, " is as unimaginable as electricity or magnetism
without metallic or other substances." Science also refutes
our doctrine. " Physiology," says Vogt, " decides definitely
and categorically against individual immortality, as against
any special existence of the soul." Again Biichner : " Experi-
ence and daily observation teach us that the spirit perishes
with its material substratum." To observations of this sort
we may reply that {a) as far as imagination goes we cannot
picture the soul with the body. Neither can we imagine God,
nor the ultimate atoms of matter, {h) The comparison of the
soul to bodiless electricity is a complete misrepresentation of
our knowledge of mind. Electricity and magnetism, as we
have already pointed out, are presented to us only through
sensible movements, whilst v/e have an immediate conscious-
ness of the simple nature of mental energy, (c) Vogt's
assertion is simply as false as his other dictum, borrowed
from Cabanis, that " thought is a secretion of the brain."
Physiology can say nothing more than that the action of the
soul during this life is affected by the condition of the brain.
{d) The final statement cited from Biichner is equally untrue.
We most certainly cannot observe or experience the death
of the soul ; and we trust our arguments have shown that
we may infer the contrary.

4. " The soul is born with the body, it grows and
decays with the body, therefore it perishes with the

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 541

body."^^ Modern science has added very little to the argument
stated with so much power by the Latin poet. Now, we have
repeatedly pointed out that in the Scholastic system the
human soul is extrinsically dependent on the body which it
informs. Such a condition would completely account for all
the correspondence observed, whilst intrinsic or essential
independence remains. Such intrinsic independence com-
bined with extrinsic dependence is thus advocated by Ladd :
"That the subject of the states of consciousness is a real
being, standing in certain relations to the material beings
which compose the substance of the brain, is a conclusion
warranted by all the facts. That the modes of its activity
are correlated under law with the activities of the brain-
substance is a statement which Physiological Psychology
confirms : one upon which, indeed, it is largely based. . . .
Ail physical science., however^ is based upon the assumption that
real beings may have an existence such as is sometimes called
* independent,' and yet be correlated to each other under known or
discoverable laws. If this assumption could not be made and
verified, all the modern atomic theory would stand for
nothing but a vain show of abstractions. Upon what grounds
of reason or courtesy — we may inquire at this point — does
MateriaUsm decline to admit the validity of similar assump-
tions as demanded by mental phenomena ? " {Physiological
Psychology, p. 607.)

The soul, moreover, as will be proved in a later chapter,
is created, not derived, like the body, from the parents. It
does not grow in the sense of being quantitatively increased ;
but, conditioned by the efficiency of the brain and sensory
organs, it gradually unfolds its capabilities. It does not
really decay with bodily disease, although since its sensuous
operations are immediately dependent on the instrumentality
of the organism, it must naturally be affected by the health
of the latter. The argument can also be inverted. In many
instances the mind is most powerful and active in the
decrepit frame of the old ; and at times, in spite of dreadful
havoc from bodily disease, intelligence may survive in
brilliant force to the last.

5. The argument from universal belief has been attacked
on the ground that some peoples, and many individuals, both
philosophers and non-philosophers, do not judge there is any
future life. It may be observed in answer, that whenever
the proof from universal consent is invoked, it only pre-
supposes a moral universality. As regards the nations or
tribes who have been asserted to believe in no future life,

1^ Lucretius, De Rerum Natnra, Lib. III. vv. 446, seq.

542 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

advancing knowledge does not confirm such a statement.
The greatest care is required in interrogating savages regard-
ing their rehgious opinions. Inaccuracy in this respect has
often caused the ascription of atheism to tribes later on
proved to possess elaborate systems of religion and hier-
archies of gods. Future annihilation, asserted to be a cardinal
doctrine of Buddhism, is by the vast majority of the disciples
of that sect understood to be not a return to absolute nothing,
but an ecstatic state of peaceful contemplation.^^

Final Objection. — There remains one sweeping
objection which strikes at all the proofs alike. The
insatiate desire for happiness, the intellectual demand
for final equity, the seeming aptitude of an immaterial
soul to survive, it is roundly asserted, afford no guarantee
that they will be realized. The mind's inferences to the
ultimate perfecting and setting right of things need
not be valid ; our intellectual craving for completeness,
harmony, or symmetry in the universe does not prove
their objective reality.

The answer is that the postulate here is not merely
the satisfaction of some particular impulse. If those
exigencies of our reason which demand a future life
are doomed to disappointment, then there is an utter and
enormous failure which involves radical perversity in
the constitution of things. Science and Natural Theology
alike assume as first principle and starting-point the
nationality of the universe. But if there be no future
life, then the fundamental principles of morality are in
irredeemable conflict with the just claims of reason :
the fount of seeming law, order, and finality is hopeless
discord and senseless strife : the most imperious
affirmation of our rational moral nature is one prolonged
fraud: the ethical life of man, all that is highest and
greatest in this world — that which alone is truly good —
is a meaningless chaos. Intrinsic contradiction, absolute
irrationality is the last answer both of science and
philosophy !

It is true that some naturalistic writers adopt a lofty
tone on this subject. The old-fashioned view of life and
morality, they assure us, was base and ignoble. Virtue,

13 On this argument, see Knabenbauer, op. cit.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 543

we are told, is its own sufficient reward. Profound
contempt is expressed for " the pains and penalties
argument" of Christian philosophy. The doctrine of
rewards and punishments is an ''immoral bribe."
Right conduct, we are informed with an unctuous
austerity, ceases to be worthy of approval if the
prospect of thereby attaining everlasting happiness is
allowed to enter as a motive.

The academic philosopher from the university
professorial chair — enjoying a comfortable income and
agreeable occupation — may sneer at the moral convic-
tions of human nature : but to the thoughtful man who
gravely looks the stern realities of actual life in the
face and contemplates the suffering of multitudes of
mankind, such language must seem the most flippant
and unworthy trifling. If this life be but a passing
period of probation, and if there be a future state and
an infinitely good and just God who will there apportion
to all their just award, then difficult and obscure though
the problem of existence be, a rational solution is possible.
But if instead the universe be naught but an iron
mechanism — whether idealistic or materialistic matters
little — aimlessly and remorselessly grinding out tears,
and pain, and sorrow ; and if, when once this frail
thread of conscious life is cut, all is over ; then, for
vast numbers of human beings hopeless pessimism is
the only creed — and often and often suicide the most
rational practical conclusion !

Here is a picture : " I think," says the poor dying
factory girl, " if this should be the end of all, and
if all I have been born for is just to work my heart and
life away, and to sicken in this dree place, with those
mill-stones always in my ears, until I could scream out
for them to stop and let me have a little piece of quiet,
and with the fluff filling my lungs, until I thirst to death
for one long deep breath of the clear air, and my mother
gone, and I never able to tell her again how I loved her,
and of all my troubles, — I think, if this life is the end,
and that there is no God to wipe away all tears from all
eyes, I could go mad."^*

" Cited in the Grammar of Assent, p. 312.

CHAPTER XXV.

SOUL AND BODY.

Individuality of the Human Soul. — There still
remain sundry problems concerning the relations
of soul and body, but the limits of our space compel
us to compress our treatment of them into the
smallest possible compass. On the individuality of
the soul there is little to be added to what has been
already urged in establishing its persisting identity
(pp. 464, 465), and in criticizing James's view
(pp. 485, 486). The conviction that I have an
individual mind, insulated and complete in itself,
distinct and separate from all other minds, rests on
the testimony of self-consciousness, corroborated by
the witness of other men concerning their own
similar experiences. To those who reject this argu-
ment we can only put the question : By what other
conceivable kind of evidence could the fact be
better demonstrated ?

Pantheism of mediaeval Arabs.— Aristotle's obscure language
concerning the nature of the vovs ttoitjtlkos or httelledus agens,
afforded occasion to a philosophical heresy already alluded
to (p. 309), which prevailed widely amongst Arabian philoso-
phers of the middle ages. Aristotle speaks of this faculty as
being "separate" from the body. The explanation of the
paragraph offered by St. Thomas is, that the Intellectus
separatiis is held by Aristotle to pertain only to the spiritual

SOliL AND BODY. 545

soul, and so, unlike the sensuous powers, is understood to be
intrinsically independent of the organism. The Arab philo-
sophers interpreted the epithet " separate " literally, and
assumed the existence of one common or universal Intellect
superior to all men, which in some mysterious way operates
in the mind of each, and illuminates or excites it to intelli-
gence. Only the Intellectus agens is made separate by
Avicenna, but both Intellectus agens and patiens seem to be
viewed as extrinsic by Averrhoes. Strange and fantastic as
this doctrine appears, it has affinity to modern forms of
Pantheism. Thus Spinoza taught that our minds are only
modes of one infinite mind, which is itself but one of an
infinite number of attributes that go to constitute the one,
infinite, all-embracing Substance. Hegel held that all human
consciousnesses are but transient moments or stages of the
Absolute Spirit. According to Cousin, we know all things in
the Universal Reason. Even the Vision en Dieu of Pere
Malebranche, and the Hyperphysical Idealism of Bishop
Berkeley, bear some relationship to the Arabian conception.
In this last view, what seem to be our intellectual operations
are really the result of the working of the one common
eternal Active Intellect. In the theory of the French Abbe,
our mental acts are really our own, though their immediate
objects are ideas in the one, all-embracing Divine Mind.
Berkeley stands opposed to both in denying the extra-mental
existence of material objects ; he also looks on God as the
cause, and apparently the external cause of all our cognitive
states, sensations, as well as intellectual ideas. A common
objection to all monistic theories is that they reject or distort
the clear, distinct, and immediate testimony of experience
for the sake of some dubious and obscure postulate of unity,
or of some even more dubious a priori assumption that it is
impossible for mind and matter to interact.

Unicity of the Soul in Man.— Plato allotted to
the human body three really distinct souls, — the vor?, in
the head, the Ovfxos, within the breast, and the kTnOv/xta^
in the abdomen. Some modern authors teach that
there is in man distinct from the rational sentient soul
a vital principle, the source of vegetative life. This
theory used to be styled Vitalism, though that term
now includes Animism and all doctrines which maintain
the reality of a vital principle superior to the chemical
and physical properties of matter. Others make the
rational soul numerically different from the common

54G RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY,

subject of sentient and vej^etative activities. In oppo-
sition to these various hypotheses the Peripatetic
doctrine, sometimes called Animism, holds that in man
there is hut one actuating principle, the rational soul, which is,
however, capable of exerting the inferior modes of
energy exhibited in sensuous and vegetative life. In
this view the plant possesses merely a "vegetative
soul," the brute a *' sentient soul," containing virtually,
however, the faculties of the vegetative principle. It
is hardly necessary to remind the reader here that the
proof of a spiritual principle in man is independent of
all theories regarding the nature of vegetative " souls."

In Man the rational and the sentient soul are
one. — This is proved by various considerations, (i) We
have the testimony of consciousness to the most perfect
identity between the mind which thinks and the mind
which feels. Introspection assures us that it is the
same being who understands or reasons, and is
subject of sensations. (2) I can compare intellectual
operations with sensitive states, and affirm the former
to be more painful, more pleasant, more exhilarating,
more depressing, more enduring, or more transitory
than the latter. But this can only be effected by the
two compared states being apprehended as modifica-
tions by one and the same indivisible subject. (3) The
intimate interdependence of thought and sensation is
inexplicable if they are activities of diverse subjects.
In particular, no reason can be assigned why it is of
objects apprehended through sense that the first intel-
lectual concepts are elaborated by the understanding.

The principle of vegetative life in man is
identical with this rational sentient soul.— This
doctrine involves two theses : (a) That there is in man
an active principle, which is the root of the vegetative
functions ; (b) That this active principle is not really
different from the rational soul. We will begin with
the former :

(a) The vegetative principle in man, and in fact in all
living organisms, is a special force or energy superior to the
chemical and mechanical properties of matter. This pro-
position is established by examination of the character-

SOUL AND BODY. 547

istic differences which separate the animate from the
inanimate world. These are amongst the cliicf :

Origin and Reproduction. — '' Omm vivum a vivo:'''
The whole weight of scientific authority in recent times
confirms Harvey's dictum that life proceeds only from
life. Formerly, owing to the imperfect means of
experiment, it was generally supposed that spontaneous
or equivocal generation was a matter of every-day
occurrence. Improvements, however, in the microscope,
and advance in the science of Chemistry have com-
pletely discredited such a view. We now find scientists,
like Tyndall and Huxley, affirming that living beings are
produced only by living bein;s. The property of life
comes only from a living a ;ent, and such agents con-
tinue their race by the generation of other beings
specifically like unto themselves. In lifeless matter
nothing of this sort tak^s place, but new bodies may be
formed by the accidental or artificial combination of
almost any kind of stuff.^

2. Nutrition, Growth, Conservation, and Decay. — The living
heing from conception to death passes through a fixed cycle
of clianges constituting its life-nistory, and generically distin-
guishing it from all forms of inanimate matter. Starting
from a single germ-cell the animate organism builds itself
up after a regular process which is practically the same
throughout the animal kingdom. By its peculiar inherent
•energy the iertilized ovum appropriates and adapts to its
own use the surrounding nutritive matter. Assimilating this

1 " I affirm that no shred of trustworthy experimental testimony
exists to prove that hfe in our day has ever appeared independently
of antecedent Hfe." (Professor Tyndall, Niuctecnth Century, 1S78,
p. 507.) Huxley declares that the doctrine of biogenesis, or life
only from life, is " victorious along the whole line at the present
day." [Critiques and Addresses, p. 239.) Elsewhere he asserts that
" the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no line between
the living and the non-living." (Art. " Biology," iTwo'^"^- ■^''''^- O^h
Edit.) Virchow describes the doctrine of abiogenesis as " utterly
•discredited." (The Freedom of Science in the Modern State.) Balfour
Stewart and Tait state that "all really scientific experience tells us
that life can be produced from a living being only." (The Unseen
Universe, p. 229.) Tyndall, Floating Matter in the Air, p. 84. shows
clearly the fallacy involved in every argument for abiogenesis
hitherto advanced. Huxley gives a brief history of the question
in his Critiques and Addresses.

548 RATIONAL PSYCHOLCGY.

substance it grows, and then divides into two distinct though
connected cells. Each of these subdivide and by repetition.
of the process the number of cells soon becomes enormous.
But this multiplication of cells speedily begins to reveal that
the energy of the primitive germ is throughout all the
operations working after a systematic plan. The embryo
commences to take a definite shape. The new masses ot
cells, so rapidly being manufactured, are gradually formed
into spinal chord, viscera, heart, sense-organs, etc. ; and
as time goes on the specific type becomes more and more
distinct until we can recognize the well-marked form of the
particular animal — the fish, the bird, the elephant, or the
man. It used to be maintained by the older advocates ot
Organicism against Vitalists that life is merely the result of
the organization of the living being; and it was believed that
the future organization was contained in some way, " en-
cased " or " pre-formed " in the primitive germ, and required
merely to be evolved. But the progress of science and the
establishment of the fact that the living body is built up by
the accretion of a vast number of cells has rendered such a
\iew untenable. Indeed every advance in science makes it
more and more certain that organization is the effect not the
cause of the vital energy. The fertilized ovum is not a ready-
made miniature organism with differentiated members merely
needing to be unfolded and magnified. On the contrary, it is
a microscopic ball of protoplasm containing no rudiment oi
any organ. But this tiny spherical mass of living matter
possesses the marvellous power of dominating the physical
and chemical properties and affinities of other matter, of con-
verting this into cells like itself, and of multiplying these and
arranging and distributing them until it has built up the
complete fully developed animal. The germ-cell thus makes
its own organism. Throughout life a process of metabohsm,
of waste and repair is continued ; and according as one or
other is more active, we have growth or degeneration. The
living being is ever actively adapting itself to changes in its
environment. If any part of the organism accidentally
suffers injury, this vital energy which compenetrates the
entire mass at once lays a levy upon the remaming parts and
combines their forces to repair the evil ; and they all show
sympathy and contribute out of their resources, or lessen
their own demands till the damage is made good or the
wound healed. This cycle of life has absolutely no counter-
part in inanimate matter. The conservation of the latter
is effected by a state of changeless repose. If increased
it is by mere external addition or juxtaposition of similar
substance. A mass of lifeless matter possesses no real

SOUL AND BODY. 549

unity — no part having more than an accidental connexion
wither influence upon any other part. Even the crystal, on
which advocates of physico-chemical theories of life have so
much insisted, is a mere aggregate of molecules, the well-
being or ill-being of any of which affects not the rest.-

These various features mark off by an impassable
barrier the living organism from dead matter : and
constitute against Ovganicism a cogent proof of the
existence in living beings of a special dominating prin-
ciple or energy superior to the properties and forces of
inanimate substances. The several processes of nutrition,
growth, conservation, and reproduction constitute a group
of operations completely transcending the chemical and
mechanical powers of matter. The innate tendency to
build itself up according to a specific type, to restore
injured or diseased parts, to conserve itself against the
agencies perpetually working for its dissolution, and to
reproduce its kind, manifest an internal principle which
unifies, dominates, and governs the entire existence of
the being. On the strength of the axiom that every
effect must have an adequate cause, we must admit a
special ground for vital phenomena in those material
substances which possess life. It is true, of course, that
life is subject to the conditions imposed on its existence
by the chemical and mechanical properties of matter ;
and that many processes which take place in the living
organism illustrate laws of chemical and mechanical

2 " L'acquisition de la forme chez le cristal n'est en rien
comparable a racquisition de la forme dans I'etre organise. Dans
le premier cas, et ce point est capital, il n'y a pas evolution, acquisition
graduelle, creation progressive de la forme typique definitive : non,
cette forme existe, complete, parfaite des I'origine, des la premiere
apparition du cristal, alors qu'il est microscopique. Cette forme
pent croitre par juxtaposition de cristaux ; mais quelque accrue
qu'elle soit, elle demeure absolument semblable a elle-meme dans
tout le cours de son accroissement. Le cristal en partie brise se
repare mais de la meme fagon qu'il s'est forme : les cristaux sub-
sistants servent d'appel, de centre de cristallisation ; de sorte que
la partie detruite se retablit par juxtaposition. La reparation
du cristal n'amene done pas, comme celle de I'etre vivant, une
modification plus ou moins notable de forme et de structure : elle
n'est jamais imparfaite et relative ; elle est jetee dans le moule
absolu du cristal primitif." (Dr. Chauffard, La Vie, p. 358. Cited
by Coconnier, loc. cit. p. 186.)

550 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

action ; but this is quite a different thing from saying
that Hfe is only the result of these properties. The more
we know of chemistry and physics on the one hand,
and the better we understand the nature of ceUular
activity on the other, the more hopeless do physico-
chemical theories of life become.^ We are justified,
then, in assuming a new internal energy, a directing
force which determines and governs the stream of
activities described as the phenomena of life. This
force is what is meant by the so-called '^vegetative sour'
or '^ vital principle :'' and all the arguments proving its
presence in the lower animals a fortiori demonstrate
its existence in man.

We can now establish our second proposition :
(b) In man this vital principle is identical ivith the ratioftal
setitietit soul. The intimate union and mutual inter-
dependence subsisting between the sensuous and vegeta-
tive activities cannot be accounted for on the supposition
that two distinct agents or principles are at work.
Organic changes and sensations arise simultaneously,
and the extinction of vegetative life puts an end to
consciousness. The vital principle is the force which
governs the evolution and development of the organs
of sensibility from the primordial germ cell ; and
pleasurable or painful excitations of these organs react
on the vigour of the vegetative activities. Fear, hope,
joy, anger, may instantaneously affect the action of the
heart, stomach, liver, lungs, or the state of the nervous
system generally ; whilst conversely the atmosphere,
narcotics, the action of the stomach, of the liver,
circulation, and indeed nearly all physiological functions
may modify the colour of our mental life.

^ Cf. Professor Haldane: "To any physiologist who candidly
reviews the progress of the last fifty years it must be perfectly
evident that, so far from having advanced towards a physico-
chemical explanation of life, we are in appearance very much
farther from one than we were fifty years ago. We are now far
more definitely aware of the obstacles to any advance in this
direction, and there is not the slightest indication that they will be
removed, but rather that with further increase of knowledge, and
more refined methods of physical and chemical investigation they
will only appear more and more difficult to surmount." {Nineteenth
Century, 1S98, p. 403.)

SOUL AND BODY. 551

In a word, the arguments put forward to reduce the
rational sentient soul to the condition of an aspect or
function of the organism contain this much truth, that
the ultimate root of physical life is identical with the
subject of intelligence, and that the two classes of
activities consequently condition each other. Finally,
if the rational soul in man were a new entity superadded
to the living being already animated by a sentient or
vegetative soul, man would not be a single individual.
He would be no longer essentially one, but two beings.

The facts concerning the origin of life, to which
reference has been made in the present chapter, furnish
another decisive argument against materialistic evolution.
There is an impassable chasm between living and in-
animate substances ; there is another similar division
between sensation and all purely physical phenomena;
and lastly, there is a still greater gulf between the
spiritual activities of self-consciousness and free-volition
on the one side, and all merely sensuous states on the
other. The attitude of men like Huxley and Tyndall
on the problem of life, is an interesting psychological
phenomenon. These writers vehemently insist upon
experience as the only legitimate foundation for belief.
They allow that experience does not afford a shred of
evidence to indicate that life ever arises except from a
living being. And then they conclude that life did arise
spontaneously from dead matter in the distant past !
The theistic alternative would, of course, be intolerable.

Scholastic Definition of Life. — The scholastics defined Hfe
as, activitas qua ens seipsum movet — the activity by whicli a
being moves itself. The word move, however, was understood
in a wide sense as equivalent to all forms of change or
alteration, including the energies of sentiency and intellectual
cognition as well as local motion. The feature insisted on as
essential is the immanent character of the operations. An
immanent action is one which proceeding from an internal
principle does not pass into a foreign subject, but perfects the
agent. All effects of non-living agents are, on the contrary,
transitive. Notwithstanding the multitude of atteuipts made
by successive philosophers and biologists, the definition of the
schoolmen has not been as yet much improved upon.*

* Bichat's definition is well known: "Life is the sum of the
functions which resist death." This is not a very great advance if

552 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Difficulties. — The solution to an objection often raised in
various forms against the doctrine of the last chapter, as well
as against that of the present or of the next, may also be
indicated here. It is argued that a corruptible principle must
be really distinct from an incorruptible one ; but sentient and
vegetative principles are admittedly corruptible; therefore the
rational spirit in man cannot be identical with the root of
inferior Hfe. Or, if it is, then it must be mortal. To this it may
be answered that a soul or vital principle capable of merely
sentient or vegetative activity perishes on the destruction of
the subject which it informs, and is accordingly corruptible ;
but that this is not the case with the root of the inferior species
of Hfe in man. Sentiency and vegetation are not in him
activities of a merely sentient subject. They are, on the
contrary, phenomena of a rational soul endowed with certain
supra-sensuous functions, but also capable of exerting lower
forms of activity. There can be no reason why a superior
principle cannot virtually include such inferior faculties.
Scholastic philosophers have always taught that the virtue of
exerting organic functions is inherent in the human soul, but
that these activities are suspended when the soul is separate
from the body after death. In the case of man, therefore, the
root of sentiency and vegetative life is not corruptible.

It is sometimes urged, that the existence of a struggle
between the rational and sensitive powers shows that both
proceed from diverse roots. The true inference, however, is
the very opposite. The so-called "struggle" is, of course,
not a combat between independent beings within a supposed
arena of the mind. It is one indivisible mind which thinks,
feels, desires, and governs the vegetative processes of the
living being. But precisely because the subject of these
several activities is the same they mutually impede each
other. Violent excitement of any one land naturally
diminishes the energy available for another.

death can only be described as the cessation of life. "Life is the
sum of the phenomena peculiar to organized beings." (Beclard.)
" Life is a centre of intussusceptive assimilative force capable of
reproduction by spontaneous fission." (Owen.) "Life is the two-
fold internal movement of composition and decomposition at once
general and continuous." (De Blainville, Comte, and Robin.) These
definitions, starting from the physiological point of view, aim
merely at summing up the phenomena of vegetative life, and exclude
intellectual activity. Mr. Spencer with his wonted lucidity, defines
life as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external
relations."

SOUL AND BODY. 553

Union of Soul and Body. — We have criticized at
some length (c. xxiii.), the accounts of the union of mind
and body furnished by Monism : we must now turn to
those of Duahsm. Of spirituaHst theories the most
celebrated are : (i) that of Plato, (2) Occasionalism,
(3) Pre-established harmony, (4) the doctrine of Matter
and Form. The first three are all forms of exaggerated
Dualism ; the last alone recognizes the essential unity
of man.

Ultra-dualistic Theories. — (i) The rational soul,
according to Plato, who historically comes first, is a pure
spirit incarcerated in a body for some crime committed
during a former life. (p. 255.) Its relation to the organism
is analogous to that of the rider to his horse ; or of the
pilot to his ship. Since it is not naturally ordained to
inform the body, the soul receives nothing but hindrance
from its partner. This fanciful hypothesis, it is needless
to say, does not receive much favour at the present day.
There is no real evidence of such a pre-natal existence;
and the doctrine would make man not one, but two
beings accidentally conjoined.

(2) Geulincx and Malebranche, logically developing
Descartes' doctrine of the mutual independence of soul
and body (pp. 256 — 259), explain their union by the
theory of Occasionalism or Divine Assistance. Soul
and body are conceived in this system as two opposed

and distinct beings between whom no real interaction
can take place. It is God alone who effects changes
in either. On the occasion of a modification of the
soul He produces an appropriate movement in the
body ; and vice versa. All our sensations, thoughts, and
volitions are immediate results not of the impressions of
material objects upon us, but of God Himself; and
similarly our actions are due not to our own, but to the
Divine Will. W'e have here the theory oi psycho-physical
parallelism plus the Divine Agency. The doctrine of
Occasionalism, however, is not confined by Malebranche
to the interaction of soul and body. No created things
have, in his view, any real efficiency. The First Cause
is the only operative cause.

The establishment of the genuine activity of secondary

554 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

causes in general, we leave to the volume on Meta-
physics ;^ here it is enough to point out the errors of
Occasionalism within the sphere of Psychology. This
theory is superior to those criticized in chapter xxiii., at
least in this, that it certainly provides an adequate cause
for the events of life. But in doing so it renders
purposeless the ingenious machinery of the various
sense-organs. It makes illusory the testimony of con-
sciousness to personal causality in the exercise of
volition and self-control. It conflicts with the irre-
sistible conviction, based on the experience of our
whole life, that our sensations are really excited by the
impressions of external objects, and that our volitions
do really cause our physical movements. Finally,
Occasionalism involves the gratuitous assumption of a
continuous miracle, removes responsibility from man,
and makes God the author of sin.

(3) The theory of Pre-established Harmony, in-
vented by Leibnitz, substitutes for the never-ceasing
miracles of Occasionalism a single miraculous act at
the beginning. Soul and body do not really influence
one another, but both proceed like two clocks started
together in a divinely pre-arranged correspondence. Leibnitz's
system is the most thorough and consistent reasoning
out of the theory of psycho-physical parallelism ; and it
excels the hypotheses of Clifford and Hoffding in that it
offers an intelligible explanation of the parallelism, whilst
they give 7wne at all. But it does so by invoking a
miracle. Our objections to this theory are substantially
the same as to the last. In both, the union between
mind and body is accidental, not essential ; and we
have in man really two beings instead of one. *^

^ Cf. Rickaby, pp. 308—313.

^ See also pp. 262 — 264. Another theory, that of "Physical
Influx," constitutes the union of soul and body in their mutual
interaction. This account, however, is either merely a statement
of the fact that they do influence each other, or an explanation
which would dissolve the substantial union into an accidental
relation between two juxtaposed beings. Cudworth invoked the
assistance of a plastic medium — an entity intermediate between
matter and spirit — to solve the problem. But this would merely
double the difficulties.

SOUL AND BODY. 555

The Aristotelico-Scholastic Doctrine.— The most
satisfactory theory is the old Peripatetic doctrine. This
explanation was formulated by Aristotle, and later on
adopted by St. Thomas and all the leading Scholastic
philosophers. The soul is described by these writers
as the substantial form of the living being. This being is
conceived as the resultant of two factors, — the one
active and determining, the other passive and deter-
minable. The first is called the Form, the second the
Matter of the being. The general problem of the nature
and relations of Matter and Form, which runs through
the entire Scholastic system of Philosophy, belongs
especially to Cosmology. Here we shall merely offer a
few brief words on the question, and refer the English
reader desirous of obtaining a thorough grasp of the
subject to Father Harper's Metaphysics of the School,
especially Book V. chapters ii. iii.

Aristotle's four Causes. — Aristotle resolves all kinds of
causes into four great classes ; the final cause, the efficient
cause, the formal cause, d.nd the material cause. The last two
are intrinsic, the first two extrinsic to the effect. The final
cause is the end in view — the good for the sake of which a
thing is done. An efficient cause is a being by the real activity
of which another being is brought into existence. The
material cause is the reality out of which the complete bodily
substance is made. The form or formal cause is that reality in
the complete bodily substance which gives to it its proper
being or essential nature. These four species of causes are
easily distinguished in the production of a statue. The
material principle is the iron, bronze, or stone — the stuff out
of which the particular statue is wrought. The formal prin-
ciple is the determining figure or shape, by which the statue
is made to represent Napoleon or Nelson." The efficient
cause is the sculptor, his hammer, chisel, etc. The final
cause is the satisfaction, fame, or money which the artist has
in view in the production of the w^ork.

Scholastic development. — Now, all things are created by
God for His own greater glory. They are manifestations of
His excellence, exhibitions of His power and wisdom ; or, in

'' It should be borne in mind that materia prima never exists as
such ; there is no matter which is in the Scholastic sense actually-
devoid of all form. The bronze, for instance, which stands in the
relation of matter to the Nelsonic form, is conceived as distinguished
from iron or carbon by its own specific form.

556 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

the case of intelligent beings, they both manifest and recognize
His excellence. We have thus in God the first efficient
cause, and the ultimate final cause of every creature. Further-
more, in the Scholastic system all material beings are viewed
as the product of two con-created constituent factors — the
one passive and recipient, the other active and determining.
The first is styled the matter, the second the form, and both
are called substantial principles inasmuch as by their coales-
cence they constitute one complete substantial being. ^ The
form is the factor which determines the essential 7iature of
each being. Thence proceed all its specific activities. As in
Aristotle's view the prima materia, the ultimate substratum, is
alike in all substances, their specific differences are due to
dissimilarities of kind in the actuating co-efficient. The dis-
tinctive properties of iron, carbon, and gold have thus their
root in the different formal elements entering into the consti-
tution of each.

The Soul the "Form" of the living being. — In living
organisms the vital principle is the substantial form. It is this
determining factor which defines the essential nature of the
plant or animal ; and from it proceed the activities by which
the being is separated from other species of things, whether
animate or inanimate. A substantial form is accordingly defined
as a determining principle which by its union with the subject that
it actuates constitutes a complete substance of a determinate species.
It should, however, be clearly understood that the proposition,
" The soul is the form of the body," stands on a quite different
footing from the general doctrine of " Matter and Form " as
applied to inanimate substances.

Argument. — It has already been proved that there must
be in each living being, and therefore a fortiori in man, a
vegetative soul, or vital principle, to which is due the natural
unity of activity comprising the phenomena of his life. And
it has been also shown that this principle must be different
from, and superior to, the properties or forces of inanimate
matter. But such a principle must be the substantial form of
the living human being. For, since actio sequitur esse— since
every action of an agent flows from the being of that agent —
the principle which is the root of the natural activity of a
substance must be the determinant of its being and nature.
Consequently, as the vegetative soul is the source of all vital
activities, it must bs the determining or actuating principle of

8 The substantial form differs from the accidental form in the
fact that the one is an essential constituent, the other a mere
accidental mode or determination which conceivably might be
removed without affecting the nature of the substance, e.g., heat.

SOUL AND BODY. 557

the living being ; but this is equivalent to saying that it is the
substantial form of the living being.

Or the question may be approached otherwise thus : The
vital principle is really different in nature from its material
co-efficient. Furthermore, the vital principle is not a mere
accidental determination capable of removal whilst the sub-
stance remains complete. On its extinction the nature of the
creature is destroyed, and the living being is changed into a
lifeless aggregate of matter — a substance or substances of
completely different species. The vegetative soul is thus a
substantial principle upon which the very being of the sub-
stance depends. In other words, by its union with its material
co-efficient the vegetative soul constitutes the active living
being. That is, the vegetative soul, or vital principle, is the
substantial form of the living body.

If the vegetative soul in living beings is the form of the
body, it follows at once that in man, since the vegetative and
rational soul are identical, the latter nmst be the substantial
form of the human body. The rational soul must also be the
only substantial form in man. For man is one, complete
individual being, specifically distinct from all other beings.
Were the human body, however, actuated by more than one
substantial form, man would be, not one, but an aggregate of
individuals, since each substantial form would constitute
with its subject a complete substantial being of determinate
species.

The Form is source of Unity and Identity. — It is on the
permanence of the substantial form that the identity of the
individual depends. The material constituents of the living
body are nearly all changed, as we have before stated, in the
course of a few years, yet we affirm that the man of sixty is
identical with the boy of six : the soul has persisted
unchanged. It is the same simple informing principle which
reduces the different parts and organs of the body to the
unity of a single being. Neither a bale of cotton nor a
bucket of water forms one being ; each is but a mere aggregate
of parts. Even a watch or a steam-ship — although the parts
are unified by its end or purpose — wants the unity of being
which is exhibited in man, in the brute, and in the plant.
Though working towards a common end, all the parts of the
machine retain their chemical and physical properties in
complete vigour and mutual independence. In the living
being, on the other hand, there is no such isolation. The
various parts are compenetrated by the informing principle,
their individuaUty is merged, their several tendencies unified,
their natural properties transformed and subordinated by this
dominating and enlivening force.

558 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Complete and incomplete Substances. — Both Matter and
Form are sometimes called substances by the Schoolmen,
inasmuch as their coalescence results in a substantial being.
Except the human soul, however, no forma or materia prima
can exist per se apart. The epithet incomplete is occasionally-
used of inferior forms to express this circumstance ; this
adjective more properly, however, connotes the fact that the
union of these factors gives rise to one complete composite
substance. Even the human soul, though capable of subsist-
ing in itself apart from the body, is styled an incomplete
substance, since it possesses a natural aptitude to form with the
body a single complete substance. An integral part of one
complete being, e.g., a man's hand, is also spoken of as an in-
complete substance. The terms constituent principle, or substantial
principle, seem less likely to mislead now-a-days than the
word substance if employed to designate the essential co-
efficients of composite substances.

Soul and Body combined into one Nature. —

Moreover, the union of soul and body results in
a single nature. The nature of a being is simply its
essence viewed as the source of its actions. But in the
living animal the various processes of growth, sleep,
motion, and sensation, are not operations of the soul or
body alone, but of the being as a whole. They are
activities of one nature. An individual nature conceived
as a complete being subsisting in itself, and not com-
municated to or coalescing with another, is called by the
Schoolmen a suppositum or hypostasis. The stippositum is,
therefore, the entire and ultimate source of all opera-
tions. Hence the axiom: Actiones sunt suppositonim.
When the suppositium is endowed with intelligence it is
termed a person.

Soul and Body one Person. — Since introspection
and external observation establish that our vegetative,
sensitive, and rational activities have their source in
and belong to one and the same Self, they prove that
body and soul are combined in a personal union. A
Person is defined in scholastic language as a suppositum
of a rational nature, or an individual and incommunicable
substance of a rational nature. Some modern writers
frequently speak as if the Mind or Soul were the
human person ; others as if self-consciousness, or
memory, or continuity of consciousness and character

SOUL AND BODY. 559

(p. 488) constituted personality. It is, indeed, not
practicable in ordinary language to distinguish con-
stantly between the mind's consciousness of itself and the
person s consciousness of self — nor is it desirable, since
it is by the rational mind that the living composite person is
capable of self-consciousness. But the theories which
identify the soul and the person, or worse, conscious
activity and the person, are seriously erroneous. Locke's
definition of a Person a.s a self-conscious substance is also in-
accurate. Strictly interpreted this would render a sleep-
ing man or an infant not a person, and an interruption
of consciousness would break up the personality of the
individual. J. F. Ferrier's language is similarly ex-
aggerated when he asserts that "a being 7nakes itself I
by thinking itself I," and that " self-consciousness
creates the Ego ; " and Professor Ladd seems to us to
fall into the same error when affirming, as he frequently
does, that the mind is its own conscious activity; that
" where there are no mental states there we cannot
speak of the real existence of mind." (op. cit. p. 145.)
Memory and self-consciousness reveal but do not con-
stitute personal identity ; and the true human person is
neither consciousness, nor soul, nor body, but the
complete Ego — the living rational being arising out of
the substantial union of both principles.^

The reasoning in the present question may have been
grasped with some difficulty by the reader unacquainted with
the Scholastic system. Fortunately, however, the problem of
the exact nature of the relations between Soul and Body is of

^ For a complete treatment of the notions, persona, suppositmn,
etc., see Rickaby, Metaphysics, Bk. II. c. 2. The terms substance,
essence, nature, severally denote the same object, but connote more
especially different features. Substance points to the general fact
of existence per se ; essence points to the reality of which the being ts con-
stituted; nature signifies the essence as principle of activity. Supposition
implies that the substance, essence, or nature subsists in itself in
possession of such complete individuality as to be incommunicable or
incapable of being assumed into another being. The invention of
the term is due to the dogma of the Incarnation. In Christ, the
Church teaches, there is one Person, one rational " suppositmn,''' but two
natures. The Human Nature of our Lord does not of itself con-
stitute a Person, or subsist in se, but by the subsistence of the Divine
Nature.

56o RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY,

ver}^ secondary importance from a philosophical point of view,
as compared with the vital questions : Is there an Immaterial
Soul at all ? and, Is there reason for supposing that such a
Soul will have a future life ?

Change in meaning of terms. — The terms Matter and Form,
with their derivatives, have had as varied and extensive an
application as any words in the language. The importance
of what is signified by each has been so changed that the
original usage is almost completely inverted. The Scholastic
followers of Aristotle used these words as equivalent to
Potentia and Actus. Potentia signified possibility — the potential,
the unrealized, the incomplete or indeterminate. Forma and
Actus, on the contrary, connoted full actuality — the last com-
plement of reality, the final determination, or complete realization
of being. Now-a-days we speak of meveXy formal observance,
unreal/orms, and irWial formal itics ; whilst material is equivalent
to important. The transition has been going on for a long
time ; but in strictly philosophical literature, Kant has done
most to bring about the change. Whereas with Aristotle,
Matter and Form are ontological or extra-mental principles
of real things, with Kant they are constituents of subjective
knowledge. The German philosopher, as we have already
pointed out, uses the term " form " to denote a purely mental
mould or character, which the mind imposes on the " matter "
of knowledge. The latter, though of course a mental
activity, is supposed to be excited or contributed from
without. Formal is thus equivalent to unreal, or objectively
non-existent. Material truth is real truth, or agreement with
extra-mental reality as far as that is possible ; formal truth is
mere subjective consistency. Kant, however, retains some-
thing of the ancient application of the term in as far as he
conceives the " material " element in cognition to be in itself
of a chaotic indeterminate nature, requiring to be perfected
and wrought into rational intelligibility by the imposition of
the subjective determining factor. In addition to Kant's
influence, popular experience of the unimportant character
of accidental forms, e.g., the shape as contrasted with the
contents of a pudding, has also contributed to the change in
the meaning of the word.

Aristotle's definition of the Soul. — We ought now to have
rendered intelligible and justified Aristotle's celebrated
definition : rj "^vx^j ccttlv evreXex^ta rj Trpcorrj aroofiaTos (pvcriKoii ^coi]v
i'xovTOS dvudfiet, or ly Trpcorj; eWfXe;^6ta acofxaTos (fwaiKoij opyaviKOv
— " the soul is the first entelechy of a natural organized
body potentially having life," or " the first entelechy of a
natural body capable of life." By entelechy is meant in the
Peripatetic philosophy an actualizing or determining principle,

SOUL AND BODY. 561

as opposed to a recipient or determinable subject — form as
contrasted with matter. The epithet, first, impHes that the
soul is the primary form by which the nature or specific
substance of the creature receives its determination in the
order of being. It is contrasted with secondary or accidental
forms, e.g., heat, colour, motion, which may supervene when
the prim um esse, the first complete substantial being of the
object, is constituted. A natural or physical body, signifies
that the subject of the soul is not a mere artificial aggregate.
The adjective, organized, expresses the fact that the body is
composed of heterogeneous or dissimilar parts adapted for
separate functions. The last words of the definition mean
that the soul is united not with an actually living being, but
with an organism capable of exercising vital activities when
informed by the soul.

Readings. — St. Thomas, Sum. i. q. 76; Father Harper, Meta-
physics of the School, Bk. V. cc. ii. iii. ; Regnon, op. cit. Livre IV. ;
Coconnier, op. cit. cc. iv. v. ; Farges, Matiere et Forme ; Kleutgen,
op. cit. §§ 80S— 842 ; Mercier, La Psychologic, Pt. III. art. 3.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SOUL AND BODY {continued.) other problems.

Locus of the Soul. — There has been much dis-
cussion among philosophers, Ancient and Modern,
regarding the precise part of the body to be assigned as
the " seat " of the souL Some have located it in the
heart, others in the head, others in the blood, others in
various portions of the brain. The natural inference
from such a diversity of opinions is that no special area
of the organism is the exclusive dwelling-place of the
vital principle. The hopelessly conflicting state of
opinion on the question would seem to be due to the
erroneous but widely prevalent view, that the simplicity
of essence or substance possessed by the soul is a
spatial simplicity akin to that of a mathematical point.
As a consequence, fruitless efforts have continually been
made to discover some general nerve-centre, some focus
from which lines of communication radiate to all dis-
tricts of the body. The indivisibility, however, of the
soul, just as that of intelligence and volition, does not
consist in the minuteness of a point. The soul is an
immaterial energy which, though not constituted of
separate principles or parts alongside of parts, is yet
capable of exercising its virtue throughout an extended
subject. Such a reality does not, like a material entity,
occupy different parts of space b}^ different parts of its
own mass. In scholastic phraseology it was described
as present throughout the body, which it enlivens, not
circninscripiive, but dejinitive ; not per contactum qiiantiiatis,
but per contactum virtntis. Its presence is not that of an
extended object the different parts of which fill and are

SOUL AND BODY. 563

circumscribed by corresponding areas of space, but of an
immaterial energy exerting its proper activities ubiqui-
tously throughout the living body. As it does not
possess extension, it is not susceptible of contact after a
quantitative manner, yet it puts forth its peculiar
virtue, and acts with the same efficiency as if it
possessed a surface capable of juxtaposition with that
of a material body.

The Soul is not confined to any particular spot within the
organism. — The argument may be formulated thus: The site
or locus assigned must be conceived either as extended or
unextended. If the latter, then : (i) all hope of any physio-
logical justification of the selected spot must be abandoned,
since the smallest cell, and a fortiori every general nervous
ganglion, must occupy an extended space ; and (2) no parti-
cular unextended point has better claims than any other ;
therefore on this hypothesis the soul might with equal reason
be located in almost any part of the body. If the site allotted
be extended, then the chief merit claimed for this view is
abandoned. If the simple soul is allowed to be capable of
inhabiting a really extended locality, the exact area of the
district is of little philosophical importance : the soul's indi-
visibility is equally unaffected whether the space be a cubic
inch or a cubic foot.

The Soul is present, though in a non-quantitative manner,
throughout the whole body. — It is, moreover, so present every-
where in tlie entirety of its essence, although it may not be capable
of ubiquitously therein exercising all its faculties. The proof of the
previous proposition implicitly establishes our present doctrine;
but reflexion on the thesis defining the union of soul and
body recently proved, completes the argument. The soul,
since it is the substantial form of the body, vivifying and
actuating all parts of its material subject so as to constitute
one complete living being, must by its very nature be
ubiquitously present in the body. For it is only by the
immediate communication of itself that it can so actuate and
vitalize its co-efficient as to constitute a single substance.
Again : since the soul is an indivisible essence or being,
whenever it is present it must be there in the entirety of that
essence or being; consequently, the entire soul is present in
the whole body and in each part — tola in toto corpore ct tota in
qualibet parte.

Difficulties. — Tlie chief objections urged against the present
thesis seem to be the following : (i) The soul is the subject
of sensations, but these, it is asserted, are originally felt only

564 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

in the brain, and by experience thence transferred to the
peripheral extremity of the irritated nerve ; consequently the
soul exists only in the brain. (2) It is impossible to imagine
how a simple or indivisible Being can be simultaneously
present in several parts of an extended space. (3) If the soul
is thus diffused throughout the body, it must be capable
of increase and diminution with growth ; and also of
occasional amputation of portions of its substance.

We may observe in reply: (i) Even if the brain alone be
the centre of sentiency, yet the entire organism is the subject
of vegetative life, and must be throughout animated by the
energy which dominates the continuous processes of waste
and repair. (2) Imagination is no test of possibility; we
have experience only of the modes of action of things condi-
tioned by space of three dimensions, and so cannot picture
the being or action of an agent free from such limitations.
We are similarly unable to imagine how unextended volitions
can move extended limbs, or how spatial pressure can excite
any mental slate, but we have shown the absurd consequences
which follow from the denial of the universal conviction of
mankind on these last points. (3) The soul is not diffused
throughout the body like water in a sponge. It must be
conceived as an indivisible essence, without mass or quantity,
exerting energy and putting forth its virtue throughout the
animated organism. Those activities, however, which require
a special organ are limited to the district occupied by the
bodily instrument. In so far as the material subject by the
lim.its of which vital activity in general is defined and condi-
tioned, increases or diminishes, the soul may be said in
figurative language to experience virtual increase or diminu-
tion— an expansion or contraction in the sphere and range of
its forces; but there is no real quantitative increase in the
substance of the soul itself.

Phrenology. — In the early part of this century, the
physicians Gall and Spurzheim elaborated a " Physiog-
nomical system," which pretended to determine precise
localities on the surface of the brain where various
mental powers are situated. Gall marked out the skull
into twenty-six, and Spurzheim into thirty-five divisions,
each of which was supposed to cover a definite field of
the brain constituting the ** organ " of some particular
mental aptitude. The theory thus assumed above two
dozen primary faculties or propensities, such as those
of homicide, property, theft, wit, number, secretiveness,

SOUL AND BODY. 565

etc., lodged in separate compartments in the surface of
the brain. Consequently, by measurement of human
skulls, the relative vigour of the several propensities
could be easily discovered, since special "bumps" or
protuberances indicated, it was supposed, greater or
less endowment in the corresponding faculty.

Phrenology, Craniology, or Cranioscopy, as this
pseudo-science was called, has long since fallen into
complete discredit, under the destructive criticism of
both Psychology and Physiology. The scheme of
" primary " faculties was arbitrary and artificial in the
highest degree. The powers and aptitudes enumerated
are not isolated or independent in the manner implied.
Many of them are complex capabilities involving varied
forms of mental activity. Moreover, intellectual facul-
ties cannot be conceived as located in organs in the
way represented. The progress of physical science, on
the other hand, has proved the erroneous character of
the views of the phrenologists concerning the physiology
of the brain.

Localization of Cerebral Functions.— Neverthe-
less, though Phrenology in its originally ambitious
character is now generally acknowledged to have been
exploded, Cerebral Physiology has for some twenty years
past been working diligently at the kindred question of
the localization of brain functions. The leading scientific
authorities in the second quarter of this century unani-
mously declared themselves against the hypothesis of
localization in any form. Flourens, Magendie, Longet,
and other distinguished writers pronounced, on the
strength of numerous experiments and observations,
that scarcely any particular portion of the cerebral
substance is essential to the performance of any parti-
cular psychical operation. 1 Consequently, the classical

1 "On peut retrancher, soit par devant, soit par derriere,
soit par en haut, soit par cote, une portion assez etendue des lobes
cerebraux, sans que leurs fonctions soient perdues. Uue poytion
assez restreinte de ces lobes suffit done a I'exercisc de leurs fonctions. A
mesure que ce retranchement s'opere, toutes les fonctions s'affai-
blissent et s'eteignent graduellement. . . . Enfin, des qu'une per-
ception est perdue, toutes le sont ; des qu'une faculte disparait,
toutes disparaissent." (Flourens.) Cf. Bastian, Brain as an Organ
of Mind, p. 520.

566 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Ph3^siology from 1820 to 1870 proclaimed that the brain
as a whole was the single organ of the mind, that the
quantity^ not the locality of the brain which is destroyed
affects mental activities, and that the degree of imbeci-
lity induced is, roughly speaking, in proportion to the
amount of cerebral matter removed. ^

Some experiments, however, of the German physio-
logists Fritsch and Hitzig, in 1870, threw serious doubts
on the then prevalent doctrine, and a new movement of
research, which still continues, was initiated, with the
result of completely overthrowing the old teaching.
By a series of elaborate experiments on the brains of
dogs, monkeys, and other animals, Ferrier, Hitzig,
Munk, Luciani, and more recently Flechsig and Von
Bechterew, have established a fairly definite theory of
localization of " motor-centres " — that is, of areas in
the cortex of the brain the irritation of which produces
movements in particular limbs. The cerebral areas
corresponding to some of the senses have also been
made out with tolerable accuracy, others with less
definiteness. Of the physiological concomitants of
particular intellectual activities nothing is at present
known, though some progress — how much is as yet
uncertain — has been made towards the determination of
" association-centres.''

Method of research. — In the study of cerebral functions
three chief lines of investigation present themselves : {a) Ex-
periment by stimulation and extirpation of particular portions
of the brains of the lower animals ; (b) Cerebral Pathology,
or the science which deals with brain diseases in human
beings; and (c) Comparative Anatomy and Histology, which
examine the structural connexions of different parts of the
brain and nervous system throughout the animal kingdom.
Thus, the stimulation by electricity of certain areas in the

- " Sur des chiens, des chats et des lapins, chez un grand
nombre d'oiseaux, j'ai eu occasion d'irriter mecaniquement la
substance blanche des hemispheres cerebraux ; de la cauteriser avec
la potasse, I'acide azotique, le fer rouge, etc. ; d'y faire passer des
courants electriques en diver sens,, sans parvenir jamais a mcttre en
jcu la contractilitc musculaire : meme resultat negatif en dirigeant les
mcmes agents sur la substance grise des lobes cerebraux." (Longet.)
Cf. Surbled, Le Ccrvcau, p. 149.

SOUL AND BODY 567

cortex of the brain of dogs, monkeys, and other animals, is.
found to excite movements in the neck, arms, fingers, legs,
tongue, etc. Conversel}', the extirpation or destruction of
these same portions of the brain temporarily suspends the
power of movement in the corresponding limb. Again, post-
mortem examinations often show that atrophy and disease of
the cerebral substance of these areas have been concomitant
with paralysis of the appropriate limb. Moreover, several
cures of such local paralysis have also been effected by the
venturesome remedy of trepanning the skull and removing
tumours found to exist where anticipated.'^ Finally, com-
parative study of the structure of the brain in different species
of animals tends to establish the identity of the "areas"
constituting the "motor-centres" of the several limbs; and it
also shows that the number and definiteness of such " areas"
increase in proportion as we rise in the animal kingdom and
examine more highly specialized brains. And quite recently
the study of embryonic anatomy has enabled Flechsig to
reach valuable results by determining the date at which
certain neural connexions are completed, and nerve-fibres
attain maturity and are capable of functioning.

Results. — By these various methods of research Ferrier
succeeded in mapping out on the surface of the brain above a
dozen " motor-centres." Successive explorers have subdivided
and largely increased the number of these areas. They are
mostly situated in the vicinity of the summit of the cerebrum,
about midway between the top of the forehead and the back
of the head — technically in the neighbourhood oi the fissure-
of Rolando and the calloso-marginal fissure. (See, at the
beginning of the book, Fig. vi. and Fig. vii., i, 2, 3, 5, 6, and
a, b, c, d.) The cortical areas on which visual impressions
are " projected," that is, the spaces in the surface of the
brain with which the images of sight are believed to be
directly connected, are located mainly in the occipital lobes,
in the hind portion of the cerebral hemispheres. (Fig. vii.
13, 13'.) Injuries here cause, it is alleged, not merely blind-
ness, as in the case of retinal disease, but actual derangement
of the faculty of visual imagination. {Scelenblindheit.) The
auditory area is allotted to the upper convolution of the temporal
tobc (Fig. vii. 14) ; and "word-deafness," " auditory asphasia,"'
or inability to image, and consequently to understand articu-
late sounds, even whilst general hearing remains, was shown
by Wernicke to be occasioned by lesions in this district.
Previous to Wernicke, in 1861 Broca had found that motor-
asphasia, or the disorganization of the faculty of intelligent

* Cf. Surbled, Le Cervcau, pp. 239, seq.

5G8 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

articulate speech, was caused by injuries in the third frontal
convolution, which hes a httle to the front of the subsequently-
discovered hearing-area. (Fig. vii. 9.) The difficulty of ascer-
taining the nature of the sensations of taste and smell of
animals when subjected to experiments has made the localiza-
tion of the cerebral correlates of these latter senses much
more dubious. Indeed, we are warned by some of our best
physiologists to receive with considerable caution even the
most confident assurances of enthusiastic observers, especially
when once they pass beyond the comparatively simple
problem of determining motor-areas.'*

Notwithstanding the considerable progress made in ex-
ploration, much of the brain, especially in the frontal region,
being " silent," or not responsive to stimulation, its precise
functions have remained unknown. For this reason there
has been a constant tendency among physiologists to assume
that this unoccupied cerebral territory is " the seat of general
intelligence," without, however, venturing to explain clearly
what they mean by this \ague phrase. We have already
shown the absurdity of attempting to conceive the higher
rational activities as spatially situated in or exerted by bodily
organs ; but as we suggested in the first edition of the present
work, these unclaimed districts may supply the material basis
for memory, imagination, and those internal sensuous facul-
ties upon which intellect is more immediately dependent.
We now find that the progress of cerebral physiology during
the last few years tends to confirm this conjecture — which is
indeed as old as St. Thomas.^'

^ Thus Professor Foster, in the latest edition of his able Tcxt-
.hook of Pliysiologv, reminds us that the cessation of particular sensa-
tions occasioned by lesions in particular parts of the cortex of the
cerebral hemispheres " does not prove that the cortex of the
hemispheres is the ' seat ' of the sensation, ... it only proves that
in the complex chain of events by which sensory impulses give rise
to full conscious sensations the events in the cortex furnish an
indispensable link." (Pt. III. p. 1094.) -^"cl elsewhere: "The
interpretation of the results in which we have to judge of sensory
effects, are far more uncertain than wheii we have to judge of motor
effects. We have to judge of signs our interpretation of which is
based on analogies which may be misleading." {Ibid. p. 1077.)

•^ Mediaeval cerebral anatomy was naturally in a rudimentary
stage, and some of the reasons assigned by the Schoolmen for
allotting faculties to particular localities are quaint ; but St. Thomas's
theory of localization — borrowed, however, from the Arabian physio-
logists— is still of interest: " Est ergo (interior) Sensus Communis a
<luo omnes sensus proprii derivantur, et ad quern omnis impressio
-eorum rcnuntiatur, et in quo omnes conjunguntur. Ejus enim

SOUL AND BODY. 569

Thus the recent contribution of Flechsi^ Hes in the
advance he has made towards the estabUshment and closer
definition of what he calls "association-centres" as distin-
guished from the previously acknowledged "projection-
centres" — the motor and sensory areas in direct connexion
with sense-impressions and movements. To the former he
allots quite two-thirds of the cortical substance of the
human brain, reserving only one-third for the latter, whilst in
most of the lower animals the distribution is reversed. Of
these higher centres he affirms that " they are apparatus
which combine the activities of the various special senses,
inner and outer, into higher unities. They are association-
centres of sense-impressions of different qualities, visual,
auditory, etc. They make their appearance accordingly as
subject of a 'co-agitation,' as the Latin language had pro-
phetically characterized thought, and they may therefore be
specially termed " association or co-agitation centres."^

organwn est prima concavitas cerebri, a quo nervi sensuum particulariiim
oriiintur, . . . Secunda vis interior est Phantasia . . . et hujus organum
est post organum sensus communis in parte cerebri quae sic non
abundat humido sicut prima pars cerebri in qua situm est organum
sensus communis et ideo melius potest retinere formas sensibiles re
absente. (Nam humidum bene recipit, et male retinet : siccum vero
e contrario bene retinet et male recipit.) . . . Tertia vis sensitiva
est ALstimativa (vel Cogitativa). . . . Organum autem hujus potentiae
ponitur in hrntis \\\ posteriori parte mediie partis cerebri. In hominibus
autem ejus organum ponitur in media cellula cerebri, quae syllogistica
appellatur . . . (et hccc facultas) quae in aliis animalibus dicitur
astimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per quamdam
collationem hujusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Quae etiam ratio
particularis dicitur, quia scilicet est collativa intentionum individua-
lium sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium . . . Quarta
vis sensitiva interior est Memorativa. . . . Organum autem hujus
potentiae est in posteriori concavitate cerebri." {Be Potentiis Anima,
c. iv.)

^ Gehirne tend Seek, pp. 22 — 24. Cf. the scholastic doctrine on
the Sensus Communis and Vis Cogitativa, p. 93, above ; also the last
note. Although judging from the stormy past history of cerebral
physiology, Flechsig's theory of association-centres is not likely to
remain long unchallenged, his methods of investigation are sound.
But he needlessly damages the value of good scientific obserx-ation
and experiments by mixing facts with dubious metaphysics and
crude materialistic hypotheses, when he lapses into language of this
sort : " Man is indebted for his spiritual superiority in the first
degree to his association-neuron. Anatomy, comparative anatomy,
and clinical experience combined show decisively that these associa-
tion-centres are the chief subjects of the spiritual life, and that
consequently they may and ought to be designated ' spiritual-

570 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

As the chain of reasoning by which the reahty of these
liigher centres is determined is necessarily more complex, and
the evidence more fragile than that by which the " projection "
motor and sensory areas are defined, we must be cautious
in assenting too easily to the facts claimed to be established,
before they are thoroughly confirmed — and even then care
will be needed for their correct interpretation. The circum-
stance, too, that serious lesions involving the destruction of
large quantities of brain in this region without appreciably
affecting any mental operations are frequently met with, ought
to warn us of the precarious character of even the most
plausible inferences in this subjects

The " motor-centre " is usually found on the side of the
head opposite to the bodily member to which it is specially
related ; but speech, and other psychical operations not belong-
ing definitely to either side of the organism are generally
dependent on physical processes in the left hemisphere,
except in the case of left-handed persons, who, it is said, are
"' right-minded " or rather "right-brained." The disease of
aphasia in right-handed persons is, as a rule, accompanied by
a lesion in the left frontal convolution. It seems also fairly
proven that symmetrical portions of the brain in the right
and left hemispheres are capable of performing similar
functions ; and ft is chiefly — though not exclusively — in the
relations subsisting between these corresponding parts that
we find exhibited the law of substitution, which has constituted
such a serious objection, or at all events hmitation, to the
value of all theories of localization.

Objections. — On this general fact, together with negative
instances presented by Pathology, the case of the opponents of
locaHzation mainly rested. It is true, said they, that irritation
of a motor-area excites movement in the corresponding limb,
and conversely, the extirpation or destruction of this part of
the brain temporarily extinguishes or enfeebles the power of
movement ; but, nevertheless, if the animal be kept alive, it
may after a few days recover complete use of the member
again. In other words, some new portion of the cerebrum is

centres,' 'organs of thought' (das sie somit ah geistige Centren als
Denhorgane bezeichnete werden d'urfen und milssen)." {Ibid. p. 6i.) After
what we have already urged (pp. 240 — 246, 466—472), we trust it is
unnecessary to dwell further on the ineptitude of describing any
mass of cerebral matter — whether frontal or occipital, cortical
or sub-cortical, as a " spiritual centre" or an "organ of thought."
Higher intellectual activity may presuppose as a condition certain
concomitant sensuous and cerebral processes, but the agent or
subject of such spiritual activity must be an indivisible being.
7 Cf. Ladd, Physiological Psychology, pp. 265— 26S, 296, 297.

SOVL AND BODY. 571

capable of adopting the suspended function.^ The part most
fitted to do so seems to be in the first place the symmetrically
corresponding area on the other hemisphere, and then the
cerebral substance immediately surrounding the damaged
centre. In addition to this difficulty post-mortoit examinations
have revealed several cases in which a very large part of one
side of the brain, and even a not inconsiderable portion of
both were atrophied or decayed, although no derangement
in psychical operations, or in the action of the corresponding
limbs, had been noticed during life.

These objections admonish us how imperfect our know-
ledge of the relations between the brain and psychical action
still is, and they also show how little foundation there is for
materialistic dogmatism. At the same time we do not think
they are conclusive against the doctrine of localization in
evoy form. They indisputably demonstrate that the " centres"
are not instruments of an absolutely fixed and permanent
character like the external sense-organs. But they do not
disprove the statement that the various sentient and motor
operations of the soul, both presentative and representative,
are, in ordinary conditions, specially dependent on particular
parts of the brain ; whilst the evidence on the other side
makes this latter assertion well-nigh incontrovertible. They
establish, however, that the principle which dominates the
living organism has, within certain limits, the power of adapt-
ing to its needs and employing as its instruments other than
the normal portions of the cerebrum.^

^ According to Goltz : "It is not possible, by extirpating any
amount of the substance of the cortex on either side, or on both
sides, to produce a. permanent laming of any muscle of the body, or
a total loss of sensibility in any of its parts. It is, however, possible
thus to reduce an animal to a condition of almost complete idiocy.
. . . No part of the cortex of the brain can, then, be called the
exclusive organ or centre of intelligence or feeling ; but the psychical
functions are connected with all of its parts." (Cf. Ladd, op. cit.
p. 298.) Goltz's chief experiments were performed on three dogs,
one of which he succeeded in keeping alive for eighteen months
deprived of nearly all the brain substance. The extirpation was
effected gradually in small pieces at considerable intervals. The
psychical effects, however, seem to be quite different when the
removal of cerebral material is rapidly executed, though in such
cases the animal speedily perishes. See W. von Bechterew,
Bewusstsein unci Hirnlokalisation, pp. 38 — 45.

9 The original researches of Dr. Ferrier on this subject are to
be found in his work, The Functions of the Brain. Bastian's volume,
The Brain as an Organ of Mind, c. x. contains a history of theories of
Phrenology and Localization. Cf. also the article "Brain" in
Chambers' Encyclopedia (Edit. 1888) ; " Physiology," Encyc. Brit. (9th

572 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Although from a strictly methodical standpoint this topic
would have been more appropriately dealt with at the
beginning of this volume, we have preferred to handle it here
at the end of Rational Psychology. We believe that its
philosophical significance, or insignificance, can be better
estimated, and the precise worth of materialistic deductions
drawn from the doctrine of localization more accurately
measured at the present stage of our work. The statement
that the progress of Physiology has discredited or disproved
the doctrine of the spirituality of the soul, is so frequently to
be met with that it is extremely desirable the student should
have at least a general notion of the character and value of
the most recent investigations in Cerebral Physiology. Vague
sweeping assertions, especially when uttered by men dis-
tinguished in Physical sciences, often give rise to a com-
pletely mistaken idea of the nature of the " recent advances
in Physiology." We trust that our sketch of the subject will
assist the reader to appreciate the true worth of such
materialistic declarations.

Mode of Origin of the Soul. — Of philosophers
holding erroneous ideas regarding the origin of the
human soul, some have conceived it as arising by
einanatioji from the Divine substance ; others as derived
from the parents. The former theory starts from a
Pantheistic conception of the universe, and is in
conflict with the simplicity and absolute perfection of
God. The hypothesis that the soul is transmitted to
the offspring by the parents — and hence called the
theory of Traditcianism — has taken a variety of forms.
Some writers have maintained that the soul, like the
body, proceeds from the parental organism : others that
it comes from the soul. This latter opinion v/as advo-
cated in Germany, in the earl}^ part of this century, b}'-
Frohschammer, under the title of Generationism. The
soul in this view is generated, or perhaps more accu-
rately speaking, created by the parents. Rosmini taught
that the sentient principle arises by generation or

Edit. 1885) ; Caldervvood's Relations of Mind and Brain, pp. 77 — 122;
Ladd, op. cit. Ft. II. cc. i. ii. (1887) ; Foster, Text-book of Physiologv
(1895), Ft. III. c. ii. §§ 7 — 9; Surbled, Le Cerveau (Paris: Retaux-
Bray, 1890); and W. von Bechterew, Bewnsstsein und Hirnlokalisatiou.
(Leipsic, 1898.) The most considerable recent original work, how-
ever, is F. Flechsig's Gehirne und Seek. (Leipsic, 1896.)

SOUL AND BODY. 573

traduction, and is afterwards converted into the rational
soul by a mysterious illuminative act of God, through
which the intellect is awakened to the idea of being.

Traducianism, whether understood of a corporeal
or incorporeal seminal element, is an inadmissible
theory. As regards the derivation of the rational soul
of the child from the body of a parent, it is obvious
that such a supposition is based on a materialistic
conception of the nature of the mind. Nemo dat quod
non hahet : a spiritual substance cannot proceed from a
corporeal principle. The derivation, however, of the
rational soul from the soul of a parent is equally
untenable. Every human soul is at once a simple and
an immaterial substance. Consequently, the hypothesis
of any sort of seminal particle or spiritual germ being
detached from the parental soul is absurd. If the soul
of the child, moreover, were generated or evoked out of
the potencies of matter, it could not be a spiritual
being endowed with intellect and free will, and intrinsi-
cally independent of matter.

Creation. — Opposed to these various theories stands
the doctrine according to which each human soul is pro-
duced from nothing by the creative act of God. The accept-
ance of this thesis is a logical consequence of the
rejection of the previous views. By creation is meant
the calling of a being into existence from nothing, the
production of an object as regards its entire substance.
The material things which we meet around us are a
result of transformation or change, not of creation —
though of course their ultimate constituents must have
been originally created. A spiritual being, however,
cannot be effected by any such process of transforma-
tion. If produced at all, it must be formed from
nothing. Now, the human soul is a spiritual substance,
whilst at the same time it is of finite capacity, and
therefore a contingent being. But because of its con-
tingent and limited nature it cannot be self-existing ;
it must have received its existence from another being.
On the other hand, inasmuch as it is a spiritual being
intrinsically independent of matter, it cannot have
arisen by any process of transformation ; for, if it did

574 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

so arise it would necessarily depend as to its whole
being on its subject. Finally, since God alone, who
exists of Himself, and who alone possesses infinite
power, can exert the highest form of action, calling
creatures into existence from nothing, the production of
the human soul must be due immediately to Him.^^

Difficulties.— The chief objections urged against the
doctrine of creation are the following: (i) The sentient-
vegetative soul in man is of the same genus as that which
informs the brute ; consequently, since the latter is generated
by substantial transformation, so is the former. (2) Like end
must have like origin; but the human soul is immortal;
therefore it must never have had a beginning. (3) The theory
of creation involves continuous exercise of miraculous power
on the part of God. To these difficulties the following
answers may be given : (i) If the root of sentiency and
vegetative life in man were an organic principle completely
and intrinsically dependent on the body, as it is in the lower
animals, then there would be no ground for affirming a
special mode of origin in the case of human beings. But,
although man's soul is generically related to that of the
brute, it is separated from the latter by a specific distinction
which involves this different mode of genesis. (2) The second
objection has seemed very forcible to some minds, and we
find even Dugald Stewart ^^ holding that it destroys the argu-
ment for everlasting life based on the simplicity and incor-
ruptibility of the soul. Yet when we reflect and demand
proof of the assumption on which the objection is based none
is forthcoming; and it is certainly not self-evident. God
alone is without beginning, but He can will to exist whatever
is not intrinsically impossible, and He may will it to last
for ever. Consequently, there can be no absurdity in His
creating from nothing a simple incorruptible being which He
designs never to perish. (3) A miracle is an interference

^0 The proof of this is based on the fact that in creation the
effect depends solely on the efficient cause. It is, therefore, the
highest and noblest mode of action, and consequently must proceed
from an agent endowed with the highest form of being — self-exist-
ence. A creature cannot even play an instrumental part in creation ;
for the function of an instrument is to dispose and arrange the pre-
existing materials, but antecedently to the creative act there are no
such materials. Cf. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 126, seq.

11 Lotze's defective view as to the nature of substance leads him
into a similar error. Dr. Martineau's work, A Study of Religion,
p. 334 (2nd Edit.), has some good observations on this point.

SGUL AND BODY. 575

with the laws cf nature, but in the given case creation of
souls, when the appropriate conditions are posited by the
creature, is a law of nature.

Time of its Origin. — When does the human soul
begin to exist ? Plato taught that previous to its
incarceration in the body the soul had from all eternity
resided among the gods in an ultra-celestial sphere,
(p. 255.) The theory of metempsychosis or Trans-
migration of souls, has been held under one shape or
another by many Eastern thinkers. It is, however, in
all its forms, a gratuitous hypothesis. It is based on
the false view which conceives body and soul as
accidentally and not substantially or essentially united
in man, and it possesses not a vestige of real argument.

Among modern philosophers, Leibnitz has considered
human minds along with all the other "monads" to have
been created simultaneously by God, at the beginning
of the world. All souls were conserved in a semi-
conscious condition inclosed in minute organic particles
ready to be evoked into rational life when the fitting
conditions are supplied. Proof or disproof is here out
of the question. If a writer asserts that his own soul,
or that of anybody else, existed centuries ago in an
unconscious state, we cannot demonstrate that the
proposition is false ; we can only point out that there
is no evidence for such a statement. It is simply a
gratuitous assumption. No sufficient end can be con-
ceived for the sake of which such an unconscious
life coidd be vouchsafed to the soul, and, consequently,
it may be rejected as an unwarrantable hypothesis.

The Schoolmen taught that the rational soul is
created precisely when it is infused into the new
organism. The doctrine took two forms. Following
the embryological teaching of Aristotle, St. Thomas
held that during the early history of its existence the
human foetus passes through a series of transitional
stages in which it is successively informed by the
vegetative, the sentient, and, finally, by the rational
soul. Each succeeding form contains eminently and
virtually in itself the energies and faculties of that upon
which it is consequent. The advent of the rational

576 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

soul only occurs, St. Thomas maintained, when the
embryo has been sufficiently developed to become the
appropriate material constituent of the human being ;
and this rational soul itself subsequently exhibits a
gradual development in the manifestation of its powers,
exerting at first merely the inferior forms of vital
activity, later on sentiency, and only long after birth its
higher rational faculties. The embryonic history of
man is, then, in this view, that of a progressive evolu-
tion in the course of which the future rational being
passes through a series of transitory stages not unlike
the various grades of life to be found on the earth. i-

The rival theory, which seems to have much in its
favour, held that the rational soul is created and infused
into the new being in the originating of life in con-
ception ; and that it is this rational soul which by
the exertion of its inferior vegetative functions directs the
growth and development of the embryo throughout its
course.

Doctrine of Lotze and Ladd.— On this question of the
origin of the soul, Professor Ladd, to whom we have frequently
been able to refer in terms of agreement, seems neither very
satisfactory nor very clear. " Whence comes the mind of every
man ? " he tells us, " is a question with which metaphysics —
especially in the crude form in which it is found in theological
(Why not add ' and scientific ' ? ) circles — naturally busies
itself." Having rejected the traducianist and evolutionist
hypotheses, he asserts that " the creationist theory of the
origin of the mind in the form in which it is popularly

1- See Harper's Metaphysics of the School, Vol. II. pp. 553— 5f'i-
Having shown that St. Thomas's teaching of a " progressive develop-
ment of being" in all embryonic life is in harmony with the most
recent physiological science, he urges that "this theory serves
to throw light on the perfection of the cosmic order. . . . For, the
truth of the teaching lor which we are contending once admitted,
not only must we acknowledge a gradual evolution of the whole
complex and multiform universe of material substances from a few
simple elements created in the beginning; but it is also manifest
that this wondrous evolution is, so to say, more or less epitomized
in the germ-history of each living individual in that universe.
Successive Forms march through the captive Matter gradually
evolved from the predisposed Subject ; till they reach their climax
where the potentiality of Matter fails, and the creative power of
God supplies the needed Form." (p. 560.)

SOUL AND BODY. 577

conceived is no less unwarrantable or even nnintelli,i:;ible."
He deems the doctrine that " God produces an entity called
the soul, and puts it ready-made, as it were, into the body,"
to be absurd. His own view is that " the origin of every
mind, so far as such origin is knowable or conceivable at all,
must be put at the exact point of time when the mind begins
to act (consciously) ; its origin is in and of these first conscious
activities. Before this first (conscious) activity the mind is
not. But even thus it cannot be admitted that any mind
springs into full being at a leap, as it were. For the origin
of every mind is in a process of development."^^ In brief,
the soul's conscious " activities are its existence." This is
virtually Lotze's conclusion {Metaphysics, § 244) ; and flows
from his theory that a being is merely what it does.

Criticism. — This view, which, maintaining the soul to be a
" real being," distinct from the body, yet constitutes the
essence of the soul in conscious activity, is in the first place
exposed to serious difficulties based on the facts of periods of
unconsciousness. The objection of the " naive metaphysics "
of common sense is not precisely that which Professor Ladd
suggests : " Where then is the mind in deep, dreamless sleep ? "
(loc. cit. p. 386.) But : " Does the mind in its entire reality
cease to exist every time that conscious activity ceases ? or,
Has a man's soul no more reality during a state of coma from
which he recovers, than it had a thousand years before he
was born ? " The logical consequence of the doctrine that
the human soul begins to exist only at the first moment of
consciousness — or rather, if we understand Professor Ladd
rightly, at the dawn of self-consciousness — would seem to be
that the human infant is without a soul.

The objection to creation as implying the insertion of a
" ready-made " soul is based on an unfair representation of
the doctrine. All spirituaHsts who, like Ladd and Lotze,
maintain the existence in the adult being of a soul really
distinct from the organism must necessarily admit its primary
origin to have been abrupt — the first appearance of a parti-
cular being of a totally new order, and so even the " modified
creation " which Ladd accepts inevitably involves this same
distasteful notion of " ready-madeness." The truth is that
the most rational view and that least exposed to difficulties of
this kind, is that form of the scholastic doctrine which teaches
that in the origin of the new human being the creative action
is exerted according to universal law prescribed by divine
wisdom, in the act and at the instant in which the incipient
vital principle is evoked in the germinating cell.

13 Philosophy of the Mind, pp. 363, 364.

578 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Origin of the First Human Soul— Darwinian
Theory. — The modern doctrine of Evolution ramifies
into a large number of sciences, and its satisfactory
discussion involves a multitude of questions pertaining
to Biology, Geology, Physical Astronomy, Rational
Theology, and Scriptural Theology. The business of
the rational psychologist, fortunately for us, is neither
the Theology nor the Philosophy of the Evolution
hypothesis, as applied to the animal species or even to
the body of man : our official concern is with the Soul.

The Human Soul cannot be the result of the
gradual evolution of a non-spiritual principle. — This
proposition is the logical outcome of the chief doctrines
on which we have insisted throughout the volume.
The argument by which we have established that each
individual rational soul owes its origin to a Divine
creative act, proves a fortiori that the first of such souls
must have thus arisen. Since even the spiritual soul of
a human parent is incapable of itself effecting a spiritual
soul in its offspring, it is evident that the merely sentient
soul of a brute could still less be the cause of such a
result. Again: the human soul, as we have shown,
possesses the spiritual powers of Intellect and Will, and
is therefore itself a spiritual principle, intrinsically
independent of matter ; but such a being could never
arise by mere continuous modifications of a vital energy
intrinsically dependent on matter. Self-consciousness,
Free-will, Conscience, are all facts siii generis which could
never have been produced by the gradual transmutation
of irrational states. In a word, all the proofs by which
we established the spirituality of the higher faculties,
and of the soul itself, demonstrate the existence of
an impassable chasm between it and all non-spiritual
principles, whether of the amoeba or the monkey. The
special intervention of God must, therefore, have been
necessary to introduce into the world this new superior
order of agent — even if He had previously directed the
gradual development of all non-spiritual creatures by
physical laws,

SUPPLEMENT A.

ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Comparative Psychology.— The aim of a "com-
parative" science is to examine and compare the
varying manifestations of some phenomenon, or group
of phenomena, in different classes of objects. Compam-
five Anatomy thus seeks to ascertain the Hkenesses and
differences exhibited in the structure of different species
of animals. Comparative Philology in the same way
endeavours to trace the history of cognate words by
contrasting the various forms which they have assumed
in different languages. The science of Compavative
Psychology — were anything deserving the name of
science on the subject attamable — would similarly
investigate the nature of mind by comparing its mani-
festations in man and the various species of animals.

Some recent writers seem to expect that immense
benefits will accrue to Psychology by the employment
of this method of comparative study, which has un-
doubtedly done much to illuminate obscure facts in
other branches of knowledge. Now, premising that
in our view Human Psychology, or Psychology proper,
ought to base its doctrines on a careful study and
comparison of the mental phenomena of human beings
of all races, of all ages, and of all stages of intellectual
and moral cultivation ; and, further, admitting that
assistance may be derived, especially in the investiga^
tion of the lower appetitive, emotional, and cognitive
activities from the observation of animal life, we must,
nevertheless, frankly confess our belief that in the science
of the Mind the comparative method will never be
very fruitful in positive results.

58o ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Difficulties of Animal Psychology.— It must not
be forgotten that Psychology differs essentially in
character from all these other departments of know-
ledge in which the new method has proved so effective;
and, moreover, the difference is of a kind which tells
directly against the application of that method. In the
other comparative sciences we can directly examine the
specimens selected from different groups ; here we
cannot. Nay, as acute a thinker as Descartes was
found to deny that there are any such specimens in
existence at all. The anatomist can study with as
much ease and security the vertebral column of a fish,
or an elephant, as that of a human body. The philolo-
gist can investigate withfas much confidence the growth
of a word in a foreign 'language as in his own. But
real knowledge of the mental states of the dog or the
bee is utterly impossible to the psychologist. This
difficulty can never be effectually bridged over. Careful
reflexion must convince us that, no matter what pains
and industry be devoted to observation of the actions
of the lower animals, our assurance regarding the
genuine character of their subjective states can never
be more than a remote conjectural opinion.

Knowledge of other Minds. — The existence of any other
human mind than our own, it should be remembered, is
believed not on the strength of direct intuition, but of a
mediate analogical inference. By a process of percep-
tion, which we have described in chapter vii., we come
to know the existence and character of our own body,
and of the material objects which act upon us. Of
prominent interest amongst external things are certain
bodies strikingly similar to our own. In our ov/n case
we find that the impressions of some of the external
agents cause particular mental states within us, which,
in turn, give rise to definite physical actions observable
by our external senses. Noticing the similarity of ante-
cedent and consequent in the case of organisms like our
own, we insert in them an intermediate conscious link
as effect of the former and cause of the latter. The
essential elements in the argument are the similarity of
organisms and the like character of the resulting

KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS. 581

actions. Of these latter, language is incalculably the
most important, especially in indicating to us the quality
or nature of the consciousness of these other beings. It
is at once a measure of intellectual development, and
the great medium of intercommunication. Conse-
quently, its absence is, on both grounds, fatal to
scientific inductions regarding the minds of brutes. 1

The value of the other factor in the argument clearly
depends on the degree of likeness subsisting between
the compared organism and our own, especially as
regards the brain and nervous system. We know from
experience that slight modifications in the conditions
of the brain affect gravely the character of human con-
sciousness. But the profound differences which separate
man's brain from that of the nearest allied animal, are
sufficiently insisted on by our adversaries when this
course suits the special question in hand. Accordingly,
if we obey the oft-repeated advice of Herbert Spencer
on other subjects, and freeing ourselves from the
*' crude anthropomorphism of the child and the
savage," impartially estimate the strictly scientific
value of the evidence, we shall be speedily forced to
admit that the grounds for the analogical inference to
the character of the intellectual or emotional states of
the monkey, the dog, or the elephant, are very slender
indeed, whilst our conjectures as to the quality of the
mental activity of insects are utterly worthless.-^

^ "The total absence of language makes our best inferences
but feeble conjectures. ... It is clear that we cannot ascertain
the precise bearing of articulate speech on thought and feeling
until we are capable of directly observing a type of consciousness
in which this instrument is wanting ; and this is a sufficiently
remote possibility. Yet one may roughly infer that the absence
of language implies the lack of many of the familiar properties
of our own conscious life. .• . . Is it not probable that the most
rudimentary idea of self follows by a long interval the degree of
intelligence involved in linguistic capacity ? " (J. Sully, Sensation and
Intuition, pp. 16, 17.)

^ Careful and acute observer of the physical habits of animals
as Darwin was, there is scarcely an author of any importance who
has erred more seriously in theorizing about the nature of the
mental faculties of beasts. Even a psychologist as sympathetio
with evolutionism as Dr. Sully cannot ignore the mistakes of the

5$2 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Descartes' theory : Animals machines. — Were this fact
realized, the Cartesian doctrine, which appears so strange
and absurd to the unreflecting mind, would probably have
commanded a much larger following than it has ever received.
In Descartes' view, the lower animals are merely machines so
ingeniously constructed that the various impressions always
meet with appropriate responsive movement, although no
conscious state intervenes. The fact that elaborate and
complicated operations such as walking, writing, playing the
piano, handling tools, are often carried on without making
themselves felt, has been urged in favour of this hypothesis.
Moreover, recent experiments on the bodies of animals from
which the brain or head had been removed, go to prove that
complicated movements requiring the co-ordination of several
muscles may sometimes be performed by the organism without
sensation. Nevertheless, we hold the Cartesian theory to be
unsound, and accordingly we proceed to the establishment of
our thesis, that :

At least the higher Animals are endowed with Sentiency. —
(i) Many of the movements, of the cries, and of the expres-
sive acts of brutes are inexplicable in regard to their origina-
tion, direction, continuation, and cessation, as the result of
unconscious forces. Such complicated operations, for instance,
as the search for suitable twigs by the bird in the construc-
tion of her nest, the movements of a terrier at the sound of
his invisible master's voice, the eager way in which the dog
bounds towards him and barks, and the manner in which
beasts of prey capture their victims, completely transcend
the capabilities of merely physically co-ordinated forces.
(2) The ediicability of the lower animals is incompatible with
the purely mechanical theor}'. We can train dogs, horses,
lions, and bears to respond to words or arbitrary signs by

naturalist in this field, (cf. loc. cit.) Romanes begins bis work on
Animal Intelligence (pp. i — 6) with an account of the nature of the
inference by which we attribute consciousness to animals, but
immediately lapses into the vulgar anthropomorphism of the
unreflecting mind, as soon as he proceeds to describe and discuss
the character of brute intelligence. It is interesting to note how
this writer can here, when it suits his object, appeal to "Common
Sense " against the " Sceptic." This sudden reverence for vulgar
prejudice is a little odd. G. H. Lewes' statement, that " tlie
researches of the various eminent writers who have attempted an
Animal Psychology have been further biassed by a secret desire to establish
the identity of animal and human nature " (A Study of Psychology, p. 122),
receives abundant and forcible illustration in both Romanes' works,
as well as in Darwin's chapters on this subject.

ANIMALS SENTIENT\ ^ 583

definite movements of a complicated character, — an impos-
sible process if they were merely machines. (3) Finally, the
ingenious construction of the various sense-organs, and their
similarity in many of the superior species of brutes with those
possessed by men, confirm the doctrine that brutes are
endowed with a faculty of sensuous apprehension. It would
appear also from such facts as the barking of dogs in their
sleep, the flight of defenceless animals at the sound of an
enemy's voice, and the resort of most brutes to particular
places for food, that they possess some of the internal
sensuous faculties, such as organic memory and imagination.
How far these powers in animals resemble tlie corresponding
faculties in man, we are unable to determine. The most
striking of these internal aptitudes is that directive principle
of action which in common language is called instinct. Its
character, however, will be better understood when we have
distinguished between animal and rational intelligence.

Animals are devoid of Intellect or Reason. — We have (c.xii.)
exhibited at length the nature of this faculty, the essential
characteristic of which consists in the apprehension of the
universal. The ground for our present proposition lies in the
fact that the brute creation do not exhibit various signs which
would inevitably be manifested by sentient beings endowed
with intellectual faculties :

I. Mode of Action. — The lower animals do not show that
individual free variation in method and plan of action, and
that intellectual progress which ought to mark the presence
of personal intelligence. Thus, animals of the same species,
when in similar circumstances, exhibit a striking specific
uniformity in their operations. They all seek their prey,
build their nests, and foster their young in the same way.
Amongst rational beings, on the contrary, we find in every-
thing the signs of individual personality. The ants and bees
in the time of Moses or of Aristotle worked as perfectly as
their descendants of to-day ; and geese and sheep acted not
more awkwardly. There is no evidence that during all the
time brutes have existed upon the earth, they have invented
a single mechanical instrument, lit a fire, or intelligently
transferred a useful piece of information from one generation
to another. The few trivial instances cited here and there
of some animal seizing a club or other rude implement that
fell in its way, only establish the more clearly the enormous
chasm which separates the brute from the rational being.

The certainty possessed by us that animals are incapable
of the most elementary inventive activit}'', is clearly shown by
the fact that, on the discovery of a few rough but similarly

584 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

pointed flint stones in Palaeolithic strata, those writers who
manitain the specific identity of animal and human faculties
were the very first to assert that these rude contrivances are
the work, not of an intelligent beast, but of a rational man.
The division which separates the simplest exercises of reason
from the highest forms of animal intelligence, is thus felt to
be impassable. But if any species of animals were endowed
with intellect or reason, they could not have remained all
these ages in the condition in which we find them. Sentient
beings possessed of reason or personal intelHgence would be
certain to make use of their intellect in attending to, compar-
ing, reflecting upon, and reasoning about the various pleasant
or painful impressions by which they were affected. They
would in this way be led to introduce modifications and
improvements into their methods of work, they would invent
tools and try changes to suit their surroundings; and, stimu-
lated by curiosity — the most primitive and useful form of the
desire of knowledge — they would inevitably make intellectual
progress. It is absolutely incredible that beings capable of
universal ideas, or of the simplest acts of generalization and
inference, should have been unable during all these thousands
of years to invent such a rude tool as the stone arrow-head of
the Palaeolithic age. In spite, therefore, of the occasional
performance of apparently ingenious or complicated actions,
we must conclude that the lower animals have not intellect.

2. Rational Language. — No beast yet discovered is capable
of making use of a system of rational signs, whilst all races
and tribes of men are found to be endowed with intelhgent
speech. Both man and brute are capable of expressing feel-
ing ; and some animals, such as the magpie and the parrot,
can be trained to utter articulate sounds : but rational
language, which is radically distinct in kind from these
phenomena, is possessed by man alone. The essence of
rational speech is the expression of thought, the communica-
tion of universal ideas. Thus in the utterance of the pro-
position, " This water is cool," there are involved the
universal ideas of cool, and of water, as well as the most
abstract notion of all, that of being, which is expressed in the
copula. Similarly^the phrases, " Milk hot nice," and " Big
Bow-wow" (horse), of the infant just learning to speak,
presuppose intellectual abstractive operations of a grade
immeasurably beyond that to which the most intelligent
animal has ever attained.^

Whether thoughts be manifested by vocal or visual signs

2 Cf chapter xvi., Mivart, On Truth ; also his Lessons from Nature,
C, iv. ; and Max Miiller, Science of Thought, c. iv.

ANIMALS SENTIENT. 585

is unimportant ; but bein,2:s endowed with reason and asso-
ciated together could not remain without inventing some
means of rational interconnnunication. The reflective activity
of intellect combined with the social instinct would inevitably
lead these beings to manifest their ideas to each other, were
such ideas in existence. The cries of one animal, of course,
often serve to awaken the rest of the flock to threatening
danger or prospective enjoyment, but these utterances diff"er
in nature from rational language. They are merely indicative
of concrete experiences, and the whole process is easily
explicable by the well-known action of the laws of associa-
tion. There is no ground for supposing that such sounds
differ in kind from the emotional expressions of man.'* Parrots
have organs capable of uttering all the sounds in the alphabet,
and they can be trained to articulate short phrases with
wonderful distinctness, but this fact shows only the more
conspicuously the absence of real intelligence. No bird has
yet been produced, which combines even the most familiar
words in new ordevs so as to form other intelligible proposi-
tions. The most accomplished parrot is separated from the
child by an immeasurable distance in this respect.^

^ Deeper study of the history of language shows so clearly the
immensity of the chasm between man and brute that students of
Philology are inclined even to exaggerate its importance as com-
pared with the other differentia. Thus, Max Miiller asserts that :
"The one great barrier between man and brute is Language. Man
speaks, and no brute has ever uttered a word. Language is our
Rubicon, and no brute will dare to cross it." {Lectures on the Science
of Language. First Series, p. 340.) Professor Whitney is also very
emphatic at times on this point: "Moreover, man is the sole
possessor of language. It is true that a certain degree of power of
communication ... is exhibited also by some of the lower animals.
. . . But these . . . (acts such as the dog's bark, etc.) . . . are not
only greatly inferior in their degree to human language ; they are
also so radically diverse in kind from it that the same name cannot
justly be applied to both." {Life and Growth of Language, pp. 2, 3.)

^ " Animals and infants that are without language are alike
without reason, the great difference between the animal and infant
being that the infant possesses the healthy germ of speech and
reason, only not yet developed into actual speech and actual reason,
whereas the animal has no such germs or faculties capable of
development in its present state of existence. . . . We cannot allow
them (brutes) a trace of what the Greeks called logos, i.e., reason,
literally, gathering, a word which most rightly and naturally
expresses in Greek both Speech and Reason." (Max Miiller, op. cit.
Second Series, p. 62.) " The animal without Language is as in-
capable of abstraction and of what we specially designate Intellect,
as, without wings, it is incapable of flight." (G. H, Lewes, A Study
of Psychology, p. 123.)

586 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

3. Moral Notions. — Again, if the lower animals possess
intellect, they must be moral beings capable of notions of
right and wrong, merit and desert, justice and injustice; and
they must be accountable for their acts. But, in spite of our
anthropomorphic tendencies, the universal judgment of man-
kind has ever refused to attribute morality or responsibility
to beasts. We may, indeed, at times inflict pain on them
in order to attach unpleasant recollections to the performance
of certain actions, and we may apply moral epithets to them
in a metaphorical way, somewhat as the farmer describes a
particular soil or pasture as kind or ungrateful; but a moment's
reflexion will always speedily assure us that we never really
consider the lower animals to be free responsible creatures.
We make a very clear distinction in our mind between the
moral character of the act by which a horse kicks a man to
death, and that by which one man murders another.

4. Absurd consequences. — Finally, if the ingenious opera
tions performed at times by the lower animals are to be
assigned to a personal intelligence similar in kind to that of
man, then, to several species, notably ants and bees,
admittedly very low down in' the scale of life, there must be
attributed intellectual endowments far exceeding those of
man himself, as well as those of the highest animal organisms.
But this is obviously absurd. The true conclusion from these
various considerations is that man's cognitive powers differ
from those of the brute not simply in degree, but in kuid. He
is endowed with a personal intelligence, with a faculty of
forming universal concepts, of reflecting upon himself, of
communicating his thoughts to others, and of apprehending
moral relations. They are utterly incapable of eliciting any
such acts as these. They frequently surpass him in the
range and subtilty of special senses, and still more surprisingly
in the possession of certain mental aptitudes of a complex
but uniform character comprehended under the term Instinct,
but they are separated from him by the boundary which
divides rationality from irrationality.

Instinct. — The various ingenious operations performed by
the lower animals are usually allotted to instinct; but about the
inner nature of this endowment, it seems to us that very little
is yet positively known. The epithet instinctive is frequently
employed in a wide sense to include acquired habits of action,
original dispositions to any form of movement, whether
random or purposive, and also purely reflex actions devoid of
all antecedent or concomitant consciousness. In modern
Psychology there is a tendency to confine the adjective to
conscious acts which are connate or unlearned, complex, and
purposive in character. Strictly speakine. Instinct is not a

Instinct. 587

continuous impulse towards a special mode of action, but an
aptitude by which this impulsive action in response to
particular stimuli is directed or guided.

Scholastic view of Instinct. — Schoolmenclassed this faculty
among the intevnal senses, with the title of Vis ALstimativa.
Conceived according to their view and in harmony with
common usage, Instinct may perhaps be best defined as
a natural aptitude ichich guides animals in the unreflecting per-
formance of complex acts useful fur the preservation of the indi-
vidual or of the species. In the Scholastic system the Vis
Mstimativa is a property of the sentient soul, analogous
though inferior to rational judgment in man. It is of an
organic character, but involves more than the direct response
of the special senses. It does not merely distinguish between
pleasant and painful impressions, but guides the animal in a
series of movements remotely serviceable to its nature. The
lamb, St. Thomas observes, does not flee because the colour
or form of the wolf is disagreeable, and the bird does not
collect twigs for its nest because they are attractive in them-
selves ; but both animals are endowed with a faculty which
under appropriate conditions is excited by these phenomena
to guide them in the execution of an operation ulteriorly
beneficial to their nature. Yet neither has a consciousness
of the formal relation of such an act to the end to be attained;
neither may have had any previous personal acquaintance
with that end ; and neither is led to the act by a process of
reasoning. It must not be forgotten, however, that to say a
particular operation is due to instinct or to Vis Mstimativa is
not to explain it ; but merely to distinguish it from certain
activities, and to group it with others the cause of which is
still unknown.

Nature of Instinct. — The essential features of Instinct are
well described in the following passage : " The character
which above all distinguishes instinctive actions from those
that may be called intelligent or rational, is that they are not
the result of imitation and experience ; that they are always
executed in the same manner, and, to all appearance, without
being preceded by the foresight either of their result or of
their utility. Reason supposes a judgment and a choice:
instinct, on the contrary, is a blind impulse which naturally
impels the animal to act in a determinate manner : its effects
may sometimes be modified by experience, but they never
depend on itJ"^ Again: "One of the phenomena fittest to
give a clear idea of what ought to be understood by Instinct
is that which is presented to us b)^ certain insects when they
lay their eggs. Those animals will never see their progeny,

•• Milne-Edwards, Zoologie, § 319. Cfalso p. 213, above.

588 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

and can have no acquired notion of what their eggs will
become ; and yet they have the singular habit of placing
beside each of those eggs a supply of elementary matter fit
for nourishmg the larva it will produce, and that even when
that food differs entirely from their own, and when the food
they thus deposit would be useless for themselves. No sort
of reasoning can guide them in doing this, for if they had the
faculty of reason, facts would be wanting them to arrive at
such conclusions, and they must needs act blindly."'' Such
facts, which might be multiplied indefinitely, prove that
animal "intelligence" is different, not in degree, but in kind
from human intellect. Although uniformity is the most
marked characteristic, there is also observable in many
instincts a certain flexibility by which they can be modified,
and adapt themselves within limits to altered circumstances.

The Origin of Instinct, together with the formation of
sense-organs, has ever been one of the most insuperable
difficulties to those who deny the creation of the universe by
an Intelligent Author. Here especially the ingenuity of
evolutionists has been severely taxed to find some plausible
explanation of the phenomena. Two chief views have been
advocated, but each has suffered severe handling from
supporters of the rival hypothesis ; and the probabilities
against either explanation, when carefully thought out, seem
to us so enormous as to render them incredible.

(i) Theory of Natural Selection. — According to Darwin,
the great majority of animal instincts have been formed by
natural selection operating on chance variations in actions and
organs. Those fortuitous acts which proved beneficial to the
agent, giving their authors an advantage in the struggle for
life, tended to be preserved and increased by heredity and
survival of the fittest in each generation. Isolated acts first
casually and of course rarely performed have thus, it is held,
been converted into the wonderfully stable and complex

^ Id. § 327. Cf. Janet's Final Causes, pp. 86, 87. " The young
female wasp (sphex), without maternal experience, will seize
caterpillars or spiders, and stinging them in a certain definite spot,
paralyze and deprive them of all power of motion (and probably
also of sensation), without depriving them of life. She places them
thus paralyzed in her nest with her eggs, so that the grubs, when
hatched, may be able to subsist on a living prey, unable to escape
from or resist their defenceless and all but powerless destroyers.
Now, it is absolutely impossible that the consequences of its action,
can have been intellectually apprehended by the parent wasps
Had she Reason without her natural Instinct she could only learn
to perform such actions through experience." (Mivart, Lessons from
Nature, p. 201.)

THE ORIGIN OF INSTINCT. 5^9

tendencies now exhibited in the instincts of insects, lairds,
fish, and mammals.

(2) Theory of "lapsed intelligence."— Herbert Spencer
and others object that such fortuitous beneficial actions could
never, or only in an infinite time, result in the complex system
of co-ordinated movements seen in many instincts. They
themselves maintain that instincts are the outcome not of
accidental movements, but of actions originally performed
consciously to satisfy a need or attain an end. Such intelhgent
actions, by frequent repetition, became automatic or acquired
reflexes, (p. 218.) They were then transmitted by heredity as
organic modifications, being increased and perfected by
practice in successive generations. All the more ingenious
instincts are thus instances of " hereditary habit," " lapsed
intelligence," or " congealed experience " of the race.

Criticism. — (i) Both Darwin and Spencer assume that
habits of action, or modifications of nerve structure, acquired
during the life of the individual, are transmitted by heredity.
This postulate is absolutely essential to the theory of heredi-
tary habit, and scarcely less so to that of natural selection ;
but it has suffered the most damaging attacks in recent years,
especially from Weismann.*^ This eminent biologist maintains
with a great weight of argument that modifications wrought
in the organism during the life of the individual are never
transmitted by heredity. Such accidental changes do not
modify the germ-cells, and so cannot be inherited by the
offspring. He allows, of course, that individual character-
istics are transmitted, and also that the germ-cells undergo
individual variations and may be affected by disease, poison,
nutrition, and the like ; but he holds that they are not affected
by such indirect and superficial influences as the exercise of
particular organs and functions. Consequently, increasing
strength of faculty is not transmitted and accumulated by
• continuous exercise during the history of the race. Other-
wise, he justly contends, the mathematical, musical, and
other special talents seen to be inherited in particular families
ought to manifest themselves growing from generation to
generation, whereas, as a rule, "the high-water mark of
talent lies, not at the end of a series of generations, as it
should do if the results of practice were transmitted, but in
the middle."^ He further subjects to severe criticism the
stories of inherited mutilations, e.g., horn-less cows and tail-
less cats, said to be born of accidentally maimed parents ; and
he shows clearly the utterly unreliable character of the

» See his Essays upon Heredity (English Translation), 1889
especially Essays iii. and viii.
^ Essays on Heredity, p. 96.

590 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

evidence in regard to the facts. Finally, he gives the results
of numerous experiments undertaken by himself, which all go
to prove that such organic modifications or mutilations are not
inherited. Thus " among 901 young mice (the entire progeny)
produced by five successive generations of parents whose
tails had been cut off after birth, there was not a single
example of a rudimentary tail or of any other abnormity in
this organ. Exact measurement proved that there was not
even a shght diminution in length." ^^ In fact, though Weis-
mann's own theory of heredity does not appear to have yet
met with wide acceptance, his destructive criticism is deemed
by the most competent biologists to have disproved the
assumption of the transmission of habits or modifications of
the nervous system acquired during the individual life. This
conclusion seems to us absolutely fatal to Spencer's theory,
and so enormously to increase the already sufficiently
numerous probabilities against the Darwinian view as to
make the latter quite incredible when carefully and impar-
tially weighed. ^^

(2) To suppose with the " lapsed intelligence " theory that
the various ingenious operations now done instinctively by
many species of insects and birds, were originally performed
with conscious purpose, is to ascribe to the less evolved
remote progenitors of animals still low down in the scale of
life a supra-human intelligence.

(3) Further : Many of the most important and most
complex instincts are connected with the function of repro-
duction, and several of these instinctive processes in the case

^•^ Op. cit. p. 432.

" The chief arguments urged for the inheritance of experience
are : (a) The rapidity with which the instinct of timidity is said to
be awakened and increased in wild animals on desert islands, in the
second and third generations after they have been invaded by man.
(b) The apparent transmission of the results of training in domesti-
cated animals, e.g., in pointers and sheep-dogs. To this it has been
replied : {a) The alleged facts have not been observed with sufficient
accuracy ; nor is their precise nature clear. The shyness of the
second generation may be simply the result of individual experience
and parental training operating from birth onwards on a hitherto
latent form of a universal animal instinct, {b) The development of
particular faculties and dispositions in domesticated animals is
much more probably due to the artificial selection pursued in crossing
promising breeds, than to the transmission of the organic effects of
training. Thus, if puppies with the longest tails were selected for
breeding purposes and their tails also frequently pulled, a race of
dogs with abnormally long tails would probably be speedily pro-
duced ; and yet the elongation might be due entirely to the process
of selection and not to that of pulhng.

THE ORIGIN OF INSTINCT. 591

of certain insects, e.g., the nuptial flight of the queen-bee,
and the laying and arranging of their eggs by other insects,
occur only once in the individual life. What then is the
meaning of the saying that such instincts are the result of
habitual experience in past individual lives ? Would it not be
as reasonable to anticipate that a man should unconsciously
draw up his will by reflex action because during many genera-
tions each of his ancestors have performed the operation
once in their lives, or to expect that babies born of Christian
parents should at once exhibit an instinct for baptism, as to
explain the parental operations of a may-fly preparatory to
its decease by acquired habits of its ancestors ? On the
other hand, in what way is the natural selection theory better
off? For according to that view the extremely complex
movements of instinct must be the gradually built-up product
of an enormous number of fortuitously beneficial actions.^^

(4) Again : The peculiar instincts of neuter insects, e.g., of
working bees, which do not reproduce their kind but leave
this oi^ce to another class endowed with quite different
habits, are an additional difficulty to both the " lapsed
intelligence " and Natural Selection theories. This argument
has been so admirably stated in the following paragraph that
I quote it at length : " Neuter insects which do nothing to
propagate their race can do nothing to transmit instinct or
anything else. Yet these neuters do all the work of the com-
munity, and require the most complicated instincts to do it.
To fit them for their object, even their bodily form has often
to be entirely different from that of the males and females ;
and in some species the neuters destined for different branches
of work differ entirely from one another. Thus in one kind of
ant there are working neuters and soldier neuters, with jaws
and instincts extraordinarily diff'erent. Yet these neuters are
the offsprings of males and females, none of whom, and none
of whose ancestors, ever did a stroke of work in their lives.
How can their instinct or its instruments have possibly
been developed by Natural Selection only ? . . . Selection,
Mr. Darwin answers, may be applied not to the individual
only, but to the race, in order to gain the required end. The
good of the race requiring the production of neuters, thus
variously modified in form and instinct, those fertile insects
may alone survive which tend to produce neuters so modified :

12 " An instinct is nothing else than a series of given acts ; a
modification of instinct is, therefore, a particular action which
becomes fortuitously intercalated in this series. How can we
believe that this action, even though it were by chance several times
repeated during life, could be reproduced in the series of actions of
the descendants ? " (Janet, Final Causes, p. 257.)

592 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY.

and thus may natural selection suffice for the production.
The realms of imagination are no doubt infinite, and within
their sphere such ramifications of fortuity are perhaps con-
ceivable ; but have we not reached the bursting strain of
improbability ? That direct descent should develop the
geometrical instinct of the working bee is hard enough to
believe, but here the difficulty is raised to the square. And
even if the improbabilities thus piled up be not overwhelm-
ing, still the explanation so suggested does not avail so
much as to touch the case of slave ants. They exhibit
an instinct beneficial, not to their own race, but to another ; it
can be of no advantage to the tribe from which they are
taken that so many of its members should be dragged away
to bondage, or, at any rate, if it were so, why should that
tribe fight to prevent it, and suffer mutilation and death in
the struggle ? By what possible process can it have been
brought about, that black queens and drones should have
been so selected as to produce neuter insects, which will
make good slaves for red ants, at the same time handing on
to their progeny an instinct that makes them perish in the
attempt to avoid that very service for which they have been
so laboriously prepared ? "^^

(5) Finally, the extreme complexity of the movements
exhibited in many instincts, especially where the exercise of
different members and organs have to be combined and the
actions of numerous independent muscles correlated, are, as
Spencer has recognized, incompatible with origination by
fortuitously and independently varying movements. Frac-
tions or parts of the movement that go to make up many
instinctive operations would be not only useless but harmful
to the author. Yet they could not all have co-operated at the
right time by chance.^"^ Indeed, many instincts would be fatal
to their owners unless they were comparatively perfect. How
they could have arisen by insensible modifications is incon-
ceivable. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that some instincts
originally of a more indefinite character may have been per-
fected, and modification effected in others by natural selection
and environment. But the attempt to explain the origin of all
instincts in this way appears to us doomed to hopeless
failure. Certain writers on this topic seem to imply that a
false theory is better than none, and that since no more plausible
*' scientific " hypothesis is forthcoming than the two criticized

^3 J. Gerard, S.J., Scienceand Scientists, p. 118. (London : Catholic
Truth Society.) The reader will find packed into this little shilling
volume much searching criticism of materialistic evolutionist
theories and "facts."

^* Consider the case of the sphex given in note 7.

ANIMAL SOULS. 593

we must accept either of them. We confess this docs not
seem to us a very scientific temper of mind.

Animal "Souls." — Tiie investigations which we have now
made into the character of the operations of the animal
"soul," render clear the deductions we are justified in draw-
ing concerning its nature, origin, and destiny. The whole
weight of analogy proves that in the brute, as in man, the
vegetative and sentient principles are identical. This animal
"soul," however, is nut a spiritual substantial principle: it is not
a substantial form intrinsically independent of and separable,
from its material subject. This doctrine follows immediately
from the theses established above. The animal manifests no
spiritual activity. It is not endowed with rational intellect;
consequently, not with free-will. In other words, all the
mental actions exhibited by it are of the lower or sensuous
order, and therefore intrinsically or essentially dependent on
a material organism. We are accordingly led to conclude
that the ultimate principle from which these operations
proceed is itself intrinsically and essentially dependent on
matter. Actio sequitiir esse ; as a being is, so it acts; but all
the mental acts which we are justified in ascribing to animals
are of an organic or sensuous character. Therefore we are
bound to infer that the animal " soul " is essentially depen-
dent on the material organism and inseparable from it. It is,
consequently, incapable of life apart from the body, and it
perishes with the destruction of the latter. On account of
this intrinsic dependence on matter, the souls of animals
were spoken of by the Scholastics indifferently as material and
corporeal. They did not, however, intend by these terms to
imply that the principle of vital activities is a bodily substance
of three dimensions. They simply meant to teach that it
depends absolutely on the material subject which it actuates,
just as the heat depends on the matter of the burning coal,
and the stamped inscription on the wax. They maintained,
moreover, that though not spiritual, the vital principle in
animals must be of a simple nature, inasmuch as the activity
of sentiency which proceeds from it is a simple immanent
operation.

The animal soul is thus, in Scholastic language, a sub-
stantial form completely immersed in the subject which it
animates. Accordingly, it does not require a Divine Creative
act to account for its origin in each successive being any
more than a Divine Annihilative volition to eftect its destruc-
tion. It is a result of substantial transformation produced
by generation. An existing vital energy is capable, by its
action, of reproducing or evoking from the potentialities of
matter a new energy akin to itself. But, as at pieseut new

594 HYPNOTISM.

life ever proceeds only from a living agent, so a fortiori in the
beginning the primordial act hy which animal life was first
educed frtm the potentialities of matter must have been that
of a Living Being.

SUPPLEMENT B.

' HYPNOTISM.

Hypnotism {vttvos, sleep). The interest awakened in recent
years in the subject of Hypnotism, and its connection with
other mental phenomena make it seem desirable that we
should devote what space we can afford to it here.

Historical Sketch. — Towards the end of last century an
Austrian physician named Mesmer professed publicly in Paris
to heal all diseases by " animal magnetism." The treatment
was so called from a " magnetic " power supposed to be
exerted over living beings by certain persons or objects more
than normally saturated with the mysterious influence. The
magnetisation was effected by passes, contact, or fixation of
the eyes, but was often accompanied by ceremonies of a
superstitious and sometimes of an immoral character. In
1714 mesmerism was examined by a commission of the Ro5'al
Society of Medicine of France.. The commissioners decided
against the reality of the alleged magnetic force. They
explained the effects of the magnetization to be due to the
influence of imagination and imitation, and the}' declared the
beneficial results claimed for the new curative treatment to
be more than counterbalanced b}' the dangers, physical and
moral, attendant on its employment. ^ Later on the Holy See
also condemned mesmerism, or rather the superstitious or
immoral use of methods of magnetism included under that
name. For three-quarters of a century the magnetic art had
fallen into general disrepute ; but during the past twenty
years it has again come into prominence under the title of
Hypnotism. The new method of treatment, however, at least
as employed by medical men of standing, is stripped of the
former superstitious and objectionable practices, though
certain grave dangers inevitabl}- remain attached to its use.
To hypnotism thus understood as excluding spiritualism,
occultism, clairvoyance, and the like we confine ourselves
here. Experiences of these latter kinds, whether \iewcd as
preternatural or merely abnormal phenomena, must be dis-

^ Cf. Binet and Fere, Animal Magnetism, pp. i — 30,

HYPNOTISM. 595

cussed individually — especially with respect to the evidence
as to matters of fact in each particular case.

Process of hypnotization. — The subject is requested to
gaze fixedly at some object, such as a button, suspended at a
little distance from his eyes and above his head ; or to stare
into the eyes of the operator ; or to listen to a monotonous
sound such as the ticking of a watch ; or " passes " are made
in front of his face and chest. After a time he often gradually
falls into a drowsy or lethargic condition, hke that preceding or
following on ordinary sleep. This is a milder form of the
hypnosis or hypnotic trance. Dr. Bernheim and the physicians
of the Nancy School ordinarily induce the hypnosis by simple
suggestion of the idea. Thus the patient being seated, the
doctor says, in a quiet, authoritative voice : " Gaze fixedly at
me and think of nothing except of faUing asleep. You feel
your eyelids heavy : you are very drowsy : your eyes grow
more and more fatigued : they wink : your sight is becoming
dimmer and dimmer : your eyes are closing : you cannot open
them! Sleep !"2 If the operation is successful, the subject
passes into the hypnosis, from which he is awakened either by
blowing on his face, by making passes in the opposite direc-
tion, or by an emphatic " Awake ! "

Characteristics of the hypnotic state. — The trance thus
induced may be of any degree of intensity, from a slight feeling
of drowsiness to profound somnambulistic sleep. Different
writers variously classify these states. Charcot's division of
stages into cataleptic, lethargic, and somnavibulistic is the best
known; as it is also the most generally attacked.^ That
adopted by Wundt of drowsiness, light sleep, and deep sleep, are
as convenient as any other ; though the state must not be
identified with normal sleep.* In the lighter forms of the
hypnotic influence the subject is quite aware of what goes on
around him, and can remember the various incidents after-
wards, but he feels perhaps slightly drowsy. The chief
peculiarity of the state is that the subject is in a condition of
rapport or special relation with the hypnotizer, which is shown
by his susceptibility to suggestions from the latter. In the
deeper stages the subject loses connexion more and more
with all other objects save the hypnotizer and the particular
experiences which the latter suggests. When he awakes he
cannot remember, or only very imperfectly, the incidents of
the hypnotic state. Amongst some of the more remarkable
phenomena are the following :

2 H. Bernheim, De la Suggestion et dc ses Applications a la TliMi-
pentique, pp. 2, 3.

^ See A. Moll, Hypnotism, pp. 48 — 52.
* Human and Animal Psycholcgy, p. ^29.

596 HYPNOTISM.

Inhibition of voluntary muscles. — The operator authorita-
tively tells the subject that he cannot pronounce his own
name, or open his eyes, or move his legs ; and immediately
the subject is helplessly paralyzed in regard to these acts,
somewhat as one feels when suffering from nightmare. Or
in a deeper stage the subject is commanded to hold out his
arm, and is next assured that it is impossible to withdraw it.
The arm then assumes a rigid cataleptic condition, and
remains thus extended for a longer period than the subject
could voluntarily sustain it in his normal state.

Illusions and hallucinations. — In a still more profound
stage illusions can be successfully suggested. The hypnotized
person is easily persuaded that a glass of water is tea, wine,
or vinegar, or vice versa. Or, his attention is directed towards
an imaginary cat, bird, or flower which he thereupon perceives
as a real being. Still more curious are the "negative" illu-
sions. The operator asserts emphatically that some parti-
cular member of the company has left the room ; and this
individual thenceforth becomes invisible to the subject,
although the latter distinctly perceives all the other persons
and objects in the apartment. The subject may be made to
adopt some other character, as that of a policeman, a nun, a
little child, or an old woman; and not infrequently acts the
part remarkably well. In this deeper somnambulistic stage
the actions suggested by the experimenter are almost
invariably executed, even though they be absurd, unpleasant,
or ridiculous.

Amnesia and "deferred suggestions." — A common feature of
the deeper forms of the trance is complete forgetfulness vvhen
awakened, of the incidents which have just happened, although
they may be perfectly recalled in a future hypnosis. Never-
theless post-hypnotic suggestions or orders given during the
trance with regard to future actions are often faithfully per-
formed at the appropriate time when the subject has been
restored to his normal waking state, although no recollection
of the suggestion be retained. The subject simply feels a
vague impulse to perform the action. It is in this force of
"deferred suggestions" that the value of hypnotism as a
therapeutic agency lies. But here also is obviously one of
its gravest dangers. The patient, when hypnotized, is assured
that he will awake in good health, that his neuralgia or
dyspepsia will have ceased ; and the malady accordingly
disappears. Or, if ordered to do something on a future occa-
sion, he will feel, when the circumstances arrive, an inex-
plicable impulse to perform the act ; and this craving, it
is said, possesses in some instances an overmastering
force which rcndcis the subject miserable until the deed is

HYPNOTISM. 597

accomplished, or the occasion for it has passed completely
away.

Exalted sensibility. — In certain cases the sensibility of
the perceptive faculties seems to be heightened in a marvel-
lous manner, so as to enable the hypnotized subject to
apprehend faint stimuli that would in the normal state be
indiscernible. How far certain strange, extraordinary pheno-
mena of this class are to be ascribed to hypnotism proper, it
is very difficult to decide. At all events authenticated cases
of the kind do not seem to occur in legitimate clinical practice
like that of Bernheim at Nancy. Cn the other hand, a writer
as little likely to extend unduly the territory of the preter-
natural as Professor James, is very frank in his confession of
belief in the reality of occurrences at " seances " given by
certain " mediums," as altogether inexplicable by hitherto
known natural causes.^

Whether the human intellect can ever naturally work more
efficiently in the hypnotized state seems even more open to
doubt ; though it is not impossible that the suspension of
inferior cerebral centres may in particular circumstances set
certain higher mental processes in a freer and more unim-
peded condition of activity.^

The percentage of persons hypnotizable is variously
stated by different experimenters, partly owing to their
differences of view as to the genuineness of the lighter form
of Hypnotism. Thus: " Bottey gives 30 per cent, as sus-
ceptible, Morselli 70 per cent., Delboeuf over 80 per cent., /
whilst Bernheim refuses the right to judge of hypnotism to /
all hospital doctors who cannot hypnotize at least 80 per cent,
of their patients, and Forel fully agrees with him."^

Men, according to some writers, are as hypnotizable as
women, soldiers being particularly good subjects. The sus-
ceptibility of the subject increases with the frequency of the
operation, and the induction of a morbid " hypnotic habit " is
one of the serious evils attending on frequent hypnotization. As

5 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. p. 396 ; and The Will to Believe,

P- 319-

^ Such would seem to be the view of St. Thomas in regard to

some states. But though he lays down the general principle, he is

rather considering the possibility of supernatural communications:

" Anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur, tanto

intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis, et aliena-

tionibus a sensibus corporis magis divinae revelationes percipiuntur,

et prsevisiones futurorum." {Sum. i. q. 12, a. 11. Cf. Coconnier,

L'Hypnotisme franc, p. 361.)

"' Moll, Hypnotism, p. 47. Only a small percentage, however,

reach the deeper stages.

598 HYPNOTISM.

to whether we can be hypnotized against our will, it is gener
ally admitted that if a person has already often submitted to
the experiment, he may sometimes be hypnotized without
his consent. It is also agreed that certain neurotic or
hysterical patients can be hypnotized from the first time against
their desire. As regards normal healthy persons, if they
decline to comply with the conditions, the hypnotizer can do
nothing. It is also generally held that an abnormally sus-
ceptible subject can be safeguarded from future abuse by the
suggestion that he can never be hypnotized save by some
particular person.

Theories concerning Hypnotism. — According to Charcot
and the Paris school at least the deeper hypnosis is a nervous
disorder, found only in hysterical patients, and exhibiting
itself in the three stages of cataleptic, lethargic, and somnam-
bulistic trance.^ On the other hand, the Nancy school, whose
view now generally prevails, advocate not a physical but a
psychical explanation of the phenomena. They teach that the
hypnosis is not a nervous disorder but a state possessing close
affinity to natural sleep. For them the essence of hypnotism
is suggestion. They explain the contrary conclusions of their
rivals, as due to the fact that the experience of the latter is
confined chiefly to the neurotic patients of the Salpetriere
hospital ; and they urge that the phenomena of the three
stages and other features insisted on by Charcot's disciples
can all be accounted for by suggestion and imitation.-' Still,
as has been justly observed, " what needs explanation here is
the fact that in a certain condition of the subject suggestions
operate as they do at no other time."^*' The matter is con-
fessedly exceedingly obscure, and no satisfactory answer is
yet forthcoming ; nevertheless, some considerations connect-
ing hypnosis with more familiar mental phenomena may be
usefully indicated.

Hypnosis. — First, then, the hypnotic trance, though not
identical in any stage with natural sleep, clearly bears affinity
to the latter state, especially to that type of it exhibited in
spontaneous somnambulism. It is induced by similar means, and
the lighter forms resemble the drowsiness which precedes or
succeeds sleep. We have pointed out how the apparent
reality of the dream results from the cessation of the cor-
rective action of the external senses and the suspension of
the power of reflective comparison whilst the exaggeration
of the impressions which succeed in penetrating into the
sleeper's mind is due to the circumstance that they secure a

« Cf. Binet and Fere, op. cit. cc. vi, vii,

*♦ Cf. Bernheim, op. cit. c. vi.

1" James, Principles of Psyclwlogy, vol. ii. p. 6oi.

HYPNOTISM. 599

monopoly of his consciousness, (p. 176.) These facts help
towards the explanation of some of the phenomena of
hypnotism.

Fixation of attention : " Rapport." — The primary effect of
the concentration of attention involved in all the methods of
hypnotizing is to starve out all rival impressions and thoughts.
This seems to bring on a condition of somnolence in regard
to all surrounding objects, except the operator who has
induced the state by directing the fixation of tiie subject's
attention. This peculiar " rapport " witli the hypnotizer
preserved throughout the trance is the chief feature by
which this artificially induced sleep is distinguished from
normal sleep. Even in ordinary sleep, the senses are not
altogether closed. There is exerted a certain " selective "
reception of impressions, and those which fit in with the
current of a dream may have an abnormally intense effect.
It is, indeed, sometimes possible, if we hit upon the current of
a dreamer's thoughts, to direct them by suggestions. But in
the hypnosis instead of this imperfect casual relation with (r.ty
body, there is a fixed stable rapport wdth one person who
possesses an absolute monopoly of the subject's conscious-
ness. The subject by the voluntary strained fixation of his
attention on the hypnotizer has fallen into a trance in which
his attention is henceforth riveted, or involuntarily fascinated
by the latter. Why the subject's attention should become
thus " clamped " we cannot tell.

Abnormal sug-g-estibility. — The power of suggestion is a
familiar fact already sufficiently illustrated. If the thought
of a rat being in the room, or of a worm crawling up my back,
is suggested to me, I am uncomfortable until I convince
myself that it is not true. As St. Thomas teaches, the repre-
sentations of the imagination win assent unless contradicted
by sense-perception or reason, (p. 178.) In proportion to the
vividness of the idea and the completeness of the suspension
of the other faculties will be the intensity of the illusion.
Again, vivid ideas of action tend to realize themselves. A
lively conception of a word or gesture expresses itself in a
faint movement of the appropriate muscles. But attention,
whether voluntary or extorted, enormously increases the
force of an idea or sensation. It augments the excitability
of the nerve tracts and cerebral centres engaged, it suppresses
the enfeebling effect of competing stimuli ; and it concentrates
mental energy on the object of interest. But in proportion
as the trance is more profound all rival experiences seem to
be excluded, and the faculties of the subject are receptive
only of the suggestions of the hypnotizer, which cunsccpiently
acquire very exceptional force.

600 HYPNOTISM.

Inhibition. — Even in waking life, onr power of action is
much dependent on onr belief in our ability to act. The
partial conviction that we cannot or can perform a certain
movement goes far to make it impossible or possible for us.
But in hypnosis the conviction of inability can be made
absolute by simple suggestion, and the voluntary control of
tiie subject's muscles is suspended as completely as in a night-
mare. The hypnotizer cannot, as is sometimes erroneously
said, directly rule the Will of the hypnotized: but he can
determine, at least in extreme cases, the movements and per-
ceptions of the latter by suggesting the images which excite
his motor and sensory nerves and cerebral centres.

Suggested illusions. — The same principles help to explain
both the negative and positive illusions of hypnosis. Even
in waking life, when the attention is engrossed by some other
subject, a man may gaze at an object without perceiving it ;
he may walk through a crowded street with as little notice
of the sights which assail his eyes, as if it were empty ; even
an acute pain may remain unobserved by him. This is the
ordinary character of the somnambulism of normal sleep and
of the hallucination of the monomaniac. The attention is
absorbed by some dominant thought or fixed idea, and the
chief difference in the case of hypnosis is that the thought
which is to dominate is determined by the operator. If he
chooses to concentrate the mental energy of the subject on
a phantasm of the imagination, since all initiative or voluntary
use of reason is inhibited, hallucination is inevitable. That
suggestions made under such favourable circumstances not
only possess exceptional force at the time, but also produce
an enduring impression which will work itself out later on,
appears natural enough. There is probably also something
in the cerebral conditions of hypnosis which renders the brain
peculiarly susceptible to suggestions of the time.

Amnesia. — The forgetfulness of the events of the hypnotic
state during the following waking period, and their recollec-
tion in a subsequent hypnosis, hive their parallel in the
obliviscence of dreams and somnambulistic performances in
the daytime. The memory of our waking experiences presents
us with analogous facts. The recollection of a past cognition
seems commonly to involve, or at least to be facilitated by,
the reproduction of part of the frame of mind in which the
incident occurred. Each mental act forms an integral part
of an environing conscious state connected with a network
of nervous conditions, and when these are completely changed
as from the sleeping to the waking state, remembrance of
experiences of the former condition are naturally difficult.
We have alluded to tliis before in dealing with "alternating

HYPNOTISM. 6oi

personalities." (pp. 490, 491.) The retention in a latent
subconscious form of an impulse to carry out a deferred
suggestion when the appointed circumstances arise may
perhaps be explained in the same way. The man who,
engrossed in conversation, automatically posts a letter,
owing to a friend's request, as he passes a pillar-box, executes,
it has been justly said, a "deferred suggestion," of which he
may have been oblivious from the moment he received the
letter until he finds his pocket empty on arriving home ; and
he may be then utterly unable to recall the incident. In many,
if not all cases, the performance of complex post-hypnotic
suggestions seems to involve a relapse into the trance state. ^^
Ethics of Hypnotism. — The morality of hypnotism is a
question rather for Ethics or Moral Theology than for
the Psychologist, so a very few words must suffice here : (i) It
is admitted on all hands that hypnotism is attended by serious
peril to health of both body and mind when practised by
unskilled persons and irresponsible charlatans. Epileptic
fits, hysterical paroxysms, and permanent mental and nervous
disorders have been induced by ignorant experimenters.
Accordingly several continental governments have wisely
made public exhibitions and the practice of hypnotism by
other than duly qualified persons a penal offence. (2) Further
it is generally agreed that frequent hypnotizatiou, especially
when the profounder stages are induced, brings on a morbid
hypnotic Jiabit, besides rendering the subject unduly sub-
servient to the influence of the operator. Obviously this
latter consequence may be attended with serious dangers.^''^

^1 See Coconnier, U Hypnotisme franc (Paris, 1897), cc. xii. — xiv.
This is an able and judicious work on the subject. There are good
chapters also in Meric's Le Merveilleux et la Science.

^- The grave words of Wundt are worth recording : " Hypnotism
as a therapeutic agency is a two-edged instrument. If its effects
are strongest when the patient is predisposed to it in body and
mind, or when suggestion has become a settled mode of treatment,
it may obviously be employed to intensify or actually induce a
pathological disposition. It must be looked upon, not as a remedy
of universal serviceability, but as a poison whose effect may be
beneficial under certain circumstances. . . . (Some assert) that the
hypnotic sleep is not injurious, because it is not in itself a patho-
logical disposition. But surely the facts of post-hypnotic halluci-
nation and the diminution of the power of resistance to suggestive
influences furnish a refutation of this statement which no counter-
arguments can shake. It is a phenomenon of common observation
that frequently hypnotized individuals can, when fully awake, be
persuaded of the wildest fables and thenceforth regard them as
passages of their own experience." [Lectures on Human and Animal
Psychology, pp. 334, 335.)

6o2 HYPNOTISM.

How far a subject can by hypnotism be led to commit a
crime is mucli disputed, but it is clearly unlawful to suspend
or diminish in this way the use of our free-will and intel-
ligence without adequate reason and due precautions. (3)
Where hypnotism is employed for illicit purposes, or in con-
nexion with superstitious practices as in spiritualism, occultism,
clairvoyance and the like, it is evidently immoral. (4) If,
however, the question be put : Is hypnotism ever allowable ?
the true answer seems to us to be that of the moral Theo-
logians who teach ^'^ that in certain circumstances the use of
hypnotism is permissible. The conditions usually prescribed
are : (a) There must be a grave reason to justify the sus-
pension of reason ; and we would add that the gravity
increases in proportion to the completeness of the abdication
of free control involved, (b) Sufficient guarantee should be
had as to the character and competence of the operator,
(c) Some adequately trustworthy witness, such as a parent,
husband, or guardian should be present when a person
submits to being hypnotized.

^' Genicot writes: " Vitatis conatibus suparstitiosis, et adhibitis
cauteiis supra explicatis, licet seipsum ob j^ravem causam hypno-
tizanti tradere. . . . Graves causae ob quas licite hypnotismus adhi-
beatur, sunt praesertim duas ; curatio morborum quibus sanandis
desit aliud medium prorsus innocuum ; et progressus quarundam
scientiarum, puta medicinae vel psychologiae, hisexperimentisobtin-
endus. Praeterea censemus hypnotismum licite adhiberi, ad tollendas,
vel saltem minuendas, quasdam malas propensiones quae, ob vehe-
mentiam suam, libertatem tollunt vel extenuant, puta propensio»em
ad suicidium, ad liquores inebriantes, &c." (TJieoIogij' Moralis Insti-
tutiones, vol. i. § 275 (1898). Cf Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moi-alis, vol. i.
n. 994 ; Sabetti, Theologia Moralis, § 209 ; Coconnier, op. cit. cc.
xxi.— XV. ; Bucceroni, Casus ConscienticT, § 89 (1895).

REPLY TO Mk. W. U. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. C03

SUPPLEMENT C.

REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK's CRITICISM.

The fourth edition of this work was honoured by an
elaborate attack from Mr. W. hi. Mallock in a long article
entitled, " Rehgion and Science," in the Fortnightly Revieiv, of
November, igoi. His own view, expounded in a series of
essays in that Review, seems to be that not only do belief
in a Personal God, free-will, a spiritual soul and a future life
find no support in Science or deductions from Science, but
that Psychology, Biology, and Physics exclude and negate all
these behefs, that ''the facts put before us by Science form
an absolute affirmation of monism, and monism is the absolute
negation of religion." {Fortnightly, Oct. 1902.) He therefore
maintains that the attempts of myself and other "Apologists"
to harmonize science and rehgion, or to justify any of these
beliefs from a scientific study of the mind are " futile and
worthless," and further that my own arguments are self-
contradictory. Mr. Mallock himself, though admitting an
irreconcilable conflict between science and religion, defends
the latter on these grounds : (i) " Contradictions are involved
in all existence," and " Religion contradicts Science no more
than each contradicts itself." {Ibid. p. 696.) (2) The ethical
argument : Life is not worth living, unless the religious
assumptions are true.

My reply in general is that in all those places where
Mr. Mallock's criticism seems effective he has misrepresented
my arguments — of course not intentionally. Unfortunately,
though he quotes me over a score of times, he only gives the
references twice, so that the ordinary reader cannot consult
the context. Yet no one knows better than Mr. Mallock how
vital this is in philosophical criticism. As my space is limited,
I must be very brief in answering his objections.

(i) Mr. Mallock starts by representing modern defenders
of Theism as resting their case almost entirely on the fact
that science has disproved the doctrine of the spontaneous
generation of life from inorganic matter. He next groups me
with these "recent apologists of Religion," and then devotes
four pages of criticism to show {a) that my argument is in-
sufficient to prove the existence of a conscious or intelligent
Being, and therefore is worthless, {b) That my own reason-

6o4 REPLY TO MR. IV. H. MALLOCR'S CRITICISM.

ing and language in other parts of my book prove its worth-
lessness. " Father Maher has unintentionally adopted almost
the exact language employed by Tyndall. . . . ' In matter
I discern the potency of life,' the only difference being that
according to Tyndall the Power which evokes this potency is
immanent in matter, and according to Father Maher it is a
separate personality which is exterior to it," but there is
nothing to prove that this Personality must be conscious.
(c) Further, Father Maher has unintentionally " misrepre-
sented in the grossest manner possible what the leading men
of science have really said on the subject. . . . F. M. quotes
Tyndall and Huxley as affirming that living beings are
produced only by living beings, and adds that accordmg to
them ' there is not a shred of evidence to support a contrary
conclusion.' What they really say is not that spontaneous
generation has never taken place, and that life as we know it
is not due to this process, but that the process has not been
discovered taking place now, and that experiment thus far
has been unable to reproduce it. That it has taken place in
the past is the very thing they affirm, and that all the
analogies of the Universe show that it must have done so."
{Fuytnighily, Nov. 1901, pp. 812 — 816.)

To (a) it may be rephed on the part of Theists generally
that this argument is only one, or rather a part of one of
several arguments which co-operate in the proof of the
existence of God in the full sense of a self-existing, infinite,
intelligent, free Being, and that even if taken by itself it does
not immediately establish all the attributes of God it is not
therefore worthless. A fact may be valuable evidence, it
may exclude a rival hypothesis, or it may supply a precious
link in one chain of reasoning, even though it should not
establish the whole thesis to be proved.

On my own part the answer is still easier. My book is a
treatise on Psychology, not on Natural Theology, and I may
incidentally allude to the bearing of some psychological truth
on the doctrine of Theism without being bound to expound
the whole proof of the existence and attributes of God.

{b) Nowhere in this book does my reasoning prove this
argument to be worthless. To point out against materialistic
scientists that the first Author of life must a fortiori have
been a self-existing Living Being does not prove that this
Being may be icitJioiit consciousness. (Cf. p. 584.) It is
shown in Natural Theology that a self -existing being must be
infinite and intelligent. The small difference between my
language and that of Tyndall covers a wide divergency of
thought. It is not the same thing to conclude that a printed
page of a book has been educed from the properties or

REPLY TO MR. W . H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. 60 =

potentialities of a quantity of type by a type-setter and that it
has been evolved by the type themselves.

(c) The reader can test the validity of Mr. Mallock's
charge of "gross misrepresentation" for himself. If he will
turn back to page 547, he will find that I there give the exact
words of Huxley and Tyndall affirming that spontaneous
generation never takes place nozv-a-days, whilst the very point
of my argument in the conclusion on p. 551 is precisely what
Mr. Mallock accuses me of concealing, viz., that these
scientists affirm " that life did arise spontaneously from
dead matter in the distant past," and that they are illogical
in so doing. When Mr. Mallock or any other writer indicates
how " all the analogies of the universe" prove that life arose
by spontaneous generation from inorganic matter in the past,
it will be time to discuss that suggestion.

(2) Mr. Mallock next attacks my proof of the spirituality of
the soul. Professing to express my arguments " as far as
possible in my own words," he writes thus : " We all admit,"
Father Maher begins, " that man possesses intellect, but
' intellect is a faculty specifically distinct from sense' (a). We
can see that it must be so by considering what intellect
includes. ' It includes attention, judgment, reflexion, self-
consciousness, the formation of concepts and the processes
of reasoning' (/3). Let us, he says, take the one act of self-
consciousness. This cannot be ' dependent essentially on a
material agent, for the peculiar nature of this aptitude is
fundamentally opposed to all the properties of matter' (y).
And what is true of consciousness is true of all the
faculties of intellect. F. M. triumphantly cites the dictum of
Tyndall that ' the chasm between the two classes of
facts remains intellectually impassable ' (S). 'There is,' he
continues himself, ' an absolute contrariety of nature between
mind and matter,' and he sums up his case by saying that
' to endow an extended substance with an indivisible spiritual
activity ' such as ' self-consciousness would be a metaphysical
impossibility beyond the power of God' (e). 'Therefore,'
says Father Maher, ' the intellect or the rational soul of man
is evidently distinct from the body through which it operates
and which it employs, and being distinct is essentially capable
of surviving it' " (i). {Fortnightly, p. 818.)

In reply I need only refer the reader back to chapter xxi.,
and especially to pp. 464 — 473, in order to let him see what a
travesty this is of my argument. Mr. Mallock professes to
give my reasoning as far as possible in "my own words," but
he omits to tell his readers that these words are taken from
half a dozen widely separated parts of my book, and that
more than half of them are extracted from later chapters

6o6 REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.

which presuppose the thesis to have been already proved.
As Mr. Maliock gives no hint that his quotations are from
different contexts, I have inserted the Greek letters so that
the reader may be able to examine them himself. Here they
are: (n) p. 230, (/3) p. 231, (y) p. 472, (§) P- 497^ (0 P- 499»
(i) p. 535 !

Mr. Maliock next confounds two different things carefully
distinguished by me, the simpliciiy and the spirituality of
mental activities. He then represents me as proving the
spirituality of the soul by the non-spatial character of its
activities. This proof he triumphantly refutes as a mere
assumption that " what is unimaginable cannot exist," and
confirms his refutation by my own statement elsewhere *' that
imagination is not a test of possibility," and by my doctrine
that the consciousness of the lower animals though also non-
spatial is essentially dependent on the organism and
perishes with the latter. " It is idle, therefore, to argue that
man's life contains a principle independent of the material
organism, merely because the phenomena of man's conscious-
ness are non-spatial or non-extended, and between the non-
extended and the extended there is an absolute contrariety,
for there is the same contrariety between the mind and the
body of an animal, and yet the two arise and perish together.
. . . The whole argument from the contrariety between
conscious life and matter is therefore valueless." (76/rf.p. 819.)

My answer is to refer the reader to page 469, where I
explicitly point out the difference between the spirituality and
the simplicity or non-spatial character of a mental activity.
I there state formally at the beginning of the thesis concern-
ing the spirituality of the soul that the principle of conscious
life in the lower animals though non-spatial is yet not
spiritual. I then prove, not from consciousness — which the
animals possess — but from self-consciousness, from thoui^Jit and
from free volition, of which the animals are devoid, that the
human soul is spiritual. Nowhere in this proof do I appeal
to the " non-spatial " quality of consciousness. My argument
is not, it is unimaginable Jwiv non-spatial consciousness can l)e
dependent on an extended organism, but that it is positively
unthinkable that self-consciousness, thought, or free-volition
can be acts of a bodily organ.

(3) Mr. Maliock next attacks my thesis that animals are
devoid of intellect, ascribing the following six arguments to
me. I shall distinguish them with capitals :

(A) " The principal contents of the intellect according to
Father Maher are these — 'attention, judgment, reflection,
self-consciousness, the formation of concepts, and the pro-
cesses of reasoning.' According to Father Maher, the

REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. 607

animals possess none of these; for as each of these is a part
of the intellect, if the animals possessed one of them they
would possess in some degree at all events that mysterious
faculty which he argues is possessed by man alone." {Ibid.
p. 820.) Having elaborately refuted this " argument,"
Mr. Mallock continues: (B) "But attention, judgnient, and
self-consciousness are not the faculties of intellect on which
Father Maher mainly relies when he is endeavourmg to show
that in the animals intellect is demonstrably absent. The
crucial faculty of the intellect on which his argument mainly
rests is the faculty of forming concepts. If nothing else is
evident, this at least he says is so — that men can form
concepts and the animals can not. In the forming of concepts
—these are his own words — 'the spiritual activity of the
intellect is best manifested.' Let us consider this point," &c.
(Ibid. p. 821.) (C) " Father Maher shows his secret and
uneasy sense of how weak and unconvincing are his tico main
lines of argument by his endeavour to supplement them with
others which unfortunately are weaker still. These supple-
mentary arguments are as follows : First, all the actions and
feelings of animals are purely sensuous." (D) Secondly,
animals unlike men make no progress, the geese of the days
of Moses were as wise as the geese of to-day. (E) Thirdly,
though the lower kinds of mental activity — such as memory
and imagination — are referable by physiological science to
particular portions of the brain, the highest faculties of all
cannot be so located. Though nominally they " may employ
as their instrument" this portion of the brain or that, they
are free within limits, if necessary, to use any portion they
please. The higher faculties then are demonstrably separable
from matter. (F) Finally, man's powers are admittedly
superior to those of the lower animals ; but there is no corres-
ponding difference between the animal brain and the human ;
therefore man's superior powers are demonstrably inde-
pendent of the brain. Let us therefore take these arguments
in order." [Ibid. p. 822.)

I have given this long extract to make it quite clear that
I am not mis-stating Mr. Mallock's representation of my
reasoning, and in order that the reader may be able to
observe for himself Mr. Mallock's methods of criticism. Let
him now turn back to pp. 583 — 586, where he will find this
thesis stated in special type, and my four arguments given.
He will notice that of the six "arguments" ascribed to me
and then triumphantly refuted by Mr. Mallock, only one
(D) has been used by me in any form. I invite him to
compare Mr. Mallock's representation with the original,
pp. 583, 584, and then to draw his own conclusions. That I

6o8 REPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.

could not have used these statements as arguments to prove
the alleged thesis would have been evident to any cautious
reader had Mr. Mallock only given the references. Here
they are: (A) with its quotation refers to pp. 231 — 234;
(B) to pp. 235—237 ; (D) to pp. 583, 584 ; (E) to p. 571 ; (F) to
p. 502 ; (C) I cannot find anywhere. In other words, my
proof of this most important thesis is, according to Mr. Mallock,
scattered in fragments throughout 350 pages dealing with
many different topics. Yet he has been good enough to say
with respect to my proofs that I have " expressed and
arranged the arguments with great skill and lucidity."

Further, the reader will observe that of the five " argu-
ments " ascribed to me, but which I have not used, to prove
that animals are devoid of intellect, four are based on
fragments extracted from the body of the book, where I
treat of Human Psychology, not from the Supplement on
Animal Psychology, where alone I deal with this question.
I have deliberately separated the discussion of the faculties
of man from that of the animals, because our assurance
regarding the former is based on introspection, whilst regard-
ing the latter it rests on mere analogical inference, (cf. pp. 580,
581.) A reader may accept the chief truths with respect to
the former, yet profess nescience concerning the latter. As
regards the "arguments" in detail, (A) (B) and (C) are
obviously utterly absurd. (D), the reader can contrast with
the original on pp. 583, 584.1

If the reader compares (E) with the original on p. 571, he
will see that the scope of my section on the localization of
brain functions is totally misrepresented by Mr. Mallock.
He will also be not a little astonished to discover how
Mr. Mallock has changed my conclusion respecting the power
of the vital principle to heal wounds of the brain and to adapt
other portions to perform the functions of the injured parts.
My words were : These objections establish "that the principle

1 Against (D) Mr. Mallock objects (i) that many nations of
mankind have not progressed, and (2) that "in all progress in the
arts the human hand has admittedly played as large a part as the
intelligence." It may be replied: (i) The rudest savage who
points an arrow-head or kindles a fire exhibits an intellectual,
"progress" separated by a chasm from that of the brute, whilst
the immense variety in the stages of human civilization proves the
vast capacity for such progress in man compared with the rigid
limitations of the animal. (2) Mr. Mallock's second objection is
subverted by his first. The lowest savages, whom he places on
almost the same level as the ape, have as perfect a hand as the
most civilized man. The backwardness of animals in general and
the forwardness of civilized man must therefore be explained by

kEPLY TO MR. W. H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM. 600

whicli dominates tJie living organism has within certain limits
the power of adapting to its needs and employing as its
instruments other than the normal portions of the brain."
(p. 571.) What Mr. Mallock makes me say is: "Although
normally they (the highest mental faculties) may employ as
their instrument this portion of the brain or that, they are free
within limits, if necessary, to use any portion they please. The
higher faculties, then, are demonstrably separable from matter.''
Comment is unnecessary. The same is true with respect to
F. See p. 502.

(4) Finally, Mr. Mallock completes my confutation thus :
" All these arguments (A, B, C, D, E, F) imply the supposition
that by observation, inference, or otherwise we can learn with
complete precision what the mental life of the animals is, . . .
but when in a supplement Father Maher comes to deal with
Animal Psychology ... he turns round on himself and
bluntly and contemptuously denies the very postulate on
which the whole of his previous contention rested. He tells
us practically that we can know nothing about the animal
mind at all. . . . How can he base an argument for man's
essential difference from animals on the fact that the animals
are incapable of universal concepts, attention, judgment,
emotions not wholly sensuous, if all our knowledge of their
character is merely remote conjecture." (p. 824.) The italics
throughout are mine.

Mr. Mallock himself has created the alleged contradiction
by ascribing to me these five arguments which I have not
employed. He further strengthens that charge by telling his
readers that after having made use of these arguments which
imply "that we can learn with complete precision what the
mental life of animals is," I "turn round on myself," &c.
Now the reader will observe (i) that I have not used the
alleged "arguments;" (2) that it is at the beginning of my
first discussion of the mental faculties of the lower animals
that I warn the reader bcforehdind of the exact nature of the
evidence and of the limitations to our knowledge of animal

some other cause. But the argument has been finally disposed of
by recent facts. There have been many examples in late years of
men deprived of their hands or arms from infancy, who exhibit the
greatest dexterity and skill in the use of their feet and toes. If
then, as is the case, men without hands have acquired the arts of
painting, drawing, knitting, sewing, playing the violin, using
hammer and chisel, &c., there can be little doubt that were they
endowed with the fore-paw of the gorilla, which is so much superior
to the human foot as a prehensile instrument, there are few
important mechanical arts from which such persons would be
precluded.

6io REPLY TO MR. W . H. MALLOCK'S CRITICISM.

minds through absence of introspection and language, and
(3) then infer, not from the absence of concepts or judgments,
which are unobservable, but from the absence of certain
modes of action and of language in which intellect, were it
present, would inevitably manifest itself, that this faculty is
absent. For this purpose it is not necessary " to know with
complete precision " the positive qualities of the mental life
of animals. I then confirm this proof with two additional
arguments ex coiicessis, based on the admissions of opponents.
The reader will thus see what little ground there is for the
charge of self-contradiction, and from these examples of his
methods he will be able, to appreciate at its just value
Mr. Mallock's general criticism.

INDEX.

Abstract Concepts. See Con-
cept.

Abstraction, and attention 232,
233, 236, 250; intuitive 294;
comparative 299 ; scholastic
theory of 305, 313 ; meanings of

307.
Accident. See Substance.

Active, powers 34, 208 ; touch

74 — 78 ; intellect 308.
Actus elicitus 217; humanus 395.
.Esthetic emotions 435 — 440.
Agnosticism, Spencer on 122 ;

outcome of monism 524.
Altruism 280, 430.
Analysis of sensation 48 ; and

synthesis 298; of judgment 315

— 318 ; of ratiocination 320 seq.
Analytic judgments 266, 289.
Anger and Fear 429, 430.
Animals, psychology of 14, 15;

579 seq. ; its difficulties 580 ;

sentient 582 ; irrational 583 seq. ;

instinct of 586 seq. ; souls of

593-
Antinomies, Kant's 267.

Apperception, Leibnitz on 263 ;
transcendental unity of 266 ;
historical sketch 358 ; nature of
359, 360 ; and perception 359 ;
and education 360.

Appetency, faculties of 29 ; sen-
suous 208 — 220 ; and movement
210; rational 378 seq. j and
emotion 426, 428.

Appetitus ; elicitus et natural is
208 ; irascibilis 209, 426.

A Priori Forms, Kant's 117 seq.,
267 ; Spencer on 286.

Assent and consent 318, 319.

Assistance, theory of 258, 553.

Association, mental and idealism
IXC — 114; and perception 125
seq.; and memory 180 seq.;
laws of 181 seq. ; reduction of
laws 184 seq. ; physiological
counterpart 188 ; cooperative
and obstructive 189 ; secondary
laws 190 ; history of doctrine
201 seq.; indissoluble 204 ; and
the beautiful 437.

Association ism, school of 230;
and necessary truth 282 — 286 ;
and conscience 337 — 340.

Attention, motor force of 219;
supra-sensuous 232, 233 ; Balmez
and Lotze on 243 — 247 ; and
abstraction 297, 298 ; special
treatment of 345 seq. ; expectant
219, 350; and volition 346, 406;
and genius 351.

Auditory Perception 145, 146.

Automata, conscious 503, 582.

Automatic movement 218.

Axioms, cf. Necessary truths.

Beauty, cognition of i66, 435 —

438.
Being, idea of, Rosmini on 264 ;

origin of 296, 297.

INDEX.

Belief, history of views on 326—
328 ; nature of 328 ; and know-
ledge 329, 330 ; causes and
reasonsof 331— 334; effects 335.

Berkeleyan theory of vision 108.

Binocular vision 142 — 144.

Body, perception of my own 104,
105, 127 — 132; idealist theory
of no — 113; primary qualities
of 152 seq.; dependence of mind'
on 499 seq. ; union with soul

553 seq.
Brain, structure of 44, 45 ;

development of 150—152 ;

relation to thought 241, 468 —

470, 496 — 502 ; functions of

564—572.
Bridgman, case of Laura 135.

Categories, Kantian 267, 268,

Causes, Aristotle's four 555. j

Causality, Hume on no ; Kant |
119, 120; principle of 291;
notion of 368 — 370 ; and free-
will, principle of 419.

Character 391—393.

Chemistry, Mental 204.

Child, growth of knowledge of its
own body 131, 132; of other
objects 133, of other minds 134,
of distance 141 ; growth of its
brain 150, 151 ; periods of
development 151, 152 ; its
memory 200 ; power of move-
ment 212 — 217 ; its intellect
297 — 302; acquisition of language
303 ; powers of attention 354 ;
consciousness of self 361 seq. ;
cognition of time 373 seq. ; self-
control 387.

Choice, deliberate 382; and free-
will 409—411.

Co-action, physical 395.

Ccenesthesis 63, 69, 71.

CoGiio, ergo sum, Descartes'
starting-point 257, 258.

Cognition. See Knowledge.

Colour, sensations of 84, 85 ;
blindness 173.

Common sensibility 69 ; sense 96 ;
sensibiles 153 seq.

Comparative Psychology 15, 579
seq. ; abstraction 298.

Comparison, supra-sensuous 233,
242 — 246 ; and discrimination
298, 299 ; and judgment 315.

Conation, 30, 384. See Appe-
tency.

Concepts, nature of abstract and
universal 235—238, 240 ; con-
troversy on 248 — 251 ; Bain,
Sully, and Stout on 272—278 ;
formation of 292 seq. ; Aquinas
on 304 — 313 ; direct and reflex
universal 294, 295, 310; and
spirituality of soul 467, 471, 472.

Conceptualism 248. See Con-
cepts.

Conscience, scholastic view of
335 ; modern theories of 336 —
344 ; authority and genesis of
339, 340 ; a spring of action 342 ;^
sentiments of 440, 441.

Consciousness and Psychology
II, 26 ; latent 355 ; grades of-
361 ; development of 362 ;
unity of 240, 366 ; discontinuity
of 366 ; duality of 106, 466 ;
double 9, 487—492 ; and free-
will 406—413.

Consent and Assent 318, 319;

and free-will 409 — 412.
Conservation of energy 42 1 , 5 1 7.
Contact, sense of 71 seq. ; double

131-

Contiguity, association by 183,

186, 187, 188.
Continuity of pleasure 223, 225;

attention 348 ; of consciousness

366.
Contrast, association by 181,

184; feelings of 224, 225, 432,

433, 436.
Corresponding points of retina

142.
Cosmology, and Metaphj'sics 3 ;

and Psychology 6.
Creation of soul 573 seq.; Ladd

on 576.
Criticism, Kant's theory of 265

seq.
Curiosity 433, 434.

INDEX.

Ill

Darwinism. Cf. Evolution,
Decision 382, 409—411.
Deductive method in psychology

5, 18, 461 ; reasoning 321, 322.
Deliberate action 381, 395, 408.
Delusion and illusion 171.
Desire and belief 172, 333 ;

analyzed 378; and pleasure 379;

Aquinas on 380 ; volition and

intention 384 ; and free-will 41 7.

seq.

and

Determinism 394
fatalism 397, 398.

Development, of external per-
ception 125 seq. ; cerebral and
mental 150 — 152; of power of
movement 212 — 217 ; of thought
and conception 295 seq. ; of self-
consciousness 361 seq. ; of cog-
nition of time 373 seq.; of self-
control 385 — 392 ; of language
456 seq.

Discipline, moral 390, 391.

Discrimination 232, 272, 273,

298, 315-

Distance, perception of 139 seq.

Dogmatism and criticism 266.

Double contact 131 ; conscious-
ness 487 — 492 ; aspect theory
492, 505 seq. See Monism.

Doubt, Cartesian 257, 258.

Dreams, nature of 176 — 178.

Dualism, epistemological 102
seq. ; psychological 553.

Education of senses 125 seq. ;
of memory 200 ; of locomotive
faculty 212 — 217; of attention
354 ; and apperception 360 ; of
will 385 seq. ; and rivalry 434.

Ego and Mind i, 2, 104 seq.;
cognition of 361 seq. ; false
theories of 474 seq. ; mutations
of 487 seq. See also Self and
Mind.

Emotions 221, 425 seq. ; various
427 seq. ; genesis and nature of
443 ; Aquinas on 444 ; classifi-
cation of 446 ; expression of 449
seq.

Empirical Psychology 3—5,
I9> 26, 394, 460. See Experi-
mental.

Empiricism 230, 254, 270, 475.

Energy, conservation of 421, 512

—524-

Entelechy 560, 561.

Epistemolo(;y 98, 271, 368.

Essence, abstraction of 302, 305,
307, 312 ; and Substance 559.

Ethics and Psychology 8 ; and
genesis of conscience 337 seq. ;
and free-will 399 seq. ; and im-
mortality 529 seq.

Evolution, and intuitive necessary
truths 286 ; and conscience 340,
341 ; and expression of emotions
450 — 454 ; and efficiency of
mind 513, 514; and origin of
soul 578 ; and origin of instinct
588 seq.

Expectation, 219, 350, 376, 2,77-

Experimental Psychology 17, 54

—61, 137—139-
Expression of emotions 449 seq.
Extension, tactual ^2) 5 visual

87 ; immediate perception of

106 ; abstract idea of 371 ;

virtual of the soul 469.
External world, reality of 99

seq.; perception of loi seq.

Faculties, defined 28, 36; classi-
fication of 28 seq. ; attacks on
36 — 39 ; mutual relations of 39,
40; intellectual 229 seq.

Fallacy and illusion 171.

Fancy 170.

Fatalism and determinism 397,

398.

Feeling, defined 221 ; faculty of
221, 226, 442, 443 ; Aristotle's
theory 222 seq. ; modern theories
226 seq. ; nature of 40, 41, 226,
227 ; and emotion 425 seq. ;
genesis and nature of 443 — 446.

Form, Kantian 117 seq., 263 —
270; and matter 555—558-

Formal Object 64, 96, 241, 305

INDEX,

Free-will 394 seq. ; and Psycho-
logy 394 ; defined 395 ; proof
ethical 398 ; psychological 406 ;
metaphysical 413 ; objections
against 416 seq.

Function and faculty 28, 29, 314,
320 ; of the brain 565.

Fundamental sense 94, 95.

General notion. See Concept.

Generalization 294, 295, 299.

Generationism 572.

Generic images 237; Sully, Stout,
and Peillaube on 276 — 278.

Genesis and validity of cognition
98 seq. ; of belief 283 ; of moral
judgments 339, 340 ; of con-
ceptions 367.

Genetic method 14.

Habit 183, 188, 190, 388 seq.

Hallucination 171 — 179.

Hearing, sense of 80 — 83 ; per-
ceptions by 145.

Hedonistic Paradox 380.

Heuristic method 256.

Hypnotism, history of 594 ;
induction of 595 ; nature of 595
seq. ; theories of 598 ; pheno-
mena 599 seq. ; ethics of 601.

Hypothetical Realism 102 seq.

Ideas, Hume's view of no ; and
impressions 163 ; association of
181 seq. ; motor force of 218,
219 ; universal 235 — 238 ; con-
troversy about 247 seq. ; origin
of 252 seq. ; theory of innate
253, 257, 265; adventitious 257.
See Concepts.

Idealism, theory of 99, 108 seq. ;
and physical science 113, II4;
and other minds 100, ill, 1 16;
various meanings of 263 ; German
270; and materialism 114, 271 ;
monistic 494.

Idealization 166, 167.

Identity, recognition of 195, 238,

240 ; consciousness of 362 — 366 ;
mind's 464 seq.; Hume, Mill,
and James on 475 seq. ; ruptures
of 487 seq.

Identity-hypothesis 515.

Illative faculty 332.

Illusions 171— 179.

Images, Aquinas on 86 ; and im-
pressions 163 ; and concept 273
— 276 ; generic 237, 276 — 278.

Imagination, sensuous 92, 164
seq. ; productive 165 ; aesthetic
166; scientific 167; and illusions
171 seq.

Imitation 214, 456.

Immortality 525 seq. ; and
Theism 525 ; teleological proof
of 526 ; ethical 529 ; universal
belief in 533 ; ontological proof
533 ; objections to 537 seq.

Impulsive action 211 seq., 381,

384-
Innate ideas 253, 255—257, 265;

intuitions 282, 283.
Inconceivability of opposite as

test of truth 283—288.
Indissoluble association 283,329.
Inductive method in Psychology

5, 6, II seq., 460; reasoning

321, 322.
Inertia, Law of 517, 523.
Inference, unconscious 28, 107,

127 ; analysed 320 — 324.
Infinite, idea of 370, 371.
Inseparable association 283, 329.
Instinct 213 seq. ; and voluntary

action 214, 216, 384; moral 337;

expressive 449 seq. ; animal 586;

origin of 588 seq.
Intellect and sense-perception

126; supra-sensuous 229 seq.,

467 ; functions of 292 seq., 314.
Intellectus agens 303 seq. ;

possibilis 308.
Intention and motive 384, 385.
Intentionalis 30, 52.
Interest 353, 354.
Internal senses 32, 93—96.
Introspection, method of 11

seq. ; difficulties of 20 seq. ;

how improved 25.

Index.

Intuition, intellectual of neces-
sary truth 289—291 ; moral

Judgment, supra-sensuous 233 —
235, 243 ; synthetic a priori 266 ;
defined 314 ; analysis of 315 —
318 ; moral t,z7.

Knowledge of mental states 11
seq. ; faculties of 29 seq. ; schol-
astic view of 51 seq., 304 seq. ;
genesis and validity of 98, 324,
325> 339» 367 ; of other minds
no, III, 116, 133, 514; of
extension loi seq., 137 ; of
animal minds 580; relativity
of 157 — 161 ; theories of general
255 seq. ; and belief 329, 330 ;
of self 361 seq.; of the soul's
nature 459 seq.

Language and Psychology 13, 14;
and thought 302, 303 ; and free-
will 405, 406 ; origin of 454 —
458 ; cerebral seat of 567, 568 ;
peculiar to man 585.

Laughter 439, 440, 445.

Liberty, physical and moral 395.

Life, future 525 seq. ; origin of
547; definitions of 551, 552.
See Soul.

Local character of sensations 73 ;
signs 130, 131, 136.

Localization of sensations 128
seq. ; of brain functions 565 seq.

Locomotive faculty 211 seq., 220.

Locus of the soul 562 seq.

Logic and Psychology 7 ; of cogni-
tions 325, 326 ; of practical life

324, 325-
Ludicrous 439, 440, 445.

Materia Prima 556.
Material World. See Idealism.
Materialism 230, 495 seq. ; and
Idealism 114, 271.

Mathematical conceptions 250,
251. ^■(ft' Necessary truths.

Matter and form 555 — 558,
560.

Measurement of sensation 54
seq.

Memory 179 seq.; defined 179;
and reproduction 180; and recol-
lection 181 ; and association 182
seq. ; and retention 191 ; and
recognition 195 ; intellectual
197 — 199 ; training of 200 ; and
abiding identity 464 — 466.

Mental states, simplicity of 47,
48, 80, 510, 511.

Merit and free-will 401, 402.

Metaphysics and Psychology 3,
394, 460 ; and perception 98 ;
and conservation of energy 520.
See Philosophy.

Metempsychosis 573.

Method of Psychology 13 seq.,
460.

Mind, defined i, 2; difticulties of
studying 19 seq. ; and its faculties
36 ; a real unity 39, 464 — 467 ;
Idealism and other minds 100,
III, 116, 133, 514; distin-
guished from Ego I, 2, 104,
558 ; unconscious modifications
of 355—357 ; cognition of 361
seq. ; identity of 464 seq. ; real
efficiency of 513 — 515. See also
Soul.

\llND-STUFF 506, 510, 511.

Minima visibilia 355, 356.

Monads, Leibnitz's 262.

Monism, Spinoza's pantheistic 260,
262 ; various forms of 493 seq. ;
idealistic 494 ; materialistic 495
seq ; the double-aspect or
identity-hypothesis 505 seq., 509
— 516; Ilofifding's and conser-
vation of energy 517 — 523 ; and
agnosticism 524.

Moral faculty 334 seq. ; sense
336 ; intuition and instinct 337 ;
sentiments 337, 342, 440 ; obli-
gation and free-will 398 seq.,

405-
Motive 380; and intention 384.

INDEX.

Movement, sense of 75 — 77 ;
faculty of analyzed 210 ; auto-
matic, reflex, impulsive 211,
212, 218 ; development of
voluntary 212 seq. ; random and
instinctive 213 ; voluntary 216 ;
classified 218 ; ideomotor 218.

Muscular sense 49, 74 — 78.

Names and conception 302, 455.
Nativistic theory of perception

130, 135-
Natural selection 588. See

Evolution.
Nature 393, 558, 559.
Necessary truths, Kant's view

119, 266 — 269, 282 ; associationist

282 — 286 ; evolutionist 2S6 —

289; intuitionalist 289—291.
Nervous system described 44 —

46.
New Spinozism 261, 505. See

Monism.
Nominalism 248, 272 — 278.
Non-Ego 104 — 107.
NoUMFNA, Kant's view 117 seq.,

266—277 ; knowledge of 158,

280.

Object, objective, subjective i,

13 seq.
Obligation, consciousness of 336

seq., 440 ; and free-will 398, 399.
Obliviscence 206.
Occasionalism 258, 259, 553,

554-
Ontology 3, 5 ; ontological proof

of immortality 533 seq. ; onto-

logism 258—260.

Optimism 263.

Orectic or conative. See Appe-
tency.

Organic sensations 69 seq., 78.

Organicism, physico - chemical
548.

Pantheism 485, 486. See also

Monism.
Passion 221, 425, 426, 444.

Pathology, mental 16, 17, 487
seq.; cerebral 566.

Perception and sensation 49 ; by
species 51 ; validity of 98, 102 ;
nature of loi seq. ; immediate
and mediate 102 ; theories of
108 seq.; development of 125
seq.; tactual 127 seq.; visual
135 seq.; auditory 145; gusta-
tory and olfactory 146 ; and
instinctive belief 149 ; and imagi-
nation 163 ; intellectual 231 seq.;
of relations 244 seq., 272 seq.;
intuitive of necessary truths 289.

Peripatetic. See Scholastic.

Person 104, 558, 559.

Personality, double 487—492.
See Person.

Phantasm 163, 236—238, 274-
277, 306 seq.

Phenomena. See Noumena.

Philology and Psychology. See
Language.

Philosophy, meaning of 3 seq. ;
and science 9 ; and psychology
of perception 98 seq. , 1 10 seq. ;
of free-will 394 seq. ; of the
mind 460 seq. ^SV^ Metaphysics.

Phrenology 564 seq.

Physiology 9, 15, 43, 150, 188,

193. 365. 420, 465, 496 seq.,

541, 547-
Plastic medium theory 554.

Play-impulse 212, 215. -

Pity, analysis of 430—432.

Pleasure-pain of sensations 78,

82 — 88 ; Aristotle's doctrine 222

stq. ; other theories 226 see]. ;

and attention 353 ; and desire

379-
Positivism 279—281.

Power, Mental. See Faculty.

Pre-established Harmony 262

—264, 554.

Primary qualities of matter 152

—157.
Psychology, defined i ; scope 2
seq., 460; its relation to philo-
sophy 3 seq., 98 seq., 394, 460 ;
to logic 7, 325 ; ethics 8, 338
seq., 398 seq., 529 seq. ; physio-

INDEX.

logy 9, 43 seq. ; method and
sources of 1 1 seq., 460; com-
parative and animal 15, 579 seq.;
experimental 17, 54 — 62; attacks
on 19 seq. ; Kant's 267 — 269 ;
rational 5, 6, 18, 459 seq. ;
importance of 3, 4, 460.
PsYCHOMETRY and psychophysics

17, 18, 48, 54—62.
Psychophysical - parallelism,
, of Leibnitz 264, 554; of Monists
505 seq., 515 ; of ulti'a-dualists

553, 554-
Practical reason. See Conscience.

Purpose 385.

Quality of sensation 46, 58, 78,

80, 82.
Quantity of sensation 48, 54 seq.

Rational or spiritual activity, 30,
31, 229 seq.

Reaction-time, 59 — 62.

Realism, theories concerning
material world 100 seq.; trans-
figured 122; concerning universal
ideas 247 seq., 255.

Reason, meaning of 230 ; Kant
on 230, 267 ; moral 334 seq.

Reasoning 320 seq.

Recollection or reminiscence
179, 197.

Recognition 195, 464 seq.

Reflex action 46, 211, 218, 389,
589.

Reflexion, intellectual 238, 361
seq.

Relativity of sensation 90 — 92 ;
of knowledge 92, 157 seq., 280;
law of 90, 274, 275.

Reminiscence 179. See Recol-
lection.

Remorse 400, 401, 428, 441.

Representation. See Ideas.

Reproductive imagination 165 ;
faculty 180.

Responsibility 402 — 404, 441.

Retention and recollection 179;
theories of 192 seq. ; relation to
attention 352 ; and identity of
mind 464 seq. ; and James'
theory 480 seq.

Rivalry, feelings of 434, 435.

Scepticism 99 seq.

Scholastic doctrine on, division
of faculties 33, 34 ; perception
by species 51 — 54 ; relativity of
sensation 91, of knowledge 160 ;
internal senses 92 — 95 ; primary
and secondary qualities of matter
153 ; imagination 164 ; remini-
scence 180; retention 192;
sensuous and intellectual memory
198, 199 ; mental association
201 — 203 ; appetency 208, 395 ;
universal ideas 248 — 250; neces-
sary truth 289 — 291 ; intellectual
abstraction 305 — 313 ; judgment
316 ; conscience 335; knowledge
of the soul 364, 365 ; time 347 ;'
emotion .426 ; substance 462 ;
incorruptibility of soul 533 — 537 ;
definition of life 551 ; union of
body and soul as matter and
form 555 — 557 ; origin of soul
576 ; on instinct 587 ; animal
souls 593. See also Aquinas in
Index of Authors.

Self and Mind i, 2, 104, 51^;
cognition of 362 seq., 47"4 seq.,
558 ; -abstract concept of 365 ;
control of 355* seq. ; disruption
and mutcUinns . of 487 seq. ;
emotions respecting ^ 427 seq.
See also Mind.

Self-consciousness 27, 238, 239,
473 ; development of 361 seq.

Self-conservation 212, 215,
227, 450.

Sensation, indefinable 42 ; pro-
cess of 43 ; quality and quantity
46 ; objective analysis of 47, 86;
and perception 49, 50 ; measure-
ment of 54 seq. ; various kinds
of 63 seq.; subjective 172;
Balmez on 242 seq.; and atten-
tion 345.

Vlll

INDEX.

Sense, external and internal 32 ;
described 42 ; classification of 63,
64 ; muscular 63, 75 ; taste 65 ;
smell 67 ; touch 68 ; temperature
70; contact 71; sight 83;
comparison of various 99 ; inter-
nal 92 ; common 93, 96.

Sensibility, absolute 56; common
69 ; discriminative "JT,, 77.

vSentiment, defined 221 ; moral
336, 441. See Emotion.

Sensus, internus 92, 95 ; com-
munis 93 ; fundamentalis 94 ;
intimus 95.

Sight, sense of 83— 87, 88; growth
of perception by 135 — 142;
binocular 142.

Similarity, association by 180
seq.

Simplicity of conscious states 48,
86, 510 — 512; of soul 466 — 469.

Smell 67, 68, 146, 147.

Soul, defined i, 461 ; more fully
484 ; by Aristotle 560 ; know-
ledge of 364, 365 ; substantiality
of 461 ; identity 464 ; simpli-
city 466 ; immateriality 469 ;
James's attack on 481 ; immor-
tality 525 ; incorruptibility 534 ;
individuality 544 ; unicity 545 ;
vegetative 546 ; union with body
553; "form" of the living being
556 ; locus of 562 ; origin of
572 ; evolutionist view on 578 ;
of animals 593. Ste also Mind.

Space, immediate perception of
surface 74, 87, 105 seq., iioseq.,
136 — 140 ; real 120, 269 ;
abstract concept of 371.

Species 51 — 54; 308 seq.

Spirit and Mind i, 2.

Spiritual faculties 30, 31, 229
seq. ; soul 469 — 473.

Spontaneous action 381, 395.

Striving faculties 30, 208, 384.

Suii-coNSCious modifications 27,

355—357-
SuHjKcriVE, meaning of i ; method

II, 12; sensation 172; "aspect"

260 seq.

UBLIMK, the 438, 439.

Substance, Hume on no; Kant
on 267, 269 ; genesis of notion
299, 368; validity 4.62 seq.; com-
plete and incomplete 558 ; and
essence 559.

Suggestion 181. ^'tv Association.

Suppositum 558, 559.

Sympathy analyzed 430 — 432.

SynDv^resis 335.

Synthesis, in judgment 316; in
reasoning 320.

Synthetic, a priori judgments
266, 281, 282.

Tabula rasa, mind a 271, 306.

Tact 323 ; nature of 332.

Taste 65, 66.

Teleological, idealism 263 ;
proof of immortality 526 seq.

Temperament 393.

Temperature, sense of 70.

Things- in -THEMSELVES. See
Noumena.

Thought, supra-sensuous 231
seq., 470; development of 292
seq.; and language 302; judicial
314 ; ratiocinative 320 ; logic
and psychology of 325.

Time, Kant on 117, 121 ; cogni-
tion of 372 seq. ; Aquinas on

372, 374-

Touch, sense of 68 seq. ; develop-
ment of 127 seq.; and sight 141.

Threshold of consciousness 56.

Traducianism 573.

Transcendental, unity of apper-
ception 266 ; truths 291.

Transfigured Realism 122—
124.

Unconscioiis mental processes

27, 355 ; Leibnitz on 263.
Understanding 23 seq.; Kant

on 267.
Unity ok Consciousness 240

366, 382, 468 ; and duality of

466 ; double 487 — 492.

INDEX.

Uniformity of nature 376, 423.
Universal ideas. St'e Concepts.
Utilitarianism 338.

Validity and genesis of cognition

98, 257 ; of beliefs 283, 286 ;

of conscience 338 — 341,
Vegeta'itve faculties 33, 357 ;

soul 546 seq., 556, 576.
Verbum mentale 310.
Vis, osstimativa and cogitativa 93

seq., 569, 587.
Vision, en Dieii 258. See Sight.
Vital sense 69 ; principle 546.
Vitalism 518, 545-552.

Volition, and attention 346 ; and
desire 384. See Will.

Voluntary movement 210 seq.,
217 ; belief 333, 334 ; attention
347, 406—408 ; action 395.

Will and cognition 39, 40 ; and
belief 327, 333 ; and conception
of causality 369 ; volition and
desire 384, 417 ;
382 ; freedom of
spirituality of 473.
Wit and Humour 170, 171
Wonder, emotion of 433.

fiat of 219,
394 «eq. ;

INDEX.

AUTHORS CITED OR REFERRED TO.

Abelard, 248.

Alexander, S. 404, 407, 413.

Aquinas, St. Thomas, on classi-
fication of faculties 29, 33, 34,
41 ; species 52 — 54 ; mediate
perception 52 ; touch 68 ; after-
images 86 ; relativity of sensa-
tion 91 ; cognition of individuals
94 ; sensihilia covunnnia or
primary qualities 153 seq. ; rela-
tivity of knowledge 159; images
and illusions 164; dreams 177;
reminiscence 180; organic
memory 192 ; intellectual

memory 198 ; rules for memory
200 ; mental association 201 —
203 ; pleasure 224, 225 ; sense
and intellect 235 ; moderate
realism 249 ; and G. H . Lewes
250 ; necessary truth 289 ; com-
pared with W. James 294 ;
intellectual abstraction 312, 313;
with Mill and Ueberweg 314 —
316 ; on volition and cognition
318, 319 ; moral reason 335 ;
our knowledge of the soul 364 —
366 ; time 372 — 374 ; attention
to a single object 349 ; desire
of pleasure 380, 381 ; and James
on nature of emotion 444; depen-
dence of mind on body 500 ;
teleological proof of immortality
539 ; localization of brain
function 569 ; embryonic evolu-
tion 575> 576 ; instinct 587.
Sec also Scholastic in General
Index.

Aristotle 18, 31, 33, 51, 68, 71,
93, 102, 153, 179, 201, 222—
226, 249, 393.

Augustine, St. 38, 187, 192.

341,
168,

Bain, Alexander 41, 63, 77, 91,

JIG— 115, 147, 205, 212, 227,
272—275, 282, 283, 327,

41 5' 432, 449, 499, So?-
Baldwin, F. Mark 48, 130,

169, 196.
Balfour, Arthur 124, 281,

340, 341-
Balmez, James 90, 242 — 245.
Bastian, H. C. 76, 565.
Bell, Sir C. 449.
Berkeley, 108, 109, 154, 236.
Bernstein 67.
BiNET, A. 487, 488.
Biunde 185.
Boedder, B. 200, 201, 261, 309,

310, 311, 574.
Broca 565.
Brown, Thomas 37, 447.

BiJCHNER 497, 498, 540.

Butler, Bishop 343.

Calderwood 197.

Carpenter, W. B. 135, 144, 172,

177. 178, 387, 389-
Cheselden 138.
Clarke, R. F. 8, 256, 342.
Clifford, W. K. 506, 507.
Coconnter 218, 302, 470, 549.
CoMTE, A. 21, 279—281.
condillac 242, 243.
Couailhac, M. 522, 523.
Courtney, W. L. 477.
cudworth 342.

D'Alemrert 137.
Darwin, C. 450—452,

seq.
Democritus 51,

57S, 58S

INDEX.

Descartes ioi, io8, 154, 227,

256-258.
Dewey, J. 4, 210.

Fechner 56 — 59.

Ferrier, James 363.

Ferrier, David 566, 577.

FicHTF, 270.

Flechsig, p. 566, 569, 570.

Flourens 565.

fonsegrive, g. l. 402, 409, 521.

Foster, M. 568.

Franz, Dr. 138.

Galen, 393.
Gall, 564, 565.
Gerard, J. 591, 592.
Geulincx 258.
Goldscheider 64.

GOLTZ 571.

Grant Allen 227.
Green, T. H. 234.
Guthrie, M. 516.
Gutberlet, C. 36, 129, 199,
502, 535, 536.

h aldan e, j. 518, 550.

Hamilton, Sir William 5, 26,

34, 35, 41, 50, Si, 63, 102, 103,

108, 155—157, 167, 187, 193,

439-
Herbart 36, 358.

Herbert, T. H. 510.

Hering 58.

Hagemann, George 304.

Harper, T. 555—576.

Hartley 203, 337'

Helmhol'iz 80, 85.

Hobbes, 91, 203, 430, 431, 439.

Hodgson, Shadworth 503, 505,

524.
Hoffding 4, 5, 186, 187, 425,

517-524-
Hume iio, 154, 203, 238, 282,

326, 336, 343, 475, 476.
Hutcheson 336.
Huxley 497.

Janet, Paul 496, 501.
Janet, Pierre 356, 487, 491.

James, William 150, 151, 283,
290, 297, 401, 408, 443, 444,
476—486, 491, 492, 512.

Jevons, S. 20.

jouffroy 363.

Jungmann 29, 37, 435, 442, 443.

Kant 34, 63, 96, 117 seq., 157—
159, 227, 231, 265—270, 282,

342—35^, 370, 474, 475-
Knkjht 477.
Kleutgen 281, 534.

Ladd, G. T. 5, 37, 58, 217, 421,

471, 472, 498, 501, 576.
Lange 358.
Lecky 341, 342.
Leibnitz 262 — 264, 358.
Lewes, G. H. 29, 63, 117, 250,

251, 417.
Locke 20, 96, 108, 109, 115, 154,

203, 270 — 272.
LoTZE 131, 136, 217, 240, 245—

247, 446, 463, 464, 466, 468,

511, 576.
Lucas, Herbert 420.

Olle-laprune 319, 320, 331.

Maas 185.

Mahaffy, J. p. 121, 137, 267.

Malebranche 258 — 260.

Mansel 422.

Marion, H. 384.

Margerie, a. 465.

Martineau, J. 102, 158, 215, 339,

343, 396, 411-
Maudsley, H. 21 — 24, 195, 405,

416.
Max MiJLLER 14, 142, 303, 456,

457.

M'COSH i02, 163, 291.

Mendive, p. j. 304, 309.
Mercier, D. 301, 302, 311.
Mill, John Stuart 22, 110—
115, 205, 206, 282 — 286, 379,
398, 476.
Murray, T. Clarke 63, 64.
1 Myers, F. 351.

y^.

f »♦ »-«- '

Xll

INDEX.

Noel Leon 399, 407.
Newman J. H. 324,

441, 543-

329,

Pascal 324.

Payot, Jules 387, 389, 390.

Peillaube 277, 302.

PlAT, C. 295, 296, 304, 412, 527,

529.

Plato 247, 255.

Porter, Noah 103, 137, 149, 163.

Preyer, W. 138, 151, 362.

Regnon, T. 291, 385.
Reid 20, 34, 49, 50, 102.
RiBOT, T. 36, 58, 194, 489.
RicHTER, Jean Paul 363.
RiCKABY, John 26, 251, 263, 268,

313. 33O' 462, 463- 554-
RiCKABY, Joseph 344.
Roscellinus 248.
RosMiNi 94, 95, 264, 265.
Ruskin, J. 437, 438.

Salts Sewis 71.

schleiermacher 36, 38.

Scripture, E. 6o.

SiDowicK, Henry 339, 343, 396,
405, 410, 413, 531.

Smith, Adam 336.

Spalding 139.

Spencer, Herbert 35, 48, 116,
122—124, 155, 157, 186, 227,
286—289, 296, 418, 419, 424,
448, 449, 452—454, 496, 498,
508, 509.

Spinoza 226, 260, 412.
Stewart, Balfour 521, 547.
Stewart, Dugald 20, 34, 102,

574-
Stockl 71.

Stout, G. F. 37, 248, 278, 346,

347, 349, 359, 3^6, 416.
Suarez 93, 95, 96, 199, 307.
Sully, James t,"/, 61, 62, 171,

177, 205, 275—278.
Surbled 502, 567.

Taine 36, 48.
Tetens 34,
Thackeray 386.
Thomas, St. Str Aquinas.
Tyndall 16, 496, 497, 510.

Ueberweg 120, 121, 316.

Venn, J. 422, 423.
Vives 203.

Von Bechterew 571.
Vorlander 36, 38.

Ward, James 91, 92, 151, 376.

Ward, Wilfrid 320.

Ward, William George 282,

285, 383.
Weber 54 — 59.

William of Champeaux 248.
Whitney 457.
Wundt 454, 601.
Wyld, R. S. 143.

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